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In the five case studies, we examine how Israel, as a collection of individuated interests given 
expression in the form a state, is in a dialectic of recognition with the Naqab Bedouin community. 
Recognition happens on a few registers. Palestinians from the Naqab seek recognition for their 
particular identity and lifeways. They seek legal recognition for their living spaces. And they seek 
these things from the Israeli state, the sovereign. But the struggle for recognition from the 
sovereign is fraught, particularly in settler colonial situations like this one, in part because it pivots 
around a particular identity for which autonomy or freedom is sought. Identities in law tend to be, 
after all, static, constrictive and generalizing.  
 
The five case studies concern a land ownership case, a crop-spraying case, the eviction of Bedouin 
from Umm al-Hieran, discriminatory land allocation in the Wine Path Plan case and the vaccinations 
case. Four of the five case studies concern land, which speaks to the centrality of land in the 
dialectic between Naqab Palestinian Bedouin citizens and the Israeli state. The dissertation is 
principally informed by the theoretical frameworks of critical race theory, postcolonial theory and 
feminist theory, but is at the same time theoretically and methodologially eclectic, and beyond just 
using theory to validate phenomena, this dissertation attempts to understand why phenomena 
come to be phenomena – whether it be ‘Bedouin’ as identity or the organized, legal struggle for 
recognition – what makes these phenomena identifiable, stable states of being?  
 
After aggregating the individual conclusions to the case studies, the dissertation finally posits the 
question, how might we imagine freedom for the Naqab Bedouin community given that their social 
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“We stopped being ‘Bedouin’ a long time ago”.   
 
These were the words spoken to me by a prominent human rights lawyer, Morad al-Sane’, when I 
first set out to conduct fieldwork in the Naqab and was asking about his tribal affiliation. My initial 
inquiry for the dissertation was to ask how law, in its entanglements with Palestinian Naqab 
‘Bedouin’ society, shapes, constructs and is the site of contestation for ideologies and identities.    
 
Morad’s words were jarring, and they haunted me for years. How could the subject of my inquiry, 
‘Bedouin’ from the Naqab, be said (by someone I had identified as the same) to not exist, or at least 
to no longer be relevant to the task I had assigned it? What did that mean for the assumptions, 
hypotheses and research that were built around the term, ‘Bedouin’? I will attempt at an initial 
deconstruction of the dilemma in this Introduction, and then in a more thoroughgoing way over the 
length of the dissertation’s six chapters.    
 
The reality in the Naqab could quite summarily be concluded as being a legal battle between 
Bedouin and the State over rights to land use, possession and ownership following the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. So, if we take our cue from most contemporary 
scholarship on the Naqab Bedouin, we could set the frame for our discussion around the fact that 
one hundred thousand Arab Bedouin live in some three dozen villages that are not recognized by 
the state (even though they existed prior to the establishment of the state in 1948) where they are 
denied basic amenities such as water, electricity, adequate educational and medical services. 
Another one hundred thousand live in development towns that are recognized by the state but are 
among the poorest recognized localities in all of the country. As the state seeks to assert its 
sovereignty over the land that it has colonized, it ought to displace the natives that existed there 
prior, hence the attempts to transfer and concentrate them from their unrecognized zones of 
habitation to the recognized ones.  
 
We could then cite the Planning and Building Law of 1965 as the legal basis for why homes are 
routinely demolished, particularly in the three dozen unrecognized villages, or look at more recent 
legal maneuvers in the Prawer Plan to regulate Bedouin settlement in the Naqab. We could look 
back to Ottoman and Mandatory legislation and case law to establish certain prescriptive or 
ownership rights in the present under Israeli law. We could also attempt to chiefly frame the 
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dilemma as one stemming from property law specifically informed by the logic of settler 
colonialism and draw analogies with other settler colonial societies like Australia and Canada. 
These evaluations, and solutions, would be the crux of the story to tell if a strictly jurisprudential 
analysis is adopted. However, as critical legal studies (CLS) scholar Roberto Unger clarifies for us, 
legal rules and principles do not appear out of nowhere, rather they are created in a specific 
historical context at a specific historical moment.1 For this reason, the specific contexts and 
arrangements that critical legal studies, feminist theory and critical race theory alert us to, are 
summoned in every legal case study I analyse.  
 
What this dissertation attempts 
What this dissertation attempts to do is go beyond the typical scholarship on the ‘Naqab Bedouin’ 
subject, which has largely been descriptive, stating the legal or political arguments as they appear, 
and mostly failing to show the subject’s intersections with, and enfolding within, other theoretical 
streams.2  
 
That said, in calling on other theoretical perspectives, this dissertation does not limit itself to 
describing the way law aligns or ‘makes’ citizen subjects of the Bedouin. And while it does “analyze 
how settler colonial legality appears when encountered from their lives”, 3 meaning it is as much 
about the subjects themselves – their lifeways and affective investments – as it is a commentary on 
the modalities of and the operational rationales for settler colonial law, it is not just about settler 
colonial law.  The dissertation does not simply posit that constellations of forces and moving power 
bases are at play in the settler colonial encounter, as (post)colonial theory would insist. Rather, 
what it attempts to do is look at how and why phenomena come to be phenomena – whether it be 
‘Bedouin’ as population category or identity, ‘vaccination compliance’ as practice and ideal, or the 
organized legal struggle for recognition by the Bedouin community – what makes these phenomena 
identifiable, stable states of being? 
 
Specifically, this dissertation looks at precarity, agency and performativity in the milieu of race, 
class, citizenship, security and health. Four of the five case studies concern land, which although 
                                                          
1 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1986) 
2 See Ahmad Amara, Ismael Abu-Saad, and Oren Yiftachel (eds.), Indigenous (In)Justice: Human Rights Law and 
Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013) 
3 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
2016) at 23. 
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may not be their primary preoccupation, are nevertheless informed by issues around land – its 
ownership, the agricultural use and possession of – and also the dispossession, destruction and 
eviction from land. The fact that the majority of the case studies are, to varying degrees, embedded 
in the scene of contestations over land, speaks to the centrality of land in the dialectic between 
Naqab Palestinian Bedouin citizens and the Israeli state.  
 
The five case studies open with vignettes of individuals embedded in a particular legal dilemma. 
They are not ethnographic explorations, per se, if only because they take a shorter form. The 
vignettes tease out perceptions, behaviours and affective investments in situations and events 
directly related to the particular case, and the constellation of situations that we can identify as 
making Bedouin lifeways.  
 
On Theory 
Clinton Bailey, a leading ethnographer on Bedouin culture in the Naqab and Sinai, writes that until 
the nineteenth century, Bedouin were as dependant on reading the stars for predicting the weather, 
travel, and animal husbandry, as their ancestors were several generations ago in the Arabian 
Peninsula.4 I would like to draw in this metaphor of star-gazing to illustrate for the reader how I 
recommend they approach the dissertation, specifically with regard to how the different theories, 
or constellations, coalesce as they lead up to the final, and concluding discussion on recognition, our 
Polaris (al-Jidi, in Arabic), or north star.   
 
The dissertation is methodologically eclectic. I take my cue from Duncan Kennedy’s own method in 
Critique of Adjudication5 in that I draw in different theories – chiefly critical race theory, 
postcolonial theory and feminist theory, and methods – such as technical legal analysis, 
jurisprudence and deconstruction – because no one theory or method can claim to represent the 
subject of my inquiry – Naqab Bedouin in Israeli law. All these theories and methods have been 
subject to critique and to claim that a theory or set of theories can accurately represent the subject 
would be false because it would conflate representation with ‘truth’. What I’ve chosen to do in star-
mapping this dissertation is to mull on particular theoretical streams when traversing a particular 
constellation. Therefore, I appropriate spatial theory in the chapter on the Wine Path Plan because 
                                                          
4 Clinton Bailey, “Bedouin Star-Lore in Sinai and the Negev” (1974) 37:3 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (University of London) 580-596 
5 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). 
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spatiality is at the crux of the legal discussion. Yet, spatial theory is ensconced in the chief theories 
that guide this dissertation – CRT, PCT and feminist theory. Similarly, digging deeper into the legal 
decision in the Abu Mdeghem crop-spraying case, we see that violence is not just what is 
represented as violence, but that which escapes representation as well, and this is where the 
phenomenon of structural violence becomes so relevant. Yet, the concept of structural violence 
furthers the discussion and reveals further sides to the main theoretical frames. It is hoped that in 
moving from one chapter to the next, the reader is able to understand deeper dimensions of what it 
means to be Bedouin in Israeli law, towards the concluding discussion on what it means to be 
‘recognized’ as the same. Each chapter, and its eclectic theories and methods, attempts to guide that 
journey.  
 
So, back to star-gazing. If Polaris is our north-star, the concluding chapter on recognition, then 
Canopus (Suhayl, in Arabic) comes to stand in for security, as that which orients the reader to the 
south, is always looming and attempting to hide like the spectre of security.6 Thurayya, or Pleiades, 
as a star that signifies what is to come,7 could be taken to represent ‘affect’, the circulation of 
emotions always implicit to a situation but not necessarily knowable or nameable. And just as when 
stars are juxtaposed to one another, when concepts or theories intersect, a different reading is 
possible than when stars or concepts/theories are read alone. So, for example, when Sirius hangs 
over Canopus, which happens in late February because they are on the same meridien, the Bedouin 
know that spring is about to rear its head.8 Similarly, how does security’s intersections with 
liberty/liberalism or equality tell us something more about security? If concepts or phenomena are 
stars, then theories can be the constellations, and both stars and constellations help us traverse the 
different chapters in our journey to Polaris, or a conclusion on recognition.  
 
Identity, Racialization and Constructs 
So what does ‘Bedouin’ mean, anyway? Why was the US-educated lawyer from Laqiya insistent in 
his refusal to carry the label in the way I had deployed it? 
                                                          
6 The saying is, “Filan zay nijm as-Suhayl-yitla' wiy'aiwid 'al-adh-dhayl”, meaning “So-and-so is like Canopus; rises 
and immediately returns on his tail”. Clinton Bailey, “Bedouin Star-Lore in Sinai and the Negev” (1974) 37:3 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) 580-596 at 583 
7 Wasm ath- Thurayya, ' the sign of the Pleiades ' or simply al-wasm ' the sign ', is reckoned to last for 75 days from 
the end of October and is a sign for the rains that fall in its duration, ibid. at 585 
8 Thus the Bedouin traditionally said: “Al-Burbarah, limma tasir li-Suhayl rishi 'Ishi wala hu 'ishi Awwal rabi' wi 
akhar ishti”, meaning “When Sirius hangs over Canopus like a bucket-rope At the very beginning of evening 'Tis the 
last of winter and the first of spring,”, ibid. at 586. 
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The word Bedouin has its origins in the word ‘badiah’, the Arabic word for desert, so that a ‘badawi’ 
(Arabic for ‘Bedouin’) was a desert dweller. ‘Bedouin’ also signifies a life that is ‘bidai’, meaning 
essential and basic, so that the lives Bedouin lived were marked by simplicity. The word Bedouin 
has also come to mean those who lived a nomadic/semi-nomadic lifestyle. As a result of these 
characterizations, Palestinians from the Naqab were identified, or themselves largely identified, as 
‘Bedouin’ prior to the first half of the 20th century.  
 
Since then, however, they have been fully sedentarized. The community no longer undertake 
seasonal migrations, while a significant portion live lives with modern amenities outside a typical 
desert environment. Accordingly, they live lives that traverse the boundaries of what it means to be 
‘Bedouin’. Nevertheless, the term is still deployed, both by those who self-identify as such, and by 
the Israeli authorities.  
 
The Israeli legal system consistently refers to the population as ‘Bedouin’. This ascription to a 
population of a racial category, its racialization, defines the contours of what this population is (and 
what it can be) in the law. Therefore, as the case studies reveal, in ascribing to the population that it 
is ‘Bedouin’, taken to mean essentially and naturally ‘nomadic’, the courts make the argument that 
the community does not have a tangible connection to the land that would give rise to certain rights 
to it.  
 
In the same vein, the court deliberations and decisions frequently mark the Bedouin as a 
community always in transition from the traditional to the modern. In defining the Bedouin as such, 
the courts simultaneously mark the Israeli state, and its legal and executive arms, as facilitating that 
transition to modernity, from the unplanned and unrecognized villages to recognized development 
towns.  
 
So, we can see how the naming of the community as ‘Bedouin’ facilitates the nation-building goals of 
freeing up the land and demographic reorganization in a settler colonial society. At the same time, 
the persistence of the term ‘Bedouin’ can also be attributed to its adoption by the community and 
the larger Palestinian population itself.  
 
The self-identification as Bedouin allows the community to ascribe uniqueness and value to their 
particular situation, which is different in many (but not all) ways from other Palestinian citizens of 
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Israel. It is also an identity that resonates with Orientalist conceptions of the Bedouin – the noble 
warrior, the chivalrous, the brave and the hospitable.  
 
As critical theorists have shown us, identity, like race and gender, is a social construct and an 
invention of modernity.9 As much as Palestinian identity in the earlier twentieth century was a 
product of anti-colonial convictions and pragmatic drives for autonomy10 so too Jewish, Israeli 
identity was constructed as a homogenizing identity around an essentially very heterogeneous 
polity.11  
 
Therefore, minority or indigenous population groups or gender non-normative identities are 
marginalized in majority, heteronormative populations. The former are excluded from certain 
goods and services and as a result also have slimmer life chances. This means that we cannot end 
the conversation at ‘gender/race/[fill in other non-normative identity] is a social construct’. Rather, 
we are called to deploy these alternative, non-normative, subaltern identities in a way that Gayatri 
Spivak has termed ‘strategic essentialism’. That is, we should act as if essentialism were true for 
political expediency and collective action.  
 
One particularly central way of collective organizing for the community has been around the theme 
of ‘recognition’.  
 
On recognition 
Palestinians from the Naqab seek recognition for their particular identity and lifeways. They seek 
legal recognition for their living spaces. And they seek these things from the Israeli state, the 
sovereign. But the struggle for recognition from the sovereign is fraught, particularly in a settler 
colonial situation. 
 
                                                          
9 David Theo Goldberg, “Introduction: Racial Subjects,” Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) at 3, Donald S. Moore, Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe 
(London and Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) at 12-15, Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest” in Stuart Hall 
and Bram Gieben (eds.), Formations of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1992) 275-320.  
10 Salim Tamari, Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and their Fate in the War (Jerusalem: Institute for 
Jerusalem Studies, 1999), David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections of Racial Neoliberalism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2009) at 106 [Goldberg, The Threat of Race] 
11 Goldberg, The Threat of Race, ibid. at 113  
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This dissertation explores the theme of recognition as it springs up in the five case studies and I 
explore the dilemmas associated with the dialectic in depth in the final chapter. Specifically, the 
discussion around recognition is grounded in Hegel’s treatment of the same, which speaks to 
identity, to conflict between competing identities and to the possibilities of mutual recognition. 
 
Briefly stated, then, Hegel’s dialectic of recognition conceptualises how in the process of 
recognition, a self-consciousness encounters another self-consciousness. In seeing the second self-
consciousness the first self-consciousness comes out of itself. Self-consciousness sees in the other 
its own self, it thereby supersedes the other, becomes equal to itself and subsequently becomes 
certain in its being for self. This being for self is the exclusion from itself of everything else, “it is not 
attached to any specific existence… it is not attached to life”.12  
 
The dialectic is a critique of social relations of domination and is undertaken in the name of 
equality, even though one could read ‘recognition’ as always coming too late, realized after the 
effects of domination and subjugation.13 
 
But the dialectic of recognition prompts anxiety when considering Naqab Bedouin. So, for example, 
Povinelli14 and Markell15 warn that when indigenous or multicultural communities seek recognition 
from the sovereign, they also bind themselves into being permanently spatially, temporally and 
metaphysically isolated within their racialized enclaves. Charles Taylor cautions that 
‘misrecognition’ can cause those subject to it to internalize a depreciatory view of themselves, 
chaining themselves with a crippling self-hatred that prevents them from taking advantage of new 
opportunities.16 Certainly, as human existence is always a becoming, it is unable to fit, with its 
doubts and irritations and moral conundrums, into the fixed legal forms and modern dialectics 
prescribed by ‘recognition’.  
 
                                                          
12 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, (trans. A.V. Miller) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) at 113 
[Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit].  
13 Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003) at 92-95 [Markell, 
Bound by Recognition] 
14 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian 
Multiculturalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002) [Povinelli, Cunning of Recognition] 
15 Markell, Bound by Recognition, supra note 13 
16 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994) at 25-26 
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This dissertation begins with Nuri al-‘Oqbi’s story. Nuri is a social justice activist who is seeking 
legal recognition for the ownership of family lands in al-‘Araqib and Zahaliqah. In seeking 
recognition for the same from the courts, he risks closing for good the final chapter in his life-long 
struggle to gain ‘recognition’ should he lose the case. On the flip side, however, he also has his 
whole life’s work to gain.  
 
This forces me to pose the question that Lauren Berlant asks in Cruel Optimism, “Why do people 
stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies—say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, 
political systems, institutions, markets, and at work—when the evidence of their instability, 
fragility, and dear cost abounds?”17 Similarly, why would the community continue to push for legal 
recognition from a settler colonial state, when all branches of government have repeatedly shown 
incapacity to really apprehend, make intelligible and recognize Bedouin lifeways?  
 
I, too, evolve 
The following chapters were researched and written over nine years. The fieldwork component, 
which was a core component of this dissertation, began in September 2010. It involved, among 
other things, Hebrew study for half a year, participant observation, interviews, and ethnographic 
research around six legal cases in the Naqab, even though in the end I chose to focus on only five. 
Each case involved meetings with at least six individual stakeholders in a case (among them Naqab 
Bedouin petitioners/respondents, local authorities, community leaders, lawyers, judges, 
government officials, students, academics and activists). In addition, I undertook extensive research 
at Ben Gurion University - the only institution where a lot of relevant literature on the Naqab 
Bedouin is located, and also co-created with a fellow doctoral student an online study group for 
students and professors in an attempt to breathe more theory into the research being conducted 
around Naqab Bedouin. My fieldwork also included conducting archival research at local archives, 
including the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) archives, the latter which I won’t forget too easily, if only 
because one of the guards at the archives remarked to a senior employee that my wife, who is 
Palestinian with Israeli citizenship, ought not to be there, because she was Palestinian. My wife had 
accompanied me to help with the identification and translation of documents into Hebrew. 
Contrary to the guard’s insistence, the IDF archives are open to all Israeli citizens, Palestinian or 
                                                          
17 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011) at 2. 
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otherwise, though in any case, the majority of the archival material remains classified and so not 
available to the public.18  
 
Over the length of the dissertation, I lived in the unrecognized Bedouin village of Khirbet al-Hura in 
Nuri’s home.  I acquired Israeli citizenship and also gave birth to a son, who, too, acquired Israeli 
citizenship. I worked on an Israeli organic farm at the moshav, Kfar Yehoshua, and I even instituted 
an online fundraising system for Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.19 My 
experience over the past decade reveals to me that research projects like this one are indeed chiefly 
about the individuals and the larger Naqab Bedouin community and the settler colonial legal 
system, but in a way not insignificant, at the same time are also a personal journey, where one’s 
situatedness in Israel/Palestine, entangles me in a network of competing ideas, situations, events, 
affects and identities, so that I too evolve as the dissertation itself does. Over the span of a decade, 
my orientation towards identity, exemplified in the question I posed to Morad about Bedouin tribal 
identity, had morphed into something else; something far more circumspect, and particularly in the 
context of social justice struggles where identity politics tend to be front and center.  
 
The five case studies 
Complexity theory holds that in order to understand reality, we should not work on general 
abstraction and attempt to fit that to explain complex social situations or individuals. Rather, we 
ought to look at the complexity of relations at the level of the individual and understand the 
relational networks that make individuals to have a fuller understanding of what is the subject.20 As 
the dissertation progresses, this is what I set out to do for each case study. 
 
Chapter 1 is about Nuri al-‘Oqbi and concerns his ownership claims over five strips of land in al-
‘Araqib and Zahiliqah. In 1948, the State took possession of the lands of Zahiliqah and in its place 
built Moshav Talmei Bilu for Israeli Jews. In 1956, the state expropriated the lands of al-‘Araqib 
under the relevant legal provisions. Nuri’s case is appropriate to launch this dissertation, because I 
would like to first sketch Bedouin lifeways, and his work as a social justice activist for all of his 
                                                          
18 Ofer Aderet, “The classified treasure Israel will never fully reveal” Ha’aretz (July 7, 2013), online: 
https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-the-treasure-israel-will-never-fully-reveal-1.5292067  
19 The latter, after all fieldwork research was completed and most of the dissertation, save the final chapter, was 
written up. 
20 For a helpful account of assemblage and complexity theory, see Nick Srnicek, Assemblage theory, complexity and 
contentious politics: The political ontology of Gilles Deleuze, Master's Thesis (unpublished) (London: University of 
Western Ontario, 2007) [Srnicek, Assmeblage Theory] 
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adult life is an appropriate lens through which to do that. Lifeways refer to ways of being and 
organizing in a native community that are both about tangible, recognizable practices as much as 
they are about affect, the somehow unknowable and undefinable circulation of emotions that makes 
the subject and binds subjects to each other. The chapter grapples with settler colonial legal rules of 
evidence, procedure and the court as a site of deliberation for competing native-state narratives, 
and what that means for the courts’ ability to apprehend and make intelligible Bedouin lifeways.  
 
The next chapter looks at a crop-spraying case in Bedouin unrecognized villages and dives deeper 
into the legal rules, those birthed in that moment of rupture in sovereignty around the years 1947-
1949, that influence the ability of the courts to make Bedouin testimony intelligible. Here we will 
unpack the concept of ‘structural violence’, as put forth by Galtung and Farmer,21 and given a 
contemporary interpretation in Murdocca’s exploration of the Kashechewan water crisis. Structural 
violence is systemic violence by those that belong to a certain social order directed at persons, 
preventing them from achieving their potential. However, being structural, the forms of violence 
are not recognizable as distinct events that rupture the ordinary flow of life; as a result, the violence 
is not often named, and those responsible are not always known. This chapter pursues the question, 
‘What does the phenomenon of structural violence mean for legal decisions that are received 
positively’? The court ruled to ban the method of aerial spraying of crops. But it did not address the 
larger phenomenon of dispossession of the Bedouin community from lands they laid historical 
claim to. At the tail-end of the chapter, I undertake a deconstructivist reading of the decision, 
inspired by the work of Derrida and Spivak, to imagine how the court could have reached a more 
far-reaching decision, possibly one more deserving of the label of ‘a positive decision’.  
 
The third chapter, focused as it is on land, like the chapters before it, is a ripe opening to explore 
‘spatial theory’, drawing on Henry Lefebvre and Doreen Massey. Here, I build on the identification 
of silences of human suffering (Nuri’s case) and structural violence (the crop-spraying case) in 
Israeli adjudication to explore how several other elements of ‘space’ – particularly the ‘social’ and 
lived aspects of it - are also silenced and the implications of such silencing for Naqab Bedouins’ 
interactions with it. This is a chapter that unpacks how forms of Bedouin agency materialize in Atir 
and Umm al-Hieran, the sister Bedouin villages threatened with destruction to make way for a 
                                                          
21 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, Peace Research” (1969) Journal of Peace Research 6(3): 167–91, Paul Farmer, 




Jewish community and a forest in their place. The findings also push back against the idea that 
Bedouins are primarily “suspended in space” as explored by Ronen Shamir, or even just hanging in 
the interstices between zoe and bios as seen in Agamben’s work on homo sacer, but rather are in a 
dialectic with space, via the Lefebvrian notion of lived space.  
 
The fourth chapter is a deep meditation on liberty and security, and how the two are in fact co-
constituted. Why was Israel’s court generally regarded, particularly during the era of former Chief 
Justice Aharon Barak, as an example of legal liberalism? What have the implications of adjudication 
on the basis of fundamental principles, as put forth by Barak, meant for Palestinian citizens of 
Israel? If both equality and security are deemed by Barak to be fundamental principles, what basic 
guarantees to equality do Palestinians enjoy?  
 
It is worth asking why I choose to spend an entire chapter on liberalism, that which has been the 
subject of extensive critique by the three principal theoretical streams I employ in this dissertation. 
Once more, I take my cue from Duncan Kennedy and the coda he employs for critiquing law.22 
Therefore, if the Israeli courts are generally identified as a site for legal liberalism, it makes sense to 
identify, as Kennedy proposes, the qualities and characteristics exclusive to Israeli law on one hand 
and legal liberalism on the other. Thereafter, in the spirit of chiastic inversion,23 we attempt to show 
the inherent tensions between the two when it comes to the common denominators of 
‘accomodating minorities’, ‘recognizing the right to self-determination’, and possibly most crucially, 
for our definition of ‘liberty’. Next, we put these distinctions aside to meditate on why these 
distinctions persist, despite the identifiable tensions between the two. That is, why does the 
phenomenon whereby the Israeli court is identified as a liberal court come to be a stable state of 
being, in spite of the inherent contradicitions that we identified via our chiastic inversion? This is 
where our principal theories explain what is served when such distinctions escape being named, 
and this facilitates our movement further towards drawing conclusions on the phenomenon of 
recognition.  
 
The fifth chapter centers around a legal amendment that would cut child allowance payments to 
families that did not meet the essential vaccination requirements set by the state. The amendment 
                                                          
22 Duncan Kennedy, “A Semiotics of Critique” (2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1147-1189 at 1189 
23 In rhetoric, chiasmus is when two or more phrases are presented and then presented again in reverse order to make 
a larger point. Derrida’s work in deconstruction employs this method. See ibid.  
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threatened to disparately impact Naqab Bedouin families as they had inadequate access to well-
baby clinics where such vaccinations were administered. Being about vaccines and the promotion 
of the health of the child and the social body, the case is a rather unique prism through which one 
can explore how ‘life’ generally is conceived, lived, made to conform, regulated and biopolitically 
governed in the community. Further, it sheds light on how life is made recognizable and how 
different forms of recognition manifest. As it deals with the issues of birth, vaccination, life and 
medicine, as well as the performativity and agency of Naqab Bedouin mothers, the case is a rather 
telling example of ‘assemblage’, the coming together of disparate elements into a unity.  
 
In fact, assemblage theory informs the dissertation as a whole. This is because as we attempt to 
aggregate our conclusions in Nuri’s land ownership case, the crop-spraying case, the Umm al-
Hieran evictions, the discriminatory allocation of land in the Wine Path Plan case and the 
vaccinations case, assemblage theory allows us to draw in heterogeneous elements – theories, 
methods, concepts – into a unity to make conclusions about recognition, which is done in the sixth 
and concluding chapter.  
 
The dissertation is not without its conundrums. How do five women in Bir al-Mashash, while bombs 
drop around them, come to stand in for Bedouin women’s approach to vaccinations or 
performativity around the same? In the same case, what I had identified as the most pressing 
problem was not similarly diagnosed by the women. The vaccination amendment was not 
problematic for the women because it closed down possibilities for different ethical choices (to 
vaccinate, vaccinate partially or not to vaccinate), but rather because it threatened to cut off a 
crucial lifeline (child allowance) for mothers and their children and to exacerbate an already 
arduous life. Would it really matter that the aluminium content may have had a detrimental effect 
on their children if at the same time they carried the very real fear that a Gazan-sourced bomb 
could seriously injure their children? My own situatedness prevented me from appreciating where 
my subject’s energies and affective investments really lay, and I don’t believe that that is something, 
or could be something, fully resolved.   
 
Further, how did my own gravitation towards ‘Naqab Bedouin’ as a subject of study, because I saw a 
community that resembled the community of my birth and childhood, influence my preconceptions 
of and inclinations towards that particular identity, or indeed ‘identity’ as a concept? These are just 




Despair. The present moment is marked by despair, and uncertainty for Naqab Bedouin. The 
Prawer Plan could be implemented very soon, on a wide scale and with considerable force, thereby 
displacing tens of thousands of Naqab Bedouin from their historical lands. Looking further afield, 
we see that the Palestinian national movement is in disarray, Israeli settlement expansion in the 
West Bank and Jerusalem is continuing apace, most stakeholders have given up on the negotiations 
around a two-state solution, while the spectre of a larger regional war, possibly centering around 
Syria, continually looms over the heads of all those in Israel/Palestine.  
 
When the faces of racialization, the denial of liberties, both quotidian and fundamental, and the 
absence of hope rear their head, the call for ethical relationality doesn’t cease. That is, part of what 
we are working through in this dissertation is appreciating a form of ethical relationality ensconced 
in Bedouin being within the milieu of Bedouin lifeways. The dissertation concludes with some 
suggestions for the same.  
 
The ethical relationality that this dissertation prescribes in the concluding chapter can be found in 
Povinelli’s call to “look elsewhere from where we are standing,”24 not only to sense those similarly 
maligned by constellations of power that malign, but also to develop an ethical relationality to the 
outside. That is, it is heeding to Spivak’s call to “to unseat oneself to ethically reseat oneself”, it is 
the Levinisian “infinite right of the other”, Judith Butler’s “comporting oneself beyond oneself….of 
being dispossessed from sovereignty and nation in response to the claims made by those one does 
not fully know and did not fully choose”.25 And it is the affective current that we sense when we 
perform a particular reading of Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish’s “Passport”, where he writes,  
 
Don’t ask the trees for their names 
Don’t ask the valleys who their mother is 
From my forehead bursts the sword of light 
And from my hand springs the water of the river 
All the hearts of the people are my identity26
                                                          
24 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
2016) at 13. 
25 Judith Butler, Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (Columbia University Press, 2012) at 9 
[Butler, Parting Ways] 
26 Mahmoud Darwish, “Passport” (undated), online: http://www.adabna.com/diwan/a/1266 
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Chapter 1 - The Case Study of Nuri al-‘Oqbi and Bedouin Lifeways 
 
Introduction 
Nuri Sliman Mohammad al-‘Oqbi was born on January 20 1942 and grew up with his immediate and 
extended family in al-‘Araqib. Nuri is a prominent social justice activist who has dedicated his life to 
seeking recognition for his family’s historical use, possession and ownership of lands in al-‘Araqib. 
In doing so, Nuri has sought a form of recognition where not only his family’s, but the wider Naqab 
Bedouin community’s historical forms of living are respected so that present ways in which they 
organize themselves and choose to live can be accorded protection by the state. Because Nuri’s land 
claims struggle has spanned a lifetime of over seven decades I think his lens is a fitting one to look 
through when exploring the dialectic of recognition between the Israeli sovereign and the Naqab 
Bedouin. 
 
As the somewhat linear history of this chapter sketches, Nuri made three significant returns to al-
‘Araqib to lands he claims are his family’s ancestral property. He also has land ownership claims in 
nearby Zahiliqah that his father inherited after his grandfather passed away in the summer of 1945 
and are also the subject of Nuri’s land ownership case under study.  
 
This chapter is an apt launching point to demonstrate Bedouin lifeways, and how those lifeways are 
recognized and apprehended by the Israeli courts. By lifeway I refer to that which is common to 
other indigenous cultures, a diverse and “ongoing creative practice that is simultaneously rational, 
affective, intentional, and ethical,”27 a way of organizing in the community that is an alignment of 
our metaphysical being – both spiritual and physical – with that of the natural world.28  
 
Glen Sean Coulthard has referred to such indigenous ways of being and organizing as ‘grounded 
normativity’, which are “the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding 
experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our 
relationships with human and nonhuman others over time”.29 
 
                                                          
27 John A. Grim, “Introduction” in John A. Grim (ed.), Indigenous Traditions and Ecology: The Interbeing of 
Cosmology and Community (Harvard University Press, 2001) 
28 For more on the Anishinabeg lifeway, see Winona LaDuke, "Minobimaatisiiwin: The Good Life" (1992) 16(4) 
Cultural Survival Quarterly 69–71 
29 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014) at 13 
15  
 
Being affective, Bedouin lifeways, as much as they can be demarcated and known, are also an 
amalgamation of what exists in the intimate. Affect, although often conflated with ‘emotion’, is after 
all, not emotion. Unlike emotion, affect is not recognizable, knowable or defined.30 As Kathleen 
Stewart writes, affects are surging capacities to affect and be affected in a continual motion of 
relations, scenes and emergences. And they happen in impulses, sensations and expectations.31 
How does this obtuse movement of affect in indigenous lifeways influence the ability of the law to 
recognize and apprehend all that is in fact at stake in a land claims case? Also, are these fleeting 
currents of affect the only significant factor in determining whether specifically Bedouin indigenous 
lifeways can be apprehended by the Israeli courts, or may there be other significant elements at 
play?  
 
The early years 
Nuri’s family grew their own food and were generally self-sufficient in al-‘Araqib. Agriculture 
enabled the family to make a living off their produce, as they grew wheat and barley in the winter 
and cucumber, berries, pumpkin and watermelons in the summer. They also had fruit and nut trees 
which gave them almonds, figs, grapes and pomegranate. The land they farmed was organized 
around a central water source, known as ‘batn il-sada’. They grew cactus and trees around their 
water source, and in receding order from the water source, they grew fruits, vegetables, lentils, 
tobacco and on the outermost perimeter, corn. In communal spaces, when animals were taken out 
to pasture, the community made use of two kinds of shade trees, the thorny ‘sidr’ (Christ’s Thorn 
Jujube) that carried little fruit called ‘doma’, and ‘ithl’ (Tamarisk) which with its numerous, slender 
branches and spike-like racemes, generated a gentle breeze for whoever was sitting in its shade. 
 
The presence of the al-‘Oqbi tribe dates back centuries, with one of the earliest written records in 
the Dafteri Mufassel, an Ottoman tax register that records the taxes on wheat, barley and summer 
crops that the tribe paid to the Ottoman authorities in 1596.32  
 
The Nakba and the First Displacement 
The ‘Nakba’ – meaning ‘catastrophe’ –led to the displacement of 750,000 Palestinians and the 
destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages during the founding of the state of Israel between 
                                                          
30 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect” (1995) 31 Cultural Critique 83-109 at 88 
31Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007) at 1-3. 
32 Salman Abu Sitta, “The Denied Inheritance: Palestinian Land Ownership in Beer Sheba”, Paper presented to the 
International Fact Finding Mission (London: Palestine Land Society, 2009) at 5 
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1947 and 1948.33 The city of Beersheba, the cultural and economic capital of the Naqab at the time, 
fell to Zionist forces on October 21 1948.34 Thereafter, the majority of the tribes were expelled or 
forced to flee for fear of repercussions;35 such was the fate of Nuri’s uncle, organizer of the local 
resistance, Ibrahim Mohammad al-‘Oqbi. By 1953 only some ten percent of the Naqab’s original 
inhabitants remained within the borders of what became Israel.36 
 
Following Beersheba’s fall, six-year old Nuri was propped on the back of a donkey destined for Jabal 
al-Kohleh, near today’s Kibbutz Lahav. However, he and his family were able to return to their lands 
later that year through the assistance of a relative. Salman Al-Huzayyel, married to Nuri’s paternal 
aunt Wadha Mohammad al-‘Oqbi, enjoyed good relations with the Zionist authorities and his 
intervention enabled the family to return to their home after a three month absence. Salman Al-
Huzayyel was also responsible for convincing Nuri’s father to remain within the new borders of 
Israel and on his land.37 In July 1949, an order from Avraham Shemesh of the military government 
demanded the immediate eviction of al-‘Araqib’s residents and their relocation to a small portion of 
land which the authorities had deemed their ‘original living space’.  
 
The Post-1948 Early Years in Al-‘Araqib 
Nuri’s family, however, was not evicted in 1949 but remained in al-‘Araqib. As Nuri’s paternal uncle, 
Ibrahim, belonged to the resistance and was forced to flee, the Israeli authorities no longer 
recognized Ibrahim as being the Sheikh of the tribe and instead bestowed that recognition on Nuri’s 
father. The tribal court serving the Naqab Bedouin community was moved from Beersheba into 
Nuri’s father’s home in 1949. In 1949, his parents, along with many others in the tribe, were 
                                                          
33 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (2d ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 
34 'Aref Abu-Rabi'a, A Bedouin Century: education and development among the Negev tribes in the 20th century 
(New York : Berghahn Books, 2001) at 58, Ahmad Abu Khusa, Mausw'at Qabayil Beer al-Saba' wa- 'Ashairiha al-
Raiysiah (Amman: Sherkat al-Sharq al-Awsat le-Teba'a, 1994) (Arabic) at 274-286 [Abu Khusa, Qabayil Beer al-
Saba'], Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, Biladuna Filastin (Our Country, Palestine) (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1991) 
(Arabic) at 360. 
35 Rosalyn Higgins, "The Middle East vol. I", United Nations Peace Keeping 1946-1967, Documents and 
Commentary (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 147-149, Emanuel Marx and Moshe Sela, "Situation of the 
Negev's Bedouin", Appendix No. 1. Ben-Mayer's Team for Evacuation and Resettlement of the Bedouin (Tel Aviv: 
TAHAL, 1980), Ahmad Abu Khusa, Mausw'at Qabayil Beer al-Saba' wa- 'Ashairiha al-Raiysiah (Amman: Sherkat 
al-Sharq al-Awsat le-Teba'a, 1994) (Arabic) at 7-75, 'Aref Abu Rabi'a, A Bedouin Century: education and 
development among the Negev tribes in the 20th century (New York : Berghahn Books, 2001) at 93, 'Aref Abu 
Rabi'a, "The Bedouin Refugees in the Negev" (1994) 14:6 Refuge at 15. 
36 'Aref Abu Rabi'a, The Negev Bedouin and Livestock Rearing: Social, Economic and Political Aspects 
(Oxford: Berg, 1994) at 8, Emanuel Marx, Bedouin of the Negev (New York: Praeger, 1967) at 12. 




granted the right to vote for the Israeli Knesset. 1949, Nuri recalls, was the year of an extraordinary 
harvest. In that year, the family received orders from the Military Administration to report on their 
produce, including if the produce originated from the land of those who were forced to leave al-
‘Araqib. The family also paid taxes on their crop to the new Israeli government. Israeli military 
presence in the vicinity also meant more encounters between the settler soldiers and the native 
Bedouin. Nuri relates how soldiers, following firing practice, would come by the tribe’s living space 
for a taste of Arab hospitality – roasted sheep, home-grown figs and fresh tea.38  
 
The Second Displacement and Life in Khirbet al-Hura 
In 1951, the remaining residents of al-‘Araqib were forced to leave the area because a military 
order deemed that their presence undermined the security of Israeli soldiers who needed to move 
freely in the area. Nuri’s father, Sheikh Sliman, was cajoled over many months to pack up his 
belongings and move. The military governor who regularly summoned Sheikh Sliman told him that 
it would be futile to oppose the order – “There are no grounds on which you can oppose this 
order.”39 Then, in November 1951, army trucks forcibly loaded the tribe’s belongings and deposited 
them in Khirbet al-Hura, while the people and animals trailed behind. The military administration 
had deemed Khirbet al-Hura their new home. 
 
The land possessed and farmed by the al-‘Oqbi tribe members who remained in and became 
citizens of Israel spanned 19,000 dunams.40 The family was informed by the military authorities 
that their move to Khirbet al-Hura was a temporary measure, and would last a period of six months. 
The tribe was also promised 20,000 dunams of agricultural land in Khirbet al-Hura in exchange for 
what they had to forego in al-‘Araqib. However, upon forced relocation to Hura, the tribe learnt that 
the land granted to them by the military administration did in fact belong to other Bedouin farmers. 
The administration, therefore, had no authority according to Bedouin custom to grant that land to 
the al-‘Oqbi tribe. As the land in Khirbet al-Hura was not theirs, the al-‘Oqbi tribe followed Bedouin 
                                                          
38 Interview with Nuri al-‘Oqbi, Khirbet al-Hura (October 20 2010), Protocol of Proceedings from December 7 
2009, Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06. 
39 Nuri al-‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice: A Document – The Story of the el-Okbi Tribe in Israel (April 2004) at 125 [al-
‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice] 
40 Ibid. at 123. This was all made up of personal ownership and did not include shared grazing and well water land. 
Interview with Nuri al-‘Oqbi, Khirbet al-Hura (March 2 2011, April 6 2011) 
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custom and refused to consider it their own.41 However, they did work on a portion of the land that 
belonged to the absentees, roughly 6,000 dunams.42 
 
The al-‘Oqbi tribe was subject, as was the entire Palestinian community, to Military Administration 
rule until 1966. Palestinians from the Naqab were concentrated in a ‘siyag’ in the northeastern 
Naqab during this time.43 There were strict restrictions on freedom of movement, with movement 
even within the siyag requiring a permit from the military governor. Khirbet al-Hura lacked schools, 
unlike al-‘Araqib, which meant that in most cases children were not able to access education until 
1966 when military rule ended. Nuri’s father was persistent in demanding a return to the family’s 
land in al-‘Araqib as he was verbally promised as much by the military authorities. However, the 
persistent demands caused him to fall out of favour with the authorities and they withdrew the 
official recognition that they had granted him as the sheikh of the al-‘Oqbi tribe.44 Baruch Hakim, a 
Jewish, Israeli activist in the former left-wing Israeli party, Mapam, who had raised Nuri for a few 
years at various kibbutzim at the request of Nuri’s father, noted that, to the authorities, Nuri’s 
father was himself “very left-wing. He had his own ideas and he didn't want to be an informer”.45 
 
In 1954, the family attempted to return to their home in al-‘Araqib. As a result, military governor 
Sasson Bar Tzvi tried to have Nuri’s father imprisoned. Once more, through the intervention of 
Sheikh Salman Al-Huzayyel who enjoyed good relations with the authorities, Nuri’s father was 
released but only on condition that he not attempt to return to al-‘Araqib.46 The reality slowly sunk 
in for the al-‘Oqbi family. Khirbet al-Hura, the village intended to be the site of a temporary six-
month relocation, had become their permanent home. Subsequently, the land at the al-‘Oqbi tribe’s 
disposal was reduced to 5,000 dunams of farm land and 1,000 dunams of pasture. Around 1971, the 
tribe’s land holdings were further reduced to only a thousand dunams. The rationale was that those 
                                                          
41al-‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice, supra note 39 at 122 
42 Interview with Nuri al-‘Oqbi, Khirbet al-Hura (March 2 2011, April 6 2011). 
43 'Aref Abu-Rabi'a, A Bedouin Century: education and development among the Negev tribes in the 20th century 
(New York : Berghahn Books, 2001) at 93. For an early and critical study of the Military 
Administration imposed on Arabs in Israel from 1948-1966 see Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (Beirut: 
The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968). For a detailed study on the life of the Naqab community during the 
Military Administration years, see Mansour Nasasra, The Naqab Bedouin and the Israeli Military Government 
1948-1967, PhD Dissertation (University of Exeter, College of Social Sciences and International Studies, 2011) 
44 al-‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice, supra note 39 at 121. 
45 Aviva Lori, “Tribal Lands – Part 2”, Haaretz (July 14 2006), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/tribal-lands-
cont-1.193077  




under 40 in the tribe do not need their own land, and could be employed by Israeli Jews in 
agriculture and construction.47 Today, the al-‘Oqbi tribe no longer work their own land in 
agriculture as they used to.  The vast majority of the thousand-strong tribe live in the unrecognized 
Bedouin village of Khirbet al-Hura and in the financially distressed mixed Arab-Jewish city of Lydd, 
a fifteen-minute drive from Israel’s economic center, Tel Aviv.  
 
 
The Seventies and the Second Return to al-‘Araqib 
Nuri’s father did not keep the promise he made to the authorities to not return to his land in al-
‘Araqib. In October 1973, he and Nuri embarked on a return to farming their land after they filed a 
land claim in August that year. The land claim was filed with the Land Settlement Officer in the 
Ministry of Justice, in keeping with the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969) which entitled 
Bedouin to register their claim to Naqab land; a process that occurred in the seventies.48 
Coincidentally, after they had they begun sowing seeds anew, the ‘Yom Kippur’, or ‘October War’, 
began. They were accused by the state of squatting and attempting to steal government land. The 
state initiated a lengthy legal process against Nuri, spanning roughly six years. In the end, an 
agreement was reached whereby Nuri was allowed to farm 250 dunams in al-‘Araqib and some 300 
dunams in the Hura area. However, the latter belonged to the Abu Kaf tribe and so Nuri, again in 
keeping with the dictates of Bedouin custom, refused to use it, and in the end he was left with only 
250 dunams in al-‘Araqib.49 The land arrangement procedure over Nuri’s claims is still ongoing. 
 
Nuri’s Run-ins with the Criminal Justice System 
In the 1960s, Nuri moved to Lydd and in 1964 opened a garage at a time when Lydd lacked an 
industrial zone from which he could operate. Several decades later, in December 2010, he was 
sentenced for operating the garage without a license as well as for other violations against the 
Planning and Building Law (1965), such as building without a permit.50  
                                                          
47  al-‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice, supra note 39 at 120 
48 See Human Rights Watch, Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel's Unrecognized Bedouin 
Villages (2008) at 18-20 
49 al-‘Oqbi, Waiting for Justice, supra note 39 at 120, Protocol of Proceedings from December 7 2009, Suleiman 
Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06. 
50 Nuri asserts that others in his situation, who have operated a business in a residential zone, received a license from 
the municipality and that the Lydd municipality’s refusal to issue him a license stemmed from his critical stance of 
the municipality’s policies towards Palestinians in the community, particularly their policy of home demolitions. 
The Ramleh Magistrate Court sentenced him to seven months in prison.  After a month in prison, his appeal was 




Nuri was also imprisoned for thirteen days in 1979 for protesting the expropriation of Naqab 
Bedouin land in Tal al-Malah. The expropriation of Bedouin land took place so that the government 
could use it to relocate a military airport and an army base after their withdrawal from the Egyptian 
Sinai.51 His arrest was on the grounds that he encouraged other demonstrators to attack the police, 
though recorded evidence speaks to the contrary. To protest what he saw as an illegal arrest, he 
went on a hunger strike.52  
 
Nuri returns to al-‘Araqib for a third time 
On April 14 2006, Nuri erected a tent, poured a cement floor and began his strike on his family’s 
lands in al-‘Araqib. This was done on the Passover seder, because as Nuri explains, “On Passover the 
Jewish people emerged from slavery to freedom, that's why I built my tent on the holiday…I also 
want to emerge to freedom.”53 The decision to settle on his land was made following the Supreme 
Court’s (sitting as a Court of Administrative Appeals) rejection of an appeal to enable the al-‘Oqbi 
tribe to build a rural agricultural settlement on its historical lands. The Green Patrol, policemen and 
Border Patrol, at the request of the Israel Lands Administration (ILA),54 on a number of occasions 
arrested Nuri, demolished his tent, and confiscated personal belongings following his protest. 
Ultimately, Judge Eyal Baumgart of the Be'er Sheva Magistrate's Court rejected the request of the 
ILA to keep Nuri off of his land in al-‘Araqib.55 
 
However, in February 2010, Nuri’s fortunes changed once more. He was arrested for an entire 
week. He was charged with forty criminal counts of invasion, uprooting trees and violations of an 
order for being present on the said lands in al-‘Araqib. The court issued him an ‘exclusion order’, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which was later commuted to community service. As community service, Nuri worked daily at a religious school in 
Lydd, an hour’s drive from his home in Khirbet al-Hura, from early in the morning until two in the afternoon. 
Nasser Rego, “Courts of Racial Rule: The Imprisonment of Human Rights Defender Nuri al-‘Oqbi”, Palestine 
Chronicle (January 3 2011), online: http://palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=16526 
51 Some 750 families were forced to leave their lands, eighty percent of which was being used for agricultural 
purposes. Ghazi Falah, "Israeli State Policy toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev" (1989) 18:2 Journal of 
Palestine Studies 71 at 80. Also, the compensation offered to the Bedouin was 2-15 percent of what was offered to 
Jewish settlers to leave the Sinai. Penny Maddrell, The Bedouin of the Negev (London: Minority Rights Group, 
1990) at 11. 
52 Interview with Nuri al-‘Oqbi, Khirbet al-Hura (October 21 2010). 
53 Aviva Lori, “Tribal Lands”, Haaretz (July 14 2006), online: http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/738380.html 
54 The ILA manages 93% of the land in Israel. They enjoy quasi-governmental status, undertake 
land acquisition on behalf of the State and represent the government in land acquisition. Oren Yiftachel, Planning as 
Control: Policy and Resistance in a Deeply Divided Society (Exeter: Pergamon, 1995) at 135 
55 Supra note 53 
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preventing him from being within ten kilometres of the land in al-‘Araqib without also being in the 
presence of a guarantor. In addition, in another decision of a magistrate court in June 2010 (which 
he has appealed) he has been ordered to pay the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) roughly NIS 
300,000 (US$ 85,000) for expenses the ILA incurred in demolishing his tent and uprooting his land 
in al-‘Araqib since he staged his protest there in 2006.56 
 
Today, Nuri splits his time between Khirbet al-Hura in the Naqab and Lydd, an hour’s drive north. 
Having been relocated by the government in 1951 to Khirbet al-Hura, his current location in the 
town is not part of the ‘recognized’ Hura, but an unrecognized village that stands across the road 
from it. It is called Khirbet al-Hura (meaning ‘ruins of Hura’). It was at his home in the ‘ruins of 
Hura’ where we held most of our meetings. 
 
At home in Khirbet al-Hura 
Although I’d been to his home over a dozen times since August 2010, I always struggled to pinpoint 
its location. Off road and unmarked, Khirbet al-Hura lacks a paved entrance. Accordingly, visitors 
travelling by car have to carefully manoeuvre off the Route 31 highway onto the shoulder. They 
then have to follow three hundred metres of asphalt sprinklings to arrive at Nuri’s home. If I can 
help it, I avoid visiting after sundown.  
 
Nuri’s home is adjacent to the community’s mosque. In fact, he donated the land on which the 
mosque was constructed. The mosque’s plastic blue dome, however, gathers dust by his home. 
Residents were warned by the authorities that the mosque faced immediate demolition if the roof 
remained in its designated location. Like all structures in unrecognized villages, indications of 
permanence, like tiled roofs, are strictly prohibited.  
 
The Land Claims Case 
Nuri brought before the Beersheba District Court ownership claims over five strips of land – three 
in al-‘Araqib (Araqib 1, 6, 60) and two (Sharia 133, 134) in Zahiliqah.57 His case was heard by 
Justice Sarah Dovrat.  
 
                                                          
56 Nasser Rego, “Courts of Racial Rule: The Imprisonment of Human Rights Defender Nuri al-‘Oqbi” Palestine 
Chronicle (January 3 2011), online: http://palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=16526 
57 Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06 
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In 1948, the State took possession of the lands of Zahiliqah and on it they built Moshav Talmei Bilu 
exclusively for the settlement of Israeli Jews. In 1956, the state expropriated the lands of al-‘Araqib 
under the relevant legal provisions. The state operates with the conviction that, save the existence 
of legal title, the Naqab is essentially mawat, or dead land, ‘terra nullius’ and belonging to no one. 
The two requirements to classify land as mawat were that first, the land was so distant from any 
town or village that a person who used the loudest voice could not be heard there (later interpreted 
to mean a mile and half away), and second, that the land was barren and not held by anyone or set 
aside for anyone by authorities. 58  
 
However, in Nuri’s case and in similar Bedouin land claims’ cases, legal teams have attempted to 
prove that the Naqab was characterized by extensive cultivation, and therefore was not ‘dead’. They 
attempted to show how land was bought, sold, leased, mortgaged, inherited, and how taxes were 
paid to the central Ottoman and British governments on both land and crops. They asserted that 
these undertakings on the land in the Naqab were guided by oral principles of internal regulation, 
laws, and customary practice.59  
 
In the District Court case, Justice Dovrat determined that the onus was on the plaintiffs to prove 
that the claimed land was not mawat, but miri. Miri land, as determined by the Ottoman Land Code 
of 1858, was land that was located within the vicinity of a settlement, and it proffered possession 
and usage rights for the landholder though ultimate title remained with the State. Article 78 of the 
Ottoman Land Code provided for adverse possession rights on miri land, where title could be 
registered with the landholder if the said land was possessed and cultivated continuously for the 
relatively short time period of 10 years.60 This is what the plaintiffs had to demonstrate to prove 
title over the said lands.  
                                                          
58 Mawat meaning 'dead' is one of the five categories of land under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 which 
remained in effect in Israel until the late 1960s. See Abraham Granott, The Land System in Palestine (London: Eyre 
& Spottiswoode, 1952) at 91-93, Hussein Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay, Access Denied: Palestinian Land Rights 
in Israel (New York: Zed Books, 2003) at 104-137 [Abu Hussein, McKay, Access Denied], Ronen Shamir, 
"Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel" (1996) 30:2 Law and Society Review at 238-239 [Shamir, 
“Suspended in Space”]. 
59 See Salman Abu Sitta, “The Denied Inheritance: Palestinian Land Ownership in Beer Sheba”, Paper presented to 
the International Fact Finding Mission (London: Palestine Land Society, 2009), Avinoam Meir, “Contemporary 
State Discourse and Historical Pastoral Spatiality: Contradictions in the Land Conflict between the Israeli Bedouin 
and the State” (2009) 32:5 Ethnic and Racial Studies [Meir, “State and Pastoral Spatiality”], Noa Kram, “The Negev 
Bedouins: Struggles for Land Rights and Cultural Survival in Israel” (Beersheba: Robert H. Arnow Center for 
Bedouin Studies and Development at Ben-Gurion University, 2010). 
60 Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “The Legal Transformation Of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law And The Palestinian 





However, Justice Dovrat clarified that the plaintiffs would have to prove the land as miri as the 
conditions “that prevailed in practical terms on the ground in 1858”.61 Therefore, the plaintiffs had 
to show possession and continuous cultivation for a period of ten years from over a hundred and 
fifty years ago. 
 
On 15 March 2012, Justice Dovrat issued her decision. Justice Dovrat rejected the petition to 
provide restitution to the al-‘Oqbi plaintiffs for the land that was expropriated in 1954. The judge’s 
rationale was that the al-‘Oqbi’s were not able to prove that they held title to the land. She also 
found that they were unable to prove title obtained through adverse possession because they were 
unable to show that they possessed and cultivated the claimed plots continuously for ten years 
beginning in 1858. Second, Justice Dovrat determined that the legal basis for the expropriation was 
sound. The land was expropriated pursuant to the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and 
Compensation) Law (1953). All the same, the judge acknowledged that such a law would probably 
not pass the constitutionality test today because it allowed for the retroactive approval of land that 
was seized without a statutory basis. Such retroactive validation of land expropriations would 
today be considered “a substantial infringement of the right of title to property”,62 particularly as 
provided for in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992).63  
 
However, Justice Dovrat clarified that the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) 
Law (1953) ought to be seen “in light of the needs of the period in which it was enacted”64 and “the 
special historical circumstances of the early days of the State”.65  
 
It is worth flagging that Justice Dovrat had strong criticism for Nuri’s legal team and the expert, 
Prof. Oren Yiftachel. Justice Dovrat pointed to flaws in the expert opinion for not citing authoritative 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography”], The Ottoman Land Code (trans. F. Ongley, ed. Horace E. 
Miller) (London: William Clowes and Sons Limited, 1892). I will discuss the doctrine of adverse possession in 
Israeli jurisprudence in more detail in ‘The Eviction Orders for Umm al-Hieran’ chapter.  
61 Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06 at para. 11, citing Bracha Diner v. 
State of Israel CA 3535/04 at para. 16 
62 Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06 at para. 11, citing Bracha Diner v. 
State of Israel CA 3535/04 at para. 6-7.  
63 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992), Sefer Ha-Chukkim number 1454, 90. 
64 Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06 at para. 11 
65 Supra note 62 
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sources (relying on secondary rather than primary sources) and for failing to meet the standards of 
an expert opinion submission. Justice Dovrat also criticized the legal team’s expert for conjecture, 
when the expert concluded, from aerial photographs taken in 1945, that there was “intensive 
cultivation covering most of the plots at al-‘Araqib.”66 When an interpreter of aerial photographs’, 
Ben Shlomo, was questioned in court it became clear to the court that “an entirely different picture 
emerged of very partial cultivation” in al-‘Araqib.67  
 
While both the plaintiffs and the respondents presented European travelogues from the period to 
support their claims regarding the presence of a ‘permanent settlement’ in al-‘Araqib, Justice 
Dovrat favoured those presented by the state’s expert witness, Prof. Ruth Kark. One of the key 
documents that Kark presented, and which Dovrat relied on in reaching her decision, was the 
survey of the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), which was carried out between 1871 and 1877, and 
was an “in depth and fundamental review, the results of which were published in seven volumes 
and 26 folios of maps”,68 and which “shows that for the most part the area is a Bedouin grazing 
area… and no permanent settlement is mentioned.”69 For these reasons, Justice Dovrat concluded 
that she “preferred the detailed and comprehensive opinion of Prof. Kark (the state’s expert 
witness) over that of Prof. Yiftachel”.70  
 
Nuri and his fellow family plaintiffs decided to appeal to the Supreme Court. With the financial 
support of friends and other civil society members, enough money was raised to fund the legal 
appeal.71 Heading Nuri’s legal team in the Supreme Court appeal was the prominent human rights 
lawyer, Michael Sfard,72 who had been assisting in Nuri’s case since 2010.73 I visited Sfard’s Tel Aviv 
office in the winter of 2014, where he managed to squeeze me in for a half hour update on the case. 
Sfard was candid about the fact that Nuri’s case threatened to undermine a very potent and 
pervasive Zionist narrative about the land being empty and uncultivated and that it was only 
revived by the new Jewish settlers in Palestine. As a result of this, it was not going to be an easy 
                                                          
66 Suleiman Mohammad Salem al-‘Oqbi v. State of Israel [2012] DC 7161/06 at para. 17 
67 Ibid. at para. 19 
68 Ibid. at para. 20 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid. at para. 23 
71 Interview with Advocate Radwan Abu Ara’ara, Lawyer for plaintiffs in in DC 7161/06 case (January 13, 2011) 
72 Jodi Rudoren, “A Champion for the Displaced in Israel” The New York Times (July 27, 2012), online: 
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decision for the judges to make. If Sfard didn’t think the chances of winning were good, why take 
the case? I asked. “What we’re trying to achieve is some sort of a crack in the sealed legal doctrine 
that says that Bedouin do not have any title to land in the Negev”.  
 
Bedouin lifeways: Alternative facts 
Nuri’s legal team attempted a number of arguments before the court to make that crack in how the 
courts understood Bedouin presence and lifeways in the Naqab. The team sought to disprove the 
‘Dead Negev Doctrine’74 that said that land in the Naqab was essentially barren and uncultivated by 
Palestinians pre-1948. As no formal registrations of land existed for the majority of the Naqab 
Bedouin75  the Israeli authorities classified those lands as vacant and barren lands that fell under 
the mawat category of the Ottoman Land Code. 
 
However, as relayed by Western travelers such as Henry Baker Tristram in 1858 and Edward Hull 
in 1883 and as also demonstrated by aerial photographs from the 1940s, Palestinian Bedouin made 
substantial investments in agriculture on tracts of land up to two million dunams.76 As mentioned 
earlier, the Dafteri Mufassel was an Ottoman tax register that showed the taxes paid by Naqab 
Bedouin, including the al-‘Oqbi (Bani Okbeh) tribe, to the Ottoman authorities on wheat, barley and 
summer crops as far back as 1596.77  
 
Justice Dovrat also relied on the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) survey, which indeed produced a 
very detailed map of the area, to reach the conclusion that there were no significant investments in 
agriculture nor was there a permanent settlement in the al-‘Araqib area. However, as the historian, 
Salman Abu Sitta has pointed out with regard to the PEF survey, the survey covered only one third 
of the Beer Sheba district, stopping at Wadi Ghazzeh in the south. This meant that although the 
                                                          
74 The ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’ is how scholars, also active in Nuri’s case, coined the phenomenon. See Oren 
Yiftachel, Ahmad Amara and Sandy Kedar, “Debunking the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’” Ha’aretz (December 31, 
2013), online: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.566357, Oren Yiftachel, Sandy Kedar, Ahmad Amara, 
“Challenging a Legal Doctrine: Rethinking the Dead Negev Ruling” (2012) 14:1 Law and Government (Mishpat U-
Mimshal) 4-141 (Hebrew) [Yiftachel, Kedar, Amara, “Dead Negev Ruling”] 
75 Bedouin had not formally registered their lands so as to avoid paying taxes and being drafted into the 
army. Shamir, “Suspended in Space, supra note 58 at 241. Further, neither the British Mandatory authorities or the 
Ottomans before them surveyed the Naqab, so that there do not exist reliable records of land classification or 
registries of land ownership except in and around the town of Beersheba. See Ghazi Falah, "Israeli State Policy 
toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev" (1989) 18:2 Journal of Palestine Studies at 75-76 
76 Supra note 74 
77 Salman Abu Sitta, “The Denied Inheritance: Palestinian Land Ownership in Beer Sheba”, Paper presented to the 
International Fact Finding Mission (London: Palestine Land Society, 2009) at 5 
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maps mentioned the land names and the tribe names, they did not contain the same comprehensive 
data that the surveyed areas did.78 Therefore, what Justice Dovrat concluded was proof of non-
permanent settlement was in fact an area not comprehensively surveyed.  
 
While Justice Dovrat established there was not ‘extensive cultivation’ in al-‘Araqib, aerial photos 
from al-‘Araqib in 1949 do show areas of cultivation, human settlement in the form of tents, a 
cemetery, a stone building, various water works and several smaller structures such as sheds and 
stables,79 all of which indicate settlement and the semi-pastoral, semi-agricultural lifestyle that was 
common to the Naqab Bedouin lifeway.  
 
As researchers have shown, the prior sovereigns in Palestine - the Ottomans and the British – 
recognized Bedouin as owning and cultivating the land.80 Bedouin even sold land to the Ottomans, 
such as when the ‘Azazma tribe sold two thousand dunams in 1900 to set up Beersheba.81 Similarly, 
there are many Ottoman and British registry records that show Bedouin land ownership. The 
British also collected crop (or ‘tithe’) taxes,82 which Nuri’s family also has receipts for, for the years 
1922-1946. Other document proofs that Nuri’s legal team presented to the court included a lease of 
land agreement, a division of lands agreement and a sale agreement.83 
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Finally, there was extensive purchase of land from Naqab Bedouin by Zionist organizations (such as 
The Jewish National Fund84) in the amount of 100,000 dunams.  
 
In spite of the considerable evidence of Nuri’s family’s presence in al-‘Araqib, and Bedouin presence 
and cultivation in the Naqab more generally, they were unable to uphold the burdens of proof 
placed on them by the District Court. The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals found 
similarly and upheld the decision of the District court, with Justice Hayut of the three-judge panel 
writing the majority opinion.85 Justice Hayut found that the Bedouin did not enjoy legal autonomy 
under Ottoman and British Mandatory rule in the sense that the plaintiffs claimed, meaning that the 
Court would need to examine British and Ottoman law to determine rights to the land, and not 
Bedouin tribal or customary law.86  
 
When applying the relevant Ottoman legal provisions to determine rights to the land, Justice Hayut 
found that the fact that Bedouin lived in tents and lived a semi-nomadic lifestyle disqualified their 
form of living as being one of ‘permanent settlement’, which was necessary to prove certain rights 
to the land. So although Justice Hayut concluded that the al-‘Oqbi tribe appear to have ‘roamed the 
area’87 of the claimed plots, she cited the Mandatory court judgement, Samaonov to buttress her 
conclusion that the particular way of life of Bedouin did not give rise to any prescriptive rights to 
the land, “I do not think that by moving tents hither and thither over a tract of land allows the tent 
owners to establish prescriptive title to the land”.88  
 
Second, the court imposed weighty burdens of proof to show living presence and cultivation. Justice 
Hayut determined that the plaintiffs would have to show proofs of ownership, possession, use or 
cultivation over an extended period of time and in a continuous manner between the years 1858 
and 1921 to establish rights to the land.89 1921 was the year when the Mandatory government 
                                                          
84 The Jewish National Fund (JNF) owns roughly 12% of 'Israel Lands' ('Israel Lands' is 93% of all land in the State) 
in the amount of 2,542,000 dunams and is only mandated according to its bylaws to lease its land for Jewish 
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passed the Mewat Land Ordinance,90 repealing Article 103 of the Ottoman Land Code that allowed 
for the revival of ‘mewat’ land, so that plaintiffs could no longer acquire title to ‘mewat’ land by 
cultivating it. The weighty burdens of proof meant that the plaintiffs were unable to prove they 
owned the land for lack of official documents, and even if the tithe (tax) receipts on crops after 
1927 and aerial photos from the 1940s showed active use and cultivation of the land, they did not 
count as proof because they were inadmissible, falling out of the relevant period’s scope, between 
1858 and 1921.  
 
The court also dismissed all arguments based on international human rights law on indigeneity 
saying that such law was not applicable in this case because the Bedouin had not proved they were 
indigenous, local law had not codified the relevant provisions, and the norms and standards on the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and lifeways were not part of customary international law 
and therefore not binding on the state.91 
 
Discussion 
As law is able to interpret what it can follow, precedent, and what it can hear, evidence, elements of 
narration that are untranslatable render the entire code of which they are part lost.92  
 
In ‘Frames of War’,93 Judith Butler picks up on this idea of translation when it comes to the ontology 
of the body. Butler sketches a genealogy for how certain bodies come to be identified with 
precarity, and others not, particularly in the context of war. When certain bodies are identified as 
‘life’ then it becomes possible to see their lives as precarious and to grieve for their suffering. When 
certain other bodies are not identified as ‘life’ per se, but merely as ‘living’, then precarity to threats 
and grievability for their loss or suffering is less certain.  
 
Butler sees recognition as beginning at the point where something is apprehended. Apprehension is 
the means by which one senses or perceives, but not in a way that is mapped onto a conceptual 
grid.94 Intelligiblity makes sense of the subject of apprehension, as it is the general historical 
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schema by which bodies that are apprehended are made to fit a frame or domain of the knowable.95 
The schemas of intelligibility allow for norms of recognizability to take place between two 
subjects.96 However, when a subject falls outside the frames that constitute ‘life’, that subject may 
be seen as ‘living’ but not as ‘life’.97  
 
Consider the discussion and rationale for the decisions in Nuri’s land claims case at both the District 
Court and the Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Appeals. The courts are able to identify the facts 
of the case and fit those facts onto a conceptual grid made up of historical schema informed by 
precedent – Ottoman, British and Israeli legal decisions pertaining to the Naqab Bedouin. The 
courts also make certain forms of evidence intelligible – the evidence of the PEF surveys, 
travelogues of European explorers and the testimony by the State’s expert witness, Prof. Ruth Kark, 
because they fit the historical schema of what has come to be considered reliable enough to count 
as evidence. What both precedent and evidence do in this case (and in other cases pertaining to 
Naqab Bedouin) is that they also set the frame for how Bedouin living is understood. Both evidence 
and precedent do productive work in generating and sustaining the idea of Bedouin as nomadic, 
impermanent and agriculturally non-productive. 
 
In doing so, evidence that is apprehended but cannot fit such a conceptual grid of Bedouin living, is 
dismissed. Therefore, in spite of the plethora of evidence to show Bedouin presence, cultivation and 
lifeways in the Naqab generally and on the said plots in al-‘Araqib in particular, the evidence was 
not intelligible to the court in a way that would give rise to certain rights to the land.  
 
As Bedouin forms of living fit a conceptual grid of ‘nomadism’,98 conferring the meaning ‘temporary’ 
and ‘moving’, they did not count as living in a ‘permanent settlement’. This precluded according 
them rights that arise with permanent settlement in Israeli jurisprudence, including in the courts’ 
interpretation of Ottoman and Mandatory legislation.  
 
Bedouin legal documents pertaining to land transactions – the ‘sanad’ (sale), ‘rahen’ (lease) and 
‘iratha’ (inheritance) - although containing considerable information, official revenue stamps and 
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Ottoman/Mandatory stamps, and regularly used as evidence in tribal court proceedings prior to the 
establishment of the Israeli state in 1948,99 did not fit the conceptual grid of official, certified 
government documents according to Israeli standards. To the courts, the fact that the land was not 
registered in an official government land registry,100 meant that these Bedouin legal agreements did 
not prove ownership, sale or otherwise regarding the status of the land.  
 
Finally, the eleven witness testimonies at the level of the District Court, some of which were first-
hand accounts of living in al-‘Araqib before the foundation of the state, did not hold as much weight 
as the journal entries and travelogues of European explorers.101  
 
This shows how the courts may apprehend Bedouin lifeways, but because such apprehension does 
not align with historical schema, it is not made intelligible in the sense that it gives rise to certain 
rights for the Bedouin. And it is precisely because Bedouin lifeways are apprehended but not made 
intelligible that Bedouin suffering is not grievable.  
 
Consider the expulsions of the residents of al-‘Araqib in 1948 and 1951 as was discussed earlier in 
this chapter. The fact that the harm caused to the population in forced expulsion (and subsequent 
land expropriation) was not duly calibrated allowed the courts to mark such actions during the 
Military Administration years as somehow ordinary, thereby rendering the harms caused to the 
local Palestinian population as something to be expected and not out of the ordinary. Indeed, this is 
how Justice Dovrat framed it when she said that the legal basis for the expropriation of the land 
would likely not pass the constitutionality test today because it retroactively legitimized illegal 
arbitrary expropriation,102 yet that the courts had considered this question before in the Diner 
decision,103 and found no reason to intervene. Justice Dovrat affirmed that the law was a fait 
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accompli, immune from further legal challenge, ought to be seen as appropriate for the particular 
time period,104 effectively normalizing the harms caused to those impacted by it.105  
 
That suffering of certain populations does not elicit grief is also seen in the phenomenon of 
‘structural violence’. Sociologist Carmela Murdocca explains how ‘structural violence’ is systemic 
violence by those that belong to a certain social order directed at persons, preventing them from 
achieving their potential.106 The violence seems ordinary or banal where both source and subjects 
cannot be easily identified. In Nuri’s case – did the source of Bedouin suffering, if acknowledged, 
stem during the Military Administration years or were recent actions of home demolitions by the 
Israeli government more to blame? Who was harmed, if at all - the plaintiffs, all the al-‘Oqbi tribe, all 
Naqab Bedouin who were displaced in 1948? In structural violence, the difficulty in naming specific 
actors makes the effects appear not right, and yet nobody’s fault, while the suffering of those 
affected is elided.  
 
At the chapter’s opening, I drew attention to how Bedouin lifeways, that which the Israeli court can 
apprehend but not make intelligible, is informed by the ‘affective’. As emotions circulate, affect does 
work; affect both makes the subject and binds subjects to one another.107 When affect cannot be 
effectively grasped, it is inevitable that communitarian lifeways that owe their dynamism to 
affective investments will not be recognized.  
 
What was striking in the court proceedings was the court’s discounting of feeling that punctuated 
Nuri’s testimony and that of the other witnesses. Of course, court rules of evidence often discount 
emotion or affective considerations as irrelevant to the facts of the case, or place those emotions in 
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a hierarchy (for example, grief as acceptable but anger not), and often as a counterpoint to 
‘reason’.108  
 
Consider this exchange in the District court case. Advocate Rawash, the state’s counsel, queried 
Nuri regarding the Jewish National Fund’s forestation efforts on plots Araqib 6 and 60 while judicial 
proceedings regarding the determination of the plots’ ownership were still ongoing.109  
 
Adv. Rawash: …I asked if there were trees there. And do you confirm that throughout the 
years the plot was leased to other Bedouins?  
al-‘Oqbi: But is it right to do that? 
Judge: We are not discussing if it is right or it is not right. Take the political issues out of 
this hall.  
al-‘Oqbi: This is not politics. 
Judge: Focus on the facts, not on politics.  
al-‘Oqbi: It is not politics, it is my property which was robbed from me. 
Judge: I heard your pain twenty times and even fifty times. Now we have to focus on the 
facts. We have to move forward and you should answer to the point.  
 
When Nuri attempted to reflect to the court that he felt wronged or deceived by what was 
happening on his ancestral home, Justice Dovrat was swift to summarily deny him the space to do 
so. Of course, assuming that he was given the space to express his affective investments around the 
claimed land, does not necessarily imply that it would uphold the plaintiff’s burden of proving land 
possession and use at the relevant time period.  
 
At the same time, however, as a number of legal scholars have agreed, “emotion in concert with 
cognition leads to truer perception and, ultimately, to better (more accurate, more moral, more 
just) decisions.”110  
 
                                                          
108 See for example, Susan A. Bandes (ed.) The Passions of Law (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 
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What this means is that had the court allowed for emotions to do their work, it would mean that the 
rich texture of Bedouin lifeways could be made palpable, and this could add to the weight of the oral 
testimony and other evidence presented by the Bedouin plaintiffs to show connection to the 
claimed lands. In this way, their unique agricultural practices of grazing and seasonal cultivation 
would not summarily be deemed as non-productive use of agricultural land. In a similar fashion, 
their tent dwellings and the wider spacing between them than is usually found in contemporary 
society, could be seen as a cultural preference of sustainably living off the land and their animals 
(tents were often made from animal skin) and them placing a high value on privacy; it would not be 
deemed as “hither and thither” movement of non-permanent dwellings. As for the legal 
arrangements around land lease and sale, were Bedouin affective investments considered, these 
would less likely be seen as informal, unofficial documents that fail to establish rights to the land. 
Rather, they would be seen as a complex, rich and deliberative negotiation of rights, obligations and 
duties, a legal custom very specific to this population, and ‘custom’ that generally typifies legal 
arrangements of indigenous peoples.  
 
Yet, would it be fair to conclude that the discounting of affective evidence was the primary reason 
the court did not find in the plaintiffs’ favour? As detailed above, the rules of procedure and 
evidence made it very difficult for the plaintiffs to uphold the burdens of proof placed on them by 
the courts. What about these burdens of proof? In what particular context were they birthed and 
what telos do they serve?  
 
In the next case, Abu Mdeghem, we will probe those aspects of procedure and evidence that make it 
particularly difficult for the courts to make Bedouin testimony intelligible. For this I would like to 
shift the focus to that moment of rupture in sovereignty around the years 1947-1949. If we 
consider Nuri’s case to be one of an indigenous or native sovereign effectively asserting rights, to 
land and lifeways, in the era of a successor sovereign, the Israeli state, then what about that 
particular turn of sovereignty informs the rules of evidence and procedure in the post-1948 era? 
For this we will move further along in space to the star of ‘structural violence’, a concept we will 
unpack further to look at its operation in the law through a post/colonial lens (even as 1948 was 
the beginning of a new settler colonial order).  
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Chapter 2: A Postcolonial Reading of the Abu Mdeghem Naqab Crop-Spraying Decision  
 
Introduction 
On April 14 2007, in what was characterised a ‘precedent setting’ ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court 
ruled that the aerial spraying of wheat, barley, corn and watermelon cultivated by Arab Bedouin in 
roughly a dozen unrecognized villages in the Naqab by or on behalf of the Israel Lands 
Administration (ILA) was illegal, underscoring the spraying as insensitive, disrespectful and 
endangering to life, health and a violation to the dignity of those affected. Subsequently, the Court 
held that the temporary order nisi, issued three years earlier and prohibiting the spraying of crops 
aerially, be made absolute, and ordered that the ILA pay legal fees and court costs to the petitioners. 
The ruling was considered by Bedouin advocacy groups as "important and meaningful for the 
Bedouins."111 Israel also trumpeted the decision in international fora as evidence of the relentless 
efforts of the Supreme Court to enshrine human rights, as was in keeping with the state's 
progressive and democratic character.112 
  
From 2002 to 2004, some thirty square kilometres of Naqab farm land was aerially sprayed with 
the crop-killing chemical Roundup by or under the aegis of the Israel Lands Administration, the 
governmental body that manages 93% of the land in Israel. The stated purpose was to stop the 
Bedouin from taking over state land. According to Avigdor Lieberman, then Minister of National 
Infrastructures and the minister responsible for the management of state lands at the time, “We 
must stop their illegal invasion of state land by all means possible. The Bedouins have no regard for 
our laws; in the process we are losing the last resources of state lands. One of my main missions is 
to return to the power of the Land Authority in dealing with the non-Jewish threat to our lands.”113  
 
The aim of this case study is to propose caution in the reception of a legal decision that was viewed 
in generally favourable terms. I want to build on the case study of Nuri al-‘Oqbi, where we looked at 
how contours of ‘human suffering’ are often hidden and silenced in legal systems. The fact that such 
affective investments aren’t allowed to be made intelligible in law stems in part from law’s self-
designation as objective and formal, often seen as a counterpoint to the affective. The Abu 
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Mdeghem114 case is an apt launching point to deconstruct what appears (particularly when we 
choose to focus primarily on the binding declaration of the court, its decision) to be a progressive or 
liberal115 decision by illustrating what happens the day after. What happens once the legal decision 
is issued and the legal processes have run their course? Will the Bedouin plaintiffs be better off 
when compared to where they were before they sought, and received, remedy from the courts?116 
And what about ‘the law in these parts’,117 Israeli law as applied in the Naqab Bedouin context, 
informs what happens after a progressive decision?  
 
It is with similar caution that others have received the Qa'adan decision, where in 2000 the 
Supreme Court ruled that the State has an obligation not to discriminate in the allocation of land 
between Arab and Jew.118 Qa’adan was a decision celebrated in many quarters.119 In Qa'adan, the 
Court did not, however, set precedent with a formal ruling but instructed the authorities to 
reconsider the admission of an Arab couple into the Jewish community of Katsir. Further, it stated 
specifically that the decision was 'forward-looking' and would not serve to re-evaluate past land 
allocations that may have been discriminatory. This was of little comfort to Palestinian Arab 
citizens, for whom land expropriations took place during the early years of the state.120 Only in 
December 2010 did the Qa'adans move into their home in Katsir.121 In March 2011, the Knesset 
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passed an 'Admissions Committee Law' that gave 695 communities the legal basis to reject 
applicants if they found them to be 'socially unsuitable'122 to live in that particular community.123 
 
The Abu Mdeghem case is of significance because of the groundswell of legal measures initiated by 
the government to tackle 'the invasion' and resolve the decades long land conflict between the 
Naqab Bedouin, indigenous to the region124 and the Israeli government that refers to them as 
interlopers. The Prawer Plan is the government's latest proposal and it threatens to expropriate 
hundreds of thousands of dunams of ancestral Bedouin lands and forcibly evict 40,000 Bedouin into 
government planned development towns against their will. Although the Prawer Plan was shelved 
in 2013, in no small part due to the work of civil society organizations and activists,125 three years 
later it was revived again.126 Among the villages to be demolished are those whose crops were 
destroyed in the Abu Mdeghem case, namely the villages of al-'Araqib, 'Atir and Umm al-Hieran.127  
 
The chapter recommends that decisions that are considered landmark, such as Qa'adan, or 
meaningful, as Abu Mdeghem was received, only be accorded these attributes with time having 
substantiated the accolades. A progressive decision is one whose effects trickle down to the affected 
parties and bring about a substantial, marked improvement in the situation for which they had 
sought legal remedy. In order to achieve this, law cannot offer patchwork solutions and cannot 
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restrain itself to only 'looking forward', as in Qa'adan, but would need to be adequately 
retrospective to a past that motivates such wrongs in the present.  
 
To achieve its aim, the chapter attempts a number of tasks. First, it will perform a postcolonial 
reading of the legal decision, while also attempting to identify how a judicial postcolonial sensitivity 
might have read the case differently. It will also venture to locate traces of the ‘native informant,’128 
the non-elite or subordinated group in Israeli society – the Naqab Bedouin, in the legal decision, 
which although discontinuous and interrupted, in a postcolonial, deconstructivist reading, make 
appearance. Yet in being a postcolonial critique, this chapter stresses that the very naming of the 
native informant, or subaltern, and with that the other as lord, or colonizing class, risks a 
generalization that assumes endorsement of non-acknowledgement for the silences and disruptions 
in all text.129 The chapter will isolate the genealogical fragment that is a postcolonial reading of the 
Abu Mdeghem case to enable an empirical methodology that challenges the dominant historical and 
legal narratives of the case. This genealogical fragment is the alternative knowledge, the native 
informant's testimony juxtaposed against the official script and it provides the opportunity to 
critically read a particular empirical event that was interpreted in the mainstream as positive, 
praiseworthy, and general proof of the court as a site where justice is dispensed.130  
 
The Facts of the Case and the Rationales for the Decision 
The facts of the case as established by the Court are that Negev Bedouin nomads, citizens of the 
State, had undertaken large scale, illegal incursions onto state land in al-'Araqib, Wadi al-Baqqar 
and other areas, and had planted agricultural crops there. The respondents decided to destroy the 
crops by aerially spraying herbicide, Monsanto's Roundup, from 2002 to 2004.131 The Bedouin 
petitioners challenged this policy on the grounds that the spraying of herbicide was done ultra vires 
of the Plant Protection Law,132 which authorizes the Minister of Agriculture to carry out pest control 
activities for a single purpose only, which is the protection of plants and the environment. However, 
the spraying was performed without warning, and it endangered the health and dignity of Bedouins 
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in the vicinity of the spraying. It was also harmful to animals and the land.133 The petitioners 
refuted that the land was state land and countered that the settlement proceedings to determine 
the land’s owners were still ongoing.134 The respondents denied that the herbicide Roundup 
presented any risks to health. They emphasised that according to legal provisions they had a duty 
to protect the state's ownership and possession of its land for the benefit of the public. According to 
the respondents, Bedouin incursions onto state land did not concern only the affected areas as 
raised in the petition but was a pervasive phenomenon of repeated illegal incursions onto extensive 
tracts of land in the Negev owned by the State. The respondents insisted that the herbicide 
Roundup was safe and remained one of the most commonly used herbicides in Israel and the 
world.135  
 
During legal proceedings, in 2005, the court issued an order nisi barring the practice of aerial 
spraying until the petition had been decided on.  
 
In 2007, the court delivered its decision. The court found the ILA’s actions of the aerial spraying of 
Roundup a violation of the constitutional rights to dignity and to life and a violation of the 
fundamental right to health, as encoded in Israeli law, and also drew on various international legal 
provisions to support their decision. In deciding in favour of the petitioners, Justice Joubran, who 
wrote the majority opinion, ruled that the act was performed ultra vires of the Plant Protection 
Law,136 and the executive branch of government had no authority in the law to conduct the 
spraying. Justices Arbel and Naor ruled on a different rationale. Justice Arbel found that the act had 
a legal basis, particularly in the Public Land (Eviction of Squatters) Law whose provisions granted 
the authority the right to evict ‘squatters’ and to destroy or uproot or undertake any other act to 
return the land to its original state.137 However, the spraying operation failed the proportionality 
test, as the harms caused to the right to life, the right to dignity and the right to health of those 
affected superseded the benefit accruing to the public in the state enforcing its right to property 
and its right to evict squatters. The right to evict squatters stemmed from the duty of the state, as 
Arbel elaborated, to prevent incursions and illegal planting on state land to ensure public benefit of 
that land, and also to relay to the public and ‘lawbreakers’ that the rule of law cannot be treated 
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lightly.138 In applying the three-pronged proportionality test, Justice Arbel quotes then Supreme 
Court President Aharon Barak to explain why the third subtest, where measure is made of whether 
the benefit stemming from the act supersedes the harm, is a cornerstone of Israeli democracy: “It is 
an expression of the concept that there is an ethical barrier that democracy cannot pass, even if the 
purpose that is being sought is a proper one”.139 
  
However, what are we to make of the particular narratives and statements of fact as recorded in the 
legal decision where the chief assumptions of the state surrounding the case – of ‘the Bedouin’ as 
‘nomads’, squatters and lawbreakers that threaten the development of the land in keeping with 
Zionist prerogatives (which necessarily exclude the Bedouin as ‘non-Jews’) – are then reconstituted, 
packaged and deployed as facts by the court? This more circumspect critique of the Abu Mdeghem 
case, informed by postcolonial theory and deconstruction, is reason why caution rather than 
celebration is how the legal decision should be received, while also signalling how legal decisions 
by the Israeli Supreme Court vis-á-vis Palestinians might be better understood. 
 
A Discussion around Postcolonial Theory 
Colonialism is both the exercise of power and control over a native population via racial 
rationalities,140 and their exclusion, dispossession, and displacement by the colonizing class.141 As 
Goldberg142 describes, drawing from Foucault,143 the construction and deployment of racial 
rationalities is termed ‘racialization’. Racialization creates a hypothetical hierarchy of beings, 
creates physical/mental distinctions between them, enabling a legitimate and ethical subjugation 
and different levels of entitlement and restriction.144  
 
Fanon poetically depicts in his exploration of the French colonization of Algeria in The Wretched of 
the Earth,145 how the dehumanization and exclusion of the colonised Algerians circumvented 
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burdensome moral queries about racialized colonial spaces on account of the French. Therefore, as 
differential exclusion enabled the creation and persistence of racialized spaces146, places marked by 
their housing of particular racial groupings, the inegalitarian distribution of resources, services and 
security between those racialized spaces posed no hard, moral questions for the colonizing class. 
Rao and Pierce147 write that colonial governmentality created minute distinctions of race and status 
that were encoded into forms of rule that encompassed extreme bodily violence and the more 
benign ‘rule of law’. Where violence on racialized, colonised bodies seemed necessary but also 
antithetical to civilized governance, it required a more moderate, less obviously tortuous, form of 
discipline, which found possibilities of realization in ‘the rule of law’. 
 
Scholars like Kimmerling,148 Shafir149 and Shamir150 have demonstrated how Zionism was in 
essence a colonial movement, and others like Zureik151 and Yiftachel152 have shown how Israel 
operates as a colonial settler state. More recent work looks at how settler colonialism operates in 
the Naqab.153  
 
Yiftachel points out that in the case of the Naqab Palestinians, the twin goals of securing land and a 
Jewish demographic majority defined the Israeli policy towards this community.154 The Zionist 
settler policy of settling and Judiaizing the land was threatened by the fact that the Palestinian 
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community in the Naqab exerted possession in various forms over 3-5 million dunams of land.155 
Further, the community were sizeable in number and enjoyed high fertility rates.  
 
What postcolonial theory attempts to treat are the contestations, forms of agency, counter-currents 
and complexities in colonial encounters that tend to be ignored if adopting a Fanonian Manichean 
dichotomy between the colonizer and the colonized.  
 
Stoler and Cooper assert that colonial regimes were neither monolithic nor omnipotent.156 
Therefore, there were competing strategies for maintaining control, doubts about legitimacy of the 
endeavour, questions about how much ‘civilizing’ of the natives should occur, and competing 
conceptions on the extent of power being diffused through capillary157 and arterial forms.158 
Further, a postcolonial approach would not discount the role of native leaders and elites in assisting 
the colonial project, the reconstitutions of identity among the colonizing class, the negotiations 
between capitalist and imperialist interests that were not necessarily always aligned, as well as the 
multiplicity of actors, power struggles and contradictions in colonial contexts.159 
 
The postcolonial current of this case study has taken its form inspired by three texts. The first, 
Yehouda Shenhav’s postcolonial study on the subject of ‘Arab Jews’.160 Arab Jews explores, in the 
context of Zionism, how colonised, racialized identities of Jews from Arab/Muslim lands are 
constructed, but purified, patched together and unraveled, by emissaries whose own identities 
were fluid and changing, as a means of encouraging the immigration of ‘Arab Jews’ and enabling 
their absorption into the Israeli settler state. Shenhav illustrates how the Zionist subject is 
manufactured around three intertwined, heterogeneous and necessary categories that are the 
ideological structure of Zionism, namely nationalism, ethnicity and religion. However, the 
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heterogeneity of the ‘Arab Jews’ category is unacknowledged by state institutions, but is packaged 
as homogenous and uniform. Shenhav accepts the hegemonic definition and counterposes a critical 
opposition to it; doing what he feels Spivak would refer to as ‘strategic essentialism’.161 Shenhav's 
work underscores how identity is constructed, how it is constituted of non-essentialist 
underpinnings, while it acknowledges the ‘rhizome-like’ character of ‘nation’ and ‘history’, which is 
not composed by ‘the single story’162 but is constituted of numerous contradictions and breaks. 
Shenhav's work is of particular import for this case study because it allows for a circumspect take 
on identifiers such as 'Negev Bedouin', probing the silences in such an identity construction and the 
power-effects behind its use. The construction of the Zionist subject in Arab Jews as a means to 
facilitate their immigration to that same place where similar homogenous constructions of Negev 
Bedouin are deployed, as a means to have the former take the place of the latter, speaks specifically 
to the power-effects behind homogenous identity constructions.  
 
I then draw from the deconstructivist work of Spivak,163 whose postcolonial reading challenges the 
linear progression of history and elite historiographies and emphasizes the heterogeneous strands 
and indeterminates in politics, ideology, economics, sexuality and history that constitute the 
subject. Specifically, it is Spivak's tracking of the work of the Subaltern Studies group164 and their 
efforts to bring hegemonic historiography into a crisis that I have taken as the second textual cue in 
shaping this analysis.  
 
Spivak cites Ranajit Guha who writes that although the prose of the colonial class in archives takes 
shape based on the will of colonial administrators, it is itself based on the will of the insurgent.165 As 
Guha notes, despatches, minutes, and reports of counterinsurgent archives are informed not on the 
will of the counterinsurgents themselves, because the will of the counterinsurgents is predicated on 
the will of another – that is the insurgent. Colonial administrators act in response to acts by the 
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colonised. Therefore, we can read a rebel consciousness in bodies of official evidence.166 Spivak 
similarly engages with the work of subaltern studies scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty who attempts to 
account for the gaps in the historical record, arguing that they are as representative of working 
class conditions as any direct description of them.167  
 
While Shenhav's work allows us to scrutinise the construction of 'Naqab Bedouin' identity, Spivak's 
writings tell us where to direct that scrutiny. Spivak's tracking of the work of the subaltern studies 
group is a cue to look for traces of the native informant not in a native informant composed text, but 
in the text of official historiography, in the text of a legal decision, which I've chosen as the subject 
of analysis. According to Spivak, only the texts of counterinsurgency, that is of the colonial 
administrators, give us some idea of consciousness of the insurgent/the subaltern,168 as being 
subaltern is about being excluded from official historiography.169 As soon as a subaltern speaks, to 
Spivak it is as if that person ceases to be subaltern.170 Why this line of thinking is influential is that it 
enables us to track the native informant/subaltern both in the text and in the gaps of the Abu 
Mdeghem legal decision. Granted Spivak's strict definition of 'subaltern', those Naqab Palestinian 
citizens who have managed to speak on their own account and for their community before 
international fora, Israeli officials and in the media, could be said to have ceased being 'subaltern' in 
that their effort at representation was able to catch official lines.171 
 
Finally, the theme of violence is recurrent in the legal decision. However, there are certain forms of 
violence that are underscored while other forms are undisclosed; certain actors and victims 
identified, while others brushed over. The third cue that this chapter draws on allows for a 
postcolonial take on the phenomenon of violence in a situation of ongoing colonialism. This builds 
on the form of violence that we touched upon in the previous chapter, that is, law’s foundational 
violence during the founding of a new sovereignty. Carmela Murdocca explores how for indigenous 
people in Kashechewan, Canada, a site of water contamination for many years, ongoing colonialism 
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is effected via forms of legal and structural violence.172 The phenomenon of structural violence 
applied to this study allows for a more rigorous critique of the conceptions and representations of 
violence raised by the court. 
 
Structural Violence and Historical Amnesia 
Juxtaposed to the facts of the case and the rationales for the legal decision are the stories of 
alterity/otherness that are deliberately elided as a necessary feature of structural violence in a 
colonial setting. Drawing from Galtung173 and Farmer,174 Murdocca explains how ‘structural 
violence’ is systemic violence by those that belong to a certain social order directed at others where 
the effects seem 'wrong' and yet nobody’s fault and the suffering of those affected is obscured. The 
difficulty in naming structural violence is an historical amnesia that prevents current acts of 
structural violence to be associated with, or to be seen as an effect of, a specific perpetrator or 
historical referent. 
 
Applying this phenomenon of ‘structural violence’ to the particular colonised place of the Naqab 
allows us an opportunity to provide an alternative reading to the spraying of agricultural crops than 
that stated as its official purpose. According to both the State as respondent and the court, the 
spraying was a means to stem incursions on State land and to ensure the possibilities of public 
benefit to those lands. However, reading the performance of spraying as 'violence' and opening up 
the possibility of considering it violence that is structured, historical, ongoing as is characteristic of 
'structural violence' as a form of ongoing colonialism allows us to reach conclusions that are 
markedly different from those reached by the court.  
 
The crop spraying constituted a number of violent acts. It caused the destruction of thirty square 
kilometres of agricultural land where wheat, barley, corn and watermelon were being grown and 
were feeding a politically and economically marginalised community. Often times the spraying took 
place without warning.175  
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It was accompanied by the police, border guards and inspectors from the Green Patrol,176 the latter 
a governmental body that is noted for violently handling residents of the Naqab as a means to effect 
state control of land.177 The spraying occurred over residential areas as well178 and as a result many 
of the residents had to be hospitalized, among them children.179 The act killed; it was both violent in 
debilitating the inherent fertility of the land and was responsible for the death of livestock and the 
spontaneous abortion of goat fetuses.180 According to the expert opinion of Dr Eliahu Richter, 
submitted by the petitioners, the spray substance, Monsanto’s Roundup, presented risks to fertility, 
caused congenital defects and may have been carcinogenic. In the expert opinion of Dr Ahmad 
Yazbak the dangers of Roundup included eye and skin irritations, and prompted frequent abortions, 
nausea and breathing difficulties.181 As would be in keeping with the phenomenon of structural 
violence, the suffering and the gravity of violent destruction is for the most part anesthetized. The 
court deliberates and decides with a concurrent historical amnesia. Therefore, at the heart of the 
legal decision was a remedy to the arbitrary and illegal administrative act of the destruction of 
crops planted by citizens. However, by eliding a retrospective turn, the court's decision was 
intended to treat one spoke in the historic wheel of structural violence experienced by Palestinians 
from the Naqab. And therein lay its ineffectiveness. Immediately following the temporary injunction 
to ban the aerial spraying of crops, the State resumed its destruction by plowing the land with 
tractors,182 a method of crop destruction that continues today.183 
 
The Court's lack of engagement around the contested legal status of Naqab land was also very 
problematic. As touched upon in Nuri’s land claims case, effectively all the land in the Naqab is 
considered by the state as being mawat (dead land that has been uninhabited and uncultivated for 
an extended period of time) based on the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, thereby according 
ownership of the land to the state. The Israeli-legislated Land Rights Settlement Ordinance 
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(1969)184 took precedence over the Ottoman legislation and provided for land to be registered in 
the state's name unless legal title said otherwise. In 1921, under the British Mandate, authorities 
passed The Mawat Land Ordinance,185 which the Israeli state considered the last opportunity to 
gain legal title for mawat land. As the vast majority of Bedouin had not formally registered their 
lands and so could not prove title, the only option left to claimants was to prove that said lands 
were not of the mawat category so as to invalidate registration of the land as State-owned.  
 
However, it has been near impossible for Naqab Bedouin to prove that the land they claim 
possession, ownership or use of was not mawat in the middle of the 19th century. Orientalist 
rationales of Bedouin encampments not counting as settlements and of pastoralism as non-
productive use of land have been standard court findings to deny recognition of Bedouin claim to 
Naqab land, since the 1974 al-Hawasheleh186 case until the recent Supreme Court decision in Nuri’s 
case. Of nearly 200 land rights cases that Naqab Bedouin have brought before the courts, all have 
been decided in the state's favour.187 The state began a land settlement process in the 1970s, 
whereby Naqab Bedouin who had claims to land were invited to appear before the Land Settlement 
authority to put forward his/her claim. As a result, 776,856 dunams were claimed.188 However, the 
State made no genuine attempt to resolve the claims since they began the land settlement process 
in the 1970s, except to file counter-claim suits.  
 
From interviews I conducted with persons with outstanding claims, like Nuri, I was made to 
understand that it was as if the State was waiting for the claimants to die so that their claims would 
expire with them. Although the land settlement process is still ongoing, meaning that the 
authorities have officially registered the fact that there are contested claims on land ownership, the 
courts continue to refer to the Negev Bedouin collectively as 'the dispersion'. An engagement with 
the above facts would have precluded the court's use of labels conferring illegality, such as 'the 
dispersion', 'squatters' or 'interlopers' when referring to the affected communities. As a result of 
the lack of adequate engagement with these issues, the court effected a deliberate historical 
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amnesia which furthered the structural violence, which has come to be a recurrent experience of 
the Naqab Bedouin before the authorities.189  
 
As the ruling was reached on the basis of the injuries caused specifically using the chemical 
Roundup, the history of structural violence experienced by the Naqab Bedouin did not actively 
influence the decision. Therefore, the remedy provided meant that a particular performance of 
structural violence, the aerial spraying of the chemical substance Roundup, could no longer occur. 
However, the destruction of crops and the eviction of Naqab Bedouin from lands they occupy and to 
which they lay ownership claim, in plowing of the lands, an “agrotechnological” instance of 
structural violence, were allowed to continue. In fact, this form was sanctioned by the court, which 
stressed the duty of the state to protect the land from illegal encroachment, owing to its status as an 
“unparalleled vital resource” and “national asset”.190  
 
Structural violence, resting as it does on being without historical referent, was reduced to only a 
vague mention by Arbel. At the tail end of her decision, she references some of the historical context 
provided by the petitioners in their petition of the community’s poverty, unemployment, 
inadequate housing and their substandard health, educational and welfare facilities. The land's 
contested legal status and the histories of violence, however, are not mentioned. Further, Arbel 
supplants this vague historical context with “distress does not justify committing illegal acts”.191  
 
What a Postcolonial Reading Enables: Locating Foreclosure, Racialization and Humanitarianism, 
and the Trace of the Native Informant  
In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Spivak demonstrates how the Lacanian concept of foreclosure 
is effected on the native informant, or the subaltern, in the great texts of Marx, Hegel and Kant.192 
Foreclosure is the sense of a specific defence mechanism in which “the ego rejects the incompatible 
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idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all,”193 so 
that an element is rejected outside the symbolic order as if non-existent.194  
 
The legal decision, in being composed by Israeli Supreme Court judges, is an example of 
counterinsurgent text. Although references are made to subaltern Bedouin, their voice is rendered 
stemming from a homogenous mass, the specificities of their very human suffering unheard, while 
only the legally ‘relevant’ facts of the case are mentioned and debated. 
 
In the reading of the legal decision, we see how certain elements are foreclosed – namely, law’s 
violence and the violent events of 1948 that speak to the content and nature of rights to the land in 
the present. This case study will focus on the foreclosure not of the native informant (as in Spivak), 
since in many ways he/she is specifically referenced (even if much is missing in such reference) but 
on those elements that are crucial to the rationales behind the decision, but nevertheless are 
completely unaccounted for. These elements are so far outside the symbolic order that they are 
rejected completely, and remain unaddressed by even the petitioners. 
 
The reading of the legal text provides us with two other manifestations – one, the explicit narrative 
of the courts that mark a 'worlding' of what the Court assumes is as an uninscribed world.195 Here 
the legal text ignores, by deliberate non-inscription, the lived histories of the Naqab Bedouin 
population, and itself creates and defines a world that the Naqab Bedouin are said to inhabit. As a 
result, narratives of fact (read ‘truth’) are constructed, reformulated and deployed by the court of 
Bedouin racialization. In concert with the narratives of the court's 'humanitarianism', which is 
another explicit element of the decision, credence is given to the right of colonial rule. 
 
Second, there are implicit elements that are not completely foreclosed nor explicitly stated, but 
through the careful deconstructivist technique of 'tracing', the native informant makes a subliminal 
and discontinuous appearance. Tracing is the technique whereby subaltern agency can be evinced 
in the gaps and remnants of the text, with an understanding that from text we can also gauge that 
which has been silenced, elided but nevertheless subsists. Tracing the native informant in the 
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decision hints at the agency of the subaltern in asserting her/his claim to land that is at the same 
time claimed, and violently contested, by another. Performing the trace to expose native informant 
agency, we also come to appreciate how the court's racialized representation of the native 
informant is a necessary device to speak of the centrality of land in the Israeli national imagination. 
 
Foreclosure in the Abu Mdeghem Case 
The expulsion from the unconscious in Lacanian psychoanalysis as a self defence mechanism is 
what Spivak evidences in the foreclosure of the native informant in Kant’s third critique, The 
Critique of Judgement and in Hegel’s reading of the Hindu scripture Gita.196 The Abu Mdeghem 
decision also forecloses elements that are so incongruent with the particular worlding of the world 
undertaken by the judges and the legal system, that they are treated as non-existent. The 
petitioners do not broach the foreclosed subjects of law’s violence and the violence of 1948 because 
they know that such subjects would be deemed irrelevant to the case; the rules of legal process 
preclude any possibility of these issues from being received, let alone discussed. As law is able to 
interpret what it can follow, precedent, and what it can hear, evidence, elements of narration that 
are untranslatable render the entire code of which they are part lost.197 Yet, these are the very 
elements that speak to the heart of the issue, how law is being used by the executive to displace and 
dispossess and how the legal system is unable to effectively remedy these administrative wrongs. 
The events of 1948 mark the originary violence that birthed the conflict over whose land and what 
rights therein. Acknowledging these elements would help identify the act not as ‘excessive’ by the 
executive, but as a spoke in the wheel of structural violence, debated in a forum, the court, that is 
unable to acknowledge its own violence, and thereby the historical and current impediment it poses 
to providing an adequate and just remedy.  
 
In ‘Force of Law’, where Derrida engages with Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, the theme of 
originary violence of the law is discussed.198 As Benjamin describes, every act of the legal system 
conserves the originary violence on which it was founded. The foundational moment was when a 
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previous (out)law was violently undone and a new law violently enforced. Zizek199 holds that to 
foreclose its originary violence, as Israeli law does, is the necessary condition by which law sustains 
itself, by hiding this foundational violence in which it was birthed. To acknowledge that 
foundational violence, which is hidden but conserved in every legal act subsequently, is to undo 
law’s authority and eternal character and law’s subject’s fetishism for and allegiance to it. 
 
The violent events of 1948 are similarly foreclosed. Therefore, the judges make no reference to the 
fact that roughly 90% of Palestinian Bedouin from the Naqab were expelled or forced to flee, while 
those remaining were forcibly concentrated in a closed reservation under Military Administration 
rule with basic civil liberties of freedom of movement, freedom of association and the right to 
property denied.200 In fact, concentration in the reservation enabled that land in use, possession or 
ownership of the Naqab Bedouin be expropriated and transferred to state ownership without due 
process. This is precisely what happened in Nuri al-‘Oqbi’s case during his family’s expulsions from 
their lands in al-‘Araqib. And this is the cornerstone of the land conflict between the Naqab Bedouin 
and the state today.  
 
It was brought to the attention of the Court how the family of petitioner Salman Abu Jilaydan, from 
the Wadi al-Baqqar area that was sprayed in March 2003, was present on the sprayed lands before 
the Israeli state was founded in 1948. At the very least, such a fact ought to render the term 
‘squatter’ inappropriate to describe his family’s legal status. Abu Jilaydan’s family was forced to 
move out of their lands in Wadi al-Baqqar during the war in 1948 but returned in 1952 and 
continued with the planting of wheat and barley and raising sheep.201 However, had the court 
deemed ‘squatters’ inappropriate to describe the Abu Jilaydan family, the legal backing to use 
‘reasonable force’202 of eviction provided by the Public Land (Eviction of Squatters) Law would not 
apply, making administrative action ultra vires, and precluding the judge from recommending that 
the state enforce its duty to protect state land via evictions, at least as regards the Abu Jilaydan 
family. 
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There was also no reference made by the court to documentary evidence that indicated how the 
state discussed in 1951-52 how the Bedouin were expelled/fled the land and how the State 
intended to concentrate the remaining in a closed reservation in order to free up western Naqab 
land, considered ‘rich’, for Jewish settlement.203 
 
The necessary foreclosure of both the law’s violence and the violent events of 1948 enable the 
spectacle of the law to function as intended and for the status quo over the land conflict to be 
maintained. To address the issues would force the court to cease using a term like 'squatting' to 
describe Naqab Bedouin settlement and would radically alter the facts of the case and the 
framework the court applies in adjudication.  
 
By foreclosing these subjects, the court effectively ignores over six decades of human suffering, 
pain, of the lived experiences of military administration coercion, of community disintegration, 
impoverishment, forced relocations and physical violence. The court as an ideological actor, an 
actuality whose contents we will flesh out in more detail over the course of the case study, thereby 
prevents any link from being drawn between administrative wrongs committed today from those 
that were committed in 1948 and precludes possibilities of the State assuming historical 
responsibility.  
 
This is, therefore, also how we come to understand the enabling of law’s violence conserving its 
originary violence – that which was able to strip privilege from the land’s original inhabitants and 
accord it to the incoming, preferred ethnicity. The purging of historical violence is also generative. 
By de-linking between wrongs today from those of 1948, and by abdicating historical responsibility, 
colonial governmentality enables similar privilege-granting and privilege-taking rituals to be 
reproduced (maintaining their originary production), deployed and consequently, amplified.  
 
Explicit Elements of the Decision: Racialization and Law’s Humanitarianism  
From the particular locus of Abadan, on the Iranian side of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, Shenhav 
explores how the Arab Jewish subject is constructed by Zionist emissaries working for Solel Boneh 
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in the 1940s, a construction company that built and maintained oil-refining facilities under the 
aegis of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Solel Boneh company provided cover for the 
emissaries’ illegal entry into Iran and Iraq to recruit Jewish communities into the Zionist project of 
settling in Palestine.204 
 
Shenhav notes how the Zionist emissaries saw Arab Jews as “difference”, as ‘others’ in a colonial 
reality where they were Orientals vis-à-vis Europe, and as Jews in their (Arab/Muslim) national 
paradigm.205 Drawing on Latour,206 Shenhav argues that Zionism adopts the simultaneous 
processes of hybridization (hybridizing secular with religious) and purification (treating 
nationalism and religion as two separate spheres, obscuring the hybridization) to create modern 
Jewish nationalism. Religion is equated with the premodern which represents Arab Jews. 
Conversely, secular stands in for the modern and this represents European Jews.207 However, for 
Arab Jews to be absorbed, even if partially, into the Israeli national imagination, they are propelled 
towards assuming a national and religious identity but pressured towards relinquishing their Arab 
identity.208 In this way, Arab Jews were constructed in the service of a particular colonial project of 
encouraging settlement. 
 
Yet, as in many colonial projects, in addition to the settlement of the colonizing class, there needs to 
be a concomitant displacement, exclusion and dispossession of the natives. How do Israeli legal 
narratives construct Bedouin subjects to facilitate this colonial project? In the decision’s summary, 
the Bedouin are referred to as interlopers under ‘facts of the case’,209 as lawbreakers210 and as 
nomads,211 the latter even though the community was fully sedentarized by the early 1970s and 
underwent processes of sedentarization as far back as the mid-nineteenth century.212 Further, the 
rationality and legal dexterity that mark Justice Arbel’s thirty-nine page decision strengthen the 
legitimacy of the particular worlding that it performs. Therefore, we are told to see the Bedouin as 
undertaking incursions onto a very precious, national resource, thereby restricting the ability of the 
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public, which we can infer does not include non-Jews, to enjoying the land. The Bedouin are 
therefore framed as outsiders to the national consensus and threatening to it.213 The violence that 
state representatives mete out on the Bedouin is equated to that directed by the Bedouin towards 
the state,214 and in fact the judge reprimands the Bedouin for their ‘reckless’ behaviour in 
endangering themselves.215 State violence manifests in the spraying of a toxic substance that 
threatened the health and forced the hospitalization of the affected, among them children, and 
killed livestock and crop. All the while individual violent reactions from the Bedouin were 
contained with the threatening presence of police and the Green Patrol.216 Therefore, similar to how 
Arab Jews were racialized by Zionist emissaries and later state institutions, the legal decision 
demonstrates the racialization of Naqab Bedouin towards the facilitation of a particular colonial 
national objective. 
 
Justice Arbel’s obiter dictum on ‘the Bedouin society in the State of Israel’217 clues us into how the 
court envisions Bedouin be absorbed, inadvertently with unease and in a process never fully 
achieved,218 into the national Israeli paradigm. Referring to the Bedouin as “an integral part of 
Israeli society”, she cites the petitioners’ arguments, which themselves are supported by a 2000 
State Commission of Inquiry, to make note of how economic, housing and health disparities result 
in part for the Bedouin’s lawbreaking activity of squatting. However, Arbel is quick to backtrack on 
this truncated historical context, reminding all participants of the legal spectacle that violence 
against the sovereign is never acceptable, “Distress, no matter how great it is, cannot justify 
breaking the law” [italics added]. The parting message of the decision is that law is without origin, 
is supreme and is what makes “a civilized country”; under no circumstance can breaking it be 
tolerated.  
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Justice Arbel closes with her vision of how the Bedouin ought to be recognized. This form of 
recognition, which is at the same time the Bedouins’ need to be absorbed into Israeli society, 
recommends, 
 
 “a complete and comprehensive systemic solution, and the sooner the better… will be 
capable of allowing the integration of the Bedouins once and for all in Israeli society as 
citizens of equal status, who have equal rights and equal obligations. It should be 
emphasized that this call is not directed solely at the state authorities. It is also directed at 
the Bedouin population itself, which as I have said is also responsible for the position in 
which it finds itself, as well as for the nature of its relationship with the authorities. The two 
sides are jointly responsible for the situation which I call upon them to change, even if in 
greater or lesser degrees and in different ways. Only by means of communication, 
collaboration, tolerance, a recognition of joint interests and a willingness to make 
compromises — on both sides — will it be possible to succeed in changing the situation” 
[italics added]219 
 
It is hard to grasp how the recommendation by Justice Arbel that the State “take determined and 
uncompromising action”220 to evict Bedouin squatters aligns with her recommendation that 
communication and collaboration be the markers of future relations between the State and the 
Bedouin. Uncompromising action seems to preclude the possibilities for genuine communication 
and collaboration between the state and the Bedouin.  
 
For communication, there needs to be a transaction between speaker and listener. Subalternity is 
the condition whereby there is no listener in the transaction of ‘speech’,221 meaning there is no 
communication, but rather a 'talking at'. Not being able to make speech acts is the consequence of 
not being able to be heard. Naqab Bedouin's lived experience of structural violence and the 
contested legal status of the land are both unheard - by the state and most significantly by the court, 
that which is prescribing 'communication'. In their failing to make speech acts catch official ears, 
the Naqab Bedouin condition is expressive, at least on the issues of structural violence and the 
contested legal status of the land, of their subalternity. The court's refusal to hear jars with their 
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recommendation that 'communication' inform official relations with the Naqab Bedouin. The court, 
which is meant to keep executive action in line with democratic principles according to 
administrative law, is prescribing that which itself is unable to perform. 
 
Arbel's endorsement of compromise fails a number of the prerequisites to ethical and moral 
bargaining between contending groups in the jurisprudence on compromise and in the ethics of 
exchange. Compromise between contending groups forces each to ask what are one’s own 
priorities/interests that they can trade for other goods that they would prefer.222 For the bargaining 
to be honest and fair, deception, manipulation, evasion and exploitation are necessarily 
precluded.223 The party proposing, and possibly mediating, compromise and negotiation should be 
a relatively neutral party for the negotiation to be honest and fair. Yet, the court can hardly be said 
to be that neutral party given its uncritical adoption of the state's position on the 'nomadic' and 
'illegal' nature of Naqab Bedouin settlement. The occlusion of historical referents to the case also 
render the court’s mediation as problematic.224 
 
Further, the proposal to compromise seems, at best, imperceptive. Negotiation between conflicting 
parties in the form of alternative dispute resolution does have its benefits. Arbel's proposed 
negotiation could save the burdens of traditional litigation, such as the expenses accrued by both 
parties, the burden on public resources, and the formality that accompanies the legal process.225 
Arbel proposes a collaborative strategy in the negotiation between the two parties, as opposed to a 
competitive one. Therefore, value-embedded trades are envisioned to satisfy both parties' interests. 
There is a particular long-term objective implicit in the negotiation, that is preserving the 
relationship and integrating Bedouin 'once and for all' into Israeli society. On the other hand, the 
competitive strategy in negotiation is sensing the possibilities to exploit the other party on their 
account of being legally inept or overly trusting. If one side is resolved to a collaborative strategy, 
the resolution to adopt a competitive strategy by the other side would mean walking away with a 
bigger slice of the pie. Following that line of thinking, we could assume that the strategy chosen by a 
party in this instance would be influenced significantly by what one believes one has to lose in the 
exchange. Naqab Bedouin do not possess the same resources to legal astuteness as is available to 
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the state, and the law of trespass has always already implicated them as wrongdoers. They are the 
trusting party, in that they agreed to initiate a legal process that they deemed impartial enough to 
hear their petition. Yet, the negotiation process in contractualism can also be defined by the social, 
economic and racial components that define the parties, whereby the party that perceives itself 
socially, economically or racially superior, in our case the state, will choose a competitive strategy 
to maintain its advantage or elite status.226  
 
Arbel’s recommendation of compromise comes after she recognizes that the ‘two sides’ are equally 
responsible for the current conflict. Therefore, alongside with equating the extent of violence 
performed by both sides, there is the implicit assumption that the conflict between the State and 
the Bedouin is one of balance, hence the need for communication and compromise. Yet the histories 
of structural violence and the vanishing present moments of it do not accord with the relationship’s 
characterization as one of balance. A common criticism of alternative dispute resolution is how 
power disparity plays to the advantage of the more powerful.227 
 
These considerations in mind, the court's endorsement of collaboration and negotiation between 
the state and the Naqab Bedouin is not what it seems. In the mind of the court, Naqab Bedouin do 
not hold the land, so they are not being forced to compromise such a right to the land. What 
Bedouin are being forced to compromise is planting and living on land that is not theirs. But not 
being theirs, to compromise it should be easy. Implicitly the court seems to be saying that Bedouin 
stubbornness in living on and off land that is not theirs, what are Bedouin priorities/interests in 
this situation, should be compromised in exchange for the goods that are the development 
townships the state has constructed for them. The court has made it clear that on the other hand 
the state holds the land. The state is not asked to compromise their interest in the land, because 
they own it, whereas the Bedouin do not. Rather, what the state is being asked to compromise 
appears to be the enormous power at its disposal to enforce their ownership to the land.  
 
The recommendation to compromise is not so as to reach a solution whereby the genuine concerns 
of both parties are addressed. Rather, it is done so that the state does not overstep the law and 
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threaten the democratic image that justifies the right to colonial rule. This idea seems to accord 
with what was considered the ‘paradox of colonial discipline’. The paradox is that violence on 
colonised natives seemed necessary but also antithetical to civilized governance. In order to 
discipline but at the same time maintain the representation of being a civilized country, as the court 
characterizes the state,228 requires a more moderate, less obviously tortuous, form of discipline. 
This form of discipline was realized in ‘the rule of law’.229 The court is not calling for the state to halt 
its use of violence to enforce its right to the land. On the contrary, "the state is required to act 
forcefully, through its various executive organs".230 What the court is calling for is the state's 
measured use of violence. In what could be akin to a teacher's slap on the wrist of a student that 
should have known better, the court appears to be asking, 'Does the state not realize that law's 
sanction and its threat of violence, together with your own executive efforts, are sufficient enough 
to adequately discipline, punish and deter Naqab Bedouin from squatting, thereby preserving your 
important, central and constitutional right to the land'? The court is endorsing a violence that is 
measured, meaning that the violence not be excessive and second, that it is measured in the sense 
that it is also precise, to reflect the formalism of the law (which ultimately determines executive 
action and the rights and responsibilities of citizens). The court, as in Nuri’s case, once more 
performs the law as objective and formal.  
 
If Arbel's proposal to negotiate is located on ethically shaky ground, how can we understand its 
purpose vis-à-vis the context of Bedouin being integrated as citizens of equal status in Israeli 
society? If we follow Himani Bannerji’s critique231 of Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition,232 or 
Elizabeth Povinelli’s thesis in The Cunning of Recognition,233 we come to appreciate how recognition 
in colonial contexts creates an aura of accommodation and toleration that masks the imperial 
histories and colonial violence that then tend to be hidden indefinitely.234 By encouraging 
negotiation and compromise, and eliding the structural violence of ongoing colonialism, it seems 
that the court is advocating that the status quo continue, that Naqab Bedouin remain a counterpoint 
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to the preferred Jewish ethnicity. In this way, the Bedouin are resolved to being authentically 
Bedouin, ‘recognized’, yet as per the status quo, differentially excluded. 
 
The Justice’s references to those affected by the crop spraying in her obiter dictum and even when 
talking about the harm caused235 are to ‘Bedouin’, as opposed to naming the particular persons 
harmed and the specificities of that harm. Yet, the spraying took place in around fourteen different 
localities in the Naqab, on seven different occasions over the span of three years, and in 
circumstances that were specific to every spraying act. Therefore, the acts against individual 
Bedouin varied in terms of the extent to which they were affected, the number and extent to which 
their animals were hurt, and the consequence to the health of the land. There were those who were 
hospitalized and those who were not, spraying occurred mostly without warning except on a few 
occasions, and the physical violence at the hands of the state and the threatening presence of police 
and other security forces was experienced differently by each member of the community. What, 
then, explains the judge's use of such generalization? Homogenization, Goldberg writes, is the 
hallmark of a population’s racialization. They are constructed as a homogenized mass that then 
facilitates the creation of hypothetical hierarchies between them and the referent, preferred 
ethnicity, enabling a legitimate and ethical subjugation and different levels of entitlement and 
restriction.236 When a ‘Bedouin’ identity is constructed, its meaning embedded with the 
aforementioned qualifiers or historical schema of reckless lawbreakers, squatters, nomads, then the 
deployment of these understandings are greatly facilitated with simply the use of the term 
‘Bedouin’. This also saves the risk of sounding racist and illiberal in repeatedly specifying varied 
ugly character traits; it becomes enough to say 'Bedouin'. 
 
Law’s humanitarianism is explicitly stated in the legal decision. Drawing on Kelm,237 Murdocca 
shows how the nation responds to the Kashechewan water crisis and contamination with an act of 
national goodwill, by saving and compensating the affected indigenous community.238 In a similar 
vein, the legal decision was shown to be a humanitarian ruling, one that kept governmental excess 
in check, and looked out for the health and dignity of the affected Naqab Bedouin community.   
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This positive ‘humanitarian’ ruling can be seen as a cornerstone of colonial/racial rule, the message 
being that we are humanitarian and so have a right to rule over you.239 Justice Arbel underscores 
the state’s responsibility to protect citizens from indirect or direct results of state actions. She 
concludes that the State is obligated by a (humanitarian) law to protect the Bedouin from 
themselves, who she says we can expect to ignore the issuance of warnings.240 The construction of a 
humanitarian court is seen when Justice Arbel cites a previous case overseen by former Supreme 
Court President Barak, affirming that the present ruling is in line with the “constitutional 
democracy” that Israel is. A judicious approach to the proportionality test helps the Court “maintain 
a system of human rights”, guided by “ethical barrier(s)” that minimize harm even if an action is 
undertaken for a proper purpose.241  
 
Further, Justice Arbel underscores the possibility of unintentionality in the state being insensitive 
or disrespectful to Bedouin.242 This despite the testimony of Saleem Abu Mdeghem that his wife was 
sprayed while tending the field, that the Green Patrol had prevented him from reaching his wife to 
assist her, and requests to police to call an ambulance were denied.243 Sayyah Abu Mdeghem also 
gave testimony that the aerial spraying took place on his land in al-‘Araqib without prior, adequate 
warning to residents as required by law244 and the lack of warning is supported by others similarly 
affected.245 However, Justice Arbel concludes that “the premise in our case is that the state is acting 
legitimately… and certainly it seeks to prevent any harm to the Bedouin citizens”.246 
 
A Postcolonial Sensitivity to Power Relations and Judicial Reasoning 
Yet, are we slipping into the hold of Manichaeism whereby a colonial situation is characterized by 
an all powerful colonizer oppressing a forsaken and feeble colonised class? Postcolonial theory 
reminds us that identities are fluid, changing, negotiated, contested, and rewritten, that the 
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colonised also exhibit agency, even if with ‘selective sovereignty’, meaning that subjects of power 
are active agents yet not completely self-sovereign in the construction of their conscious will.247  
 
Foucault reminds us that power is neither an institution nor a structure, “it is the name that one 
lends to a complex strategical situation in a particular society”.248 Power’s operation is intelligible 
as a moving base of force relations that by their inequality induces states of power, with ‘moving 
base’ implying that the power base is taken away from the character of intentionality.249 As Deleuze 
instructs us, although power may be the result of a moving base of force relations, it is nevertheless 
a fairly stable system, one that we can represent as ‘power’. Its state of equilibrium is maintained by 
‘attractors’ or equilibrium points, though it is nevertheless open-ended and subject to fracture 
owing to the potentiality of the virtual and the virtual structure’s processes of individuation.250 
Spivak notes that the act of naming it power is the closest one can get to it. This sort of naming can 
be called catachrestic, the misapplication of a word to overcome poverty of expression.251 Similarly, 
the complexities of power relations in this particular court spectacle, encompassed in the written 
and unwritten in the legal decision and in the historical materialism, and our own historical sense, 
that informs it, tells us this story is not one of powerful oppressing the powerless. I will return to 
this point when performing the native informant trace in the legal decision. First, however, it is 
worth looking at how a postcolonial sensitivity may have informed a different decision.  
 
For one, the accounting of ‘Bedouin identity’ as monolithic, homogenous, nomadic and with all the 
racialized inscriptions of criminality would not stand up to a postcolonial critique. The individual 
subject is a plethora of inscriptions as much as she/he insribes politics, sexuality, history and 
ideology. As Spivak elaborates, the ‘subject-effect’ of the subaltern as subaltern consciousness 
doesn’t account for heterogeneous strands and indeterminates that constitute subaltern 
consciousness. Therefore, that which is the subject is actually an amalgam of an immense 
discontinuous network (‘text’ as she uses it in other places; assemblage if we use Deleuze’s term) of 
strands that are politics, ideology, economics, sexuality, history. Therefore, the subject is actually an 
effect of an effect. The subject-effect of the subaltern, that is subaltern consciousness, thereby 
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substitutes an ‘effect’ (of many heterogenous factors) for a ‘cause’ (‘this subject’ causes subaltern 
consciousness).252 The judicial rationale is far less generous, positing that the subaltern 
consciousness in this case, generalized to envelop all Naqab Bedouin society in Israel, is sovereign 
in its exercise, and therefore fully responsible for squatting, violently reacting to police and 
therefore of breaking the law. Even if we can assume that the ‘distress’ this community faces, the 
effects of poverty, housing inadequacies and poor health and welfare services, constitute in part the 
Bedouin subject, we are told that the Bedouin bear responsibility, because their consciousness is 
essentially sovereign in its exercise. 
 
Similarly, a postcolonial sensitivity would invite historical referents to inform the ratio. It would 
consider the histories of forced expulsion, military administration, home demolitions, 
administrative violence, planning discrimination and governmental plans at concentration and 
freeing up the land for the settlement of Jewish immigrants. It would also appreciate the 
incongruence of such practices with basic anti-discrimination provisions in Israeli law, and would 
not ignore the contours of human suffering that circulate in these encounters. The suffering of the 
subaltern would then be better grasped, as would the realization that the violations to the 
fundamental right to dignity and to the basic rights to health and to property are not to be 
consigned to the particular instance of being sprayed with Monsanto’s Roundup between 2002-
2004. Rather, the violations would be seen as symptomatic of structural violence before the 
authorities ever since Palestinian Bedouin were constituted as being outside the Israeli Jewish 
constituency. Further, the role of the legislative and the judiciary in this structural violence is 
clearly indicative of their lack of postcolonial sensitivity. As a result, the violence of that which they 
make and adjudicate, law, is far easier foreclosed than it is queried.  
 
Tracing the Native Informant in the Decision  
Performing the native informant trace in the legal decision is an attempt to read a text of 
counterinsurgency for evidence of subaltern agency. The discontinuous appearance of the subaltern 
is in the gaps of the text and in the will of the judges who inscribe the text, the judge’s will in part 
predicated on the will of the subaltern. If we follow Derrida, as the judges attempt to undertake an 
‘explanation’, as is done in every textual production, what we can trace “is the itinerary of the 
constantly thwarted desire to make the text explain”.253 Applying this understanding to our reading 
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of the legal decision helps us to appreciate that when the judges compose a text, they are also telling 
us something that is not part of their textual composition. Also, when judges compose, we should 
understand their rationale and motivation as not a product of sovereign agency, but rather 
motivated in part by the effect of Naqab Bedouin agency (the unspoken and unwritten), which itself 
is a product of other effects. Drawing from this, Spivak contends that explanation, in this case a 
requisite of legal authority, is the desire to have self and world. The “possibility of explanation 
carries the presupposition of an explainable (if not fully) universe and an explaining (even if 
imperfect) subject… [By explaining] we exclude the possibility of the radically heterogenous”.254 
These exclusions via explanation were explored above, showing how law's violence and the 
violence of 1948 were foreclosed, how structural violence is excluded from explanation, how 
constructions of Bedouin identity and law's humanitarianism in judicial explanation shuts out the 
lived experiences and affective investments of the subjects - of that identity and of that law - as they 
do not accord with official explanation. 
 
Nevertheless, by tracing the native informant we do not restrict ourselves to revealing that which 
has been hidden nor do we confine ourselves to exposing distortions. Rather, by tracing the native 
informant we are able to understand the shifting, contentious, contradictory forces at play in power 
relations between the Israeli state and the Naqab Bedouin. The aim of the native informant trace is 
to go beyond cautioning of the law and prescribing disenchantment.255 As a result of our effort we 
are able to locate agency in the subaltern and defeat the Manichaeism of which postcolonial theory 
warns.   
 
Before applying the proportionality test, Justice Arbel applies the limitations clause test, which aims 
to answer if the violation of human rights is nevertheless constitutional and lawful.256 For a 
violation of human rights to be lawful, the limitation clause of Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty sets out four conditions that need to be satisfied: that there is authority in 
statute for the violation, that the violation befits the values of the state; that the violating norm has 
a proper purpose; and that the violation is not excessive (the fourth condition being the 
proportionality test).  
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Finding the first two conditions satisfied, Justice Arbel turns to the third condition of the limitations 
clause test. Tackling the third condition of ‘proper purpose’, she explains the meaning of the term as 
“the purpose of a statute will be deemed proper if it serves a public purpose whose realization may 
justify a violation of human rights”.257 She finds that the purpose “is a very proper one” given the 
centrality of land to the Israeli national project.258  
 
Justice Arbel then borrows in part from Justice Or in the Sedei Nahum Kibbutz case to explain why 
Israeli land is so important to the national project:  
 
“The State of Israel is a small country. Its territory is limited, and its land is a very valuable 
resource. Public land, in particular, constitutes an important national asset, since it is an 
essential basis for future development of the state and society… The first respondent, which 
is responsible under the law for retaining possession of state land and managing it, has the 
duty to protect it so that it can be used to further various national and other goals…”259 
 
“Land is a unique asset among state assets. It is hard to exaggerate its importance to society 
and the state. If the nation and its cultural enterprise are the “soul” of the people, then its 
land is its “body.” On the basis of land the individual and society conduct their whole lives… 
 
“Land is an unparalleled vital resource and it has great value. It is of especially great 
importance in a country like Israel, where the territory is small, the population density is 
high and there is a policy of absorbing immigration. It is impossible to create land… 
 
“… [those entrusted with public land should] ensure that it has sufficient land reserves for 
the various needs in the future, whether for building, agriculture, industry and other gainful 
occupations…Awareness of the need to spread the population is also required”.260  
  
It is because land is vital, a national asset and necessary for immigration absorption to answer “the 
need to spread the population” that makes the following a governmental duty:  
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“The widespread phenomenon of incursions onto state land in the Negev in particular requires the 
state to take effective measures to remove the squatters and the incursions [sic]”.261 
 
What we can trace here is the itinerary of Palestinian Naqab Bedouin effecting agency that is 
threatening to the state ethos that envisions the unison of the land (body) and the Jewish people 
(soul). It therefore requires the state to take forceful, effective measures to enable their eviction 
from the land and to foreclose the possibilities of hearing the native informant speak.   
  
The community’s particular “politics of contention” to expand common understandings of 
citizenship, and framed increasingly in terms of indigeneity,262 is exercised beyond the utilization of 
political arenas like the courts, the Knesset and civil society organizations. Naqab Palestinians are 
exerting a presence on historical lands in spite of the cycles of structural violence they face as a 
consequence. In the eyes of the State and the courts, ‘the Bedouin’ are not only lawbreakers, but 
undermine the cornerstone of Zionism, that rightly exercised enables consummation of the people 
(adam) and the fertile land (adama) towards the realization of God’s righteous city, their living 
union incomparable to other nations in the world.263 A pioneer of modern Zionist thought, Moses 
Hess, speaking of the faithful Jews, wrote they need a land of their own, “a common native soil”, the 
earth “to realize the historical ideal of our people, an ideal that is none other than the reign of God 
on earth”.264 As Justice Arbel emphasises, land is a requisite to satisfying both the social and 
spiritual imperatives of the state. It is 'an unparalleled vital resource' that enables the social goal of 
'the future development of state and society'. By being the 'body' (adama), land communes with the 
Jewish nation, the 'soul' (adam) thereby enabling the spiritual, historical ideal of Zionism. 
 
According to Shenhav, Zionism emerged from a theological context and ostensibly passed it by 
transforming religion into modern nationalism. Yet, Zionist nationalism, operating as it does via 
simultaneous processes of hybridization and purification, remained theological, so that conceptions 
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of the nation revolve in part around the theological myths of ‘redemption of the land’ and a ‘return 
to Zion’.265,266 
 
Although Arbel professes that Bedouin have formal democratic representation in being equal 
citizens,267 and that her ruling is in line with the constitutional democracy that Israel represents268 
(she finds in favour of the petitioners269 based on the democratic value of human dignity and the 
right to life), this postcolonial reading of the decision indicates otherwise. The judges employed a 
deliberate historical amnesia towards the structural violence that the community has faced for 
decades. Also, they framed the community in absolute, homogenizing and racialized terms of 
criminality. Therefore, being 'a fact of the case' we are told to see the defendants for their 
lawbreaking activities and for the violence they exert on the authorities who attempt to evict them. 
We are told to see the defendants not for their humanity, but within the strictures of criminality. 
The absence of due attention paid to the varied forms of violence exerted on Bedouin bodies and 
the loss of animal life as a result of the spraying fails the test of adjudicating based on the 
democratic value of the sanctity of life. One would also be very hard-pressed to consider the court's 
call to compromise and negotiate and the simultaneous endorsement that the state forcefully evict 
illegal Bedouin as adjudication inspired by 'social justice', however hard that term may be to 
define.270  
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As an ideological actor committed to the social and spiritual projects of Zionist nationalism, the 
court needs to first, perform a foreclosure of law's violence and the events of 1948 and then to 
secondarily, racialize Bedouin and present that which it adjudicates and makes, law, as 
humanitarian. To allow the space for foreclosed subjects would threaten to unravel the very project 
to which it has stated its commitment and for whose longevity it adjudicates in the manner it does. 
 
Coming back to the native informant trace, in its performance we are able to identify how the 
steadfastness, sumoud,271 of Naqab Palestinians in holding on and exerting their rights to historical 
lands is an act of considerable accountable reason (Spivak’s characterization of ‘agency’) that falls 
significantly out of line with the national Israeli script. It therefore elicits the court to call for a 
prompt, comprehensive solution and Bedouin's integration into Israeli society. Integration should 
be read as neutralizing their agency and the bestowing of recognition so that Naqab Palestinians 
can be enveloped into the fold of liberal (tempered by ethnocratic prerogatives) citizenship in a 
Jewish state. The national script is the securing of land for the spread of the Jewish population and 
for the absorption of Jewish immigrants, mandated in part by the theological underpinnings of 
modern Israeli nationalism. Therefore, the trace enables us to understand precisely why the legal 
judgement is not progressive, and should be treated with caution over celebration, because the 
ruling affirms the centrality of land to the Israeli national project, and the necessity of Naqab 
Palestinians’ exclusion from it. 
 
In an interview with Salem Abu Mdeghem,272 somebody Spivak would be hesitant to call a ‘native 
informant’ or ‘subaltern’ given his professional position as lawyer and well-known community 
activist that is able to be heard by official ears,273 we discussed the case, where his own family had 
been affected by the spraying in al-‘Araqib. Considering the ruling ineffective, he drew my attention 
to what he considered to be at the heart of the matter. According to Salem, the law is built on a 
Zionist ideology that directs land be taken over by the State so that it can be made ‘Hebraic’. A 
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precursor to such making is that the land needs to be expropriated from Naqab Palestinians that lay 
claim to it.  
 
Conclusion 
The court’s conceptualization of time and space stems from the official historical narrative of 
Judaism, itself hybridized and purified by modern Israeli nationalism. As Shenhav points out, 
modern Israeli nationalism, taking from the Zionist movement, divides the past into two periods: 
the ancient past when Jews were in the land of Israel before the destruction of the temple and the 
past in exile, following the temple’s destruction. However, in constituting the exile as metacategory, 
the Zionist movement succeeded in obliterating Jewish histories in other kingdoms, the 
heterogeneity of Jewish communities’ experiences, while sovereignty was seen in the kingdoms of 
David and Solomon as a positive time, a time to which to return. The void between exile and the 
return and foundation of modern Israel was bridged in the constitution of a single historiographic 
narrative line linking the ancient past to the present.274  
 
This linear progression of history between the Kingdoms of Solomon and David and Israel’s 
foundation in its 1948 independence is an elitist historiography that ignores the other histories, 
both of Arab Jews and Palestinians at large, that don’t fit into this sequential timing. Their lived 
experiences and memories are either expropriated and recast as national memory,275 as in the case 
of Arab Jews, or for the most part erased, as we see in the court’s accounting of Naqab Palestinian 
history.  
 
As Spivak alerts, time and the process of timing as a sequential event prevents us from reading life. 
Freud suggested that ‘real lived time’ is produced by the machinery of the mental theatre. 
Therefore, we grasp life and ‘ground-level’ history as ‘events’ by fleshing out ‘time’ as a sequential 
process. This Spivak calls ‘timing’ – therefore, this feeling for ‘time’ prevents us from feeling for life 
or history.276 
 
Yet it is precisely by fleshing out events that contribute to the national narrative that other 
alternative events are kept at bay. This is a very important element of the judgement, where just as 
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time is isolated to certain fragments that support ‘the single story’, the dirt, the alternative histories, 
are kept at bay. The alternative history of Palestinian presence, ownership, land, law, memory, 
suffering, economy, affect, agency and loss on the land, the same land that is to be ‘native soil’ on 
which to realize the dream of Zion, is like ‘dirt’, matter out of place, that needs to be kept separate 
from the sacred277 for fear of contamination of the other.278 
 
Yet Buber’s endorsement of the realization of God’s righteous city through the unison of land and 
the people, we could say, exhibited postcolonial sensitivity. Buber recognized Palestinian presence 
on the land and called for sharing the land with Arabs, because Jews know of rejection.279 In words 
not characteristic of the Israeli court’s ‘precedent-setting’ ruling, Buber underscored how, reading 
from Leviticus, the land does not belong to a specific people but to all, because it is not of the 
people, but of God.280 The court’s conception of right and responsibility to the other is much less 
informed by philosopher and Talmudic scholar, Levinas. On the infinite right, what he refers to as 
‘Jewish humanism’, Levinas contends its basis is not the concept of man but ‘of the other’, the extent 
of the right of the other is that of a practically infinite right.281 And this also marks the break (within 
which deconstruction exercises itself) between droit/right/law and justice, where law is the 
calculable, the founded, the enforced, it encapsulates the performance of the Israeli court. What the 
Israeli court makes no attempt at is the ethical turn to the other, justice, as infinite, incalculable, 
heterogeneous, ethical alterity.282 I will turn to Levinas, and specifically Judith Butler’s endorsement 
of his ideas on the Jewish conception of ethical responsibility, when discussing recognition in the 
final chapter.  
 
The ethical turn to the other is enabled in part by an unlearning. The unlearning would mean seeing 
one’s privilege as one’s loss283 and exercising a critique of what one cannot not want.284 This 
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deconstructivist reading of the space between law and justice would mean that the court would 
work critically back through its particular history and prejudices modelled as they are on 
mainstream Israeli nationalism and elite historiography and their learned and instinctual responses 
that entrench this privilege. As Spivak stresses, our learnings about race and nation are a closing 
down of creative possibilities of other knowledge, which is knowledge we are not equipped to 
understand because of our social position. Unlearning means to gain knowledge of Naqab 
Palestinians who occupy spaces most closed to our privileged view. This then could perhaps make 
possible for the court to speak to them (and not just ‘at them Bedouin’) so they may “take us 
seriously” and “be able to answer back”.285 The court’s imaginings around land as a vital, national 
public asset crucial to the realization of God’s promise to the Jewish people is something the court 
cannot not want, that is, it is the basis for the ruling that functions to protect the land in effecting 
the unison of adam and adama. Yet, it is precisely this imagining, of what the court cannot not want, 
that a deconstructivist reading would critique, asking what about this want betrays an ethical turn 
to the other, what about this want makes it difficult to sit oneself ethically, what about this want 
does not accord with the possibility of justice? Only by probing and working against the grain can 
the court unseat itself as a means to ethically reseat itself.  
 
In tracing the native informant in the Abu Mdeghem legal decision, we were able to locate how 
sumoud was a marker of the tremendous power effected by Naqab Palestinians, challenging the 
national ethos of land acquisition to enable the spread of the Jewish population on it. Therefore, we 
were able to grasp how power is not necessarily found in an institution or structure, like the Israeli 
court, but in Foucauldian terms is a moving base of force relations, whether enacted by ‘states’, 
historical currents, effects of ideology or hegemony emanating from and inscribed by multiple 
sources, or the selective sovereignty with which subalterns like Naqab Bedouin exact agency. It is 
the inequality of these force relations that produces ‘power’, painting a picture far more 
complicated than one of colonizer exerting power over colonised.  
 
All the same, it would be myopic to conclude for the sake of constituting the argument as displaying 
‘postcolonial sensitivity’, and with that requiring some measure of indeterminancy, that we cannot 
identify the scope and tilt of ‘inequality’ when talking about force relations. Although Justice Arbel 
places equitable onus on the two sides in solving problems in her obiter dictum, performing what 
may seem a recognition of agency on both sides and defeating the State-Bedouin/oppressor-
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oppressed dichotomous divide, what is actually being performed is a myopia of not seeing the 
forest from the trees. Seeing the bigger picture means weaving together the different threads of 
experience that tell of how power, ideology, hegemony and agency are performed.286 Arbel’s 
excessive focus on the empirical ‘facts’ of the case, of striking a balance between the two sides, 
prevents her from recognizing the historical materialism and historical referents of structural 
violence that inform it. As this chapter isolates a genealogical fragment in reading with postcolonial 
sensitivity the Abu Mdeghem legal decision, although it is able to show the effecting of tremendous 
agency on the part of Naqab Palestinians, it remains cognizant of the scope and tilt of ‘inequality’ in 
force relations. Accordingly, it appreciates how the interweaving of structural violence, 
racialization, and the foreclosed subjects of the violence of law and the events of 1948 constitute 
Israeli legal hegemony, law’s power and its necessary inability to hear the subaltern Naqab Bedouin 
speak.  
 
This case study calls for a deliberate disenchantment with the law. I applied various postcolonial 
techniques to illustrate why. We also looked at the paradigm of 'structural violence' to a situation of 
ongoing colonialism to provoke the silences in official descriptions of violence. The case study drew 
on the work around the heterogeneity of identity and history. It showed how what was considered 
progressive and important was a decision that failed its own democratic tests of adjudication. 
Finally, I attempted to apply deconstructive techniques to perform a native informant trace by 
reading an official text in the legal decision. 
 
In the following chapter, I will read the legal case of the sister-village duo of Atir and Umm al-Hiran 
which are threatened with demolition and eviction of all Bedouin residents to make room for the 
Jewish village of Hiran. As both Nuri’s case and the Abu Mdeghem case centre on land, the next 
chapter that also centres on land is a ripe opening to explore a new constellation, ‘spatial theory’, in 
this study. I will build on the identification of silences of human suffering (Nuri’s case) and 
structural violence (Abu Mdeghem) in Israeli adjudication to explore how several other elements of 
‘space’ – particularly the ‘social’ and lived aspects of it - are also silenced and the implications of 
such silencing for Naqab Bedouins’ interactions with it.  
 
The Postscript 
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The Solel Boneh company that was active in recruiting Jews from the Arab and Muslim world to 
settle in Palestine was also responsible, in the mid to late 1940s, for setting up Jewish settlements 
in the Negev, some in the place of existent Palestinian villages. In 1949, Solel Boneh demolished 
homes of Bedouin from Atir and Umm al-Hieran, the sister villages later sprayed in 2002287 and are 
today threatened with complete destruction. This cyclical profit-driven, capitalist performance of a 
construction company that engineered both colonial settlement and native displacement bears 
peculiar resemblance to the agricultural company that is the subject of the case, Monsanto. 
Monsanto, whose efforts coalesce with those of Solel Boneh in the Naqab region, also carries the 
mark of a capitalist venture, with a cyclical story angle, that is unwilling to reveal the negative 
effects that follow from its purportedly worthy and respectable mandate.288 While the defendants 
boasted that Monsanto's Roundup was one of the most commonly used insecticides in Israel and 
the world, what was conveniently absent was how Monsanto, owing to its aggressive and 
underhand marketing strategy, was also one of the most hated agricultural biotechnology 
corporations to those it professed to serve, farmers (Robin 2010).289  
 
In 2010, a study  was performed on Genetically Modified Roundup-Ready (GM RR) soy.290 GM RR 
soy is soy genetically modified to be resistant to Monsanto's herbicide Roundup, which when 
sprayed kills all plant life except the GM RR soy. The researchers found that Monsanto's claim that 
GM RR soy produced better yields, was economically and mechanically efficient in allowing for no-
till farming and used less toxic weed control were either short-term or illusory claims. Further, the 
harmful impacts of its use were not publicized by Monsanto.  
 
As was revealed through court proceedings in Abu Mdeghem, glyphosate, the essential element in 
Roundup has serious health and environmental impacts. The 2010 study showed that the use of 
Roundup, contrary to Monsanto's claims, produced low yields of the GM RR soy crop, interfered 
with nutrient uptake and increased pests and diseases. However, the most problematic impact was 
the phenomenon of glyphosate-resistant weeds, known as 'superweeds'. In order to kill these 
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superweeds, farmers were forced to use herbicides in greater quantity and potency. In some cases, 
the added herbicides failed and farmers were forced to abandon their land. 
 
It is the strange phenomenon of Roundup-resistant superweeds that prompts one to draw parallels 
between toying with nature and toying with humans embedded in nature. It is hard to miss the 
irony of how the state's oppressive policy in the Naqab mirrors Monsanto's oppressive policy of 
spraying Roundup. This policy effects Bedouin agency in sumood, as it does the phenomenon of 
superweeds. The state's policy of attempting to replace the Naqab Bedouin by settling Jews in their 
place, as GM RR soy takes the place of the natural features of the land, does not serve the stated 
purposes of sustainability and efficiency.  
 
Rather, and with disparaging associations aside, superweeds (Bedouin) spring up in the vicinity of 
the GM RR crop and prompt an elevation of herbicides (oppressive, violent, legal measures) to kill 
the superweed (Bedouin) presence. However, unpredicted by scientific formula, superweed sumood 
persists. The metaphor should clue in authorities to how, potentially, an upsurge in violent 
measures to eradicate Bedouin incursions and squatting will only lead to an increase in Bedouin 
sumood, much like the positive feedback cycles inherent in certain systems of nature. However, 
what loses in the process is soil fertility, energy, environment, animal life and the quality of human 
life. If farmers in Georgia were forced to abandon tens of thousands of dunams of farmland after 
losing out to superweeds,291 how will oppressive state policy render Naqab land? Will large tracts of 
Naqab land, whose settlement was once envisioned by Ben-Gurion as one of the most central and 
urgent duties of Zionist policy as a whole,292 be finally rendered unliveable? If unliveable, then will 
it, in irony, but finally in truth, acquire the label of mawat land? 
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Chapter 3: The Eviction Orders for Umm al-Hieran 
"I'm not against being cited. Cite me. I'm not breaking the law. The state is breaking the law". The 
interview with 'Atwa Abu al-Qi'an, native of Umm al-Hieran, an unrecognized village of five 
hundred in the Naqab had begun. We buried our heads in an indiscriminate, poorly lit corner at 
coffee-chain Aroma's Hebrew University branch, each sipping faintly bitter hafukh293. Seated at this 
Mount Scopus branch, which had about it an unsettling hue of exaggerated bloody red, we were not 
unaware of the university's dubious honour of contravening international law. Some four decades 
earlier, it was implicated in the expropriation of private Palestinian land, and the subsequent 
eviction of Palestinian residents, in order to expand its campus premises.294 
 
Yet 'Atwa and I were meeting to discuss a more recent attempt at eviction. We were meeting to 
discuss the civil appeal to court-issued eviction orders for the village of Umm al-Hieran. These 
orders, together with various other home demolition and eviction orders, threaten to forcibly expel 
one thousand Palestinian residents, comprising 150 families, from the sister-village duo of Atir and 
Umm al-Hieran. It struck me as curious how the court rationalized the forced eviction of these 
residents, particularly with the knowledge that an Israeli Jewish town was to be built in its place. 
Indeed, an expulsion of this magnitude was a step up from the routine home demolitions, police 
harassment and non-provision of basic amenities that is the experience of residents from the 
unrecognized villages. 
 
I asked 'Atwa if he had hope in the appeal, if he saw promise in the legal process to realize the rights 
of his community. He was unambiguous about the possibilities. "There is no court of justice in 
Israel... it's a lie, maybe when talking about [appealing] a traffic violation fine, but on the issue of 
land, there is no justice". I asked if he was referring to the land on which Naqab Palestinians were 
living. Equally unambiguous, he replied, "In all Palestine". He then proceeded to map out the history 
of his community for me.  
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Native Testimony: His-Story295 
As it happens, 'Atwa's family is not unfamiliar with eviction, as they had been forced to move on a 
number of occasions in the past. After the 1948 war, under the imperatives of Israeli military 
government, the Abu al-Qi'an family were first expelled to Laqiya from their historical lands in 
Khirbet Zubaleh, presently within the jurisdiction of Kibbutz Shoval.  They were subsequently 
moved to Khirbet al-Huzayyel, where fellow al-Huzayyel tribe members under Sheikh al-Huzayyel 
resided, to the area of Jighili (today Kibbutz Lahav), Kohleh and Abu Kaff.296 In 1956, about two-
thirds of the original tribe, around two hundred persons, conceded to the order to move to Wadi 
Atir, their present location, and the locus of this case study.  
 
Throughout the period, requests to return to their historical lands in Khirbet Zubaleh were turned 
down by the military authorities. The military authorities leased the family seven thousand dunams 
of land for residence, agriculture and grazing after the family completed the procedural steps of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. All the same, the residents were dismayed by the land's poor quality, 
compared to that which they held in Khirbet Zubaleh. In 1963, the government transferred part of 
the family's farmed land to the Jewish National Fund. Around the time of the 1967 War, 'Atwa 
recalls "being caught in the cross-fire", as Jordanian forces used to shoot into Israel,297 though the 
tribe received no protection from the state. As the years progressed, the majority of the family's 
farmed land was turned into a forest. In the early 1980s the lease of land they were issued upon 
agreeing to move in 1956 was cancelled by the Israel Lands Administration.  
 
In 1969, under the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance [New Version], the government initiated the 
land-title settlement process, inviting Naqab Palestinians to register land ownership claims with 
the Land Settlement Officer at the Ministry of Justice.298 Thereafter, in 1973, the family registered 
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their claims to lands in Khirbet Zubaleh. Their claim is pending, as are the majority of similar land-
title settlement claims by Naqab Palestinians.299  
 
In 2002, the planning authorities undertook an amendment to the Master Plan for the Southern 
District300 to construct the Jewish settlement of Hiran in the vicinity of these villages; this was 
approved by the hierarchically senior National Council for Planning and Building (NCPB) and 
subsequently by the government. In July 2002, the government issued a decision301 for the 
establishment of 14 new Jewish settlements in the Naqab and Galilee, including Hiran. It was 
described by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a "national necessity".302  
 
As the planning process progressed, the 2007 Partial District Master Plan for Metropolitan Beer 
Sheva was submitted and it too accounted for the Jewish settlement of Hiran.303 Yet, conspicuously 
absent in the plan's explanatory notes and maps, as well as in that of previous plans, was any 
mention of the villages of 'Atir and Umm al-Hieran.304 Rather, these official documents had 
disappeared them, representing the space as empty. It is this particular conceptualization of space, 
of the land as empty, awaiting Jewish settlers, that informed some of the germinal ideas in Zionist 
thought and was a rallying call for settlement in the new yishuv period (pre-1948) and founding 
years of the state.305 And yet today it seems incredible that one would fail to grasp the diversity of 
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Sheva, Israel: HaMachpil Ltd, 2006) at 19, Neve Gordon, “Uprooting 30,000 Bedouin in Israel”, Al-Jazeera (April 
3, 2012), online: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/2012421020291808.html  
300 District Master Plan – Southern District No. 14/4 (Amendment No. 27) – Suburban town of Hiran. 
301 Cabinet Decision No. 2265 of 21 July 2001, “Building new settlements and recognizing existing ones”. 
302 Hana Hamdan, “Individual Settlement in the Naqab: The Exclusion of the Arab Minority”, 10 Adalah’s 
Newsletter (February 2005) at 2 [Hamdan, “Individual Settlement”] 
303 District Master Plan No. 14/4 (Amendment No. 23) – Partial District Master Plan for Beer Sheva (Beer Sheva 
Metropolitan Area). 
304 Hamdan, “Individual Settlement”, supra note 302 at 4 
305 It is worth flagging that there were streams, though in the minority, that did not subscribe to a reductionist vision 
of Palestine’s demographic makeup. For example, Eastern European Jewish essayist, Ahad Ha'am, wrote in 1891 
after a visit to Palestine that contrary to the Zionist belief that Eretz Yisrael is almost totally desolate, in truth it was 
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this space and the rival claims that render it bitterly contested. Do the courts conjure this space as 
essentially contested and not terra nullius? Or does the court’s conceptualization of space mirror 
that of the new yishuv’s in the early 20th century? I will take up this query later in my analysis. 
 
Having been rendered invisible by the authorities, the community nevertheless appealed to them 
for recognition. The community felt that gaining visibility would put a halt to plans to displace them 
and would also mean receiving essential services, such as being connected to the national water 
and electricity grids, which they were currently denied. Drawing on the support of human rights 
NGOs Adalah and Bimkom, they filed an objection to the National Council for Planning and Building 
(NCPB) against the plan.306 The response of the Southern District Planning and Building Committee 
was that the residents should move to the development town of Hura. The NCPB solicited the 
services of Advocate Talma Duchan307 to provide recommendations to the objections filed. In her 
report, Duchan called for the partial recognition of the sister village duo, effectively granting 
recognition for a rural settlement within the boundaries of Atir,308 which was met with the NCPB's 
approval. However, the Prime Minister's office intervened309, ostensibly on account of security 
considerations, and in November 2010 the NCPB withdrew their approval.310  
In 2003, a year after the planning authorities earmarked Hiran for settlement, they began legal 
efforts to demolish homes and evict residents from Atir-Umm al-Hieran. Among these legal 
undertakings is the motion to the Beersheba Magistrate's Court for demolition orders against all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
difficult to find fields that are not sowed. He derided Zionist use of such a terra nullius characterization of the land. 
Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi, Jews and Christians under Islam (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press/Associated 
University Presses, 1985) at 105, cited in Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 
1881-1999 (New York: Knopf, 1999) at 42. 
306 Adalah, “Adalah and Bimkom Demand Recognition and a Master Plan for the Unrecognized Village of Atir-
Umm al-Hieran in the Naqab” (November 26 2007), online: 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/pr.php?file=07_11_26 
307 Duchan formerly served as chief of the Jewish Agency's (JA) planning team for the Galilee (Zuckoff 1987). The 
JA, where Duchan was formerly a high-level employee, is responsible for immigrant absorption and rural settlement 
with a policy, like that of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), of serving Jewish interests to the exclusion of 
Palestinians (Abu Hussein, McKay, Access Denied, supra note 58 at 154). 
308 Talma Duchan, “Recommendations of the Researcher to the Objections to TM"M 23/14/4 –The Partial District 
Master Plan for Metropolitan Beer Sheva”, Investigatory report to the TM"M 23/14/4 – Partial District Master Plan 
for Metropolitan Beer Sheva (June 21, 2010) (Hebrew) 
309 Gabi Golan, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Planning and Development in the PMO, sent a letter on November 
15 2010 to the NCPB urging the reconsideration of their decision to grant the villages recognition, citing, among 
other factors, existing living options in Hura. The NCPB scheduled a meeting the following day at which they 
rescinded their approval. See Khoury 2010. 




homes in Umm al-Hieran, ex parte, without informing, and in the absence of, homeowners.311 A few 
months after the motion was filed, the Magistrate Court issued the demolition orders without 
hearing the homeowners, who only discovered their homes were to be demolished when police 
were deployed to execute the demolition in 2007. Adalah filed a series of court requests to the 
Kiryat Gat Magistrate's Court312 to cancel the 33 home demolitions but the court rejected the 
motion, and instead suspended the application of the decision by a year to give the residents and 
the authorities time to negotiate alternative housing solutions. According to Adalah's Attorney 
Suhad Bishara, "The judge ignored the history of the people of Umm el-Hieran who were uprooted 
from their ancestral lands and displaced to the land of Umm el-Hieran by military order in 1956" 
and completely supported the government's intention to clear the area for the settlement of Jewish 
citizens in their place.313 Adalah filed an appeal to the Beersheba District Court,314 but this was 
rejected on March 19 2014.315 
 
In April 2004, the authorities filed eviction lawsuits against all the residents of Umm al-Hieran, with 
the Magistrate Court ruling in their favour316 and the District Court upholding the decision.317 A 
motion for appeal to the Supreme Court was subsequently filed318 but this was rejected on 5 May 
2015 in a 2-1 decision. This case of eviction orders against Umm al-Hieran, and in particular the 
Magistrate and District court decisions, is the focus of this chapter.  
 
In late 2010 I drove down to Haifa to meet with the chief attorney working on the eviction case. I 
was flitting through white paper photocopies in the sitting room when a senior staff member 
approached. We exchanged pleasantries. Sipping from her generously sized coffee mug, she asked 
what case I would be inquiring into that day. "Atir-Umm al-Hieran". She chuckled, "Which Atir-
Umm al-Hieran case? We have half a dozen different Atir-Umm al-Hieran cases!" Indeed, among the 
other legal submissions submitted by Adalah, besides the planning objections and legal petitions 
                                                          
311The State of Israel v. Anonymous, Different Motions (DM) 6615/03, Beer Sheva Magistrates’ Court. 
312Sabri Abu al-Qi’an v. The State of Israel, DM 2136/09, Kiryat Gat Magistrates’ Court. 
313 Adalah, “Court Rejects Motion to Cancel Home Demolition Orders in Unrecognized Arab Bedouin Village of 
Umm al-Hieran in the Naqab; Adalah to Appeal” (December 12, 2011), online: 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/12_12_11.html 
314Abu Al-Qian v. State of Israel, Criminal Appeal 50761-01-12, 
315 Adalah, “District Court Rejects Appeal against 33 Home Demolition Orders in Arab Bedouin Village of Umm el-
Hieran in the Naqab” (2014), online: https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8258 
316The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, [2009] CC 3326/04 
317Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an v. The State of Israel, [2011] Civil Appeal (CA) 1165/09 
318Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi'an. v. The State of Israel, Motion for Permission to Appeal 3094/11 
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already mentioned, include a water petition319 and an objection filed with the Southern District 
Committee for Planning and Building to cancel the 'Yatir Forest Plan'.320 This latter plan, 
spearheaded by the Jewish National Fund, seeks to evict and demolish the homes of the five 
hundred Palestinian residents of 'Atir. The plan is then to plant trees in their place.321 
 
The Abu al-Qi'an Case 
Procedural History and the Magistrate Court Decision 
In 2004, the state filed lawsuits with the Beer Sheva Magistrates' Court to evict residents of Umm 
el-Hieran.322 These eviction lawsuits, together with previously filed eviction lawsuits, aimed to evict 
all one thousand residents of Atir-Umm al-Hieran. The state claimed that the Bedouin residents 
were trespassers on state land and had not received permission from the state to settle there. 
Accordingly, the state was seeking their eviction. 
 
In the eviction lawsuits, the state argued that Bedouin who had lost past eviction cases had 
subsequently moved to the recognized development town of Hura, where there remains availability 
of homes. According to the state, the purpose behind the respondents wishing to stay was to 
acquire higher compensation as many homes now fell within the boundaries of the Jewish 
settlement of Hiran.323  
 
According to the residents, respondents in the case, they had been moved to the Wadi Atir area in 
1956 under military order, where they remained with the consent of the authorities, and so claimed 
they were not 'trespassers'. In their view, the eviction lawsuits were injurious to their 
constitutional rights to equality, property and human dignity, and were inconsistent with the 
limitations clause test for actions infringing on human rights. Accordingly, they called for the court 
                                                          
319Salib Abu al-Qi'an vs. The Government Authority for Water and Sewage, CA 2541/12 
320 Objection to the "Yatir Forest" Plan No. 264/03/11 
321 For more on the dubious aspects of official green-friendly environmentalism in the Naqab, see Al-Beit - 
Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Israel, JNF eBook Volume 3 - Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing: 
Judaizing the Naqab (January 2011), online: http://jnfebook.net/JNFeBookVol3.pdf, Irus Braverman, Planted 
Flags: Trees, Land and Law in Israel/Palestine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Braverman, 
Planted Flags], Zafrir Rinat, “JNF using trees to thwart Bedouin growth in Negev”, Ha'aretz (December 8, 2008), 
online: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/jnf-using-trees-to-thwart-bedouin-growth-in-negev-1.259038 
322 The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, [2009] CC 3326/04. The statutory basis for the eviction 
lawsuits is found under the laws for the protection of ownership and possession, specifically Article 17 of the Land 
Law 5729-1969. 
323 Protocol of The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, CC 3326/04 (June 4 2009), Nasser Rego, The 
Efficacy of the Israeli Legal System in Protecting and Fulfilling Naqab Bedouin Land Rights, LLM Thesis (Toronto: 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2009) at 138-139. 
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to dismiss the lawsuits. Adalah's motivation for taking on the case was the discrimination that 
underpinned the eviction orders. They saw both the action and its effects as discriminatory, and in 
their reading of the case, there was also government intent to discriminate.  
 
The court identified that at issue was determining whether the residents had certain prescriptive 
rights to the land that should prevent their eviction. The court placed the burden of proof on the 
residents as the state was owner of the land. 
 
The Magistrate Court determined a number of 'facts'. It found that the community's living quarters - 
illegally constructed tin, mud and cement shacks - did not count as investment in property and so 
the respondents did not have a right to demand compensation for their eviction. No statute of 
limitations applied against eviction since prior to the lawsuits being filed, the state did not revoke 
permission for the residents’ stay there. As the court clarified in its decision, only at the point where 
the state revokes permission does the period of the statute of limitations begin.324 
 
The court determined that the respondent's claim of discrimination, whereby their eviction was set 
to make room for the Jewish town of Hiran, was beyond the court's judicial authority to determine, 
while also irrelevant to answering the central issue at hand, which was if the residents had certain 
prescriptive rights to the land that should preclude eviction. The court stated, "maybe the 
respondents will find a remedy in the sphere of constitutional and administrative law before the 
appropriate court, however, in the current constitutional legal setting, these claims do not form a 
basis for their claim to a right to the land, or a defence from prosecution by the appellant, by force 
of its ownership of the land" (para. 13).325  
 
Rationale and Decision of the Magistrate Court 
The court established that the standing of the respondents was that of having authorised 
entitlement to the land, as their settlement was undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the 
state. Aside from authorised entitlement, the court determined that the residents had no other 
prescriptive rights to the land. Owing to the fact that the state gave permission to the community to 
reside on the land free of charge, the court found that the state could revoke its permission "at any 
                                                          
324 The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, [2009] CC 3326/04 at para. 11.  
325 Ibid. at para. 13 
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time".326 Rights stemming from adverse possession327 did not apply since permission to settle was 
granted, thereby the 'hostile' condition for adverse possession was not satisfied. The court found 
that the payments made by the respondents to the state for the agricultural use of the land did not 
give rise to any prescriptive or ownership rights to the land. The courts found that the respondents 
did not prove that the authorities promised them certain rights to the land upon their consent to 
move from their original village of Khirbet Zubaleh.328  
 
On the basis of the respondents not picking up the burden of proof that they had rights to the land 
that should prevent their eviction, the court ruled in favour of the state and issued the eviction 
orders. 
 
The District Court Decision 
In fairly short deliberations, the District Court confirmed the findings of the lower court. Among 
these, it found that as the state gave permission to the community to reside on the land free of 
charge, in the absence of evidence such as a lease agreement, the state could revoke its permission 
at any time. It affirmed that it too was not an appropriate forum to deliberate the constitutional 
issues raised, directing the appellants to raise planning objections with the relevant tribunal, 
presumably the Supreme Court or the planning authorities. 
 
Motion for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court 
Following the District Court decision, the residents filed a motion for permission to appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 329 However, the Supreme Court denied the motion and upheld the decision of the 
lower courts in a 2-1 decision. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Daphne Barak-Erez found that once 
it was determined by the lower court that the residents were not illegal trespassers (as the 
respondents had claimed) but permitted residents, the authorities ought to have reconsidered the 
format of the eviction and the compensation that would be granted to the residents in the event of 
eviction. However, the authorities did not. As the original eviction demand by the authorities was 
based on the claim of illegal trespassing, the fact that the authorities did not change the format of 
                                                          
326 Ibid. at para. 11 
327 The doctrine of adverse possession transfers title to a non-owner of land upon the satisfaction of basic conditions 
such as her continual, exclusive occupation for a sufficiently long period of time. In addition, the occupation should 
be hostile to the interests of the true owner and without the owner's consent, as well as ‘open’, meaning that the 
owner is aware of the occupation. See the elaboration on the doctrine of adverse possession below.  
328 The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, [2009] CC 3326/04 at para. 11.  
329Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi'an. v. The State of Israel, Motion for Permission to Appeal 3094/11 
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the eviction procedure meant that there were flaws in the authorities’ conduct, both in terms of 
legal procedure and public law.330 For the majority, Justice Elyakim Rubenstein found as the lower 
courts had, that the residents did not acquire a right to the land but resided on it as permitted 
residents, free of charge. Therefore, the authorities’ revocation of that permission was lawful and 
there was no need to intervene in the decisions of the lower courts.331  
 
Before interpreting the magistrate and district court decisions, I’d like to outline the relevant legal 
doctrines that apply. 
 
The Legal Issues: Adverse Possession and Prescriptive Easement, Equality and Non-Discrimination 
Adverse Possession and Prescriptive Easement 
The doctrine of adverse possession assigns title to a non-owner who exerts physical possession 
over land and makes use of the property via certain stipulations, such as cultivation, for a 
sufficiently long duration of time. The possession is also determined to be actual, exclusive, 
continual, open and hostile.332 Accordingly, the original owner of the property loses title, which is 
transferred to the adverse possessor. Prescriptive easement, on the other hand, arises by the 
satisfaction of some, but not all, of the conditions for adverse possession such as open, hostile and 
continuous use of property over a designated period of time, and gives a non-owner the right to use 
part of the property for a particular purpose. In prescriptive easement, unlike in adverse 
                                                          
330Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi'an. v. The State of Israel, Motion for Permission to Appeal 3094/11, Barak-Erez 
opinion (dissenting) at para. 15. 
331Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi'an. v. The State of Israel, Motion for Permission to Appeal 3094/11 at para. 20 
332  In the spirit of the post-colonial sensitivity that informs this study, it is worth noting the 'adverse', or 
unfavourable, aspects of adverse possession doctrine, or of possession more generally, as raised by property law 
scholars. Although these aspects do not bear on our study, given that in our case the issue is of natives asserting 
rights to property by adverse possession, and not of a colonial power doing the same, it underscores how certain 
legal doctrines can be called upon in the interests of conflicting parties, whether natives or the colonial power. 
Stolzenberg (2009: 119) asserts that the basic logic of possession in property law shows overlap with the imperial 
European doctrines such as the 'right of discovery' and the 'right to conquest', and that such rights enabled the 
colonization and expropriation of native lands by imperial powers. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “Facts on the Ground” 
in Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver (eds.) Property and Community (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at 119. In the same vein, see Rose’s exploration of possession as the cornerstone of property law, 
conclude that it is "doubtful whether the claims of any nomadic population could ever meet the common law 
requirements for establishing property in land", given that the law's presumed audience is that of an 
agrarian/commercial society and not a communal one. Carol M. Rose, “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 
52 The University of Chicago Law Review 73 at 87 [Rose, “Possession as Origin of Property”]. In the Israeli case 
where Palestinians were attempting to exert rights of adverse possession, Kedar demonstrates how the Supreme 
Court (SC) ruled in line with the more stringent conditions to satisfy adverse possession rights. The SC also 
overwhelming ruled in favour of the state on appeal in adverse possession cases. The reason for this, Kedar proffers, 
is that the Supreme Court functioned in an ideological context where 'redemption of land' was central, as it would 
probably be expected to be in a colonial/settler-society context. Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic 
Geography”, supra note 60 at 973, 985-988. 
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possession, title remains with the original owner. There are various justifications for the law of 
adverse possession,333 yet principal theories that underlie this legal doctrine are utilitarianism, 
Lockean labour theory and Hegelian personality theory.  
 
Utilitarian theory would be willing to abandon property rules upon applying a cost-benefit analysis, 
where the benefits accrued to the larger public outweigh the costs involved. It would therefore be 
willing to allow forced exchanges such as that under adverse possession, where the adverse 
possessor is making productive use of land and increasing the land's marketability, while the 
original owner is not. High transaction costs such as title search costs also factor into the cost-
benefit equation favouring the adverse possessor.334 As time erodes memory, adverse possession 
under utilitarianism favours the certainty in establishing an owner, and accordingly imposes a 
statute of limitations on claims against an adverse possessor.335 
 
Lockean labour theory holds that when an individual exerts labour on a thing, that thing 
intermingles with the person, making it part of the person, and thereby giving the person 
ownership of the thing.336  
 
Hegelian personality theory, or personhood theory, emphasises the emotional bond that develops 
between the adverse possessor and the property over time, wherein the property becomes part of 
her person. Conversely, the lack of possession by the original owner signifies a weakening of this 
bond, and a wading of interest in the property.337 
 
The Ottoman Land Code (OLC) of 1858 was one of the chief statutes governing land law in 
Palestine, and was operational in Israel until the passing of the Israeli Land Law of 1969. Under 
                                                          
333 See, for example, Jeffrey Evans Stake, “The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 The Georgetown 
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Article 78 of the OLC, adverse possession rights could be acquired on state land, classified as miri338 
land, by satisfying the condition of continuous possession over ten years and cultivation of the land. 
 
The possibility that Arab landholders could establish land rights via adverse possession alarmed 
ILA officials back in the 1950s. The fact that it was not particularly hard to satisfy the conditions of 
Article 78 aroused in the authorities "concern that this land would be removed from ILA possession 
and transferred to the ownership of trespassers".339 Accordingly, the authorities sped up settlement 
of title operations340 in the Galilee in the 1950s and 1960s, while at the same time modifying the 
law of adverse possession.341 
 
The reformulated doctrine of adverse possession meant the passing of the Law of Limitation 
(1958). This law extended the time period of the possession requirement, from ten years to fifteen 
(if land was in possession before 1943) or twenty years (if in possession after 1943) in the case of 
unregistered land, and twenty-five years in the case of registered land.342 Second, the possibility to 
use land possession as evidence of ownership declined, with the courts establishing that cultivation 
had to be of 50% of the tract of land, irrespective of the land's agricultural suitability. In addition, 
rules of evidence and procedure made it increasingly difficult for occupants to prove that they had 
cultivated the land for the time required.343 Among these rules was the court's regular use of British 
Mandatory aerial photos of 1945 to show evidence of cultivation. These photos were taken as part 
of a project mapping all of Palestine. If the state was able to show that in 1945 less than 50% of a 
tract of land was cultivated or that there was non-agricultural use of land, such as the presence of a 
structure such as a house, they were able to disprove the adverse possessor's claim and to acquire 
                                                          
338 According to Ottoman land law, 'Miri' referred to agricultural land in the vicinity of villages, that was in the 
ultimate ownership of the state, but to which a landholder had various prescriptive rights. 
339  ILA Report for the Years 1964 - 1965 (Jerusalem 1965) at 66, cited in Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic 
Geography”, supra note 60 at 970.  
340  Settlement of title meant that land rights are recorded in official registers according to blocs and parcels based on 
mapping. See Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography”, supra note 60 at 938. Once land had completed 
this registration procedure, it came to be known as ‘settled’ land. Following surveying and registration efforts of the 
British Mandatory authorities, 'settled land' accounted for only 5 million of the 20.4 million dunams that would be 
incorporated into the state of Israel (see Haim Zandberg, Land Title Settlement in Eretz-Israel and in the State of 
Israel, Ph.D. dissertation (unpublished) (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1999) (Hebrew) at 287, cited in Kedar, 
“Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography”, supra note 60 at 938-9). Therefore, land expropriations, transfers and 
settlement of title operations were instituted to rectify those lands awaiting settlement. Today, ownership of 
effectively all lands have been 'settled', with 93% of all land classified as state land and the remainder under private 
ownership, leaving no land 'unsettled'. 
341 Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography”, supra note 60 at 970 
342  See Articles 5b, 22 of the Law of Limitation (1958). 
343 Kedar, “Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography”, supra note 60 at 970-988 
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the land.344 Also, tax records as evidence of possession no longer qualified under Israeli 
jurisprudence, whereas these could be used as evidence of possession of land in the Mandate 
period.345 
 
Therefore, adverse possession of state land could be possible under Article 78 of the OLC, despite 
the aforementioned difficulties. In addition, the statutory basis for establishing an easement, either 
adverse possession or prescriptive easement, can be found in the Land Law 1969, though neither 
apply to public land.346 However, following the 1992 Shibli decision of the Supreme Court,347 the 
possibility of acquiring title by long term possessors and cultivators of state land under Article 78 of 
the OLC was effectively extinguished. 
 
Shibli concerned the land of Bedouin living in the Lower Galilee near the Mount Tabor area in the 
village of Shibli. In 1943 their land was registered in the name of the High Commissioner, as trustee 
of the British Mandate. Upon Israel's establishment in 1948, as with other Mandatory assets, the 
land was transferred to the state.  
 
The residents petitioned the District Court in 1986 to recognize their ownership of the land. The 
District Court found in favour of the Bedouin petitioners, on account of Article 78 of the OLC, as 
amended by the Law of Limitation 1958. As the petitioners were able to establish they had been in 
                                                          
344 Ibid. at 981-982 
345 Ibid. at 982-984 
346  Article 162(2) of the Land Law 1969 allows for the applicability of a plea of limitation (and thereby a claim for 
adverse possession) under Article 78 of the OLC for 'unsettled land', meaning land not registered under the Land 
(Settlement of Title) Ordinance (New Version) 1969. Under Article 159(b) of the Land Law 1969, limitation no 
longer applied to 'settled land' because its registration was seen as accurate and having been thoroughly examined 
(Weisman 1970: 449). However, a plea of limitation continued to be applicable was a person entitled to raise one 
prior to the coming into force of the Land Law, on January 1 1970 (Article 159(b)). Article 23 of the Land Law 
provides for the right of a non-owner to register land in his name. Among the conditions are that the non-owner 
invested in the land by building or planting on it whilst believing in good faith the land to be under his ownership. In 
essence, this provision compels the original owner to 'force sell' the land to the non-owner at a price equal to the 
value of the land prior to the non-owner's investment in it. This provision is grounded in the doctrine of adverse 
possession. Yet, the terms of adverse possession under common law, such as 'open' and 'hostile' mentioned earlier 
are not found in this provision. This provision, by virtue of Article 112, does not apply to public land, which is land 
held by the State, the Development Authority, the JNF, by corporate bodies established by statute and local 
authorities. Article 94 of the Land Law provides for prescriptive easement rights to both 'settled' and 'unsettled' land 
if a limitation period of thirty years has elapsed. The provision does not apply to public land by virtue of Article 
113c. Unrelated, but worth noting, is that one principal motivation of the Land Law was to extinguish equitable 
rights (see Article 161), which are those remedies found outside statute and case law, that allow a judge to deliver a 
'just' result.  
347  State of Israel v Abdullah Asad Shibli, [1992] CA 520/89. See also Abu Hussein, McKay, Access Denied, supra 
note 58 at 120-121.  
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possession and farmed the land for a period exceeding twenty-five years (counted backwards from 
January 1 1970 when the Land Law 1969 came into effect), they were able to prove their claim. 
 
In the appeal, the Supreme Court sought to determine the relationship between Article 78 of the 
OLC and Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960). The Court found that Article 1 of the Basic Law that "The 
ownership of Israel lands, being the lands in Israel of the State, the Development Authority or the 
Jewish National Fund, shall not be transferred either by sale or in any other manner" showed intent 
of the legislator to prevent land in state ownership being transferred to private hands. The Court 
referred to Article 78 of the OLC as an archaic provision and unsuitable for the times. It determined 
that where there was a conflict of adverse possession provisions of the OLC and the inalienability of 
state lands in the Basic Law, the latter would prevail. It overturned the ruling of the District Court 
and ruled in favour of the state. The decision ensured that once land was registered in the name of 
the state, even if the prescription period of twenty-five years had been satisfied by an adverse 
possessor (and counted backwards from 1970 when the Land Law came into force), the state would 
not lose title to the land. 
Equality348 
Although not codified in statute, the right to equality has been established in Israeli case law. It has 
been determined to have constitutional quality.349 With regard to the principle of non-
discrimination in Israel, public law dictates that public bodies have a duty not to discriminate on 
the grounds of race, sex, religion or national origin. As established in case law,350 the executive as a 
public body is obligated to act non-discriminatorily, in particular in dealing with the Arab minority. 
                                                          
348  A more circumspect treatment of the principle of equality as it applies in Israeli jurisprudence, its normative 
content and in particular how Palestinians have been/are accommodated into the stated government objective of 
ensuring equality between Jews and non-Jews, will follow in the subsequent chapter on the Wine Path Plan decision. 
The Wine Path Plan case deals with differentiated land allocation and access between Palestinians and Israeli Jews 
in the Naqab, where the latter are allotted individual single-family settlements stretching tens of thousands of 
dunams, while tens of thousands of Palestinians from the Naqab are denied basic amenities. As in this case, the 
Court refused to consider that the principle of equality had been offended. The JNF has justified the Wine Path Plan 
initiative saying it brings "blue and green to a brown land" (See Lauder (undated). This is Lauder's (then JNF's 
president) description of the Wine Path Plan initiative. Today Lauder is Chairman of the JNF Board). At this point, 
however, it is worth touching on the status of the right to equality in Israeli law, that it has constitutional quality as 
established by case law, to appreciate the oddity in both Magistrate and District courts' resolve not to address the 
residents' claim that their right to equality was violated by the executive in expelling entire Bedouin villages to make 
place for new Jewish settlements.  
349  See Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 86, 88 
[Barak, Judge in a Democracy], Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law” (1998) 3 
Israel Studies 80 
350 See Follow-Up Committee for Arab Affairs v. Prime Minister of Israel, [2006] HCJ 11163/03 at para. 14; Adalah 




Nevertheless, encoding the principle of equality has been fraught with difficulties and has been the 
cause of deep divisions and disagreements, so that there has not been a broad enough consensus in 
favour of bills entrenching this right. Some of the sources of disagreement have been the 
implications of entrenching the right on the status of non-Jews vis-à-vis Jews and women vis-à-vis 
men in religious law.351 Accordingly, equality is not incorporated in the Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom (1992), which is a constitutional document that is foundational in establishing civil 
rights in Israel. Israeli law professor, Aeyal Gross has written that the principle of equality has only 
been recognized by the courts in cases involving discrimination on grounds of gender or sexual 
orientation. In equality petitions brought by the Palestinian minority the court has regularly 
rejected claims, resorting to a formal and narrow interpretation of the principle.352 
 
Proving Discrimination – Israeli and US Jurisprudence 
In discrimination cases, Israeli jurisprudence does not adopt the doctrinal standard of strict 
scrutiny analysis, as is applied in US jurisprudence. Strict scrutiny analysis is applied when the 
courts are dealing with a governmental or legislative classification that disadvantages a minority. 
Accordingly, the burden is placed on the state to demonstrate that the classification has been 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, and no other less drastic means 
could have been employed.353 Further, strict scrutiny is also applied when dealing with a 'suspect 
class'. Suspect class refers to a group that has been historically subject to discrimination, for 
example particular racial(ized) groups, such as African Americans.  
 
Although the above jurisprudential standards for establishing discrimination exist in the US where 
they do not in Israel, nevertheless, establishing discrimination in US courts has been a challenge. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of inquiry instituted after the killing of twelve Palestinian citizens of Israel by Israeli police, recommended in its 
final report that the state allocate land to Arabs according to the principle of equality and distributive justice. See Or 
Commission Report – Official Commission of Inquiry into the October 2000 Events, ch. 6, para. 13. 
351 Judith Karp, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, History and Power Game - A Biography of Power 
Struggles” (1993) 1 Mishpat Umimshal 323-84 at 333-338 (Hebrew), Suzie Navot, The Constitutional Law of Israel 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007) at para. 589 [Navot, Consitutional Law] 
352 Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law” (1998) 3 Israel Studies 80 at101 
353  Benvenisti and Shaham argue that the Israeli Supreme Court adopts a 'colour-blind' approach to discrimination 
suits concerning resource allocation, as opposed to an approach with sensitivity to ethnicity. Accordingly, minority 
interests are insufficiently protected against facially neutral discrimination and the possibilities for affirmative action 
for marginalized minorities are also precluded. Eyal Benvenisti and Dahlia Shaham, “Facially Neutral 




Discriminatory purpose doctrine dictates that in order to prove discrimination under the equal 
protection clause of the US Constitution, it would have to be established that either the government 
act/policy is worded in racial terms or that a discriminatory purpose underlies it. In both cases, the 
intent to discriminate would have to be demonstrated to prove a constitutional violation.  
 
The historical development of the discriminatory purpose doctrine can be seen in the judicial 
decisions of Swann354 and Keyes355. These were two cases that upheld Brown's356 ruling that 
segregation was unequal and therefore unconstitutional. However, the two cases also made the 
distinction between de facto and de jure discrimination, with only the latter establishing 
discriminatory intent. This eventually translated to only de jure discrimination being a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which could be proven by demonstrating 
that it was brought about by intentional official action. However, given that only exceptional short-
sightedness could give rise to an official body admitting intention to discriminate, intent has been a 
very hard condition to prove to establish official discrimination under discriminatory purpose 
doctrine.357 
 
Establishing discrimination in Israel in discrimination cases concerning Palestinian citizens has 
been even more of a challenge than the US case. Nazareth Lands358 concerned the 1954 government 
confiscation of Arab land, on which government offices were to be constructed. The Arab 
petitioners claimed that the confiscation order was discriminatory as they were targeted because 
they were Arab. The Court found that unless the petitioners could prove discriminatory intent they 
would not be able prove their claim. Accordingly, the petitioners would have to prove that the 
expropriation took place because they were Arab, with the court clarifying that it was insufficient 
                                                          
354 In Swann the Court found that District courts had judicial authority to rectify an intentionally segregated public 
school system via remedies such as bussing students. It also found that racial segregation that resulted from facially 
neutral language in the desegregation plans of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was de facto segregation. 
This distinction of ‘de facto segregation’ was one that future courts would find did not offend the equal protection 
clause. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 [1971].  
355 Keyes concerned segregation in schools in the US North. The court found that intentional state actions that 
contributed to segregation, even though not expressed as such in statute, amounted to de jure segregation. Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 [1973]. 
356 In Brown the Court declared that school segregation was unconstitutional because it was inherently unequal. The 
ruling spurred civil rights legislation in education, housing and employment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 [1954]. 
357 Yousef Taiseer Jabareen, Constitutional Protection of Minorities in Comparative Perspective: Palestinians in 
Israel and African-Americans in the United States, PhD Dissertation (Georgetown University Law Center, 2003) at 
66-67 
358 Nazareth Lands Defence Committee v. Ministry of Defence, 9 P.D. III 1261 (1955). 
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for the petitioners to demonstrate that alternative land could have been used for the construction 
of the government offices. The Court applied low-level scrutiny, or 'rational basis' review in this 
case, with the test being that the governmental action be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest, which it found it was. Although Arabs were living under Military 
Administration at the time and were being denied fundamental rights such as freedom of 
movement and freedom of association and widespread expropriations of Arab lands were taking 
place, the Court did not see the need to apply a higher level of scrutiny of government action. The 
Court subsequently found in the government’s favour. 
 
In Bourkan,359 the Court upheld a government policy of permitting only Jewish Israelis to purchase 
apartments in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City in a petition brought by a Palestinian who 
had formerly lived there and was forced to move out of his residence in 1967. In this case, officials 
admitted to intentionally discriminating in allowing only Jewish Israelis to purchase apartments. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the US doctrinal standards of discriminatory purpose, the Court applied 
low level scrutiny in the face of discriminatory intent. The Court determined that the issue was not 
one of equal right of residence, though this was what the petition sought remedy for. Rather, the 
Court determined that the issue was whether public bodies, in the aim of "restoration of a national 
and historical site, in name as well as substance, in character and identity"360 were justified in 
discriminating against individuals. The Court found that they were.  
 
However, a break from the above trend was to be found in the Higher Follow-up Committee361 
decision of 2006. In this case, the Court sought to determine if the 1998 government decision to 
establish 'national priority areas' was discriminatory. These 'national priority areas' were granted a 
variety of benefits, including in education, on account of their being peripheral communities. Yet, 
they excluded Arab towns. The Court found that the decision was both without authority and 
discriminatory. The Court found that the government decision was ultra vires, since the executive 
had no authority to undertake what they determined was a 'primary arrangement', which is an 
arrangement that requires legislative backing from the Knesset because of its country-wide 
implications. Further, Justice Barak affirmed that discrimination can be established by only showing 
discriminatory effects, that is by establishing that the institution of 'national priority areas' resulted 
                                                          
359 Bourkan v. Minister of Finance, [1978] HCJ 114/78, 32 P.D. II 800  
360 Ibid. at 807-8. 
361 Higher Follow-up Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister of Israel, [2006] HCJ 11163/03  
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in discriminatory allocation between Arab and Jewish areas, without the need to prove intent to 
discriminate.362  
 
Over the years, judicial standards for proving discrimination have tended to apply low level 
scrutiny even when discriminatory effects and intent were shown.363 Yet, the 2006 Court decision 
regarding 'National Priority Areas' (NPAs) seems to signal a break from this trend,364 as the Court 
                                                          
362 Higher Follow-up Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister of Israel, [2006] HCJ 11163/03, Barak 
Opinion, para. 18. It is worth noting that by March 2011, the decision of the Court to void the government decision 
was not implemented by the executive and Arab towns in the north were not designated ‘national priority areas’ 
(NPAs). See Letter from Advocate Yehudit Karp to Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein, “Re: Failure to comply 
with interim decisions of the courts and with commitments and undertakings made by the state concerning court 
rulings” (March 2011), online: http://www.adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Yehudit_Karp_English.pdf, Akiva Eldar, 
“Former official bemoans government's disregard of Supreme Court”, Ha’aretz (April 1 2011), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/former-official-bemoans-government-s-disregard-of-supreme-court-
1.353406. Since then, the government announced it was no longer using the prohibited decision, yet it continues to 
possess wide discretion in the assignment of NPAs under criteria that remains obscure. See Adalah, “New 
Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel”, Updated October 2012 at 5, online: 
http://adalah.org/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Discriminatory_Laws/Discriminatory-Laws-in-Israel-
October-2012-Update.pdf. For more critique on the arbitrariness in the assignment of NPAs and non-compliance 
with the court decision, see Adalah, “On the Israeli Government’s New Decision Classifying Communities as 
National Priority Areas” (2010), online: http://adalah.org/newsletter/eng/feb10/docs/english%20layout.pdf. On 
August 4 2013, the Israeli cabinet approved 20 new communities, all Jewish and nine of them settlements in the 
OPT, to the list of ‘National Priority Areas’. See Adalah, “Israeli Government Adds 20 Jewish Towns to ‘National 
Priority Area’ List, 9 are Settlements in the Occupied West Bank; Arab Towns in Israel Excluded” (2013), online:  
http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/2197/Israeli-Government-Adds-20-Jewish-Towns-to-Area, Barak Ravid, “Mapping 
national priorities - Cabinet approves new development plan to benefit more Israeli settlements” Ha’aretz (August 4 
2013), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.539667. 
363 For example, see Wattad v. Minister of Finance, HCJ 200/83, 38 P.D. III 113 (concerning discriminatory 
allocation of child benefits), Agbaria v. The Minister of Education, HCJ 3491/90, 45(1) P.D. 221–4 (concerning 
special educational programs implemented in ‘development areas’, which included only Jewish localities at the 
time), Al-Sane' v. Attorney General, HCJ 2678/91, P.D. 46(3) 709 (regarding home demolition provisions in the 
Planning and Building Law (1965) that petitioners claimed was used in a discriminatory manner against Naqab 
Bedouin), Adalah v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, HCJ 240/98 52 P.D. V 167 (regarding discriminatory budget 
allocation for religious affairs of community); Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister 
of Finance, HCJ 3429/11 (regarding the penalization of public bodies such as schools and universities for holding 
events commemorating the Nakba). 
364 Other examples where the Court found in favour of Palestinian petitioners claiming discrimination was the 2000 
decision in Qa'adan v. Israel Lands Administration, HCJ 6698/95, P.D. 54 (1) 258, finding that the principle of 
equality had been offended by the ILA in allocating State land that was only accessible to Jews. In 2011, however, 
the legislature sidestepped fairer access to land that was intended by the Qa’adan decision. On March 22 2011, the 
‘Admission Committees Law’ (The Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (no. 8) (2011)) was passed, 
whereby ‘admission committees’, such as that in Katzir that denied the Qa’adan family the right to buy a plot of land 
on ‘suitability grounds’, were legalised to operate in roughly 475 small community towns (up to 400 family units) 
built on state land in the Naqab and Galilee. Two other cases where the principle of equality for Palestinians was 
upheld were in The Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education v. The Ministry of Education, HCJ 2814/97, 54 P.D. 
III 233, where the Court accepted the government offer, which was proposed after the petition was filed, that 
academic enrichment programs to the Palestinian Arab sector should be allocated at 20% of the Ministry’s budget. 
Similarly, in The National Committee of Arab Mayors v. The Ministry of Housing, HCJ 727/00, the Court ruled that 
the ‘Urban Renewal Program’ designed to reduce social inequalities in Israel, and whose social-educational 
component consisting of enrichment programs, scholarships and extra-curricular activities, should be provided to 
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affirmed that as long as the act or policy adversely impacted a particular group, or was 
discriminatory in its effects, there was no need to show that there was discriminatory purpose 
behind it in order to establish discrimination. Would this 2006 ruling be that liminal possibility for 
the residents of Umm al-Hiran to arrive at justice through the law? What would the courts need to 
apprehend – human suffering, affective investment, structural violence, something else - in order 
for such disruptive potentials located within the law to manifest not just as a ‘possibility’ but as ‘an 
actual state’365?  
 
International human rights law (IHRL) 
International human rights law on forced evictions and equality and non-discrimination tell of the 
duties binding on Israel, via ratification of the relevant treaties and as a matter of customary 
international law, vis-à-vis Naqab Palestinians and are a benchmark against which the state’s 
actions should be judged.   
 
IHRL on Forced Evictions  
In IHRL, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its General Comment 
No. 4 on 'Adequate Housing' has written that forced evictions can only be justified in the most 
exceptional circumstances.366 In General Comment No. 7 on forced evictions,367 the Committee 
emphasizes the state's obligation that no discrimination is involved when evictions take place,368 
and when they do take place, that feasible alternatives are provided, in particular to large groups, in 
genuine consultation with them. It also calls for legal remedies to be provided to those affected, and 
that affected persons have a right to adequate compensation for affected property.369 Further, the 
law provides that adequate notice of the eviction and information on the land’s alternative use be 
provided to those affected. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Arab localities at at least 20% of the relevant budget. However, Jabareen interprets these rulings as formal remedies 
that failed to answer to the substantive demands of the community. Yousef Taiseer Jabareen, Constitutional 
Protection of Minorities in Comparative Perspective: Palestinians in Israel and African-Americans in the United 
States, PhD Dissertation (Georgetown University Law Center, 2003) at 246-248 
365 For more on liminality, actual states and assemblage see the extended discussion on Deleuze’s assemblage theory 
in the fifth chapter on vaccination allowances.  
366 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “The right to adequate housing,” General Comment 
No. 4, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1991), para 18. 
367 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “The right to adequate housing (art. 11.1): forced 
evictions,” General Comment No. 7, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1997) 
368 Ibid. at para. 10 
369 Ibid. at para. 13 
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In the case of Umm al-Hieran, courts issued both demolition orders and eviction orders against the 
village as a means of forcibly evicting all residents. The aim to construct the Jewish town of Hiran 
does not seem to qualify as an exceptional circumstance justifying the eviction of Palestinians, and 
is in fact a discriminatory justification that is prohibited under Articles 2.2 and 3 of the ICESCR. The 
feasible alternative of moving to Hura was not provided after genuine consultation with the 
petitioners and in fact was an alternative that the petitioners have consistently refused. The courts 
also denied the right of the petitioners to compensation for affected property, not considering their 
illegal building as investment in property. Finally, adequate and reasonable notice of the eviction 
plans were not provided, as demolition orders were issued ex parte, without the affected persons 
being informed. Similarly, the planning authorities drew up a plan for the construction of Hiran 
without informing Umm al-Hieran’s residents, who learnt of the plan for the land’s alternative use 
after it was drawn up.  
 
IHRL on Equality and Non-Discrimination 
In international human rights law, the principles of equality and non-discrimination are 
fundamental norms that are binding on all states as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR).370 Furthermore, the prohibition on racial discrimination is also considered in 
international law as a preemptory norm, or jus cogens.371  The principle of non-discrimination goes 
beyond just providing formal equality before the law; rather it speaks to actual protection from 
direct and indirect discrimination and to the principle of equal access to public resources.  
 
Space, Representation and Power 
This instance of eviction is very much about conceptions, representations and performances of 
‘space’. As much as it is about the right to equality, as the Bedouin respondents insisted but on 
which the courts refused to deliberate, or about the doctrines of adverse possession and 
prescriptive easement to which the court made nominal reference, it is also possible to scrutinize 
the occasion using spatial theory, and then come full circle to ask why the legal issues were 
interpreted by the court the way they were. The most obvious reason to draw on spatial theory is 
that this case speaks of maps and planning, what Henri Lefebvre referred to as conceived space, a 
                                                          
370 Article 2 states, "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without 
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December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 




Cartesian ordering of space by technocrats and planners. However, this case is not just about 
cartography. It is also about the everyday practices that make this space, a spatial practice that 
Lefebvre identified as perceived space.372  For example, as a matter of routine Bedouin residents 
negotiate water prices with private individuals, while scenarios of home demolitions play in the 
back of their minds, because the state refuses to recognize the legality of their residence. 
Representational/‘lived’ spaces, on the other hand, are spaces lived via their symbols, which 
inhabitants’ imaginations seek to alter. Take, for example, the fact that just a few hundred metres 
from a hilltop in Umm al-Hieran, a dog cemetery in a neighbouring Jewish individual settlement is 
clearly visible. When ‘Atwa and I ascended the hill, the dog cemetery came to symbolize the 
experience of ‘Atwa as racial other – a dog cemetery is legal, but his human settlement is not – and 
was also his impetus to challenge the insult by speaking of the same to reporters and pursuing legal 
means for more equitable access to land.373 Space, then, is not about maps alone. It is social. In this 
section, I will unpack the multiple meanings embedded in Umm al-Hieran’s spatiality as a means to 
better scrutinize and deconstruct the magistrate and district court decisions in this eviction case.  
 
The production of space is a dialectical process, whereby all three elements of conceived, perceived 
and lived space are in dialectic communication in one another. What is dialectic communication? 
The concept of aufheben or ‘sublation’ is at the heart of the dialectic. Sublation, in seeming 
contradiction, means both to preserve and to put an end to. When a contradiction to a proposition 
is sublated, this means that it is overcome. Yet, the contradiction is at the same time preserved, 
bringing it to a higher level, and preserving its tension in the resolution.374 We can think of 
resistance of lived space of residents such as public squatting as being a contradiction to the 
propositions of conceived space that outlaws such practice. Here, squatting is overcome by 
regulations against squatting, but nevertheless, the act of resistance leaves an indelible mark on the 
use, practices and performances of public space for the future. The act of sublation is indefinite, 
meaning that it always leaves an opening, a ‘potentiality’ or a promise, for that which cannot be 
determined a priori.  
 
                                                          
372 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, (trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1991) at 38 [Lefebvre, Production of Space] 
373 Ibid. at 38-39 
374 Christian Schmid, “Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space: towards a three-dimensional dialectic” in 
Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, Christian Schmid (eds.) Space, Difference, Everyday 
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The maps drawn up by the planning authorities are static representations of space that attest to be 
two dimensional renderings of geographic ‘reality’. Only in December 2010, when the planning 
authorities submitted a detailed master plan for the Jewish village of Hiran375, were the homes of 
five hundred Palestinian residents of Umm al-Hieran superimposed on the master plan map. They 
make an appearance, according to the map legend, as ‘existent structures’. In previous cartographic 
representations, Atir and Umm al-Hieran homes are simply missing. What explains this? Could this 
have been a slip up by the authorities? Could it be they were unaware of the many hundred 
residents there? It is not that the authorities were unaware of the village. The villagers had various 
dealings with government officials and ministries over decades on issues of land lease and home 
demolitions and they even received flood relief and government compensation for a storm that 
ravaged the community in 1997. Further, in 2001, a year before the planning authorities made an 
amendment to the Master Plan for the Southern District to include the Jewish Hiran, the ILA 
referred to Atir-Umm al-Hieran as the “special obstacle” that stood in the way of future Jewish 
settlement.376 Therefore, the authorities were aware of the villagers, yet they chose not to render 
them on planning maps. Did the haphazard spread of tin shacks being unplanned and illegal not 
represent a living space that justifies representation? What sort of explanation for this could we 
find in spatial theory?  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will outline some principal ideas of spatial theory to account for this 
non-representation by the planners. I will then ask how the courts, in their deliberations and 
decisions, represent the community and probe what the overlap is, if at all, with the conception of 
space put forth by government technocrats. I believe that by outlining spatial theory we can reach 
an understanding of the role of the courts and law in shaping not only the space of Umm al-Hieran 
but of other Bedouin spaces in the Naqab. Further, it will also answer to how the inhabitants ‘live’ 
this space and in turn shape it. In applying spatial theory to the lived conditions of Umm al-Hieran 





                                                          
375 Master Plan No. 107/02/15, including detailed Stage A plan for the suburban town of Hiran. 
376 The Israel Land Administration (ILA), “Report on Status of New and Renewed Settlements” (August 2001) 
(Hebrew), cited in Adalah, Nomads Against Their Will, supra note 127 at 18. The report was submitted to the PMO 
as a recommendation for the setting up of Hiran and discussed the initiation of 68 new Jewish towns.  
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On Spatial Theory 
Doreen Massey puts forth three principal propositions for spatial theory.377 First, that space is alive, 
not static and is a product of interrelations, from the global to the intimate. Second, that space is 
multiplicity as multiplicity is space, meaning that it is contemporaneous plurality where distinct 
trajectories exist, embedded with stories that are both multiple and varied. Finally, that space is 
always becoming, it is always under construction, never finalised. On account of these propositions, 
we can appreciate how the spatialization of social theory affirms heterogeneity as a sort of natural 
condition and supports the idea of the interrelatedness of identities and histories.378  
 
This contemporaneous plurality of space is echoed in the work of Donald Moore, who emphasizes a 
concept of space that is the sedimentation of cultural practices, historical materiality, social 
relations and political economic processes in multiplicity, coming together. Therefore, the ‘place’ 
that is the subject of Moore’s ethnographic study, Karezei in Zimbabwe, is not a fixed, static location 
with an enduring essence but a site of a distinctive mixture where translocal influences interweave 
with historically contingent meanings and practices embedded in a particular geography.379 
 
For Glen Sean Coulthard, the ‘grounded normativity’ of indigenous peoples, the modalities of 
organizing and being on the land, ought to force geographers to reorient their conception of land 
towards a “system of reciprocal relations and obligations”.380 
 
That space is fundamental in any exercise of power381 is taken up by Nicholas Blomley in his 
exploration of how representations of space in the cadastre enable the violence of property law.382  
Space, like property, is active, is constantly performed, constructing subjects and norms. Yet, 
property being a regime of persuasive sociality and shared understandings,383 has intrinsic to its 
performances and productions violent socio-spatial effects. One manifestation of the same on a 
subject we’ve touched upon is the forceful transfer in adverse possession. Similarly, as the law has 
                                                          
377 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage Publications, 2005) at 9 [Massey, For Space] 
378 Ibid. at 11 
379 Donald S. Moore, Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe (London and Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005) 
380 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014) at 13 
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(2003) 93(1) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 121–141 
383 Rose, “Possession as Origin of Property”, supra note 332 
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the power to determine who has access to property and who is excluded from it, it also creates the 
spaces of degeneracy, dark zones of sex-trade workers,384 the slum,385 the reservation,386 and the 
unrecognized village, which stand in opposition to those of respectability, and where certain bodies 
are more exposed to violence than others.  
 
Race, Space and the Law387 is a volume that explores how space becomes race, how space is 
constructed, organized and performed to sustain unequal social relations, which in turn shape 
space in a white settler society. Foundational to such societies are national mythologies, narratives 
that are “deeply spatialized”.388 Therefore, at the primary phase of conquest in a settler society, the 
myth of empty land or terra nullius is deployed,389 which justifies settlement since the land is 
deemed empty and open to conquest. This is precisely the myth that Nuri’s legal team sought to 
overturn, unsuccessfully.390 As no native population exists, there is no deontological dilemma 
associated with settlement. Once settlement is underway, the myth of the empty land developed by 
hardy and enterprising European settlers circulates. As Razack expounds, here rugged 
independence and ingenuity, ostensibly ingredients for the settler society’s greater commitment to 
liberty and democracy, justify the project. This is in contrast to the characteristics of degeneracy 
that are the mark of non-settler societies and natives, in the case where their existence is 
apprehended and made intelligible. Finally, the third spatialized myth in the national lore is how 
these settler society spaces of tranquil order are now threatened by incursions from the ‘wild’ 
outside, made up of natives, immigrants and asylum seekers.391 
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So what does spatial theory propose? First, spatial theory calls for denaturalizing space.392 This 
allows for a sifting of static geographical representations, to expose the world views that make 
space, such as those of the national mythology repertoire. It also enables us to ask how those spaces 
came to be. Therefore, how do maps, courts, the law, the media, literature, settlers and natives 
perform space? More significantly, the heterogeneity that is the mark of space, permits us to see the 
multiplicity in systems of oppression – how space is race, is gender, is class.393 The 
contemporaneous plurality of space allows us to acknowledge the interlocking nature of class, 
gender and racial differentials and hierarchies in the making of space. Patriarchy and capitalism 
make racialization, and vice versa, each feeding and playing off the other. Most significantly, spatial 
theory helps us see beyond, as Lefebvre’s theory of space goes, a textual reading394 of space, or 
describing space’s materiality, that there are socio-economically disadvantaged unrecognized 
villages where Bedouin live alongside wealthy Jewish neighbours with gardens and swimming 
pools. It also helps us read past its symbolism of how such a geography is constitutive of racial, 
national space and the rendering of bodies and populations that belong/not. A knowledge of space 
goes beyond description, deciphering codes, and understanding how we perform it. It is about how 
the symbolic and material work through each other to constitute space.395 
 
There have been varied explorations on the materiality of space in Israel. These have described 
how ideology, planning, law, History,396 language and national myths, and the seemingly innocuous 
practice of tree planting construct the Israeli space. Scholars inquiring into Israeli space have 
critiqued the symbolism of space as terra nullius, the ‘informality’ and ‘gray space’ that characterize 
where minorities live (the native quarters), and the pine tree as symbolising the ordered, 
productive and refined national space.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
them in spite of there existing reasonable danger to their well-being and security. See ACRI, The State of Human 
Rights in Israel and the OPT – 2012 at 16-25. 
392 Richard Phillips, Mapping Men and Empire: A Geography of Adventure (New York: Routledge, 1997), Nicholas 
Blomley, “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid” (2003) 93(1) 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 121–141 
393 Razack, Race, Space and the Law, supra note 146, Sherene H. Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims 
from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) 
394 For more on ‘textual’ production and its implicit elision of other narratives, see the Abu Mdeghem chapter.  
395 Lefebvre, Production of Space, supra note 372 at 7, Razack, Race, Space and the Law, supra note 146 at 8 
396 Capitalized to mean the single story, the linear narrative, as opposed to history, which is contemporaneous 
plurality and the heterogeneity of experiences and stories.  
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Oren Yiftachel has explored how conceived space as drawn up by the Israeli planning authorities 
serves as a tool of control of minority populations. Yiftachel identifies the marks of planning 
authorities as being top-down planning, imposing cumbersome bureaucracy, operating with Zionist 
objectives that prioritize for Jews over Arabs and spreading the Jewish population in Arab 
concentrated regions in the Galilee and Negev in the name of ‘development’.397 In Ethnocracy,398 the 
name Yiftachel ascribes to the regime on account of its ethnonational expansion and control while 
simultaneously representing itself as democratic, he emphasizes the central role land law399 and 
policy play in the realization and promotion of the ethnocratic regime and its effects on Palestinian 
citizens. Making ethnocratic space relied on the deployment of national mythologies, the deeply 
spatialized stories of settler societies. In the newly established settler state, these stories spoke 
specifically of national redemption, a return of the exiles to an empty land that was once home to 
forefathers. It was inscribed in the terms of the newly revived Hebrew language, so that aliya 
lakarka (ascent to the land/settlement) was undertaken to enable ge’ulat karka, land redemption, 
whose positive biblical connotations for Jewish settlement were found in the terms hityashvut 
(agricultural settlement founded on cooperative principles) and hitnahalut (taking possession by 
divine decree). There were stories of enterprising and hardy settlers that undertook kibbush 
hashmama (the conquest of the desert).400 In fact, such stories continue to circulate today, for 
example in the story of the three dozen single family farms that constitute the Ramat HaNegev 
‘wine path plan’, the subject of the following chapter. These spatialized myths constructed 
belonging and collective identity, provided the moral basis for settlement,401 precluded hard 
questions being asked about natives that would be displaced or dispossessed, and marked the 
space as improved by settlers, a product of toil, thereby justifying the exclusion of those outside the 
national project. According to Pappé, the Zionist myth of an empty, static space awaiting settlement 
was actively deployed in the late 1930s. Although it was compellingly undermined with the post-
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Zionist trend of the late 1980s, the spatialized myth circulated with renewed force after the Second 
Intifada in 2000 and persists today.402  
 
The national stories were supplanted by an ordering of space that took place via cartographical 
representations. In the late 1970s, the Green Line was erased from official maps, atlases, and state 
publications, coinciding with Israeli Jewish settlement in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank.403 
The legal and policy measures that contributed to making ethnocratic space was the widespread 
expropriation of Palestinian land, entrusting state land control to State-Jewish organizations that 
structurally excluded Arabs, registering British Mandate land as state land, transfer of land to the 
JNF, particularly agricultural land, prohibiting the sale of state land, transfer of land control to the 
ILA and discriminatory allocation of land between Arab and Jew.404 Fenster argues that Zionist 
ideology operative in official planning institutions privileges Jewish spatial memory over 
Palestinian, particularly in the preservation and promotion of Jewish heritage sites, accentuating 
the Zionist narrative and memory of space and erasing the Palestinian. Symbolically, planners also 
made informality a mark of non-Jewish settlement, one where unlawful, underserviced residence 
was the norm.405 This in turn facilitated Arab populations being avoided and contained, effectively 
locating them in a ‘gray space’ between legality and eviction,406 thereby denying them full 
participatory and planning rights to the city.407  
 
In Planted Flags, Irus Braverman illustrates how the planting of trees constructed space 
discursively and symbolically as Zionist space.408 She demonstrates how the pine came to mark the 
Israeli space as a Zionist tree, both in enabling the reclamation of Palestinian land and in marking 
itself as the respectable field tree that stood in contrast to the forest cactus, associated with the 
untamed and with ‘wild’ Palestinians. The JNF’s tree planting missions marked the organization as 
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an environmental forerunner, while also symbolically telling the story of empty space waiting 
afforestation. Here, Palestinian locals merged in with the local landscape, and were therefore not 
entitled to any particular legal claims to that space. Braverman discusses how the law, in particular 
the adverse possession provision in Article 78 of the OLC, has been deployed to claim non-private, 
non-urban Palestinian land as state land for non-cultivation exceeding ten years. And yet, 
Palestinians of that space interacted with it in different ways, interpreting perceived space and 
their own everyday practices simultaneously alongside conceived space as carved out by Israeli 
planners and technocrats. Palestinians lived through the materiality and symbolism of the space, 
and utilize the olive tree, imbued as it is with a plethora of socio-cultural, political and religious 
meaning, as a symbol of resistance.409 
 
Ronen Shamir’s influential article, ‘Suspended in Space’, takes on spatiality in reference to Naqab 
Palestinian Bedouin and the law.410 Seen through the prism of law performing colonial culture, the 
series of case studies reveals how space is materially and symbolically constructed. Yet, not very 
much is said of how Naqab Palestinians perform that space or how we can understand the 
Lefebvrian notion of ‘lived space’ of the inhabitants. While Shamir explicates on how the state 
performs governmentality, constructs subjects, and erases native narratives and memories, the 
limited scope of the inquiry means we don’t learn of how the inhabitants interpret this space 
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conceived by the authorities and challenge, negotiate and shape space in dialectic with it. This 
chapter attempts to identify both the symbolic and the material in Umm al-Hieran space, 
particularly in respect to the law, and how each feeds into the other to shape space. What can we 
know of the forms of resistance enunciated in inhabitants’ lived space? It will also attempt an 
answer at why the legal doctrines were adjudicated in the manner they were using this more 
nuanced understanding of Umm al-Hieran spatiality.  
 
First, however, does Shamir share the same understandings of space, as outlined above, that of 
space as contemporaneous plurality, a becoming, essentially social? When Shamir refers to ‘space’ 
and Bedouins suspension in it, what ‘space’ is he referring to? He writes, “The Negev is conceived as 
vacuum domicilium” via law’s conceptualist “praxis of extracting and isolating elements from the 
indeterminate and chaotic flow”.411 In doing so, the law applies a “conceptualist grid on space – 
expecting space to be divided, parceled…[resulting] in the annihilation of the actions, movements 
and histories of people who do not fit the frame”.412 The law, like the map, flattens space, 
representing it as Space. Shamir is referring to Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space, the kind 
conceived by planners and technocrats. As Drummond writes, the toponymic map, one that accords 
specific names to places, is a representation of one culture, one story, one History, over others, and 
in that sense is the triumph of that culture’s historical and epistemic priorities and proclivities.413 In 
the toponymic map, ‘Atir-Umm al-Hieran’ reads ‘Hiran’ and in conceptualist law, ‘Bedouins of the 
Naqab’ reads ‘illegal dispersion in an empty space’.414 Bedouins being suspended refers to them 
being nomadic, not going anywhere specific, and not rooted to the ground. They are also emptied of 
their varied histories, narratives and memories and are suspended in the sense of being 
undetermined, floating in limbo between being primordial matter and modern subjects, with law 
and government’s benevolence attempting to be that bridge. Being suspended also means their 
cartographic representation is put off, presumably until they move to ‘recognized’ living centers 
that the grids are able to capture and make intelligible, the development townships. As we saw in 
Nuri’s case, such representations of Space do not recognize Bedouin lifeways, their ways of 
organizing and being.  
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Yet, to only speak of their suspension in conceived space, is to obfuscate the fact that they are 
always becoming and actively negotiating and making their lived space. It also obscures that space 
is produced by the perceived, conceived and lived in simultaneous dialectic communication, making 
both the self and society.415 Space is not the dead or inert, or really what planners say it is. Indeed, 
Masseycautions that this has been a common misunderstanding of the word space in the 
humanities tradition, whereby it has been mistaken for representation/conceptualization, or fixity 
of meaning. Space, in this conceptualist sense, has been contrasted with time, which is said to be 
multiple and continuous. Yet, representation fixes and stablizes time and space, both of which are 
multiple, continuous and ultimately unrepresentable.416  Shamir is not positing that space is a 
representation or fixing of time, but the absence of engagement with all of space’s productive 
dimensions, risks leaving the reader with the common misconception of space as Space. In Space, 
the complexity of social relations is chopped down to the digestible form of the legal/cartographic 
grid, for which the agency of inhabitants is unintelligible and thereby lost; rendering them 
suspended in space is as if to speak of them as puppets in a marionette. Although the attempt is to 
show how law as culture is made operative to govern bodies and things, by eliding agency, the 
danger is that we do not see the full spectrum of governmentality. That is, we miss seeing 
governmentality beyond its arterial forms by which power flows from the state to subjects. We miss 
how subjects become enlisted in projects of their own subjugation as the state counters agency via 
capillary forms of power and cooptation, in an unfinished, unbounded dialectic of force relations 
that embeds natives, government, political economies, histories and geographies from the intimate 
to the global.  
 
So, what can we tell of Atir-Umm al-Hieran’s spatiality? Law’s conception of this particular space is, 
as Shamir explicates, empty space. The one thousand Palestinians that live there do not have a 
history or have not undertaken any actions that give rise to any right to continue living there. 
Indeed, conceived space in this place is an ‘annihilation of history’.417  
 
Conceived space is precisely this utter destruction because it erases engagement with the everyday 
routines of its inhabitants that give space its meaning. Perceived space is of the material 
interactions and communications that shape and make space. In determining the right to space, 
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such as who has the right to live in a particular locale, it is precisely the forms of communication 
and interaction of perceived space that one needs to consider. Lefebvre’s theory of right to the city 
is the right of all inhabitants that occupy a space to have a right to use of that space and a right to 
determine its form via participatory planning.418 
 
Of course, perceived space is itself in dialectic interaction with the other spatial dimensions. 
Therefore, the fact that the government and planners have designated Atir-Umm al-Hieran 
unrecognized, shapes the everyday routines of its inhabitants – from obtaining water, to getting to 
work, to using the road network that links to the village. 
 
On Umm al-Hieran Spatiality 
Visiting that Place without Toponym  
At our meeting in Jerusalem, ‘Atwa promised to one day show me his village. It was an offer to get a 
sense of his everyday. Our schedules aligned a few months later,419 and agreeing to meet in Hura, 
easier for me to locate, it being recognized, we drove to that place without toponym down a snaky 
gravel road. We made a few stops before arriving at the village so that ‘Atwa could breathe life into 
what cartographic representations rendered lifeless. However, there was no breathing life into the 
dessicated olive trees. Located between Hura’s outskirts and his home in Umm al-Hieran was the 
village’s agricultural land, though it could barely afford to carry that label anymore. ‘Atwa blamed 
the lack of water. The olive trees had died because the state refuses to provide the community 
water as they do recognized communities, while the costs of a private water connection to maintain 
the native Palestinian evergreen are simply out of bounds. 
 
We then began to speak more about water. ‘Atwa described, and his son supplanted later, the 
difficulties in obtaining water. It costs ‘Atwa’s family more than twenty times for a cubic metre of 
water than it does for a private home connected to the water line. For a single family, a cubic metre 
of water is good for about five days. Every month, they spend several hundred shekels on water 
alone. The water is obtained from a private water connection from a nearby recognized settlement 
and is transported by truck. The costs associated with truck rental and gasoline also figure in the 
price.  
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In a fairly nondescript home, we break bread. First, however, I’m invited to wash my hands. I learn 
that there are no shortcuts to hygiene, irrespective of the scarcity of water.  ‘Atwa’s son, who 
refuses to be audio recorded, then pitches in to elaborate on the challenges of obtaining water. A 
particular source of his displeasure is the price haggling with those fortunate to have a connection. 
He is unequivocal about his impatience with ‘Arabs’ who ‘ask too many questions’ before agreeing 
to connect him to their water supply. He is, of course, referring to fellow Arab Palestinian Bedouin 
living in the environs. Yet, he deploys the term ‘Arab’ disparagingly against the community, his own 
community, wishing to leave the impression that incorrigibility was a mark of ‘the Arab’. 
 
Others from the village who purchase in bigger quantities are able to secure a better, but 
nevertheless high rate. Salim Abu al-Qi’an, for example, pays NIS 42 (US$11) per cubic metre for a 
water tanker that holds 14 cubic metres.420 These prices are exorbitant considering that the January 
2012 rate paid by recognized settlements is around NIS 7 (US$1.86) per cubic metre.421 Recognized 
private water connections, not linked to a municipal line, of which there are dozens among the 
Naqab Palestinian community, pay NIS10.364 (US$2.8) per cubic metre. In fact, between July 2011 
and January 2012, those with a private water connection saw a 66% price increase. The fact that 
households linked to a municipal line did not see a similar increase alerted ACRI to appeal to the 
water authorities its discriminatory impact on Naqab Palestinians.422  
 
I thereafter spoke to ‘Atwa’s mother, a village elder, who remembers a time in the 1940s when 
water drawn from rainwater cisterns and underground wells made it much easier to come by. 
During the war of 1948,423 however, and since,424 local Palestinian water wells and infrastructure 
were destroyed, most often with the aim of forcing residents to move. Today, ‘Atwa’s family cannot 
depend on rainwater collection, since the practice is effectively banned for sanitation reasons.425 
                                                          
420 Appeal in Salim Abu al-Qi'an v. Water Committee, DC 51011-09-11 at para. 15. 
421 http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/Rates/Pages/rates-update-2017.aspx  
422 ACRI, “Right to Water: There are those who pay more” (February 28 2012), online: 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=19873 (Hebrew) 
423 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (2d ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006) 
424 CESR – Center for Economic and Social Rights, “Thirsting for Justice: Israeli Violations of the Human Right to 
Water in the OPT” A Report to the 30th Session of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2003), online: http://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ThirstingforJustice.pdf  
425 See Ehud Zion Waldoks, “New immigrant looks to make rainwater harvesting popular”, Jerusalem Post (January 
20 2010), online: http://www.jpost.com/HealthAndSci-Tech/ScienceAndEnvironment/Article.aspx?id=166217, 
where Waldoks writes on rainwater harvesting, “Acting under the Planning and Building Law, specifically the 
regulations governing sanitation devices, the first option is to stream the collected rainwater into the community's 
channeling system. However, if a private homeowner wants to use the water himself, the engineer would have to 
104  
 
Water access is ultimately tied to the state’s water provider, Mekorot, who as a rule do not provide 
water to unrecognized communities. 
 
As a matter of routine, accessing water is a sedimentation of negotiation practices, haggling, 
persuading, appealing to authorities and courts, and reminiscing. It is about monitoring gas prices 
and water prices to know how much comes out of the pocket that month for this basic resource. It is 
about constructing one’s own identity in relation to the communications and interactions with 
other ‘Arabs’. Memory is indelible to the mix. Pre-Nakba longings are recycled in the present and 
become one lens whereby inhabitants’ ultimately unrepresentable time/space moments are forever 
differentially symbolised.426 Such memory serves as persistent contest to state appropriations of 
memory, where the geography is told to be one of empty, barren and dry land. Memory 
appropriated in the service of nation building427 denies that there existed a system for water 
provision and distribution prior to the arrival of the new settlers, and certainly not one centuries 
old, as far back as the time of the Nabateans.428 Besides ‘Atwa, there are five hundred others in the 
community. Each person experiences, as a matter of routine, problems of water flow, water pipes 
being sabotaged, negotiating with single family farm Jewish owners who live a kilometre away to 
draw water from their water points. Perceived space is in dialectic communication with the 
conceived, so that being planned as ‘unrecognized’ gives rise to routines, which themselves then 
effect how planners respond to these everyday spatial practices by raising prices, disconnecting or 
installing infrastructure, and petitioning courts for eviction and demolition orders.  
 
How does ‘Atwa perform the daily duty of work and work related travel? There is no public 
transport serving Palestinian communities in the Naqab.429 This means that the vast majority of 
residents rely on private transportation or taxis. ‘Atwa owns a four wheel drive, a handy vehicle for 
navigating the gravel roads. His work centers in Jerusalem, where he trades in used cars. This 
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occupational choice is informed by the lack of industry in the Palestinian communities and the 
mostly low-paying, manual labour opportunities that are available to those from the community. He 
splits his time, and residence, between Jerusalem and Umm al-Hieran. When in Umm al-Hieran, how 
is it getting to and from work?  
 
To get to Jerusalem, ‘Atwa hops along a section of the 235-kilometre-long Route 60. Route 60 makes 
a clean slice down the length of the West Bank, from Wadi al-Khalil in the south, near the Jewish 
town of Meitar, to Jalameh in the north. Although it cuts through the West Bank, Palestinians are 
subject to regular checkpoint stops, while those not living in the vicinities or without a permit to be 
on that road, are barred from using it. Israelis, however, use it without restriction. Leaving Umm al-
Hieran, ‘Atwa travels up the snaky 316 until he reaches the Shani checkpoint. This permanently 
staffed crossing is named for the Israeli Jewish settlement that straddles the Green Line and falls 
under the Har Hebron Regional Council. Once inside the West Bank, he links with Route 60 which 
takes him all the way to Jerusalem. His return, however, is more eventful. 
 
He usually faces two scenarios at the Shani checkpoint in his attempt to re-enter Israel. These two 
scenarios play out when those stationed at the checkpoint identify him as Palestinian. On the 
chance occasion that they do not identify him thus, he passes as if he were a Shani resident or 
Israeli Jew attempting to cross. The first scenario is that he and all those travelling with him are told 
to offload. Next, the men, including his young sons, are asked to raise their shirts to confirm they 
carry no weapons. The underside of his car is also dutifully inspected. Finally, after this security 
check, they are allowed passage. The second scenario is that he is denied entry and told instead to 
cross at the Meitar Green Line checkpoint. This rerouting takes him nearly four times as long to get 
to his home, which is only 9km from Shani, but 34km from Meitar. 
 
This daily routine of travelling to work to and from Umm al-Hieran is embedded with race, class, 
and patriarchy signifiers, and demonstrates how the three interlock in this particular, daily spatial 
practice. As de Certeau informs us, space is the “intersection of mobile elements… actuated by the 
ensemble of movements deployed within it”.430 This quotidian, mobile journey also illustrates how 
space, as much as it is intimate, is inextricably linked to external spaces, and to the global, when we 
think of what Route 60 means materially to Palestinians and non-Palestinians (Israelis, foreigners) 
and symbolically, in terms of the reified, privileged form of Israeli mobility across Israel/Palestine 
                                                          
430 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 3d ed. (University of California Press, 2011) at 117  
106  
 
that this road represents. At the locus of the Meitar Green Line checkpoint, the global and intimate 
are similarly entwined. ‘Atwa is told to reroute via this checkpoint in order to be subjected to the 
stricter security checks of individual scanners and biometric systems. However, how the authorities 
deal with someone like ‘Atwa has changed over time. In the past, the crossing was notorious for 
giving Palestinian citizens of Israel a hard time entering Israel from the West Bank, particularly 
after a day of shopping in local markets.431 Yet, in 2009, under international pressure to work out a 
two state solution, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s offered instead the diversion of his ‘economic peace’ 
model, a short-term injection of life into the Palestinian economy enabled by easing restrictions on 
freedom of movement in the West Bank, including for Palestinian citizens visiting Palestinian towns 
in the OPT.432  
 
We can also see how such spatialized practice makes individual and collective subjectivities. Here, 
‘Atwa is denied entry at the Shani checkpoint a few kilometres from his home because he is 
Palestinian. Yet, because he is Palestinian with Israeli citizenship, he is afforded greater mobility 
than that enjoyed by Palestinians without Israeli citizenship. This is what Parizot refers to as the 
different ‘regimes of mobility’433 instituted by the planners and technicians, subjecting OPT 
Palestinians, Palestinian citizens of Israel and Israeli Jews to different time regimes that increase 
fissures between each population, and for the Palestinian citizen, is a constant reminder of her 
marginality, or suspension, in Israeli society. There is more to say on the symbolism in the daily 
routine of work travel in its dialectic with conceived space, but I will save that for later in the 
discussion.  
 
What we see is how the everyday acts of accessing water and travelling to work are imbued with 
social meaning and make this space. Yet, in determining who has access to this space, and who is to 
be excluded from it, neither the authorities nor the courts seem to take these very meaningful 
ingredients of space into account. For the authorities seeking their eviction, the residents, like all 
Bedouin in unrecognized villages are illegal trespassers. In a 2007 ILA press release on Umm al-
Hieran, the cartograph is transliterated into text. The map, with its flattening of life and spatiality 
represents only the developed, ordered and gridded development town of Hura (though not to the 
                                                          
431 Cédric Parizot, “Temporalities and perceptions of the separation between Israelis and Palestinians” (2009) 20 
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, online: http://bcrfj.revues.org/6319 at 13 
432 Jonathan Cook, “Netanyahu’s substitute for sovereignty”, The National (July 15 2009), online: 
http://www.jonathan-cook.net/2009-07-15/netanyahus-substitute-for-sovereignty/ 
433 Cédric Parizot, “Temporalities and perceptions of the separation between Israelis and Palestinians” (2009) 20 
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, online: http://bcrfj.revues.org/6319 
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same degree as neighbouring Jewish town, Meitar) alongside a haphazard scattering of what seem 
illegal encampments off Road 316. This particular ILA text similarly presents a reality of the 
“ordered and modern city” contrasted alongside what we are told are its antipode – the 
disorganized and antiquated Bedouin encampments. Further, the press release is intended for the 
reader to be puzzled by why “health, education and welfare services” of the city would not be opted 
for by the Bedouin over settlements that “have [note how they do not use ‘are deliberately denied’] 
no direct connection to the water and electricity lines”. The reader would then answer the puzzle by 
concluding that the Bedouin are unreasonable and quite possibly greedy for insisting on higher 
compensation before agreeing to move. At the same time, the ILA publication tells the reader that 
the state provides millions of dollars to improve the living conditions of Bedouin, has made 
countless attempts at negotiations, has provided generous compensation and alternative land 
offers, and hopes for a day when Bedouin stop foot-dragging and take up the benevolent offer. 
Historical context is similarly missing in this representation. The story of the community begins 
when “the tribe received land from the state” and not when the tribe were forcibly displaced on 
multiple occasions from ancestral lands before finally conceding to the military order to settle in 
Atir-Umm al-Hieran.  
 
As we saw the court do in Abu Mdeghem, the state represents the relationship between itself and 
the residents of Umm al-Hieran as being a dichotomous divide between order/disorder, 
legal/illegal and munificent/selfish. This superficial rendering of spatiality’s complexity and 
heterogeneity is buttressed by this case’s magistrate and district courts’ findings. For the courts, the 
Bedouin were granted temporary permission to stay, irrevocable at any time. Such logic is 
reminiscent to that of monarchical patriarchy, whereby property rights ultimately derived from 
kings, down the chain from God to Adam to Noah, and that if individuals held property rights this 
was only by the grace of the monarch who could withdraw them at will. Locke’s labour theory of 
property, discussed above in the context of a rationale underlying the doctrine of adverse 
possession, endorsed private property rights and was a seventeenth century challenge to the notion 
of property as founded on divine right.434 Divine right meant that a king derives the right to rule 
directly from God, is not subject to any earthly authority, and is not accountable to the public. The 
logic of the court in Umm al-Hieran seems to suggest that were the community to have laid roots 
                                                          
434 Alison Clarke and Paul Kohler, Property law: commentary and materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 82 
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and constructed space for another fifty years, their rights arising therein would just as easily have 
been denied.  
 
The Courts’ Representation of Space 
The courts conceive space in interpretation, adjudication and in setting the frames within which 
legal discourse must occur. This has been a matter of historical record and in contemporary court 
performance. Such representations are buttressed by the legislative branch, and as outlined above, 
by the executive. All of this contributes to how this space is represented and facilitates why both 
magistrate and district courts decided in the manner they did.  
 
First, the law reinforces static, homogenous notions of space, whereby certain places are designated 
solely for Jews and others solely for Palestinians. In the Bourkan case discussed above, the judge 
affirmed the right of the authorities to discriminate against a Palestinian who sought to live in the 
Jewish Quarter in East Jerusalem, in order to maintain its Jewish character and have it be open to 
Jewish residents alone. Similarly, in Avitan,435 the court upheld the administrative decision to allow 
only Bedouins to lease in Bedouin townships, as this was in line with the government policy of 
having Bedouin move out of their villages and into the towns. The Jewish policeman seeking to take 
advantage of the favourable leasing rates in the towns, and claiming discrimination against Jews in 
him being denied a lease, was unsuccessful in his petition. Qa’adan, cited above, was considered by 
many as a watershed moment in Israeli jurisprudence, a “big leap”436 from the ‘Jewish/Zionist’ 
character to the ‘democratic’ one in the Jewish and democratic identity of the state. The court had 
affirmed that state bodies like the ILA are prohibited from discriminating against Arabs in the 
allocation of public land. Yet, many cautioned437 how the state only recommended, as opposed to 
delivering a binding decision that would set precedent, that the ILA reconsider leasing to the Arab 
family in Jewish Katzir.438 Further, both the exclusionary structure of ‘selection committees’439 and 
                                                          
435 Avitan v. Israel Lands Authority, HCJ 528/88, P.D. 43 (4) 297 
436 Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “A First Step in a Difficult and Sensitive Road: Preliminary Observations on Qaadan 
v. Katzir” (2000) Israel Studies Bulletin 3 
437 Ibid., Ilan Saban, "Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case of the 
Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel" (2004) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics at 
964, Ronen Shamir, “Legal Activism in a Bi-National Society: Israeli Palestinians and Jews at a Crossroad” (2000) 
Adalah Newsletter  
438 The bureaucratic hurdles to realizing the recommendation of the Qa’adan court are worth noting. It took the 
Qa’adan family a decade after the decision to finally move into their home in Katsir. See Jonathan Cook, “Arab 




the historically determined exclusive zones of Arab and Jewish settlement remained intact. In fact, 
since the decision, the regulatory backing of the selection committees was strengthened by the 
legislature and given legal backing. On March 22 2011, the ‘Admission Committees Law’ was 
passed, legalizing the operation of selection committees in some 475 small community towns in the 
Naqab and Galilee. This historical justification of separate, homogenous zones of residence between 
Arabs and Jews makes almost ‘natural’ that both courts resolve to not examine why Umm al-
Hieran’s Palestinian residents were not included in the plan as future residents in the recognized 
and legalized village (Hiran) superimposed on their unrecognized and illegal one. 
 
A second aspect of the court’s material production of space is its interpretation of law that allows 
Palestinian land to be transferred to Jewish ownership but not vice versa. Various legal manoeuvres 
were concocted in the formative years of the state to enable this ordering of space.440 In our case we 
see how the court’s interpretation and application of Article 78 of the OLC, the adverse possession 
provision makes space in this manner. As described above, in the early years of the state, adverse 
possession doctrine was significantly modified to prevent Arab landholders from establishing title. 
With the Shibli decision of 1992, the slim possibility that title could be acquired via adverse 
possession was extinguished, as the judge determined that the “archaic and unsuitable” Article 78 
of the OLC could not apply to Israeli state land. The stringent requirements of Article 78 are also 
used in one of the final bastions of land not under possession or ownership of Israel, miri land in the 
Occupied West Bank.  
 
The Elon Moreh decision of 1979 meant that Israel was no longer permitted to build civilian 
settlements on private Palestinian land in the OPT (military settlements, however, remained 
permitted). It could only build civilian settlements on what was declared ‘state land’.441 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
439 In 80% of the land in Israel (and 89% of Jewish settlements in the Naqab) a three-party lease system exists. The 
three parties involved are the ILA as the public landowners' agent, the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish settlement as 
a legal cooperative with its 'selection committee'. In order to lease a plot of land in such a settlement, a person must 
be accepted as a member of that cooperative by its 'selection committee', which has the power of selection and veto 
over acceptance, and has been used to keep undesirables (read Arabs, LGBTI) out and maintain the settlement’s 
homogenous character. See Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “A First Step in a Difficult and Sensitive Road: Preliminary 
Observations on Qaadan v. Katzir” (2000) Israel Studies Bulletin at 4, Hamdan, “Individual Settlement”, supra note 
302 at 1 
440 Geremy Forman and Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, (2004) “From Arab land to ‘Israel Lands’: the legal dispossession 
of the Palestinians displaced by Israel in the wake of 1948” 22 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 80 
441 State land, according to the military issued ‘Order Concerning Government Property 59-1967’, is property that 
“belonged… to an enemy country” (the Kingdom of Jordan) or was registered in its name, on the “determining day 
(7 June 1967) or thereafter”. See B’Tselem, Under the Guise of Legality: Declarations on state land in the West 
Bank (2012), online: http://www.btselem.org/download/201203_under_the_guise_of_legality_eng.pdf at 13. It is 
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government’s response to this damper on the settlement enterprise was two-pronged. First, it had 
to show that miri land was not cultivated for ten years, or had ceased to be cultivated after this 
time. Demonstrating this would allow the Israeli government, under Article 78 of the OLC, to 
register the land as ‘state land’. Then, once the land was declared state land, by virtue of ‘Order 
Concerning Government Property 59-1967’, a military order which like others serves as primary 
legislation in the OPT, the Custodian for Government and Abandoned Property in Judea and 
Samaria, an official of the ILA, is allowed to assume possession of ‘state land’ and “take any 
measures he deems necessary for that purpose”. Most often the purpose is the construction of 
civilian Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian land. Given that the requirements under Article 
78 have been extremely hard to satisfy, and that Palestinians face restrictions on access to land and 
a discriminatory water policy in the OPT,442 converting miri land to ‘state land’ has been a 
successful undertaking, allowing the government to realise its goal. In this manner, adopting the 
jurisprudence on adverse possession as it developed within the Green Line, the government, with 
the backing of the court, has converted massive amounts of miri Palestinian land to state land, and 
used it to house Jews.443 It is interesting to note that settlers also encroach and cultivate on 
Palestinian land in order to acquire title via adverse possession.444 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
worth noting that the government does in fact also build on private Palestinian land and settlers regularly encroach 
on private Palestinian land. The High Court has ruled for the demolition of such settler houses built on private 
Palestinian land in certain cases, for example regarding the Ulpana neighbourhood in the settlement of Bet El, north 
of Ramallah in September 2011. However, given the political backlash from settler constituents, such rulings are 
seldom implemented immediately, as in the Ulpana case, with a government request for an extension on the set 
demolition date, a request to reopen the case and conduct further hearings, and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s own 
attempts to circumvent the demolition. See Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu working to prevent demolition of new outpost 
in West Bank”, Haaretz (April 4, 2012), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-
working-to-prevent-demolition-of-new-outpost-in-west-bank-1.422570, Yesh Din, “Illegal Construction in the 
Ulpana Neighborhood (Jabel Artis) – Background” (undated), online: http://www.yesh-
din.org/hottopview.asp?postid=18. 
442 Amnesty International, Israel/OPT – Troubled Waters - Palestinians denied fair access to water (2009) Index: 
MDE 15/027/2009 at 41 
443 According to the State Comptroller, on account of this legal manoeuvre, ‘state land’ increased to 1.44 million 
dunams in 1992, from 527,000 dunams in 1967 when the Occupation began. See State Comptroller, Annual Report 
56A (2006) at 206. 
444 However, in March 2012, the High Court ruled against settler Michael Lessens who had taken possession of land 
belonging to the Palestinian village of Qadum and was claiming title under the doctrine of adverse possession. 
President Beinisch held that in order to establish such a right to title, the possessor would have to prove that he had 
not offended the rules of equity, such as illegal trespass. As the settler failed to demonstrate the same, and as he was 
unable to prove cultivation for ten years, the Court denied his claim and issued an absolute order to evacuate the 
land and return it to its Palestinian owners. The decision hints that in establishing a right to title via adverse 
possession doctrine, the new standard of proving that rules of equity were not violated will be applied, and this may 
make it harder for settlers to attain such title in the OPT in the future. See Yesh Din, “High Court of Justice orders 
eviction of settler from Kedumim who invaded private Palestinian land belonging to residents of the village of 
Qadum” (March 20 2012), online: http://www.yesh-din.org/infoitem.asp?infocatid=188, Ahmad Abd-al-Qader v. 




In early 2017, the legislature passed the ‘Law for the Regularization of Settlement in Judea and 
Samaria – 5777’ that ushered in a new era for how Israeli law deals with the expropriation of 
private Palestinian land. The new law retroactively expropriates the land on which settlements 
have been built from their rightful private Palestinian landholders. While it does not transfer 
ownership to the settlers, the new law paves the way to expropriate vast swathes of private 
Palestinian land in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions.445 
 
It is this material making of space whereby lands under historical use by Palestinians are brought 
under Israeli possession and ownership in Israel/Palestine that makes it possible for the courts in 
Umm al-Hieran’s case to inadequately scrutinise whether there arise rights to prescription for the 
Palestinian residents, on what is registered Israeli land. Had either court attempted to answer 
whether or not long-term use and possession of the land gave rise to certain prescriptive rights, 
even though ultimate title would remain with the state, it would likely have come to a very different 
set of conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expropriation of more Palestinian land? Not likely. As Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor elucidated, there is “an 
internal debate about where it is necessary to settle”. In the case of Qadum, there were those in government who 
were opposed to Lessens encroachment, and prior to the villagers filing their petition, the governmental Civil 
Administration (CA) had issued an eviction order against Lessens (though it was not executed since the CA’s 
Appeals Committee found in Lessens’ favour and recommended cancellation of the eviction order). While the 
overarching governmental strategy is to increase state possession and ownership of Palestinian land, political 
exigencies such as fear of international condemnation and isolation, as well as the need to appear democratic by 
upholding the right to private property and abiding by the landmark decision of Elon Moreh, demand that the 
government favour strategic settlement, meaning that which is authorised by a majority of the higher echelons in 
government. Wanton settlement, such as that of the individual outposts and emblematic of Lessens’ undertaking is 
seen as more expendable. See Geoffrey Aronson, “The Rule of Law vs The Rule by Law”, 22:3 Foundation for 
Middle East Peace, Settlement Report, (May-June 2012), online: http://fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-22/no.-3/the-
rule-of-law-vs-the-rule-by-law. In any case, appropriation of Palestinian land does not mostly take place under the 
aegis of individual settlers. A few months earlier, in December 2011, President Beinisch offered a very different sort 
of ruling in the case of stone quarries in the West Bank. She held that the prolonged occupation meant that Israeli 
quarries were entitled to operate in the West Bank, even though 94% of their produce makes its way to Israel. The 
ruling was in clear violation of the law on occupation, where, as the occupying power, Israel is obliged to manage 
the territory for the benefit of the local population. Rather, it strengthened the uni-directional schema whereby 
Palestinian natural resources are being depleted for the increasing benefit of the Israeli economy. Yesh Din v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, [2011] HCJ 2164/09, Aeyal Gross, “Israel is exploiting the 
resources of the occupied West Bank”, Ha’aretz (December 28, 2011), online: http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/israel-is-exploiting-the-resources-of-the-occupied-west-bank-1.403988, David Kretzmer, “The law of 
belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel” (2012) 94:885 International Review of the Red Cross 207 at 
220-22. 
445 Adalah, “Knesset approves law that lets Israel expropriate vast tracts of private Palestinian land” (February 5 
2017), online: https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9021, Allison Kaplan Sommer, “Explained: Israel’s New 




Although acquisition of title to state land cannot happen under adverse possession doctrine, the 
long-term use, settlement and possession for a period spanning 50 years, could in theory give rise 
to certain prescriptive rights, such as the right to a long-term lease. Such a justification can be found 
in the spirit of Article 78 of the OLC read alongside Article 94 of the Land Law446. Therefore, based 
on the Shibli decision, title would not be transferred from the state to local residents, but other 
accommodations, that do not interfere with ownership rights of the state and so do not seek to 
balance Article 78 with the Basic Law: Israel Lands, could be made. These could be made owing to 
the adverse possession doctrine justifications of attachment and personality theory and Lockean 
labour theory. Long-term use should give rise to an entitlement as the long-term possessor, by 
virtue of her extended use of the land has come to expect continued control of it,447 and indeed as 
both Hegelian and spatial theory assert, as the land becomes part of her. 
 
But more significantly, the Al-Kilab case448 established that land from which a Bedouin community 
were displaced from in 1948 under military order should be seen as giving rights to land in that 
area to where they were transitioned. Local case law has also affirmed that certain prescriptive 
claim rights arise on account of long-term use and possession. In the Shibli court’s decision (para. 
13), the court held that although Article159(b) of the Land Law 1969 excludes claims of a 
prescriptive right from applying to settled, immovable property under the Prescription Law 1958, 
procedural rights, such as a claim right that protects the long-term user against an eviction lawsuit 
could apply. Such procedural claim rights in lieu of prescriptive rights would accrue in Umm al-
Hieran, as its land was registered in the name of the state in 1978,449 meaning that in 2003 the 
twenty-five-year prescription period was satisfied. This fact is of enormous significance to the 
residents of Atir-Umm al-Hieran, as well as those in other unrecognized villages threatened by 
forced evictions under the Prawer Plan, who have lived on settled, immovable property for over 
twenty-five years, and who can claim a right not to be evicted under the Prescription Law 1958.  
 
A third aspect of the court’s conception of space is that it sets the frames within which the issues 
can be discussed. The residents’ interpretation of this particular ordering of legal narratives, an 
                                                          
446 Article 94 of the Land Law provides for prescriptive easement rights to both 'settled' and 'unsettled' land if a 
limitation period of thirty years has elapsed. However, the provision does not apply to public land by virtue of 
Article 113c. 
447 Margaret Jane Radin, “Time, Possession, and Alienation” (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 723 
at 744  
448 Al-Kilab v. Ben Gurion University, CA 496/89, PD (4), 343, 351 (1991) 
449 See The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, CC 3326/04, Protocol of February 25 2007 
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aspect of their ‘lived space’, means that the scope of remedies that they seek is correspondingly 
conditioned. I’ve flagged this point in the Abu Mdeghem case, whereby historical amnesia envelopes 
the issues of structural, quotidian violence and the contested legal status of Naqab land, so that the 
remedies sought, and attained, offer only limited respite.  
 
This manifested in a ban being issued on crop destruction via aerial spraying with Round-up 
pesticide, but allowed, and even encouraged, that those same crops be destroyed by a tractor 
plough. This outcome was in keeping with the court not seeing crop destruction as a form of food 
insecurity and thereby structural violence, and not appreciating how the status of the land was 
contested, implying that this was not simply a case of a landowner asserting his right to evict 
squatters. The violent events of 1948 and law’s own violence are simply foreclosed to the court’s 
recollection and so, unsurprisingly, no attempt is made to raise them in the petition. In our case, the 
scope of the remedies sought is conditioned by similar frames set by the court, which also informs 
the tone of the Bedouin defendants. Elements of defence narration, however, need to be 
translatable to the court for fear that if they fail to catch the court’s ears, the larger argument that 
the defence narration buttresses will be lost.450 What this means is that in their attempt to appeal to 
the ethnocratic leanings of the court, Bedouin petitioners tend to replicate the racialized 
hierarchies on which they are founded. I will take this point up further in the following section on 
the residents’ interpretation of conceived space. This will help clarify how their resistance via legal 
avenues, an element of their ‘lived space’ and a symbolic making of space, feeds into the materiality 
of legality, and is contoured as a result. 
 
Yet, if courts reify homogenous, static notions of space, allow for land to be transferred from 
Palestinians to Israeli Jews but not vice versa and set strict frames for how the issues of land and 
rights arising therein can be discussed, is it fair to conclude that courts do not make intelligible 
Bedouin lifeways in a particular space, or would it be more accurate to conclude that courts 
deliberately refuse to make intelligible Bedouin lifeways? 
 
Residents’ Interpretation of Perceived and Conceived Space: Their ‘Lived’ Space  
The spatiality of Umm al-Hieran symbolises a few things to Palestinians who interpret both its 
perceived and conceived space. It symbolises racialized and securitized space, where Bedouin 
bodies are marked by illegality. Elaborating on these symbolisms I believe will help facilitate our 
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understanding of why the court decided in the manner they did. It also demonstrates the forms of 
agency and resistance performed as a matter of residents’ 'lived space', and how in dialectic with 
space's materiality, a more nuanced sense of Umm al-Hieran’s spatiality can be understood. 
 
Unequal social relations in this space are enabled via the creation and deployment of racialized 
hierarchies, whereby the Arab and Jew are marked as essentially different. Being essentially 
different makes possible, and ethical, a differential exclusion whereby one group is less entitled 
than the other. 
 
In adjudicating on the applicability of adverse possession and prescriptive easement, neither court 
adequately scrutinized its underlying principles to ask if they applied in the case. For example, 
applying Hegelian personality theory, the court could have asked if an emotional bond develops 
between the adverse possessor and the land. Does the passage of fifty-six years of use and 
possession of the land suffice to create an emotional bond? Is it fair to assume that the property has 
become part of the person on account of long-term use for these many decades? What harm is 
caused if the property is severed from the person? In fact, this final question was posed by the 
Bedouin respondents in their defense. In critiquing how the eviction lawsuits are injurious to the 
residents’ human dignity, they emphasized the harm caused in severing the bond between the 
possessor and the land. To demonstrate this, they cited the Gaza beach case, where the Supreme 
Court stated, "Disengagement cuts the Israeli from his home, his surroundings, from his synagogue 
and the cemetery where his dead are buried".451 Of course, the argument foregrounds a specifically 
Jewish personhood with its associated cultural and religious identifiers. The frames of discussion in 
the court accommodate the idea that personhood theory applies to Jewish persons, that is Jewish 
people build emotional bonds with the land. As such, this does not make a normative claim that 
Arabs do not build emotional bonds with land. Yet, is that not the implication when the court 
evades discussing its applicability in the present case?  
 
Nor is Lockean labour theory considered.452 Did the court acknowledge that the respondents 
performed labour on the land? It is a matter of public record that the ILA leased the community 
                                                          
451 Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an v. The State of Israel, [2011] Civil Appeal (CA) 1165/09 at para. 85, citing 
Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence, [1993] HCJ 5688/92 IsrSC 47(2) 812, 827 
452 Locke’s labour theory of property was concerned with the original acquisition of property rights and not with 
natural resources under some form of ownership at the time labour was performed on them. Nevertheless, the theory 
remains a cornerstone of property law as it determines whether the original acquisition was legitimate and 
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land for residence, agriculture and grazing. Was the construction of homes, planting of crops and 
grazing of livestock not considered examples of the resident mixing his labour with a state of nature 
to the point that it becomes part of his person? What about the great effort of residents in 
performing the daily routine of accessing water, whether acquiring water tanks or private water 
connections in the present or constructing water wells and reservoirs in the recent past? Were 
these not considered labour on the land? Or was this not the right sort of labour on the land? What 
of the laying down of paths and dirt roads to facilitate travel?  
 
In its decision, the court does consider how the residents built homes. However, posing the 
question if those homes had investment ‘value’ deserving of compensation upon demolition, the 
court found in the negative.453 Yet, the court failed to distinguish between two essentially different 
concepts of value, that of ‘use’ value and ‘exchange’ value.454 ‘Exchange’ value refers to the value of a 
thing, usually money, for which property can be exchanged. This is what the court meant when 
referring to the investment value of the homes in Umm al-Hieran. ‘Use’ value, however, is 
subjective, and is based on human needs and the desires it fulfills. In our case home as property 
provides shelter, comfort, a sense of belonging and a locus for family life. Although the exchange 
value on the Israeli property market of a home in Umm al-Hieran would be relatively low given the 
use of substandard building materials and the lack of basic infrastructure in the community, its use 
value is far higher than its monetary worth and it is reasonable to assume that it would parallel 
with neighbouring Jewish homes, which equally serve the basic necessities of providing shelter, 
comfort and a locus for family life.  
 
By not considering how Palestinian labour in Umm al-Hieran would give rise to certain property 
rights, or essentially that it is of no investment value, is to say that Palestinian labour is not really 
labour. Palestinian labour neither gives rise to entitlements nor does it have intrinsic value, as 
Lockean labour theory establishes. Indeed, this is what Adam Smith455 recognized when he wrote 
that labour is the real measure of exchange value. What a man is able to purchase when he 
purchases a commodity is the labour of persons that contributed to the exchange value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
implications for holdings in the present. With regard to adverse possession, the scope of labour performed on the 
land by the adverse possessor is a determining factor as to whether she acquires right to the property or not. 
453 Para. 11, Magistrate Court decision, Para. 8, District Court decision 
454 Alison Clarke and Paul Kohler, Property law: commentary and materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 53-54 




commodity. By saying that homes in Umm al-Hieran have no exchange value is to say that the 
labour of persons in building such homes can be purchased without money, that is, their labour is 
effectively without worth. 
 
Racialized space is also apparent in the different regimes of mobility that operate between 
Palestinians and Jews at the Shani checkpoint, as ‘Atwa experiences as a matter of daily routine. 
 
In fact, ‘Atwa experiences the racialized milieu without having to be mobile. It only takes him a 
cursory glance from the village to experience the same. After visiting ‘Atwa’s home and family, and 
before I departed, he took me to a lookout in the village. From there, he pointed out the three single 
family Jewish settlements – Yehudah, Tsan Ya’tir and Shoham - that sprung up in the eighties, all a 
few kilometres from his village. Each is a several hundred dunam allotment, and is equipped with 
basic amenities via electricity and water lines that in some cases run for twenty kilometres from the 
mains. He laughs as he points out that the shortest distance from his village to the settlements is 
half a kilometre, entreating, “so hook us up to your connection”. He turns sombre, however, as he 
tells how one of the settlements, Tsan Ya’tir, hosts a dog cemetery. “If someone’s dog dies, they bury 
them here… each dog gets a headstone.” That dead dogs have more right to this space than living 
Palestinians is a cruel irony not lost on him. 
 
Racialized space is also symbolised in the notion of Arabs and Jews representing degeneracy/filth 
and respectability/sanitation, respectively. Such representations parallel with the Foucauldian 
premise by which a biopolitics456 is performed to separate the wheat from the chaff, the desired 
from the undesirables among citizenry. This is represented by government documents such as that 
of the ILA’s on Bedouin trespass addressed above, and in cartographic representations that 
represent the descending scale of order and respectability from the ordered Jewish town to the 
semi-ordered Palestinian township to the disorder of the Palestinian unrecognized village.   
 
                                                          
456 Foucault described ‘biopower’ as that which encompasses a series of practices controlling or exerting power over 
life by regulating it and creating disciplines around it. Biopower includes both disciplinary power and ‘biopolitics’. 
As capital punishment came to be seen as challenging the purposes of governing, a biopower took its place so that in 
moving away from the ancient right to take life or let live there was a move towards fostering life or disallowing it 
to the point of death.  
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Umm al-Hieran also symbolises securitized space, space conceived so as to enable a low probability 
of damage to acquired values, to use David Baldwin’s definition of security.457 Securitized space 
goes hand in hand with racialized space, whereby certain bodies and geographic loci are identified 
and marked as prospective threats to the acquired values of a space. In our case, it functions to 
mark the Arab outlaw from the Jewish in-law, so to speak. Security was the basis for the institution 
of Jewish Hiran, informed the rationale behind and mode of governmentality in the construction of 
Atir-Umm al-Hieran subjects, and was my own take home message in conducting fieldwork there. 
 
The institution of Hiran was grounded in security rationale. It coincided with the Prime Minister’s 
Office deciding in 2002 to establish Jewish settlements in the Naqab and Galilee as a matter of 
“national necessity”.458 What was meant by national necessity? It meant assisting in Jewish 
population distribution towards the peripheries, preserving state lands and protecting borders.459 
Jewish settlement, particularly in the area of Wadi 'Atir, the locus of our case, was part of Sharon's 
nineties political programme to create a contiguous Jewish area as an offset to Palestinian 
populations on either side of the Green Line.460 The PMO’s 2012 programme is similarly informed 
by security considerations, and aims to establish between seven to ten new Jewish villages, among 
them Hiran, on a 180 square kilometre stretch of land along the Green Line, between Arad and 
Meitar. The Settlement Department at the World Zionist Organization is at the heart of this plan 
that will create an unbroken Jewish bloc from the West Bank settlement of Susia and across the 
Green Line to the Israeli town of Arad.461 The materiality of security has been regularly relayed in 
the courts, for example in the Abu Mdeghem case, when Justice Arbel stressed the importance of 
land as a national asset and the various security considerations that go along with it, such as the 
government’s duty to distribute the population and preserve land. In Qa’adan, the Jewish Agency 
argued that its purpose is to settle Jews all over the country, particularly in border areas and those 
                                                          
457 David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security" (1997) 23 Review of International Studies 5–26 at 13. For a 
thorough exploration of the theme of security and its appropriation as a ‘fundamental principle’ in Israeli 
adjudication, see the ‘Wine Path Plan’ chapter that follows this one.  
458 Hamdan, “Individual Settlement”, supra note 302 at 2 
459 Ibid. at 2-3, Zafrir Rinat, "Sharon is promoting establishment of 30 settlements in the Negev and Galilee," 
Ha’aretz (July 20, 2003), online: http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.896967 (Hebrew) 
460 Rinat, Ibid.  
461 Lia Tarachansky, “Israel's New West Bank”, The Real News Network (February 28, 2012), online: 
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=8002, Ranit 
Nahum-Halevy, “Judaization of the Negev at any Cost”, Ha'aretz (January 9, 2012), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/judaization-of-the-negev-at-any-cost-1.406251, ACRI, “Petition for 




with a sparse Jewish population.462 Justice Barak did not find fault with these priorities and 
affirmed that executive bodies like the ILA administer land so as to prevent it from coming under 
the ownership of ‘unwanted entities’, to disperse the population, absorb immigrants and to 
implement security policies.463 Security in these instances is both a material making of space and its 
symbolism. That is to say, security policies are buttressed by all branches of government, and in 
doing so, space more generally comes to symbolise securitized space, the marking of bodies, groups 
and loci as threats to the principal acquired value of Jewish primacy in Israel/Palestine space. 
 
Second, security concerns of the state meant that all Arab Palestinians were under Military 
Administration rule for the first two decades following the state’s foundation. In the case of the Abu 
al-Qi’an tribe, one means by which the government ensured better monitoring of their activities 
was to encourage them being brought under the patronage of Sheikh Salman Al-Huzayyel. Sheikh 
Al-Huzayyel was considered a ‘good Arab’,464 meaning he regularly colluded with the authorities in 
helping them acquire Bedouin land and in enlisting members of the community into the military.465 
The government attempted to relocate certain members of the Abu al-Qi'an tribe and drew on 
Sheikh al-Huzayyel’s assistance for the task. The government’s aim was not "to expel them from 
their encampment" but "under the protection of the head of their tribe, Salman al-Huzayyel, to 
allow effective security monitoring of their activities."466 As Sheikh al-Huzayyel himself admitted, 
Sheikhs became ‘nawatir kumbania’, or kibbutz field guards,467 implying that their primary purpose 
was to directly manage the native population, while freeing the government from the task. Security 
concerns were the rationale for recruiting the Sheikh, while his monitoring for security breaches 
                                                          
462 Qa 'adan v. Israel Lands Administration, HCJ 6698/95, P.D. 54 (1) 258 at para. 10 
463 Ibid. at para. 19 
464 See Hillel Cohen, Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967 (London, 
Berkley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010) at 181-185 [Cohen, Good Arabs] for a description of 
collusion between the Sheikh and the Israeli authorities. However, Cohen, depending on certain archival documents 
where his name is wrongly noted, refers to him as 'Suleiman' instead of 'Salman'.  
465 Ibid. at 182. His 'goodness' was not lost on other characters in this study - such as Nuri al-'Oqbi, whose family 
was allowed to return to their land in al-'Araqib and whose father was released from prison in 1954 after attempting 
to return to al-'Araqib following his expulsion three years prior, both on account of the Sheikh's intervention. See 
Chapter 1. To the Abu Freih family, also of al-'Araqib, it was Sheikh Al-Huzayyel's patronage that granted them 
permission by then Military Governor Avraham Shemesh to return to the land in 1958 and farm on it. See Rego 
2012b. Others, however, claim that he undertook fraudulent land sales in exchange for Israeli lira, the national 
currency until 1980. Interview with Ibrahim Hussein Abu Al-Tayyif (Rahat), December 7 2011. The interviewee 
claims Sheikh al-Huzayyel sold his family's land to the state in 1980, two years before passing away. Sheikh al-
Huzayyel later swore under oath that it was not he who made the land sale. 
466 Israeli State Archives Document no. 149/4/1905 (August 28 1957), Adalah, Nomads Against Their Will, supra 
note 127 at 13 
467 Here Al-Huzayyel is referring to sheikhs granted their position by the Israeli state, which after 1948 made and 
unmade sheikhs, cited in Cohen, Good Arabs, supra note 464 at 183. 
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was the particular mode by which this village chieftain was woven into this particular project of 
governmentality. 
 
When I first travelled to the Wadi Atir area, I found it hard to imagine how the JNF could sell it as 
being a place for ‘recreational tourism fashioned with scenic hiking trails’.468 There seemed 
something artificial to the claim, much like the forest in which it was housed, Yatir, a 30,000 dunam 
expanse of man-made forest, home to the seemingly innocuous pine.  
 
I had arranged a meeting with the local residents of ‘Atir to hear from them about the looming 
demolition and eviction orders. As I zigzagged down the serpentine Route 316, I noted how on 
either side of the narrow gravel road concrete slabs told me that I was charting down the middle of 
a military firing range.469 The road’s sudden bends made me feel as if I was now part of the military 
exercise. As I proceeded, the martial milieu became all the more apparent as helicopter rotors 
whirred overhead.  
 
As if appearing out of nowhere, I caught a white Toyota Hilux in my rearview mirror. The driver 
sounded his horn, signaling for me to pull over. I misread the signal, and instead sped up.  
 
The pick-up swerved to the left, pulled up in parallel to me, and this time the driver signaled with 
his finger for me to pull over. I did.  
 
“Assalmu ‘alaykum”, I greeted them in Arabic, assuming they were most likely from the al-Farhoud 
family, had been expecting me, and now that they had caught up to me, wanted to guide me to the 
community.  
 
“Boker tov” [‘good day’ in Hebrew], they responded.  
                                                          
468 JNF, "Yatir Forest", online: http://www.kkl.org.il/eng/tourism-and-recreation/forests-and-parks/yatir-forest.aspx 
469 The extent of land in Israel under army control is considerable. Army firing ranges alone span a third of the land 
inside the Green Line in Israel. In fact, the IDF controls 39% of land (8.7 million dunams) inside the Green Line, 
while an additional 40% of land (8.8 million dunams) is under building restrictions because of military 
considerations. 84% of the land held by the army is in southern Israel, in the Negev. See State Comptroller, “Annual 
Report  2010”, Report No 61 (March 29, 2011), online: 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/contentTree.asp?bookid=594&id=193&contentid=&parentcid=undefined&sw=13
66&hw=698 at 39-118, Anshel Pfeffer and Yossi Melman, “State Comptroller: IDF controls 39% of Israel's land 





I was obviously using the wrong vernacular. So I switched to English. My experience has taught me 
that for a non-Hebrew speaker addressing a Hebrew speaker, speaking Arabic is generally ill-
advised for at least two reasons. First, that it is not understood by the other and second, because it 
is likely off-putting.470 
 
They asked where I was going.  
 
“Yatir”, I responded, referring to the recently constructed Jewish town that shares its name with the 
older Arab ‘Atir, though I was not certain that the Jewish town had yet been populated.  
 
As I slowly gathered my thoughts, I made out that my interrogators were Israeli, attached to some 
security apparatus, and operating clandestinely in the area. Increasingly I became aware of the 
irony that I was in a mobile interrogation meant to ensure my immobility. I felt like a blip on the 
radar that tells the monitors something is out of place. 
 
“Where are you coming from?”  
 
This is a question I often receive when flying out of Ben-Gurion airport. Its purpose is to determine 
if the person is an Arab or a Jew without directly posing the question. The answer is easily garnered 




Obviously, my answer sidestepped the question’s purpose. Still, it was a half-truth as I spend a 
significant amount of time conducting research there. 
 
Eventually, they gestured with a nod to signal the interrogation had concluded. As they did not have 
cause to detain me further, they relented and u-turned, and as when they appeared, they 
disappeared into thin air. 
                                                          
470 A poll conducted by Geocartographica revealed that a majority of Israeli Jews are put off by Arabic speakers. 
Around 50% feel either fear or ‘discomfort’, and 18% feel hate. See Jack Khoury and Eli Ashkenazi, “Poll: 68% of 





I continued cautiously. In this securitized space, I was identified as a threat of sorts that needed to 
be immobilized and determined. The experience reminded me of Derrida’s characterization of 
policing as phantom-like in the aim of maintaining the social order.471 Although my interrogators 
were army or police, they did not identify themselves as such and drove a car with a civilian license 
plate. They were the ungraspable, faceless form that appeared out of nowhere, yet seemingly 
always watching; a threat of violence always looming. 
 
Spatiality also symbolizes the marking of Bedouin bodies as illegal. As myths about their nomadism 
circulate in the courts, representing lack of fixity and uncertainty, the law is presented as its 
counterpoint – the stable and the certain. Bedouin bodies are represented as personifications of 
nomadism, a lifestyle pattern that transgresses modern, legal norms. Both nomadism and Bedouin 
bodies, then, are that which the law attempts to correct by fitting into recognized, legalized patterns 
of living and being.  
 
Illegal settlement was the basis on which the state requested the residents’ eviction. The principal 
argument on which the lawsuits rested was that the residents were illegal trespassers. The Bedouin 
respondents presented to the court official proofs that the Bedouin were not illegal trespassers; 
rather, they were authorised to settle in the Wadi Atir area after having been granted permission by 
the authorities to do so. One such proof was the 1957 letter from the Office of the Adviser on Arab 
Affairs, an office attached to the PMO, which confirmed that the Military Governor exerted pressure 
on the community to live there, that lands were subsequently leased to them, and that they were 
cultivating on it. “Following pressure by the Military Government and after the arrest of many 
members of the tribe for various criminal offences, about two-thirds of them, led by Azam Jaber 
Abu Raj‘an, agreed to relocate to the area of Atir. They received state land under lease, in 
accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Agriculture, and they are cultivating it”.472 
Accordingly, the Magistrate court determined that there was no basis for the state’s claim that the 
Bedouin were illegal trespassers, and even chastised the authorities for being factually inaccurate 
on the matter. 
 
                                                          
471 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in Drucilla Cornell and Michael 
Rosenfeld (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992) 3-67 at 44-45 
472 Israeli State Archives Document no. 149/4/1905 (August 28 1957), Adalah, Nomads Against Their Will, supra 
note 127 at 12-13 
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However, in the concurrent case of Abu Musa'ed,473 relating to Umm al-Hieran and other Bedouin 
villages, and concerned with water provision, district-level judges referred to the Umm al-Hieran 
community as trespassers and illegal squatters in their decision.474 The Abu Musa’ed decision was 
on June 5 2011, more than three months after our case’s District Court decision of February 28 
2011. How is it that one court refers to the community as illegal trespassers while months earlier 
another court chastised the government for claiming as much? In Abu Musa'ed, the court's decision 
rests on the “element of illegal settlement” which is rendered a relevant consideration that should 
be taken into account when considering whether another water point should be created.475 In fact, 
great emphasis is placed on illegality, where 'illegal settlement' is referred to forty-four times in the 
twenty-three page decision.476 If indeed for the Abu Musa’ed court the legality of the settlement is a 
‘relevant consideration’, why is it inadequately scrutinized?  
 
It appears that there are two possible explanations. First, the court, as a matter of routine, lumps all 
unrecognized Bedouin communities under the banner of the illegal. Another way of framing it is 
that unless there is explicit recognition granted to a Bedouin community, such as those in 
government constructed development townships, Bedouin bodies and their settlements are by 
default illegal. This remains the convention unless explicit, official evidence exculpates Bedouin 
bodies from that illegality, as official documents did concerning Umm al-Hieran for the case at issue. 
Second, the court, as upholder of the image of law as society’s moral compass, cannot but chastise 
that which has been publicly exposed to be false. The lawsuits case, unlike the water provision case, 
concerned only Umm al-Hieran, meaning the question of its legality was given the opportunity to be 
duly considered. Second, the central question the court sought to answer in the lawsuits case was 
whether the residents had acquired certain prescriptive rights to the land that should prevent their 
eviction, for example the right to adverse possession, which would theoretically arise had 
settlement been hostile, and not authorised. In the Abu Musa’ed water provision case, the illegality 
of the settlements was a ‘relevant consideration’, but certainly not the principal question the court 
sought to answer. The principal question was “to what extent Bedouins living in various illegal 
places of settlement in the Negev have a legal right to demand that the State install private 
                                                          
473 Abu Musa'ed v. Water Commissioner, CA 9535/06. The judges in this case were Justices A. Procaccia, E. Arbel 
and Y. Alon. 
474 Ibid. at para. 1, 48. 
475 Ibid. at para. 42. 
476 See Sharmila L. Murthy, Mark K. Williams and Elisha Baskin, “The Human Right to Water in Israel: A Case 
Study of the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev”, Working Paper (January 10, 2011) for an extended 
discussion of this case 
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connection points to water in their illegal places of accommodation.”477 The principal question in 
Abu Musa’ed takes for granted the illegality of Bedouin settlement; whether or not the community is 
legal is not up for discussion. It is this particular encompassing of Bedouin in shifting 
legality/illegality frames that I wish to take up at the end of this chapter.  
 
Residents’ lived space is also about the forms of resistance deployed against space’s materiality. 
Symbolism is both the linking of signifiers to space’s materiality, whereby Umm al-Hieran signifies 
racialized, securitized space where Bedouin bodies carry the mark of illegality, as it does 
encompass the spheres of residents’ imaginations that attempt to alter space. In Umm al-Hieran, 
I’ve identified three particular forms of resistance, though certainly the list is inexhaustible. As 
space is always a becoming, so are the resistances of ‘lived space’, meaning they can never be fully 
represented. Residents resist via outreach to the public sphere by engaging journalists and 
researchers so that they can tell their stories, via performing ‘checkpoint cheek’, or confronting 
racism when they encounter it, and finally, by using the forum that is the launching point for our 
study, the court.  
 
I encountered some difficulty in arranging meetings with local residents. I put this down to the 
sensitive nature of looming evictions of the entire community, residents’ busy schedules, and an 
understandable wariness about people unfamiliar. Nevertheless, there were those who were eager 
to meet with me, both as a researcher and as someone who would be writing in the press about 
their issue. For those that met with me, it was clear that they were attempting to get their side of 
the story out. They sought to show the disjuncture between the state’s claim to be democratic, and 
their experience. They were motivated by a longing to show how space for them was not at all as it 
was conceived by the planners or courts, but how it was subjective, multiple, continuous, and 
productive. After meeting with local residents, I was able to communicate to the public the issue of 
disparate provisions of water and electricity between Arabs and Jews, the similarities between 
Umm al-Hieran and Palestinian villages only kilometres away in the OPT, and the racism 
encountered in residents’ daily travel, in spite of carrying the privilege of Israeli citizenship.478  
Residents have similarly invited other journalists and researchers, who have conducted field tours 
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and fact-finding missions in the community, produced video reports, and written news and analytic 
pieces for the print and online press. 
 
A second form of resistance is confronting the racial experience. When discussing particular daily 
routines in the production of space, I gave the example of ‘Atwa’s travel to and from the community. 
I wrote of how he is racialized at the Shani checkpoint on account of being Palestinian, either made 
to reroute or subjected to a bodily search. However, on one occasion, ‘Atwa chose to confront that 
racism in my company.479 After presenting his Israeli ID, from which the checkpoint stationed 
soldier could tell he was an Arab with Israeli citizenship, he is told that he “needs a permit” to pass 
through the checkpoint, even though he is crossing into Israel and is an Israeli citizen. The soldier 
clarifies that only residents of Shani drive by here, though ‘Atwa knows this to be untrue. ‘Atwa has 
passed through the checkpoint on the chance occasion that the soldier manning the checkpoint at 
that moment fails to identify him as a non-Jew.  
 
Looking the soldier in the eye, ‘Atwa retorts, "Do you get what is happening here? I brought this 
doctoral student [me] to show the discrimination between Bedouin and the residents of Shani".  
 
The soldier’s embarrassment is obvious, and in his defence, he states “But there is a possibility for a 
few...".  
 
“…I know there is a possibility for a few to pass [referring to those who 'work with' the 
government]. But I brought him especially so he can see the face of things. What kind of thing is 
this? Israelis should be Israelis".  
 
Still blushing, the soldier insists, "I know, but it has nothing to do with me personally".  
 
The soldier is not incorrect. The racial/securitized logic of the checkpoint cannot be a personal 
decision. Rather, it needs to be, and indeed is, systematic and structural. 
 
By confronting the racism he encounters, ‘Atwa metaphorically dissolves, or defoliates, the Green 
Line, allowing for the differentiated spaces, and differentiated subjects, across the Green Line to be 
exposed for their commonality. The take home message for the soldier, then, is that a racial logic is 
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operative at this checkpoint for which he is being taken to task. Further, the racial logic in operation 
at the checkpoint challenges official myths of citizenship privilege, since ‘Atwa’s lived experience, 
Israeli citizen or not, is a racialized one, similar to those of occupied Palestinian subjects of the OPT. 
 
Although ‘Atwa held no illusions about the legal process, he, like other Palestinian Bedouins in this 
study, has chosen to use it. Isolated remedies are possible and individual victories have been won, 
as evidenced in Qa’adan. Nevertheless, to go back to a point raised earlier, in the court’s conceptual 
production of space, the frames of discussion are predetermined. What this means is that legal 
resistance is necessarily enunciated within the contours of those frames, thereby replicating the 
racialized hierarchies on which the law is founded. For example, we see how the petitioners 
foreground specifically Jewish religious and cultural identifiers by citing the Gaza beach case. It 
therefore affirms that Hegelian personhood theory applies to Jewish persons, that is they form 
emotional bonds to the land, a parallel the court does not make vis-à-vis the Palestinian petitioners 
themselves. Further, we are told that the moral issues that arise out of Jewish settlement in 
Occupied Gaza begin when that settlement is undone, and not before. From this we can infer 
another aspect of the court’s production of space, that in Gaza, as in Hiran, Jewish persons have a 
form of natural right to settle in the place of Palestinians whether it be those Gazans from Gaza or 
Palestinian Bedouin from Umm al-Hieran. The Bedouin respondents subscribe to previous legal 
recommendations concerning Naqab Bedouin. Specifically, they cite Justice Arbel in the Abu 
Mdeghem decision when she calls for a prompt, comprehensive solution to the Bedouin issue and 
Bedouins’ integration into Israeli society.480 Similarly, they appeal to the spirit of the Goldberg 
Commission's recommendations, including a line that critiques Bedouin illegal expansion.481 The 
endorsement of these official government positions on the Bedouin – the need for their integration 
and the critique of their illegality - elides the racialized logic of governmentality on which they 
hinge.  
 
The Bedouin respondents would do well to investigate further the court’s endorsement of Bedouin 
integration. Doing so, one conclusion they could reach is that integration would mean granting 
recognition of Bedouin as authentic ‘others’, a fixed, static community with its isolated living 
environs, with little say in the ability to question this representation and to influence it for different, 
for example, by enforcing their right to the city.  Integration could be interpreted then as a means to 
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facilitate Naqab Palestinians’ envelopment into the fold of liberal citizenship in a Jewish state where 
they are indefinitely differentially excluded. Second, the appeal to the Goldberg Committee’s 
recommendations undermines very real concerns of the Bedouin community, many of whom have 
been unequivocal in their critique of the Committee’s findings and recommendations for their 
inability to acknowledge historical rights to the land, to address decades of injustice and in their 
leaving open the possibility of forced relocation of tens of thousands of Bedouin.482 Nevertheless, 
this phenomenon of arguing in the language of the court can hardly be said to be particular to this 
case. It would apply to any party petitioning the court, where the court's underlying assumptions 
and elements of fact and precedence are starting points for the legal discussion.  
 
Why do I mention these challenges to legal resistance? We see here how resistance is in dialectic 
communication with the law. This dialectic communication I’ve explored earlier in the 
Introduction’s discussion on recognition and the Hegelian master-slave dialectic which pivots on 
the concept of sublation or aufheben. In our present case, resistance is the contradiction to the law, 
yet the law overcomes it by setting the frames of discussion, by foreclosing certain themes, by 
constructing subjects and conceiving space in two-dimensional form. Nevertheless, the germ of the 
contradiction remains within the law, that is to say, although resistance is overcome, it is also 
preserved because it is written into the resolution, which brings law to a higher level that contains 
within it the tension of resistance. What does this mean in practical terms? We can identify the 
implications of resistance within the law in philosopher Etienne Balibar’s ideas on ‘political 
heteronomy’.483 Balibar asserts that politics necessarily exists with its contradictions. That is, 
politics creates the space for counter-narratives to exist. Yet, these counter-narratives are 
overcome and preserved, which is to say sublated, within politics. Therefore, to affirm that legal 
resistance can exist and can be deployed is an affirmation of political heteronomy, the space given 
to resistance, the possibilities of political emancipation. Yet, this also means that resistance does 
not fully undermine the political system, but could also be seen to justify it because it seemingly 
allows for difference, which thereby allows the political system to persist. In arguing against 
political heteronomy, Balibar underlines how the system needs counter-hegemonic agency to 
sustain its hegemony, that is, the system exists because of itself and its contradiction. 
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In their appeal to the district court to overturn the lower court’s decision to issue the eviction 
lawsuits, the Bedouin petitioners argued that the state's decision did not meet the limitations clause 
test to justify multiple constitutional violations to the human rights to dignity, equality and 
property.484 Further, they held that the eviction was not based on legislation, but on an 
administrative decision485 and failed to demonstrate a compelling public interest to justify eviction, 
as prescribed for in case law.486 
 
As in past land cases involving Naqab Palestinians, and as we showed specifically in Nuri’s land 
claims case, the imposition on them487 of the burden of proof and stringent evidentiary rules make 
it a nearly insurmountable task to establish land claims, given the discounting of oral evidence, tent 
encampments not seen as 'settlements' and a pastoral lifestyle not seen as productive use of the 
land. The courts also apply unreasonable time barriers, inappropriately apply the Ottoman Land 
Code to the semi-nomadic pastoral lifestyle of Naqab Palestinians, and display a lack of respect for 
indigenous customary land law.488  In land claims cases, the burden of proof has been placed on 
Palestinians to demonstrate that the land they claim is not of the mawat category, and owing to the 
above mentioned rules of procedure and evidence, have greatly facilitated and offered legal 
justification for state expropriation of land. 
 
In our present case, the magistrate court placed the burden of proof on the respondents as opposed 
to on the appellants, on whom it would usually fall under the rules of civil procedure. This is 
because in the court's evaluation the state has established the threshold by establishing its claim as 
                                                          
484 For a violation of human rights to be lawful, the limitation clause of Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Liberty sets out four conditions that need to be satisfied: that there is authority in statute for the violation, that 
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Bedouins: Struggles for Land Rights and Cultural Survival in Israel” (Beersheba: Robert H. Arnow Center for 
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fact that it is the owner of the land.489 The Qa’adan decision seemed to establish that was a 
government action to result in differential treatment on an ethno-national basis, then that action 
would be ‘suspect’ and prima facie discriminatory. Accordingly, the burden of proof would then fall 
on the state to show justification for the action. However, neither court in our case saw the eviction 
as being discriminatory. 
 
In their concluding arguments to the magistrate court, the petitioners pointed out how this 
particular government eviction attempt was reminiscent of racial segregation in the pass laws and 
racial zoning laws of the antediluvian regimes of apartheid South Africa490 and early twentieth 
century USA,491 respectively. The lawsuits were issued within the framework of the 2002 
amendment to the Southern District Master Plan to construct the Jewish settlement of Hiran in the 
same space where Palestinians resided. Both courts offer the government rather generous leeway 
in not interpreting the aim to replace one particular ethnic group, Palestinians who had been 
present since 1956, with another, Jews who would be newly settled in their place, as 
discriminatory.  
 
Strangely, both magistrate and district courts chose not to address the differential treatment by the 
executive and both confirmed that neither was the appropriate forum to deliberate the 
constitutional issues raised. However, district court judges have the authority to rule on 
administrative law issues when a party is harmed by public officials and in fact are legally obliged 
to do so.492 So why did they refuse to do so? 
 
Inside/Outside Law 
At this juncture, I would like to segue into the inside/outside subjective relation to law, the location 
of individuals inside the law when they perform as legal subjects and their conceptualisation as 
outside the law when they are marked as illegal. Earlier, I drew in Ronen Shamir’s insight into 
Naqab Bedouin as being suspended in space, that is, being conceptualized as fixed, static, floating 
subjects in a space of contemporaneous plurality. Their nomadism, their floating in limbo between 
                                                          
489 The State of Israel v. Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an, CC 3326/04 [2009] at para. 10 
490 Concluding Arguments, Petition in Ibrahim Farhoud Abu al-Qi’an v. The State of Israel, [2011] Civil Appeal 
(CA) 1165/09 at para. 199 
491 Ibid. at para. 200 
492 See for example Navot, Constitutional Law, supra note 351 at 143. In an interview conducted with Suhad 
Bishara, Adalah’s attorney on September 22 2011 she confirmed that it is within the jurisdiction of the District Court 
to decide on constitutional matters. 
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traditionalism and modernity, and their deferred accounting into cartographic schema are all court 
representations that sustain suspension in that sense. Yet, I think there is a more significant 
suspension outside of that sustained by legal discourse or in the cartographic sense. I am referring 
here to the citizen subject’s inside/outside relation to law and the implications thereof.  
 
In Homo Sacer, philosopher Giorgio Agamben explores the ontology of sovereignty, and one of his 
key questions asks, what is the originary political element on which sovereignty is founded?493 
Looking at ancient Rome, monarchies and present-day states, Agamben demonstrates that being 
sovereign is deciding who is part of the political body and not. In doing so, the sovereign both 
produces biopolitical subjects, a theme explored extensively by Foucault,494 and it excludes others 
from endowment with political recognition, say as legal subject or citizen or moral person. It is this 
exclusion or exception, the ‘ban’ whereby one is abandoned by the law, that Agamben identifies as 
the originary political element on which sovereignty is founded.  
 
The exception is possible as sovereignty distinguishes between two forms of life, the Greek zoe, 
meaning bare life or simple life with no political signifiers, and bios, or politically significant life. 
Located, then, in the intermediate between these two forms of life is homo sacer. This was the term 
used to refer to the man in ancient Rome that was both ‘sacred’ and ‘taboo’,495who could not be 
sacrificed to the gods because his life was of no value and yet could be killed by anyone with 
impunity. The Romans understood the affinity between this unconditional authority of the 
sovereign and that of the father as encompassed by the law of vitae necisque potestas that gave 
unconditional authority of the father over his sons, including the right to take his son’s life.496 Homo 
sacer then is one who is included within the law, but defined therein as one who is excluded. The 
unsanctionable violence that he is exposed to, which is neither homicide nor sacrifice, 
demonstrates his double exclusion from human and divine law. This of course is the mirror image 
of the sovereign, who is legal within the law and executes and regulates it, and at the same time is 
external to it, by being able to declare a state of emergency or exception whereby its actions fall 
                                                          
493 Giorgio Agamben Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen) (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) [Agamben, Homo Sacer] 
494 See supra note 456 for the Foucauldian distinction between biopower and biopolitics 
495 The ambivalence of the word ‘sacer’ or sacred is explained by Agamben drawing on various theorists, among 
them Emile Durkheim who writes that the religious also inspires horror, while fear of some malignancy also denotes 
a sort of respect; therefore, the sacred is both the auspicious and inauspicious. See Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra 
note 493 at 77-80. 
496 Ibid. at 88-89 
130  
 
outside the scope of legal scrutiny. The sovereign decision then is “one that suspends law in the 
state of exception and thus implicates bare life within it”.497  
 
Agamben asserts that the ability to declare someone homo sacer is a fundamental aspect of 
sovereignty, and embodied in the logic of modern states. We can see as much from Guantanamo Bay 
detainees designated unlawful combatants and Abu Ghraib prisoners subject to military abuse who 
are located in physical zones where the law does not apply, and so the fundamental protections 
offered by it such as habeas corpus are not available to these homines sacri. When the state of 
exception becomes the rule, the space of the camp is opened.498 Agamben sees the camp, and not 
the city, as the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West,499 where all inhabitants are 
potentially homo sacer. 
 
The figure of homo sacer is a disquieting mirror of Naqab Palestinians. I do not take this to mean 
that Naqab Palestinians are exposed to death more than other subjects of the state, but that the 
particular inclusion/exclusion logic of the state as it applies to them, whereby they are 
encompassed within the law only to be defined as essentially illegal, is what raises alarm. The logic 
of the sovereign ban or exception suspends legal protection from being displaced, from accessing 
water and from being exposed to other forms of structural violence, thereby rendering Naqab 
Palestinians particularly vulnerable and their lives more acutely precarious. Being homo sacer and 
not possessing politically significant life also enables the courts to ignore scrutinizing how Hegelian 
personality theory or Lockean labour theory would apply to the community, as such concepts are 
only relevant to those considered moral persons or political subjects. The community’s suspension 
in the zone between bare life and politically significant life takes practical form in the shifting 
significance of their citizenship. 
 
Although accorded formal citizenship, the spectrum of protections offered citizens seems to be 
suspended in their case. There exists historical precedence for this. First, Naqab Palestinians in 
Israel were late in acquiring citizenship compared to other Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
Accordingly, being recognized as politically significant actors with the associated protections only 
happened in the 1950s, when they were accorded citizenship and the state abandoned the idea of 
                                                          
497 Ibid. at 83 
498 Ibid. at 169 
499 Ibid. at 181 
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forcibly expelling them outside the new sovereign borders of Israel. During the two decades of 
Military Administration rule, fundamental human rights were suspended, indicating a sort of 
expulsion from the political community. More recently, we see the suspension of the fundamental 
right of citizen enfranchisement as elections to the Abu Basma Regional Council in the Naqab have 
been postponed by the authorities. The Abu Basma Regional Council was founded in 2003 and 
encompasses 13 Bedouin villages that have recently received recognition. However, the twenty-five 
thousand Palestinian residents have been denied the right to vote in local council elections by the 
Interior Ministry on multiple occasions. In 2012, the postponement of elections was enabled by 
splitting the Abu Basma regional council into two separate councils, Neve Midbar and al-Qasoum. At 
the time of writing, no elections have been held, though they have been promised in 2017.500 The 
authorities partly justified the postponement of elections on account that the Bedouin residents are 
inexperienced and traditional.501  
 
To return to the question posed at the start of this chapter, in the Umm al-Hieran evictions lawsuit 
case, why were the legal issues decided in the manner they were? Why did the courts refuse to 
appreciate Bedouin lifeways as they were lived in that space? Why did the courts refuse to 
adequately take up the argument that equality, human dignity and the right to property of those 
facing eviction were being violated? Why were international human rights standards on forced 
evictions and equality and non-discrimination not referenced? I believe the figure of homo sacer 
and the originary political element of the exception/exclusion or ban in sovereign rule offers some 
clues.  
 
In order to conceive of the space as Jewish Hiran, the eviction of Palestinians in the area would have 
to be undertaken. However, in a state that self represents as democratic, this eviction cannot occur 
by the use of wanton force. Surely, it can take place by force, and in fact does take place by force, yet 
the force is qualified. It is qualified because it finds justification in the law, either on the basis of a 
court approved eviction lawsuit or in statute, for example in the Planning and Building Law 1965. 
The law, therefore, needs to contain Bedouin within itself. This envelopment also needs to show 
fidelity to essential characteristics of the law, such as being factually accurate and consistent. This is 
                                                          
500 Ma’an News, “Rights group demands Israel allow Bedouin village to register to vote in Negev” (May 9, 2017), 
online: http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=776951  
501 Adalah, “Segmenting the Naqab (Negev): Israel Redistricts to Postpone Local Elections for Arab-Bedouin 




why Justice Sarah Dovrat in the district court decision critiques the executive for referring to the 
Bedouin as ‘illegal trespassers’ when it was public knowledge that they were granted permission by 
the authorities to settle there. She reprimands the authorities for composing the text of the lawsuits 
in a manner "unfit" for a public authority, a criticism echoed by her colleague Justice Ariel. The 
judges make clear that they take offence to the state being factually inaccurate.502 Yet, while the law 
envelops the Bedouin, it is at the same time unable to deliver on fundamental reliefs that it in 
theory provides, such as freedom from discrimination and protection from arbitrary government 
action. Therefore, the law is used to envelop subjects, yet fails to deliver substantively on what the 
law promises.  
 
It seems then that the reason why the issues were decided in the manner they were, in spite of the 
many inconsistencies in formal legal reasoning, was because it was motivated by the need to 
maintain a project of colonial governmentality. Only such a structural, routine form of governing 
populations by differentiation could sustain and grow a settler colonial society.   
 
Using spatial theory helped me interpret the courts’ decisions. Although the discriminatory action, 
effects and intent of the eviction lawsuits would not require too great a leap of the imagination to 
work out, all courts refused to take up the claim of discrimination. This was enabled by conceiving 
of space as flat earth and by conceiving of Bedouin as not full political subjects. Indeed, if we were 
to return to the star-gazing metaphor, we could say it was enabled by conceiving of outer space as 
revolving around Earth, and fully known, as opposed to acknowledging that there are numerous 
heavenly bodies (lifeways) outside the self, each with their own makeup and rules that one cannot 
fully know, but one nevertheless is obliged to acknowledge exists.  
 
                                                          
502 That the residents were trespassers was the state’s grounds for eviction in their filed eviction lawsuits. That the 
court found that the residents were not trespassers left open the possibility for the court to dismiss the lawsuits. Of 
course, the court did not dismiss the lawsuits, but it was placed in an awkward position whereby it had the grounds 
to dismiss on a false claim. Further, were they in fact trespassers opens the possibility for a statute of limitations to 
apply against an adverse possessor, in the spirit of utilitarian theory, and as confirmed by the court. In such a case, 
the state would not be able to evict the residents “at any time”. Also, this is the second case in this study where we 
note the court critiquing the executive for pushing legal boundaries, though nevertheless concurring with the 
fundamentals of state policy in the Naqab. In the crop-spraying Abu Mdeghem case, the court critiqued the 
executive’s excessive use of violence, it preferring more tempered, qualified violence. State actions threatened to 
expose government policy as intentionally insensitive and disrespectful to Bedouin (see Abu Mdeghem v. Israel 
Lands Administration, [2007] HCJ 2887/04, IsrLR 62  at para. 44, 45) and ostensibly ultra vires of the Plant 
Protection Law.  
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Using spatial theory also allowed me the opportunity to explore the concept of legal resistance as a 
form of the Lefebvreian notion of lived space. This helped further the idea that Bedouins are not 
just suspended in space as explored by Shamir, or even just hanging in the interstices between zoe 
and bios as homo sacer, but are in dialectic with space via such practices of lived space, such as legal 
resistance. I will pick up on the different iterations of agency in the community and the possibilities 
of fracturing the assemblage in the dissertation’s concluding discussion.  
 
If discrimination was rather plain to see in this case, whereby one ethnicity was being forcibly 
displaced to house another, we should use the opportunity to probe what this means for the 
normative content of equality in Israeli jurisprudence. If only particular lifeways are made 
intelligible to the exclusion of others, enabling discriminating spatial policies like we see in Umm al-
Hieran, what value does equality have in determining access to land – whether it be land ownership 
in Nuri’s case, land use in Abu Mdeghem, or land allocation in the following Wine Path Plan case?  
 
This question will be taken up in the following chapter. The inquiry will hinge on the idea that 
fundamental principles should inform adjudication as proposed by former Chief Justice Barak, the 
most human rights conscious of the Israeli Supreme Court Justices. Yet, how do the fundamental 
principles of equality and justice weigh against public order or security? How are balances reached 
when deciding in equality cases? Building on the findings in this chapter, the following chapter will 
explore the Wine Path Plan case. Decided in 2010, the Wine Path Plan case concerned a petition 
brought on behalf of Bedouin interest groups to challenge what they claimed was a discriminatory 
plan favouring single family Jewish farms in the Negev as a means to prevent Bedouin access to 
land. The Supreme Court rejected the petition on the grounds that it did not find any procedural 
faults in the execution of the plan to warrant its cancellation nor could it be determined that there 
was a discriminatory policy that informed it. In the chapter, I will draw on the work on fundamental 
principles by Ronald Dworkin, the legal scholar that had a notable influence on Barak and explore 
further both the liberal and authoritarian dimensions and influences of Israeli law, particularly for 








Chapter 4 –The Wine Path Plan, Security, Equality 
SECTION 1 
4.1 Ethnographic Tour and Case Study  
 
Introduction 
I had the uncertain privilege of taking Nuri wine-tasting in the Naqab.503 I considered myself 
privileged because Nuri usually has more important things to do – from appearing in court, 
participating in demonstrations and public organizing, to just being a family man. Yet, he had 
chosen to make time for me as I explored the ‘wine route’, a single-family farm tourist endeavour 
that had sprung up in the Ramat Hanegev area some two decades earlier. And yet, I was uncertain 
how much of a privilege it was to drag Nuri along these twenty three allotments that constituted the 
wine route, to smile, swirl and spit, knowing full well that what he had been fighting for his whole 
life, recognition and the opportunity to live a life in dignity in the Naqab, had rather effortlessly 
been made possible for so many of the Jewish families we’d be visiting. I had also requested that he 
not speak Arabic before our Israeli hosts so that they would not detract from the custom of self-
satisfied chattiness. 
 
It seemed, then, that privilege had little to do with it; at least it was not our privilege to enjoy. 
Neither Nuri nor I seemed privileged in the sense of being free from constraint to speak as we 
wished. But I was certain of one thing, the uncertainty. Uncertainty that we might be made out to be 
faux-tourists undertaking critical research on the wine route and uncertainty about how bitter the 
brackish water fed vines would really make the tannins taste. I also felt unsure about the 
conclusions I would reach as I worked through this chapter probing both a privilege and an equality 
not to be had by Nuri, and my once early optimism about the possibilities of justice in the law.  
 
The case504 I was studying was a petition brought by Adalah to the Supreme Court demanding the 
cancellation of the ‘wine path plan’,505 which authorized the construction of 30 private individual 
farms in the Naqab. Adalah’s petition rested on two grounds. The first related to the policy that 
informed the plan, which Adalah argued was discriminatory as it sought to secure the land for 
Jewish citizens in order to deliberately exclude Arabs. Second, the petitioners cited administrative 
                                                          
503 Our excursion, and all the meetings therein, took place on 23 August 2012.  
504 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 




flaws at the procedural level, such as the retroactive issuance of permits and non-compliance with 
tender issuance procedures. The Supreme Court rejected the petition on the grounds that the 
petitioners were not able to prove flaws at the policy or procedural level that would justify judicial 
intervention. 
 
As we drove south on Route 40 to visit the Nahal Boker farm, Nuri shared a funny, yet 
disheartening, story. With the onset of Ramadan, the period in which adherent Muslims fast from 
before sunrise to sunset, residents of Khirbet al-Hura made out a police car parked clandestinely 
behind a tree, not far from the village entrance. Sitting in the car was an officer who was issuing 
fines to those turning left out of the village and onto Route 31. Turning left on 31 was a course 
frequently taken by residents and visitors on their way to the city center in Beersheba, to Tel Aviv 
or any of the other unrecognized villages and Bedouin towns. The basis of the traffic violation was 
that a left was not allowed from Khirbet al-Hura’s main road, a dirt road, onto Route 31, an inter-
city highway. Those leaving the unrecognized village were expected instead to turn right onto the 
highway, drive down a few kilometres before u-turning to head in the desired direction.  
 
Khirbet al-Hura, being an unrecognized village, has deliberately not been provided paved roads or a 
traffic authority regulated link to the 31 inter-city highway. Nuri himself had filed an official request 
to the Ministry of Transport and the relevant police authority for a pedestrian bridge over 31, a 
sidewalk and a paved street into the village. Part of his impetus was that the al-‘Uqbi extended 
family had lost over a dozen family members in traffic related accidents owing to the lack of these 
basic road provisions. Nuri’s brother, Sheikh Sa’eed Al-‘Uqbi, the shariah court judge I had 
interviewed for my research, lost his pre-adolescent daughter in this way.  
 
The policeman succeeded in fining many drivers. Nuri suggested that those fined appeal to the 
courts. However, they didn’t want that, fearing they’d lose the case and have their licenses revoked. 
They preferred to pay the fine, no matter how unjust it seemed. The rather funny part of the story 
was how one day the policeman came to the site, ready to assume his position behind the tree, only 
to find that it had been chopped down by a local resident the night before. The local resident was 
known to the policeman because he had earlier in the week threatened to cut down the tree. When 
the policeman warned in no uncertain terms that this would mean jail time, the local resident 




Our first stop was meant to be the Nahal Boker farm, home to merlot and cabarnet sauvignon 
grapes. The farm was also home to a pomegranate grove, a wine cellar and guest houses. It was 
marked with the typical tourist signage on Route 40 which made it easy to find. However, upon 
calling the number posted at the farm’s metal gate, we learnt that owner Moshe Zohar was not at 
the farm and his wife Hilda was not available to show us the vineyards.  
 
Moshe’s case troubled my preconceptions about eviction and displacement in the Naqab. Prior to 
the Adalah petition, in 1999, Moshe was respondent in a petition brought by an environmental 
organization, the Israel Environmental Protection Society506  that sought to challenge the illegality 
in the institution of individual farms in the Naqab. As a result of the petition, Moshe, an Israeli Jew, 
was threatened with eviction from the farm. In response to the threat of losing his considerable 
investment, Moshe remarked, “I put a lot of money into this… If I’d known this would happen, I 
never would have come.”507 
 
Along with Moshe, the authorities issued half a dozen farms eviction notices as the proper planning 
and leasing procedures were not followed in their cases. Learning about Moshe’s story, and this 
earlier petition, made me aware that while the Bedouin, as a community, were under persistent 
threat of eviction and displacement since the time of the establishment of the state, individual 
Jewish families also experienced some form of the same. The wine path plan was instituted by the 
Ramat HaNegev Regional Council, Israel’s Agriculture Ministry and the Israel Lands Authority (ILA), 
yet the ILA was the authority that issued eviction notices once irregularities were discovered. The 
vulnerability of individuals and families to being uprooted by the government seemed, then, to be 
experienced by both Palestinians and Jews.  
 
The next stop was Nahal Haro’ah, a bed and breakfast that advertised its home made goat cheese 
and dairy products. This farm, belonging to the Saragusti family, was east of Merhav Am, a religious 
communal settlement whose name means ‘wide open spaces’. Indeed, besides the army base 
located a few kilometres east of the farm, arriving at the farm felt like we were in the middle of 
nowhere. The farm advertised itself as one that ‘blended beautifully into the desert scenery’, though 
I struggled to understand how they had reached that conclusion. 
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There was no vineyard in sight. I noted a few olive trees that seemed to arbitrarily dot the area, and 
desert shrubs. From where I was, I could see a modest, single-level family home and a sheep pen, 
home to a dozen sheep. As I approached the home, I was careful not to let off any of the toy guns at 
my feet. I caught a glance of the mini-pool and surfboard on the porch, and I couldn’t help but 
wonder if the sea simulations, in the middle of the desert, left the kids feeling deceived at all.  
 
I knock. The little surfers come to the door. They don’t speak any English, so they run to the phone 
to call someone that does. In a couple of minutes, the father approaches from the direction of the 
sheep pen. There is urgency in his pace. The mother follows and is quick to close the home door, 
leaving Nuri and me with Avi Saragusti.  
 
The regular wallops of dry wind have us screaming at one another in order to be heard. Avi tells me 
he doesn’t make wine and two years ago he had stopped making cheese. So what did he do? “We 
have sheep… for meat”. Apparently, not too many people were keen on travelling to the middle of 
nowhere to taste goat cheese, making its economic potential limited. Cheese could not be stored for 
very long, it needed to be sold soon after its manufacture, and he did not like making the two-hour 
trek to Tel Aviv to sell it at the big stores. With the sheep, the buyers come to him, allowing him to 
make as much meat as he likes. 
 
Avi then directed us to a number of wineries in the vicinity. As we entered the car to continue on to 
our next stop, Nuri remarked, “He raises sheep to make profit from meat sales”. He turned to me, 
asking rhetorically, “Who used to raise sheep in the past?” The Naqab Bedouin community were an 
agricultural and pastoral society before 1948.508 However, since then, the expropriations of the 
community’s lands, their forced expulsions, governmental restrictions on grazing, and the seizure of 
their livestock509 has meant that only a fraction of the community raise livestock today.510 Yet, 
among those that do, the use of sheep for slaughter is mostly reserved for special occasions and is 
                                                          
508 According to the 1931 Census of Palestine, 89.3 % (42,868 persons) derived their livelihood from agriculture, 
while 10.7% (5,113 persons) were occupied solely in cattle raising. E. Elath, "The Bedouin of the Negev" (1958) 
45:2 Royal Central Asian Journal at 129-130. 
509 For more on government imposed restrictions on Bedouin livestock raising, see ‘Aref Abu-Rabia, “Displacement, 
Forced Settlement and Conservation” in Dawn Chatty and Marcus Colchester (eds.) Conservation and Mobile 
Indigenous Peoples (New York, London: Berghahn Books, 2002) at 206-208 
510 In 2006, flock owners from the unrecognized villages accounted for 8% of the Bedouin population. See Ilan 
Stavi, Gideon Kressel, Yitzchak Gutterman and A. Allen Degen, “Flock Use among Bedouin in ‘Spontaneous’ 
Settlements in the Negev Desert, Southern Israel” (2006) 10:1 Nomadic Peoples at 53.  
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not a regular practice. More commonly, the Bedouin community use sheep’s wool for the family’s 
quilts and pillows, sheep’s milk for personal consumption and the animal’s manure to fertilize 
agricultural land.511 Nuri’s rhetorical question was intended to emphasise the Bedouin community’s 
fundamentally different relationship to the land than that of this Israeli Jewish settler who set up 
shop some two decades ago. The community’s relationship seemed to be more intimately tuned in 
to the rhythms of the land and those living off it. Sheep were not seen as meat which could be sold 
for profit, but as intertwined with the people in a common existence. Sheep rearing was sustainable, 
and it was allowed to be so, because it was not informed by the logic of capitalism. That logic 
pursued, as its ultimate objective, short-term profit by ‘selling as much meat as one wanted’. I flag 
this point because it is one manifestation of the plethora of meanings that land carries in the 
formation of identity in the community. 
 
We then head south west, down Route 204 until we link up once more with the second longest 
highway in Israel, Route 40. From there it is a short drive south west to the Sde Boker winery, one 
of the region’s oldest wineries. It was setup in 1999 by Zvi Remak, a native of San Francisco, who 
immigrated to Israel in 1980.512 The allure of the winery is that it is located near the former home of 
David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel.513 
 
We parked in a roomy lot, which probably appeared bigger than it actually was given there were 
few visitors. After a pit stop at the skylit washroom, we enter the winery to find ourselves alone 
with a native of the US standing against the tasting table in a disinterested slouch. To all 
appearances, he was not paying much attention to the fact that Kylie Minogue’s ‘Do the Locomotion’ 
was jingling in the background. He offers us a tasting of the Cabarnet Sauvignon and some chit-chat. 
                                                          
511 Ibid. at 55-6. 
512 http://www.sde-boker.org.il/winery/EnWinemaker.html  
513 The pioneering spirit of the settlers likely took clue from Ben Gurion’s attitude towards the Naqab.  In the early 
1940s, Ben Gurion saw the Naqab as being central to Zionist settlement policy, prompting him to direct the JNF to 
purchase land there. Eric Engel Tuten, Between Capital and Land: The Jewish National Fund's Finances and Zionist 
National Land Purchase Priorities in Mandatory Palestine, PhD Dissertation (Utah: Department of History: The 
University of Utah, 2000) at 208, 252. For Ben-Gurion, such a settlement policy would be facilitated by the 
‘Bedouinization’ of Jews, where Jews became desert people who would combine 'the modern' (the pioneering 
Zionist) with 'the traditional' (the Arab Bedouin) cultural skills to settle the Naqab. See David Ben-Gurion, The 
Negev is Still Waiting (Tel Aviv: The Labour Party Archive, 1954) (Hebrew), cited in Avinoam Meir and Ze'ev 
Zivan, "Sociocultural Encounters on the Frontier: Jewish Settlers and Bedouin Nomads in the Negev", in Oren 
Yiftachel and Avinoam Meir (eds.), Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries: Landscapes of Development and Inequality 
in Israel (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) at 250-1. 
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He explains, “Two thousand years ago, the Nabateans made wine… and we decided that if they can 
do it, we can do it”.  
 
Zvi, the owner, soon joins us. We talk about soil salinity, Malbecs, water conservation and more 
about Nabateans. However, at no point does the Bedouin community come up. He asks if I would 
like to visit more wineries, and then traces on a tourist map of the Ramat Hanegev region where I 
could go. The map dutifully marks wells, springs, national and JNF parks, archaeological sites, 
museums, children’s attractions, spas, 4X4 trails, homemade cheese sites and wineries.514 Yet, the 
space is conceived by the map’s architects as being without Bedouin. None of the villages of Bir 
Hadhaj, Wadi al-Meshash or ‘Abda are mentioned though they make up more than seven thousand 
residents;515 Bir Hadhaj, the most populated of the lot, is officially a recognized village, its master 
plan approved in 2003, so it is quite surprising not to find any mention of it on this map.516  
 
After two tasting glasses, I offer to take home a malbec. The bottle is dressed with a rag paper label 
that emphasizes the settler, pioneer spirit of the winery - a young, broad shouldered, white male 
with a grape harvesting bucket in hand and unmistakeable resolve in his eyes. Dressed in Israeli-
blue khaki, he has his back to us and his head turned west towards the setting sun. I walk out 
feeling uneasy about purchasing a bottle of wine from this single family farm, knowing that it is part 
of a project intended to sideline the Bedouin population. Yet, I feel embarrassed taking up their 
time without giving something in return. When I tell Nuri that I’d be purchasing a bottle, he only 
gives me a silent nod. Before heading to the car, I remark to the hosts that Zvi made a good choice 
setting up shop near Ben Gurion’s old home, as it likely brought him more traffic than if he had set 
up elsewhere. In response, the server had another slogan, “If you build, they will come”.517 And 
then, we left.  
                                                          
514 Masa Israeli, 39 Map of Tourist Attractions in Ramat Hanegev (2011) at 6 
515 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), The Unrecognized Villages: Chief Characteristics (2012), 
online: http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Unrecognized-Villages-list.pdf 
516 Or Kashti, “For Bedouin father, Israel is his children's 'No. 1 enemy'”, Ha’aretz, (November 16, 2012), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/for-bedouin-father-israel-is-his-children-s-no-1-enemy-1.478370. The 
Ha’aretz article reports how Bir Hadaj was also the site of unprecedented police violence during an operation to 
curb ‘illegal construction’ on November 12 2012. Police arrested 19, including 6 minors, one of whom was shot in 
the stomach with a rubber bullet. 29 children were rushed to Soroka Medical Center for tear gas inhalation. 
517 I mistakenly took him to be stating Scripture, and only later learnt that in fact he was quoting a Kevin Costner 
Hollywood hit about divine inspiration convincing the protagonist to build a baseball field on his corn farm. 
Sections of the divine monologue read, “Ray, people will come Ray... They'll arrive at your door as innocent as 
children, longing for the past… They'll pass over the money without even thinking about it: for it is money they 
have and peace they lack…The one constant through all the years, Ray, has been baseball. America has rolled by 




As we enter the car, I tell Nuri how remarkable it was that they didn’t even talk about the Bedouin. 
To which he responds, “It’s not that they didn’t talk about them. They are not even on the map, 
there are no Bedouin…. The land is empty, without people. There are no Bedouin.” I didn’t realize it 
at the time, but it must certainly have been unnerving to Nuri to listen in on Zvi and me talk and 
joke about North American things, while being silent the whole time, feeling invisible in that tasting 
room. It could not have been easy to see his entire community similarly rendered invisible on that 
tourist map.518 
 
Two weeks later, on 5 September, the two-day sixth annual Salut Wine and Beer Festival would 
launch in Beer Sheva in the compound of an Ottoman-era mosque closed to public worship by the 
Israeli authorities. Despite protests by the Palestinian community that the sanctity of the site would 
be violated by staging an alcohol festival in its premises, the event went ahead as planned, adjacent 
to the mosque compound.519  
 
What follows will be a discussion of the wine path plan case, which I will use as a launching point to 
probe how the principle of equality is understood and adjudicated in Israeli jurisprudence, 
particularly through the lens of legal liberalism, that which reached its epoch during the tenure of 
Chief Justice Aharon Barak. The purpose of exploring legal liberalism is an exercise in chiasmus, as 
described in the Introduction. To interrogate if ‘Israeli law’ is indeed ‘liberal’, we ought to reverse 
the structures of the two to identify the inherent tensions where they are said to meet. If these 
tensions exist, then why do they escape being named?  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the time. This field, this game: it's a part of our past, Ray. It reminds us of all that once was good and could be again. 
Oh... people will come Ray. People will most definitely come.” So maybe I was not altogether off course in thinking 
he was citing some sacred text. If I were to give myself the license to make a reasonable assumption, it seems that 
the divine decree of setting up a baseball field was, for the server, figurative of how he and Zvi should settle the 
Negev as a fulfilment of the religious promise of Jewish exiles returning to the Promised Land. From Internet Movie 
Database (IMDB), “Field of Dreams (1989) – Quotes”, online: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097351/quotes  
518 For critical takes on tourism in Israel/Palestine that show how tourist endeavours support colonial settlement and 
also help Israelis discover and negotiate their place in the region, see Rebecca Stein, Itineraries in Conflict: Israelis, 
Palestinians, and the Political Lives of Tourism (Duke University Press, 2008). For the role of Israeli archaeology in 
supporting colonial settlement and nation building, see Nadia Abu el-Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological 
Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society (The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
519 I wrote about the wine festival at the mosque on the English language, Israeli blog ‘972’. In the piece I show the 
hypocrisy of the liberal lament that the case was about fundamentalist Muslims imposing a conservative agenda on 
the Israeli public. An introspective look would illustrate the various limits on free expression and civil liberties in 
Israel owing to Jewish religious dictates, from freedom of movement to civil marriage. See Nasser Rego, “Dispute 






Therefore, I’d like to offer a critique, internal to legal liberalism, of equality as fundamental 
principle in adjudication. I will do this by comparing Barak’s approach to that of Ronald Dworkin’s, 
given the latter’s influence on legal liberalism and therefore on Barak’s legal thought. Fundamental 
principles constitute norms, stemming from society and the constitution, that make up the rule of 
law, and can be seen as 'rights' that exist prior to law. In Dworkin’s reading, when deciding a case 
dealing with the infringement of rights, fundamental principles should trump policy, the latter 
which has nonindividuated, societal goals as ends. Where Dworkin makes a distinction between 
principles and policy, Barak does not.520  
 
I will then look at the discord between Barak and Dworkin with regard to the value of security (the 
ever-looming southern star, Canopus) being assigned a fundamental principle in adjudication, as it 
is in Barak’s jurisprudence, and the implications thereof. What this chapter attempts to work 
through, via a deep exploration of relevant strands of thought in legal and political philosophy, is 
what the wine path plan case, and the earlier Umm al-Hieran eviction orders case, both say about 
equality as fundamental principle in Israeli adjudication. By doing so, I intend for the analysis to 
also speak to how we may come to understand the normative content of ‘rights’ and ‘privilege’ and 
their operation in the Naqab space, and, by extension, Israel/Palestine. 
 
The Case 
Approved in September 2005, the wine path plan authorizes the construction of thirty single family 
farms, retroactively approving some two dozen farms, and allowing for the construction of a few 
new ones.  
 
The main aim of the ‘Wine Path Plan’ is to promote agro-tourism and further landscape 
protection.521 The plan permits one housing unit to be built in each settlement as far as such a unit 
is necessary for the project’s operation. It clarifies that the authorization for the establishment of a 
lone farm would be an exception, and would not be issued on a regular basis, and that the exception 
would only apply to the Beersheba (Naqab) region. Second, that its establishment would be in line 
with national planning policy, would contribute to the area’s development and would not conflict 
                                                          
520 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 57-8, Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law 
Review 1057 
521 ‘The Ramat Hanegev Wine Path Plan’ - Regional Master Plan TAMAM 14/4/42 : Partial District Master Plan for 
the Southern District – Amendment No. 42 at para. 6.1, 6.2 
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with the interests of existing communities, but would be of benefit to current and future 
inhabitants. The location of settlement should ‘protect forests and groves, natural resources or the 
land’ as determined by either the JNF, the Nature Reserves Authority or the ILA. A local plan for the 
authorization of a lone farm would be brought to the Committee for Principle Planning Issues at the 
National Council for Planning and Building. A permit for a lone farm would only be issued if in line 
with the above principles and if the existing planning and building laws and tender laws were 
observed. 
 
Adalah’s petition called for the cancellation of the plan on two grounds. First, they argued there was 
discriminatory intent behind the plan as it sought to prevent so-called ‘Bedouin take over of land’. 
Second, there existed procedural anomalies. The farms, which were now to be ‘retroactively 
approved’ under the plan, had not followed the relevant tender issuance procedures in obtaining 
leases as prescribed by law, namely the Mandatory Tenders Law (1992)522 and the Mandatory 
Tenders Regulations 1993523. In addition, the petitioners claimed that the farms failed to acquire 
the permits necessary in order to be connected to the water, telephone and electricity 
infrastructure as called for under Section 157A of the Planning and Building Law (1965).524 
 
Procedural History 
The current petition was filed following an earlier petition filed in 1999 by the Israel Union for 
Environmental Defense and the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel.525 This earlier petition 
sought to rectify the illegality in the establishment of individual settlements, claiming that they had 
been established either in the absence, or in contravention, of a regional master plan or that their 
establishment contravened the designated usage for the specific plot of land, for example land used 
for housing when specifically designated to be used for agriculture alone.  
 
                                                          
522 Mandatory Tenders Law, 5752-1992 
523 Mandatory Tenders Regulations, 5753-1993. In case law, Poraz affirmed that the leasing of public lands must be 
guided by the principles of fairness and equality and therefore must have a tender or lottery. HCJ 5023/91, Poraz v. 
Minister of Housing and Construction, 46(2) P.D. 793. See also Daphne Barak-Erez, “Law and Politics in Israel 
Lands: Toward Distributive Justice” (2008) 14:4 Israel Affairs 662 – 680 as she emphasizes that lack of issuance of 
tenders means that uninfluential public groups cannot adequately access public land. Yet, she offers a word of 
caution regarding the issuance of tenders, since the relevant legal provisions still give the ILA broad discretion in 
setting the priorities for a tender and also allow the Minister of Finance to issue tender exemptions. Also, the 
issuance of tenders does not automatically equate to fairer access to public land, since economically weaker groups 
may be less able to participate in the tender process. 
524 Planning and Building Law 5725-1965 
525 Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Minister of Agriculture, [2001] HCJ 243/99 
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As a result of this earlier petition, the most senior tier in the planning system, the National Council 
for Planning and Building (NCPB), took a decision on December 7 1999 whereby it concluded that 
the establishment of single family farms ran contrary to national planning objectives. However, the 
NCPB made an exception for the establishment of farms in the Beersheba (Naqab) region, stating 
that decisions would be made on a case by case basis by the planning authorities and in accordance 
with the law.526  
 
In 2002, the Ministers Committee for the Development of the Negev and Galilee adopted a decision, 
which was approved by the government, to say that the ILA would be responsible for submitting to 
the Ministers Committee a plan for lone farms in the Negev and the Galilee.527 The ILA undertook 
the necessary steps to prepare the plan, which became known as the ‘Ramat Hanegev Wine Path 
Plan’, and submitted it in December 2004.528 Objections to the plan were filed with the NCPB, 
including those submitted by the petitioners on February 24 2005.529 However, on September 13 
2005, the Sub-Committee on Principal Planning Issues, under the auspices of the NCPB, rejected the 
objections and approved the plan.530 Thereafter, the current petition was filed. 
 
The state’s response to the petition was that there were no statutory violations in the approval of 
the Wine Path Plan nor was there an improper purpose that would justify its cancellation. As 
regards past irregularities, such as the setting up of settlements without following tender issuance 
and leasing procedures, these would be dealt with by the ILA and the State Attorney’s office. The 
state stressed that contrary to the claims of the petitioners that the Plan was not in accordance with 
national outline plans, the NCPB took a decision in 1999 that individual settlements in the 
Beersheba region alone were concordant with overall planning policy, owing to their agro-tourism 
purposes. The state also underlined the various stringent procedural checks and balances in place 
in the framework of the Wine Path Plan to ensure compliance with the law and planning 
regulations.531  
 
                                                          
526 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 4 
527 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 6 
528 Hana Hamdan, “Individual Settlement in the Naqab: The Exclusion of the Arab Minority”, 10 Adalah’s 
Newsletter( February 2005) at 3. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010], HCJ 2817/06 at  para. 7, 9, Adalah’s Petition 
in Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [June 15 2010] at para. 90. 
531 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010], HCJ 2817/06 at  para. 14-19. 
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The court sought to determine if its intervention to cancel or modify the Wine Path Plan was 
justified on the grounds that the administrative decisions taken or discretion applied were 
unreasonable or undertaken in bad faith.532 The court determined that the decision to establish the 
Wine Path Plan, in particular that Beersheba be an exception to the NCPB decision that lone farms 
do not concord with the national planning scheme, was within the jurisdiction of the planning 
authorities. It determined that such a decision was ‘clearly’ a matter for the relevant, professional 
administrative body to decide and that they would be justified to intervene only if the planning 
authorities acted unreasonably or in bad faith.533  
 
Reasonableness 
A reasonable administrative decision is one with moral considerations, that which is concerned 
with the right and the good.534 Reasonableness is an assessment concept, one that acknowledges 
the relevance of a plurality of factors to a particular case and accords each factor its relevant weight 
in reaching a decision.535 Reaching a reasonable decision, then, is about finding an appropriate 
balance between these various context-dependant factors. It also requires logic, coherence, 
empirical truth or reliability and means/end-rationality. A reasonable decision also entails 
interpreting and criticizing interests and giving expression to the idea of generalizability or 
impartiality.536  
 
To ensure impartiality in ascribing weight to a relevant factor, the judge as impartial spectator, 
would need to consider role exchange, meaning “to put himself in the situation of the other, and to 
bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the 
sufferer”.537 
 
According to former Israeli Chief Justice Barak, ascribing a particular weight to competing values is 
determined by the relative importance of that value to society at large. These attitudes, in turn, are 
                                                          
532 Ibid. at para. 23. 
533 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010], HCJ 2817/06 at  para.23. 
534 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at 48-53. 
535 See Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 173. 
536 Robert Alexy, ‘The Reasonableness of Law’ in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini (eds.), 
Reasonableness and Law (Dordecht, London: Springer, 2009) at 8. 
537 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (eds. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976 [1759]) at 21, cited in Robert Alexy, ‘The Reasonableness of Law’ in Giorgio Bongiovanni, 
Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law (Dordecht, London: Springer, 2009) at 12. 
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expressed by the judge.538 In judicial review of administrative decisions, however, the judge’s 
discretion does not replace that of the public official. The judge only determines if the 
administrative decision falls within the ‘zone of reasonableness’, which means that the action is one 
possibility within the range of reasonable possibilities under the authority’s jurisdiction, and is not 
patently unreasonable.539 I will later unpack the weight formula to perform ‘balancing’ in a 
reasonable decision as developed by legal philosopher, Robert Alexy.540  
 
Good Faith 
To act in bad faith means to transgress the standard of behaviour that defines a particular 
relationship, in this case, between the administrative authorities and the appellants. In Israeli 
jurisprudence, this standard has been defined by what is honest and fair as required by society’s 
sense of justice. Acting in good faith entails that taking care of one’s own interest must be done 
fairly and in consideration of the justified expectations of the other party.541 However, 
administrative bodies bear a heavier duty than the one stemming from the good faith principle that 
is primarily associated with private law.542 Nevertheless, where the executive has been accused of 
acting in bad faith or unreasonably, the burden of proof is placed on the party making the claim.543  
 
Rationale 
The court first sought to answer if there was an ‘improper purpose’ behind the plan, such as 
discriminatory intent in the plan’s policy or content as the petitioners claimed.  
 
                                                          
538 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 71. In Ganor v. Attorney General, HCJ 935/89, 44(2) PD 485 at 
513-514, Barak talks about balancing weights in reaching a reasonable decision. 
539 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 72-74. See also Justice Zamir’s elaboration of the concept of 
‘zone of reasonableness’ in Movement for Quality Government v. Government of Israel, HCJ 2533/97, 51(3) PD 46 
at 57. In common law, the Wednesbury reasonableness test was developed in the judicial review of administrative 
decisions. It precluded judicial intervention if the administrative authority considered all relevant factors in the case, 
did not consider an irrelevant factor, and was not patently unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have 
reached that decision. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B at 
223-224. 
540 The variables in this balancing formula include the intensity of the interference with a principle, the abstract 
importance of a principle, and the reliability of empirical assumptions. See Robert Alexy, ‘The Weight Formula’ in 
Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Bro˙zek, and Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Law, vol. 3.  (Krakow: 
Jagiellonian University Press, 2007) 9-27. 
541 Roker v. Salomon, CA 6339/97, 55(1) PD 199 at 279. 
542 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 66. 
543 Maccabi Shield Association Mutual Insurance Cooperative against Disease Ltd. vs. Minister of the Treasury 
[2006] HCJ 7611/01 at para. 22. 
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The claimants carried the burden of proof to show that the authorities had acted in bad faith, yet 
the court found that they did not present any factual data to support this claim. The court 
determined that the discussions held by the planning authorities on the matter, the hearing of the 
public’s objections, the modifications made to the plan, its integration with larger tourism plans for 
the region, and the National Council’s refusal to approve another lone farm plan, all served as 
evidence that the authority acted in good faith.544  
 
The above procedural steps taken by the planning authorities were sufficient for the court to 
conclude that “the deliberations of the planning institutions were comprehensive and intensive, and 
that the full, relevant data base was presented to them. The legal rights of those who objected were 
upheld and protected”.545 The court found that the second claim of the petitioners, that there were 
flaws in the procedural processes pertaining to the plan, was also unwarranted. For the court, it did 
not matter that there were procedural flaws in the past, such as the establishment of farms in the 
absence, or in contravention, of a regional master plan or in contravention of the designated usage 
for the specific plot of land,546 or that farms were setup without following tender issuance and 
leasing procedures547 and were connected to the water, telephone and electricity infrastructure 
without obtaining the proper permits.548 What mattered to the court was that past illegalities were 
being rectified as the authorities had promised and delivered a new plan, to replace the 1993 one, 
to ensure greater compliance with the law in the setting up individual settlements.549 The court was 
satisfied that the planning authorities were taking the necessary steps to ensure compliance with 
planning laws and regulations and that previous anomalies were being investigated by the South 
District Attorney’s Office and the ILA.550  
 
However, in reaching this decision, the court failed to appreciate how the motive behind the setting 
up of the individual settlements, as will be elaborated on in detail below, was discriminatory, and 
that even if past procedural irregularities were being rectified, the discriminatory reasons for these 
settlements’ institution remain and do not ‘disappear’ with the approval of new procedures. That is, 
                                                          
544 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 29. 
545 Ibid. at para. 33. 
546 Israel Environmental Protection Society (Adam Teva V’Din) v. The Minister of Agriculture, [2001] HCJ 243/99  
547 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06, State Comptroller, ‘Annual 
Report 1999’, Report No 50B (1999) at 602-607. 
548 State Comptroller, ‘Annual Report 1999’, Report No 50B (1999) at 607. 
549 Israel Environmental Protection Society (Adam Teva V’Din) v. The Minister of Agriculture, [2001] HCJ 243/99 
at para. 7 
550 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 18. 
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even if there is greater compliance with the law in the administration and setting up of settlements, 
it does not erase the fact that one ethnic group is being deliberately denied access to these forms of 
living551 and that their access to land is also being curtailed. Israeli geographer, Oren Yiftachel, in 
his critique of the plan, drew attention to how the same organizations, namely the Ramat HaNegev 
Regional Council and the Israel Lands Administration, that initiated earlier versions of the plan 
continue to play a leading role in its revised version. In addition, the revised plan contains similar 
spatial arrangements and transportation routes, “meaning the plan’s ethnically-motivated 
objectives still exist” even if they are no longer mentioned explicitly.552 
 
The Petition 
Before a critique of the decision, I would like to comment on the substance of the petition itself. For 
all of its strengths, there were three particular weaknesses, or oversights, in the petition.  
 
First, the petitioners claimed that the tender and leasing procedures were not followed in the 
establishment of a number of individual settlements. Yet, the only evidence that they provided to 
support their claim was the State Comptroller’s Report for 1999, which itself did not go into 
substantive detail on the irregularities. The petitioners did not provide enough direct evidence for 
procedural illegalities, but focused more on the discriminatory policy and motive behind the plan 
(which, as will be demonstrated below, brought with it its own challenges). The petition would have 
been strengthened was it able to illustrate how tender procedures, even with the formulation of the 
new plan, the process for which began in 1999, did not guarantee equality. This could have been 
shown by revealing failed attempts by members of the Bedouin community to acquire an individual 
settlement via tender bids.  
 
                                                          
551 In the formulation of the revised ‘Wine Path’ plan, the authorities took care to formally state that “each citizen 
will be allowed to submit a proposal for the establishment of a lone farm, including Bedouins who are citizens of the 
state”. Ibid. at para. 29. However, no Bedouin person owns a single family farm and given the official statements 
that such farms were meant to prevent Bedouins from settling on the land, it seems very unlikely that a tender bid 
submitted by a Bedouin would be fairly adjudicated. It seems then that the revised formulation was meant to satisfy 
the appearance of being egalitarian (shoring up ‘token egalitarianism’) while not in actual fact delivering on that 
egalitarianism. For more on tokenism, see for example the critique of tokenism regarding Black political 
representation in the US in Lani Guinier, "The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of 
Black Electoral Success" (1991) 89:5 Michigan Law Review 1077-1154.  
552 Oren Yiftachel, “Inappropriate and Unjust: Planning for Private Farms in the Naqab”, 24 Adalah’s Newsletter 
(April 2006) at 1. 
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A specific condition of the Wine Path Plan states that the individual settlements should not vie with 
the interests of existing communities or future development plans, or be in conflict with them.553 
Yet, when the petitioners claimed that the individual settlements would pose an undesirable 
competition to existing Bedouin communities, they did not provide sufficient factual evidence for 
the same.554 The petitioners did not substantiate the claim of economic competition by performing 
any sort of economic competitor analysis which would have looked at rating a settlement’s focus 
and innovation in comparison with existing Bedouin communities and would have run comparative 
tests on financial predictions based on the products/services on offer, facilities and personnel, and 
scope for growth. The petitioners could also have substantiated such a claim by drawing the court’s 
attention to how land expropriated from Bedouin communities was subsequently used to construct 
such individual settlements, and how small scale economic activities such as pita and labaneh 
(Arabic sour cream) stalls and animal grazing have fallen out of reach for Bedouin communities 
since the setting up of individual settlements.555 As the petitioners did not carry the burden of proof 
on this particular claim, the court accepted the state’s dismissal of the claim that the new 
settlements were isolated, and therefore would not pose competition to existing communities and 
that the wine path plan would actually result in economic advantage as more tourists would be 
drawn to the region and there would be more investment in all communities as a result. 556 
 
The principal claim of the petitioners was that the authorities acted with discriminatory intent in 
drawing up the wine path plan and to support that claim, they offered various proofs of statements 
issued by officials and official bodies. While this claim was more substantiated than the procedural 
flaw claim or that of undesirable competition, it ran up against the challenge of proving 
discrimination by an executive body in the court. As discussed in the previous chapter on the 
eviction orders in Umm al-Hieran, to prove discrimination, the general rule has been that intent to 
discriminate has to be shown, in keeping with low level scrutiny of a governmental classification 
that disadvantages a minority.557 Showing discriminatory effects to prove discrimination, as Barak 
                                                          
553 Regional Master Plan TAMAM 14/4/42 : Partial District Master Plan for the Southern District – Amendment No. 
42 
554 See Adalah’s Petition in Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 
70 77, 137, as well as the professional opinion of Prof. Hubert Law-Yone, an Israeli scholar of architecture and town 
planning, which was submitted with the petition.  
555 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages (March 2008) at 37-39.  
556 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 17. 
557 See for example, Nazareth Lands Defence Committee v. Ministry of Defence, 9 P.D. III 1261 (1955), Wattad v. 
Minister of Finance, HCJ 200/83, 38 P.D. III 113, Agbaria v. The Minister of Education, HCJ 3491/90, 45(1) P.D. 
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ruled in the Higher Follow-up Committee decision558, does not generally suffice to uphold a claim for 
discrimination. And yet, as in the Bourkan case, even where intent to discriminate has been shown, 
the court has applied a low level of scrutiny, legitimizing discrimination towards satisfying a 
‘national aim’, which in Bourkan was determined to be "restoration of a national and historical site, 
in name as well as substance, in character and identity".559 In dismissing the petition, the court 
proffered a similar rationale, that the Wine Path Plan would consolidate a national policy goal, 
stating the plan “fulfil[s] an important national objective…the interest of developing the Negev is 
destined to advance a national, public aim”.560 
 
Critique of the Decision 
Taking into account the above shortcomings in the petition, there is much to critique in the court’s 
decision.  
 
The court determined that its intervention would be justified only if the authorities had acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith. Yet, in determining the reasonableness of executive action, the court 
needed to perform a balancing between the benefits derived from the action and the costs incurred 
as a result of it, a balancing that is intrinsic to the proportionality test in Israeli jurisprudence. Yet, 
the court failed to spell out what the competing values were, how they were to be weighted, and 
how a balancing amongst the values was to be performed. Martii Koskeniemmi, in critiquing the 
High Court’s Beit Sourik decision, where the High Court ordered the government to reroute sections 
of the separation Wall because it impinged on the rights of local Palestinian inhabitants, critiqued 
the balancing performed under the proportionality test as it did not identify how the costs and 
benefits are “identified, calibrated so as to make them comparable, and finally measured so as to 
carry out the weighting?”561  
 
In its decision, the court dismissed the costs claimed by the petitioners. Those costs were the 
discriminatory intent and effects of the plan on Naqab Bedouin, takeover of the Negev by Jewish 
elements to restrict the amount of land available to Bedouin, unhealthy competition for existing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
221–4, Al-Sane' v. Attorney General, HCJ 2678/91, P.D. 46(3) 709, Adalah v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, 
HCJ 240/98 52 P.D. V 167, Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister of Finance, HCJ 
3429/11. See previous chapter for discussion.  
558 Higher Follow-up Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister of Israel, [2006] HCJ 11163/03  
559 Bourkan v. Minister of Finance, HCJ 114/78,  32 P.D. II 800 [1978], 807-8. 
560 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [2010] at para. 23 
561 Martti Koskeniemmi, “Occupied Zone – ‘A Zone of Reasonableness’?” 41 Israel Law Review (2008) 13. 
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Bedouin communities, high infrastructure costs associated with establishing and maintaining 
remote settlements, and the transfer of large areas of Naqab land out of the public’s hands. In fact, 
the claim of unreasonableness was not adequately addressed by the court as it failed to identify a 
single cost or harm in the decision, and so did not perform the balancing required of it by the 
reasonableness standard.  
 
Yet, how are benefits and costs calibrated in balancing? Robert Alexy’s balancing formula562 is 
useful in this regard. The variables Alexy identifies are the intensity of the interference with a 
principle, the abstract importance of a principle, and the reliability of empirical assumptions. This 
relative weight of a principle is then measured against the weight of an opposing principle. The 
most significant relevant principles in this regard, as identified by the court, would be the principle 
of equality on one hand to be balanced against the principle of national development. As the court 
stated, the interest of developing the Negev is destined to advance a national, public aim,563 realised 
by satisfying the subordinate aims of the Plan to promote tourism, agriculture and landscape 
protection.564 Certainly, there are other factors to consider in the balancing, for example, the high 
infrastructure costs and the inaccessibility of large areas of land to the public, which would be 
measured against the principle of national development, though the principle of equality is far more 
important and weighty and so it suffices for our purposes to balance this principle alone against 
that of national development.565  
 
The abstract importance of equality cannot be overstated. According to liberal legal theorist, Ronald 
Dworkin, the abstract right to equality entails all citizens being entitled to ‘equal concern and 
respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them’,566 and is the 
central principle from which rights flow.567 In Israeli jurisprudence, the principle of equality, 
although not codified in statute, has been determined in case law to have constitutional quality.568 
In international law, equality and freedom from discrimination are fundamental norms binding on 
                                                          
562 Robert Alexy, ‘The Weight Formula’ in Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Bro˙zek, and Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Studies in 
the Philosophy of Law, vol. 3.  (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2007) 9-27. 
563 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 23. 
564 Ibid. at 8. 
565 I will elaborate in detail on the principle of equality in Israeli jurisprudence and in liberal legal theory below.  
566 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) at 180 [Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously] 
567 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism” in A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985) 181-204 
568 See Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 86, 88, Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in Israeli 
Constitutional Law” (2008) 3:2 Israel Studies 80  
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all states,569 with the prohibition on racial discrimination being a preemptory norm, or jus cogens, 
meaning absolutely non-derogable by states.  
 
The first variable in Alexy’s balancing formula measures the intensity of interference with the 
principle of equality. Contrary to the court’s finding that the petitioners did not prove 
discrimination, there were numerous official statements issued, that the petitioners brought to the 
attention of the court, which showed the discriminatory intent behind the plan’s institution. 
 
The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Agriculture took the decision in 1997 to 
encourage and promote individual settlements, and the Infrastructure Minister explained to the 
State Comptroller in December 1999 that the purpose behind the individual settlements was, “to 
save the nation's land… to prevent its takeover by foreign entities. I believe that this policy is not 
only reasonable, but is a proper policy that Israel needs to take, and that the main way is by the 
Israel Lands Administration ... This policymaking process was shared with the Minister of 
Agriculture. I allow myself to say that both of us are familiar with the issue of protecting the land 
against others for many years”.570 In 1997, then director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Avigdor 
Lieberman, was quoted as saying, “This is a matter of the theft of state lands. Two million and eight 
hundred thousand [2,800,000] dunams of state land in the Negev, in the Galilee in the seam-line 
area, and in Area C have been illegally seized … According to the recommendations of the Directors-
General Committee, a Ministerial Committee on Settlement Matters will be established … The 
ministers will be presented with a plan to encourage individual settlement in the problem areas, 
the purpose being to safeguard the land…in this case, we are talking about single individuals, who 
will guard extensive land areas. This is most effective…”.571  
 
A senior official at the Ministry of Agriculture was less vague about who the ‘foreign entities’ doing 
the illegal seizure were, “This is a declared and overt war… if we are not here, the Bedouin will be 
here…”. He added, explaining the reason behind the policy to concentrate the Bedouin in 
development townships, “once you lock them into apartments, there is no chance to produce 
                                                          
569 As set forth in the UDHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. 
Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), and also codified in the following treaties, ratified by Israel, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, ICERD and CRC.  
570 State Comptroller, ‘Annual Report 1999’, Report No 50B (1999) at 605. 
571 Degar Lahav, “Governmental Plan to Stop ‘State Land Theft’,” Ha’aretz (September 2 1997) (Hebrew), cited in 




children in huge numbers, and instead of 20 or 30 they will be forced to settle for two or three, 
because they will not have room to spread."572 The minutes of the meeting held on December 7 
1999 at the National Council for Planning and Building, the top tier in the planning system, also 
revealed that the plan’s policy was to save lands from usurpation by Bedouin Arabs and to ensure 
that Jews have greater access to it.573  
 
The Ministerial Committee on the Negev and Galilee, in their meeting on November 6 2002, 
affirmed that the setting up of individual settlements is a means to maintain state land.574 A 2003 
draft report prepared by the Prime Minister’s Office for the Negev-Galilee Ministerial Committee 
stated that, "The reasons for initiating [individual settlements] are to preserve state lands… [as] 
solutions for demographic issues”.575 A 2003 Ha’aretz article quoted Uzi Keren, the prime minister’s 
advisor on settlements, as describing the settlers on individual farms as “a top notch group of 
people, each one empowered to care for vast areas [of land] and act as a state appointed ‘policeman’ 
protecting these areas.”576 
 
In the above statements, ‘foreign entities’ and ‘illegal seizure’ are euphemisms the authorities use 
for Palestinians and Palestinians’ relationship to the land. Aside from the above statements issued 
by officials, the interference with the principle of equality is also evident in how the authorities deal 
differently with the two ethnic groups on the same issue. First, the Israel Lands Administration 
initiated this plan for dispersed settlements designed for the Jewish community, and yet repeatedly 
criticise the Bedouin for dispersed settlement577 and cite the latter as the reason for the non 
provision of essential services.578 Second, the authorities apply the law on illegal construction in an 
ethnically bifurcated manner, where the individual settlements although having been constructed 
                                                          
572 Daniel Ben Simon, “Bouki and Gouli in the Land of Bedouins,” Ha’aretz (March 4 1998) (Hebrew), cited in 
Adalah’s Petition in Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [June 15 2010] at 
para. 42. 
573 Adalah’s Petition in Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [June 15 2010] at 
para. 29.  
574 Ibid. at para. 33. 
575 Prime Minister’s Office, “Individual Settlements - Northern District and Southern District”, A First Draft Report 
to the Negev-Galilee Ministerial Committee (February 2003) (Hebrew) 
576 Zafrir Rinat, "Sharon is promoting establishment of 30 settlements in the Negev and Galilee," Ha’aretz (July 20, 
2003), online: http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.896967 (Hebrew), cited in Human Rights Watch, Off the Map: Land 
and Housing Rights Violations in lsrael's Unrecognized Bedouin Villages (2008) at 33. 
577 For example, see Israel Lands Administration, “350 Plots Prepared for Bani Issa in Hura Standing Empty”  
(November 26 2007), online: http://www.mmi.gov.il/hodaotmmiint/show_h.asp?key=782&CodeMaarecet=1 
(Hebrew). 




without following proper planning and leasing procedures are allowed to stand, though in the case 
of non adherence to planning procedures in the Bedouin community, the law is upheld.579 In recent 
years, the enforcement of the law on illegal construction in the Bedouin community has been 
particularly strict, doubling in 2011 and then quadrupling the following year in comparison to 
2010.580 Further, in several cases, land expropriated from a Bedouin person(s) has been used to 
setup an individual farm for Jewish persons, as have been the cases of Sheikh Awde Abu Mu’ammar 
and Mohammed Abu Solb.581  
 
The court would also have done well to consider the historical inequality in land allocation, access 
to land, the quality of living arrangements and the socio-economic standing between Arabs and 
Jews in the Naqab to appreciate how the wine path plan furthers existing inequality and would 
therefore be harder to justify in a balancing test. Although the Naqab Bedouin population accounts 
for 28% of the population in the Beersheba District, the total area of recognized Arab communities 
accounts for less than 1% of the District’s territory.582 Owing to selection committees,583 around 
91% of the 107 rural Jewish communities in the District are off-bounds to Bedouin wishing to live 
in them.584 The options for types of communities are also limited to Bedouin, with there being only 
two rural Bedouin communities, alongside 107 rural Jewish communities,585 even though the 
majority of the Bedouin community have expressed a wish to live in rural communities.586 In 2004, 
                                                          
579 Oren Yiftachel, “Inappropriate and Unjust: Planning for Private Farms in the Naqab”, 24 Adalah’s Newsletter 
(April 2006) at 6. 
580 Dukium – The Negev Coexistence Forum (NCF) reports that home demolitions averaged 250 prior to 2010, shot 
up to 456 in 2010, and in 2011, roughly a thousand homes were demolished. See Dukium - Negev Coexistence 
Forum for Civil Equality, “Report on The Demolition of Arab-Bedouin Homes in the Negev-Naqab” (2011). 
Adalah’s Naqab office Director, Abu Ras, cites similarly high demolition figures in 2012 of 862 homes, 449 of 
which were self-demolished as the owners were threatened with heavy fines if they failed to do so. Abu Ras, “Two 
years since Prawer… What’s next?”(September 11 2013). 
581 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages (March 2008) at 37-38. 
582 Adalah, Objection to ‘Partial Regional Master Plan for the Beer Sheva Metropolitan Area, Master Plan 14/4, 
Amendment 23’, submitted to the National Council for Planning and Building (October 31 2007) at para. 14. 
583 See Chapter 3 on Umm al-Hieran for further discussion on selection committees. Selection committees are 
operable in 80% of Israeli territory, where the three-party lease system exists. If someone wishes to lease a plot of 
land in such a settlement, they need to be approved by the settlement’s selection committee, which regularly rejects 
applicants on grounds of ‘social unsuitability’. In March 2011, the ‘Admissions Committee Law’ was passed, giving 
legal backing to the de facto discriminatory practices of selection committees by codifying their operation in 475 
‘small towns’, which make up nearly 50% of all communities in Israel.   
584 Adalah, Objection to ‘Partial Regional Master Plan for the Beer Sheva Metropolitan Area, Master Plan 14/4, 
Amendment 23’, submitted to the National Council for Planning and Building (October 31 2007) at para. 17. 
585 Ibid. at para. 21b. 
586 See for example, the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages’ and Bimkom’s 2011 response to the report 
by the ‘Committee for Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement’ (also known as the Goldberg Committee), which was a 
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the incidence of poverty was 79.2% among Bedouin from the unrecognized villages, nearly 7 times 
higher than the non-Orthodox Jewish population.587  
 
Had the court considered these historical inequalities between the Palestinian Bedouin community 
and Israeli Jews in the Naqab, two things could have followed. First, the Bedouin community could 
have been identified as one that has been historically disadvantaged, and therefore a suspect class, 
meaning in this case the burden is placed on the state to demonstrate that the plan has been 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, and no other less drastic means, 
less harmful to the rights of this disadvantaged minority, could have been employed. This would 
mean applying stricter scrutiny to the authorities’ decision to implement the wine path plan. 
Second, in performing a balancing of interests, the court could have reached the reasonable 
conclusion that privileging Israeli Jews under the wine path plan (for whom it was specifically 
designed and who are the only ethnic group represented in these single family farms) over 
Palestinian Bedouin would serve to increase existing discrepancies between the two communities 
and would therefore be harder to justify under the principle of equality.  
 
The third element in Alexy’s balancing formula, ‘reliability of empirical assumptions’, pits the 
empirical evidence regarding interference with the equality principle against the empirical 
evidence regarding interference with that of national development. As discussed above, there are 
numerous examples of discriminatory intent behind the institution of the wine path plan given by 
various officials, which do not disappear once the plan is revised, and are well documented and 
reported in official statements, in official minutes of meetings, in official government reports, in the 
mainstream media, and even by the State Comptroller who investigates the executive branch for 
wrongdoing upon the request of private citizens. By contrast, the authorities did not provide any 
evidence to show how the right to national development would be offended if the plan did not 
materialize. In undertaking a substantial evaluation of whether the principle of equality was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
detailed, alternative master plan concerning all unrecognized villages and called for the establishment of a particular 
‘Bedouin village’ model, which would have rural and other culturally appropriate aspects to it.  
587 Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb,”Poverty, education and employment among the Arab-Bedouin society: 
A comparative view” (2009) 137 ECINEQ - Society for the Study of Income Inequality, online: online: 
http://www.ecineq.org/milano/wp/ecineq2009-137.pdf at 11. Poverty severity is measured by the Sen-Index, and is 
calculated by considering poverty incidence, the income gap, and the Gini coefficient of inequality among the poor. 
For more on the Sen-Index, see Amartya K. Sen and James E. Foster, On Economic Inequality (Expanded Edition) 




offended, should the court not have taken into account the fact of the ‘reliability of empirical 
assumptions’ undergirding the competing principles? 
 
Yet, it would be difficult to demonstrate how the right to national development would be offended if 
the claim to the right was not grounded in empirical evidence itself. That is, it is unsurprising that 
the defendants did not present evidence on how the right to national development would be 
offended were the plan to be suspended, since they had not presented evidence to substantiate the 
right to national development itself. Although ostensibly about tourism, research on the same was 
lacking. The Ministry of Tourism was not involved, feasibility studies were not performed, 
estimates of tourist traffic not conducted, and according to the expert opinion of Professor Law-Yon 
the plan contained many contradictory statements and displayed a lack of clarity regarding the 
spatial arrangement of the settlements. It is hard to know, and thereby show, what is to be lost by 
scrapping the plan if what is to be gained by instituting it is not accurately calibrated.588 Indeed, 
evidence of the lack of a substantive planning process is how, quickly after their institution, many 
farms ran into difficulties. Having not accurately studied the tourist potential of selling gourmet 
cheese off the beaten path in the Naqab, the Saragusti family were forced to radically rethink their 
alternative, organic dairy farm endeavour. In a few years after setting up, they were forced to 
transform into a goat slaughter farm in order for their initiative to remain economically viable. At a 
late summer conference in 2012, held by the individual farms from Ramat Hanegev, the vast 
majority of the owners complained about the numerous difficulties they encounter in staying 
profitable.589  
 
As in Beit Sourek, the court failed to spell out what the competing values were, how they were to be 
weighted, and how a balancing against one another was to be performed. A proper balancing, 
modeled on the Alexy balancing formula as above, would have more accurately determined the 
costs and benefits related to the plan, and discounting the weaknesses in the petition, thereby more 
fairly evaluated on the petition’s merits. Had a more thorough balancing been performed, it would 
very likely have found the executive’s decision to be unreasonable, and therefore grounds for the 
court’s intervention.  
                                                          
588 The Berger case established that the administrative decision be a well-studied one, and if it was not, it risked 
being seen as arbitrary and thereby subject to being cancelled. Berger v. Minister of the Interior, HCJ 297/82, P.D. 
29(3).   
589 Interview with Thabet Abu Rass, Director, Naqab Office of Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights 




Even though the court did not perform a thorough balancing, yet, it divulged something important 
in the course of its decision. In dismissing the petitioner’s claim that there were flaws at the policy 
level, the court emphasized how the plan fulfilled an “important national objective”, linked to the 
‘uniqueness’ of the region and its ‘distinct’ character.590 It went on to emphasize the rather 
exceptional nature of the plan, “In practice, the plan validated the policy that this distinctive form of 
settlement will not be breached and transform itself from the exception to the rule (emphases 
added).”591 It is this aspect of uniqueness and exceptionality that I would like to flag for now, and 
take up later in the discussion when I attempt to work through how the normative content of 
equality is evaluated in Israeli jurisprudence. The strategic decision of the court to uphold the 
executive’s decision to render the plan as an exception that becomes the rule is embedded in the 
court’s understanding and application of the principle of equality. In evaluating whether the 
principle of equality was offended, as the petitioners claimed, the court’s use of ‘the exception’ 
forges an understanding of equality in Israeli jurisprudence that is more than one with just 
multifaceted or abstract aspects, but in one sense, is rather clearly defined. The exception allows for 
the court not to intervene when the principle of equality is offended, and to exclude others from the 
reach of equality’s protections, in those cases where ‘others’ are considered the exception.592 
 
                                                          
590 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010] HCJ 2817/06 at para. 23.  
591 Ibid. at para. 25. 
592 See the inside/outside argument I raised in the Umm al-Hieran eviction orders case, how Palestinian Bedouin as 
homo sacer are rendered both inside and outside the law, inside the law so they can be determined by it, and outside 
it so they can be denied its protections.  
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SECTION 2  
4.2 - Liberal Concepts of Equality 
 
As mentioned previously, the right to equality, although not codified in Israeli law, has been 
determined in case law to have constitutional quality. Yet, before I delve into the conceptions 
around the principle in Israeli jurisprudence, in particular in the decisions and writings of who was 
possibly Israel’s most liberal judge, former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, I would like to sketch a 
contemporary understanding of equality. I will discuss the work of Ronald Dworkin, being a very 
influential legal scholar in the liberal legal tradition (and therefore influential for Barak), and his 
concept of equality which he developed as an extension to John Rawls’ theory of abstract equality.  
 
Dworkin reads Rawls’ theory of abstract equality as a condition for acceptance into the ‘original 
position’. 593 The original position is a hypothetical situation proffered by Rawls whereby people 
apply a veil of ignorance so that their particular conditions and historical materialism are unknown 
to them. They are then asked to choose from various conceptions of justice that best assists them in 
pursuing their fundamental interests in society, via a social contract or agreement. According to 
Rawls, people will choose two principles of justice. The first principle guarantees equal basic rights 
and liberties needed to secure their fundamental interests and to pursue various conceptions of the 
good. The second principle provides fair equality in opportunities to education and employment, 
enabling all to fairly compete for powers and prerogatives of office and adequate income and 
education. According to Rawls, people will choose these two principles as rational and self-
interested individuals because even if they are the worst off in society, these two principles best 
assist them in pursuing their conceptions of the good.  
 
In his social contract theory of justice, Rawls distinguishes between two forms of equality. The first 
concerns equal distribution of goods under the second principle of justice. However, this form of 
equality would implicitly favour those better off. Accordingly, while two people can equally apply 
for acquisition of a plot of agricultural land under tender, the person better off economically is more 
likely to acquire it as he is able to make the higher bid. Rawl’s second form of equality, however, is 
the more fundamental.594  
 
                                                          
593 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972)   
594 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 511.  
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It is this more fundamental form of equality that Dworkin reads as being the abstract right to equal 
concern and respect.  Dworkin writes that this “must be understood to be the fundamental concept 
of Rawls’ deep theory”.595 Dworkin reads Rawls as saying that the right to equal respect is a 
condition of admission to the original contract, and not a product of it. As Rawls asserts, “this right 
is owed to human beings as moral persons”,596 and is assumed as a fundamental right intrinsic to 
the contract’s design, not a product of it. This is a right not by virtue of birth or characteristic or 
merit but by simply being human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.  
 
Although this understanding of equality is not as all-encompassing as that of Giorgio Agamben’s 
concept of ‘whatever singularity’, it nevertheless is a useful launching point to further discussion. 
Agamben was discussed in the previous chapter on the eviction orders in Umm al-Hieran in the 
framework of Palestinians’ inside-outside relationship to law, whereby they are inside the law so as 
to be judged by it, but outside it in the sense that they are forced to forfeit its protections. It is this 
distinction between politically recognized life (as, for example, citizens as political subjects and 
moral persons with equal access to goods and services) and bare life (life excluded from the 
political community and with unlimited exposure to violence)597 that Agamben seeks to collapse 
when he proposes the concept of ‘whatever singularity’. By collapsing the distinction, there is no 
room for the sovereign, the Israeli state in our case, to name, and thereby no possibility to exclude.  
 
This is because ‘whatever singularity’ is non-reducible, in a sense like Rawls, but more far-reaching. 
So, while Rawls proposes a right to fundamental equality, as an abstract right to equal concern and 
respect, and owing to an individual irrespective of social class, there is the condition that the 
individual be a moral person with the capacity to make plans and give justice. These conditions do 
not exist in the concept of whatever singularity. Agamben states specifically that a singularity 
cannot be reduced to a measurement of representation. Therefore, somebody matters regardless of 
what it is, whether if by appeal to an abstract generality such as universal humanity or something 
particular, such as a particular characteristic or trait. Significantly, the concept removes human 
                                                          
595 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 181 
596 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) Section 77, cited in Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 181. 
597 See Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, 'Bare Life' in Henry Sussman (ed.), Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era 
of Climate Change, vol.2 (Open Humanities Press, 2012) 194 at 194-195. 
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vulnerability from being made subject to human appraisal, so that people have value irrespective of 
a heinous crime they’ve committed or other normative standard they do not conform with.598  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, I will confine myself to the liberal conceptions of 




One would assume that liberalism as ideology and normative theory would serve minority 
interests, such as those of the Naqab Bedouin, well, or at least better than a more conservative 
leaning framework. That is certainly not to say that these two are the only relevant ideologies 
worth considering vis-à-vis protection of minority rights. Rather, it is to point out that they are 
generally seen in Israel to be the dominant ideologies informing law and adjudication.600  
                                                          
598 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community (trans. Michael Hardt) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993)  
599 I will be satisfied to only footnote the difficulties with Rawls’ abstract right to equality at this stage. A number of 
these points will be taken up further in the chapter when I discuss liberalism’s blind spots. First, as Dworkin notes, 
political liberty is given primacy over equality in material resources by situating the former as the more important 
justice principle. Second, inequality is justified when those worse off are better off than without that inequality. See 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 180. Amartya Sen critiques that Rawls tends to place an 
overemphasis on the equal distribution of primary goods at the expense of considering the happiness or desires 
fulfilled by access to or use of those goods; Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). Robert Paul Wolff submits Rawls’ theory of justice to a Marxist critique, pointing out that 
Rawls implicitly proposes a continuation of the status quo, which as far as the capitalist market economy goes has 
various fundamental inequalities embedded in it. See Understanding Rawls: A Critique and Reconstruction of A 
Theory of Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Hamid Dabashi points out Gramsci’s astute critique 
of the self-centeredness in the Kantian categorical imperative, an observation we can extend to Rawls, who saw his 
original position as the procedural arm of Kant’s categorical imperative. For Rawls, by agreeing to apply a veil of 
ignorance, persons in the original position would “act in a way that they would wish it be a universal law”, that is 
according to the categorical imperative. Yet, the blindspot in the Kantian categorical imperative and Rawls’ 
deployment of it in the original position is exposed by Gramsci in his deliberate misquoting of the former. In the 
Prison Notebooks, Gramsci renders the categorical imperative as, “act in such a way that your conduct can become 
a norm for all men in similar conditions”, where ‘similar conditions’ is absent in the original. By adding ‘in similar 
conditions’, Gramsci is emphasizing that it is short-sighted to wish one man’s ideal as the standard of a universal 
ethic unless all persons concerned are similarly situated, that is they see themselves as rational, self-interested 
individuals who wish to implement a conformism along liberal ideals as both Kant and Rawls do in their respective 
uses of the categorical imperative. See Hamid Dabashi, “Can non-Europeans think?”, Al-Jazeera English (January 
15 2013), online: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013114142638797542.html 
600 One example is in the work of Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (New York, US: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). Mautner discusses liberalism in opposition to the more conservative streams of legal 
formalism and Halakhic (religious Jewish)-inspired law. Many legal scholars make the case that the historical rift 
between the conservative, religious and the secularists in the drafting of the Israeli constitution continues to play out 
in present conflicting ideologies in adjudication. See Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel 
(Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia, 1994). The self-definition of Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ state 




According to legal scholar Duncan Kennedy, liberalism as normative theory encompasses the belief 
in individual rights, majority rule and the rule of law.601 These central aspects of liberalism promise 
guarantees that minorities would typically seek. Minorities would look favourably to a system that 
follows the rule of law since under it they are guaranteed not to be mistreated by individuals or 
government since, under such a system, no one would be above the law. Further, their fundamental 
rights, such as their right to free speech, their right to demonstrate and their right to own and 
dispose of property as they wish would be guaranteed, and under such a system, they are also 
promised access to justice. While such elements would also be in common to a conservative 
normative theory, liberalism would further promise a project of doing away with status-based 
inequality in both the legal and market arenas. In addition, it would promote cultural pluralism 
under the banner of ‘tolerating the other’; would encourage legal rules that increase the relative 
shares going to workers and other disfavoured groups; and would support a participatory 
framework in the exercise of legitimate authority and other participatory conceptions of 
democracy. These would generally stand in contrast to a conservative normative theory that tends 
to favour privilege and the status quo, defends authoritarian means in the exercise of authority and 
is generally less favourable to creating legal and institutional guarantees of cultural pluralism and 
accommodation for cultural difference.602  
 
It appears that a liberal normative legal framework, one true to the tenets above, would offer Naqab 
Bedouin a fair chance at attaining justice, at remedying mistreatment by government authorities, at 
offering the possibility of working towards equalization where status-based inequality exists, such 
as in the realm of access to land, a central point of contention in this Wine Path Plan case, and as 
we’ve seen, in all the cases we’ve discussed so far.  Such a framework would attempt to understand 
the cultural specificities that inform how the community organizes its affairs, its approach to land 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jewish trends and the more liberal, democratic ones in jurisprudence and adjudication. This inherent tension has 
been discussed by, for example, Ruth Gavison and Aharon Barak. See Ruth Gavison, Israel as a Jewish and 
Democratic State: Tensions and Possibilities (Jerusalem: VanLeer and Hakibutz Hameuhad, 1999) (Hebrew), 
Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349. For a historico-sociological analysis of these conflicting ideologies 
see sociologist Yehuda Shenhav, who explores the two contradictory voices of the primordial/religious and 
modern/secular in modern Zionism in The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and 
Ethnicity (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006). Also see Mazen Masri, The Dynamics of 
Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State (Hart Publishing, 2017) for the ideological 
negotiations that determine the ‘Jewish and democratic’ definition of the state.  
601 Duncan Kennedy, Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University 
Press, 2007) at 27-28. 
602 Ibid. at 47-48.  
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and would work towards imagining responsive and appropriate legal solutions. Yet, as discussed 
above in the critique of the legal decision, the court failed to deliver on all of these promises of a 
liberal approach.  
 
In an attempt to understand why a court would so consistently fail to deliver on the promises of a 
liberal approach, one pole in a supposedly dichotomous, active struggle with conservative/religious 
trends, I suggest looking more deeply at the building blocks of liberalism itself. Liberty, whereby a 
person is at freedom to order his actions, is liberalism’s core aim. In order to rationalize the court’s 
decision, we need to deconstruct the meanings associated with ‘liberty’ generally conceived and 
then hold it up alongside liberty as conceived and practised in Israeli law. 
 
Situating the Wine Path Plan decision in the Millsian notions of liberty 
“Liberty of the individual is a thing of the past, or the future, in Palestine”, Bernard Joseph, 1948603 
 
There are two understandings of liberty, as seen in a formative work on the concept, John Stuart 
Mills’ On Liberty.604 Mills’ work is primarily intended to underline the importance of individual 
liberty in the social and civil realm, and in particular against authoritarian government and ‘the 
tyranny of the majority’, where realizing the will of the many could oppress the few, for example in 
a situation where there exists discriminatory sentiment among the majority of the population 
towards a particular minority class who enjoy few legal protections. A discussion of On Liberty is 
taken up by Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously, where he makes an important distinction 
between the two kinds of liberty Mills was proffering. Dworkin attempts to demonstrate how failing 
to distinguish between these two types of liberty could lead to a misunderstanding of what Mills 
was prescribing in order to realize a more just society. Failure to distinguish between the two forms 
                                                          
603 Bernard Joseph, British Rule in Palestine (1948) 226. Bernard Joseph was an Israeli government member prior to 
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individual, Lahav opines, referred to the possibility of its realization in the ‘future’, when the ‘dream of a Jewish 
state became a reality’. Indeed, Lahav argues that the legacy of Chief Justice Agranat has admirably lent itself to a 
Supreme Court that has consistently expanded the repertoire of rights and liberties. Although tempered by the more 
authoritarian side of Janus’ face with which it is in daily battle, the liberal court is nevertheless a testament to the 
rebirth of respect for individual liberty in Israel/historic Palestine. This chapter aims to probe this claim.  
604 John Stuart Mills, On Liberty (Dover Thrift Editions, 2002 [1859]) 
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of liberty could even result in conservative rulings that would purportedly be made in the name of 
liberty and liberalism, but would run contrary to Mills’ own prescriptions.605 
 
The two understandings of liberty put forward by John Stuart Mill are those of liberty as license and 
liberty as independence. Liberty as license refers to the degree to which a person is free from social 
or legal constraint to do what he might wish to do. This is distinguished from liberty as 
independence, which is the status of a person as independent and equal rather than subservient.606  
 
Liberty as license means, as in the Hohfeldian sense, that A has a liberty to X if and only if she does 
not have a duty not to X.607 Liberty may also be restricted if another competing value arises, such as 
equality or justice or safety or public amenity, and the degree of that restriction depends on the 
weight accorded to these other values relative to the value of liberty as license.608 Liberty as 
independence is a more complicated Millsian concept, so that an individual’s independence is 
threatened not only by political decisions that deny her equal voice, but also by those that deny her 
equal respect. Therefore, a law or legal decision that constrains a person on account that he is 
incompetent to decide for himself, for example that he should not live in an unrecognized village 
because it is not in his or his family’s interest, and development towns are the far better option (as 
is the rhetoric concerning Bedouin)609, would be considered profoundly insulting and make him 
“intellectually and morally subservient to conformists who form the majority, and deny him the 
independence to which he is entitled”.610 
 
Mills’ distinction between liberty as license and liberty as independence understood that no matter 
how personal an act, it probably had effects on others.611 Government regulation, which impinges 
on liberty as all regulations do, would therefore need to strike a careful balance to constrain 
                                                          
605 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberty ad Liberalism’ in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press,  1978) 259-265, Chapter 11 
606 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 262 
607 Legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld identified liberty (sometimes referred to as privilege) as one of the four 
components of rights. The others were claim, power and immunity. Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions (ed. W. Cook) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). 
608 Supra note 606 
609 See, for example, Al-Sane'v. General Attorney, HCJ 2678/91, P.D. 46(3) 709 at 712 and ILA - Israel Lands 
Administration, ‘350 Plots Prepared for Bani Issa in Hura Standing Empty’, (November 26 2007), online: 
http://www.mmi.gov.il/hodaotmmiint/show_h.asp?key=782&CodeMaarecet=1 (Hebrew) 
610 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 263 
611 Ibid.  
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individual liberty in order to ensure that an appropriate balance is reached with competing values, 
but not to the degree that denies a person respect or is insulting to his dignity.  
 
The court in the wine path plan did not view the Jewish liberty or privilege to settle in single family 
farms in the Naqab as being constrained by a competing value, such as the right to equality of 
Bedouin as claimed by the petitioners. Assuming the court interpreted liberty to mean license, then 
we can say that it accorded liberty a high value relative to other values and thereby granted the 
value a wide range for its realization.  
 
But more significantly, the court failed to see how the Plan, in both its aim and implementation, 
could be seen as profoundly insulting and harmful to the dignity of Naqab Bedouin, given that its 
intention to prevent Bedouin takeover of land was publicly stated on numerous instances. Further, 
the plan’s implementation compounded the plight and insult of Bedouin having a lack of equitable 
access to land, while living precariously on land that they do occupy.  
 
Yet, there is no reason to justify characterizing the court’s decision as liberal. There was no attempt 
to remedy inequality or speak in the language of cultural pluralism and ‘toleration’. As it failed to 
deliver a liberal decision, it is not surprising that it also failed to distinguish between the two forms 
of liberty. The court did seek to uphold the right, specifically the liberty/privilege, of Jewish 
individuals to settle on expansive stretches of land within the framework of the Wine Path Plan, and 
in doing so it considered the claim by Bedouin that their right to equality was being violated, 
though did not accord it a high enough value to rule in favour of the petitioners. In keeping with the 
inadequate regard for the petitioners’ equality claim, the court similarly failed to see how their 
ruling could also be seen as insulting to the dignity of Bedouins living in the vicinity of the Plan’s 
Jewish residents. That failure to distinguish between liberty as license and that of independence is 
similar to how the court failed to distinguish between Rawls’ two forms of equality under his theory 
of social justice. That is, equality is not just about equal distribution of goods, so for example both 
Bedouin and Israeli Jews are being provided equal opportunity to submit a tender for plot 
acquisition, but about equal concern and respect. In the same vein, the court failed to understand 
liberty as the more all-encompassing and profound idea of liberty for Mills, and that which he 
sought to be the vocabulary for liberalism,612 that of liberty as equal respect. Marking these core 
tenets of liberalism in the works of Mills and Rawls as our standard by which equality cases are 
                                                          
612 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 263  
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decided within a normative liberal framework, we can conclude that for the court to be considered 
a liberal court, or having made a liberal decision, or having upheld liberal principles, it would be 
these understandings of liberty and equality that would need to be affirmed. Failing this, it would 
be hard to sustain the argument that a liberal decision was reached. And if it was not a liberal 
decision, then how else could it be characterized? As conservative? Authoritarian? Or something 
else?  
 
Charting liberalism in Israeli jurisprudence 
At this stage, I would like to chart liberalism in Israeli jurisprudence. What were the outstanding 
legal decisions, procedures and adjudicative methods that lend support to the idea of a liberal 
court? This genealogical mapping will serve as important background before discussing in more 
detail the adjudicative approach of Israel’s most visible liberal jurisprude, former Chief Justice 
Aharon Barak.  
 
According to Israeli cultural legal theorist, Menachem Mautner, liberalism in Israeli law has its roots 
in the haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment movement that developed in Germany during the last 
two decades of the eighteenth century.613 The haskalah was an attempt to merge religious, or 
halakhic, principles with those of the secular European Enlightenment and was promoted by those 
know as maskilim. In the 1880s, many maskilim turned to Zionism.614  
 
The haskalah was viewed as a threat to the religious establishment as it undermined the authority 
of the rabbis and the central role of religious law in the lives of Jews and brought about a new kind 
of Jewish identity, that of the secular Jew.615 This threat, Mautner asserts, continues today in the 
struggle between the liberal and/or secular trends and adjudication with the religious ones.616  
 
                                                          
613 Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (New York, US: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 11-13 
614 Ibid. at 13. See also Shmuel Feiner, “Out of Berlin: The Second Phase of the Haskalah Movement (1797-1824)” 
in Ezra Fleischer, Gerald Blidstein, Carmi Horowitz, Bernard Septimus (eds.), Me’ah She’arim – Studies in 
Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1991) 403 (Hebrew); Immanuel Etkes 
(ed.) The East European Jewish Enlightenment (Jerusalem, Zalman Shazar Center, 1993) (Hebrew).  
615 Supra note 613 at 13 
616 Ibid. 99 – 158. See also Suzie Navot, who demonstrates how this tension undermines the right to equality for 
Palestinian citizens of Israel. Navot, The Constitutional Law of Israel (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
2007) at 633-46. 
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Many scholars have remarked on the progressive decisions and positive implications for rights and 
liberties in Israel that were the result of a liberal and human rights sensitive jurisprudence of the 
courts.  
 
Pnina Lahav makes the argument that the foundations for a jurisprudence upholding human rights 
were laid down in the first decade following Israel’s independence, in large part owing to the 
decisions by then Chief Justice Shimon Agranat. Agranat creatively used the Declaration of 
Independence as a normative instrument for rights-sensitive jurisprudence, imported American 
First Amendment jurisprudence on the principle of balancing interests, and imposed limits on the 
discretion, even in national security cases, of administrative actors. It was owing to his decisions in 
Podamsky,617 Kol Ha’am618 and Mandelbrot619 that he helped lay down the intellectual foundations 
for a jurisprudence of civil liberties in the formative years of the state.620 
 
Mautner identifies the eighties and nineties as a time when values superseded the formalism that 
had to that point come to signify judicial decision-making. 621 These values were referred to as 
                                                          
617 Podamsky v. State of Israel, [1952] Cr.A. 95, 99/51 6 P.D. 341. In Podamsky, two armed men arrived at a 
detention center in order to demand the release of prisoners. However, the prisoners were being held on an expired 
detention order, meaning they were being illegally detained during the time of their escape. Agranat drew in a 
discussion of the Hohfeldian theory of rights (as I’ve discussed separately above) to show that although the police 
had no right to detain the prisoners or deny them their freedom, because they believed they were acting on a valid 
order, they were at liberty to resist the escape. Hence, by coercing the police by threats of violence, the armed men 
violated the criminal code provision that prohibited coercion of a person to perform an act he was not legally bound 
to do. 
618 Kol Ha'am Company Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, HCJ 73/53, 7 P.D. 871. In Kol Ha’am, the Minster of the 
Interior suspended the publication of two Israeli communist newspapers that were highly critical of the relationship 
between Israel and the United States. The administrative suspension was based on the Press Ordinance (1933), a 
British Mandatory enactment for suspension of a newspaper publication by the Minister if he thought it was likely to 
endanger public peace. The newspapers challenged the Interior Minister's decision in the High Court and won. 
Agranat’s decision in this case rooted the right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press in the concept of 
democracy, leveraged the Declaration of Independence to the status of a normative guide for rights jurisprudence 
and allowed for judicial review of administrative action, while placing tighter limitations on the use of security 
rationales when they impinged on civil liberties. See Lahav at 251-258. 
619 Mandelbrot v. Attorney General, [1956] Cr.A. 118/53, 10 P.D. 281; 2 S.J. 116. Mandelbrot was a case 
concerning criminal liability for murder by an insane person. Of the three judges on the panel, Agranat’s decision 
was the most sensitive to the civil liberties of the accused, considering the social conditions that influenced the act. 
Agranat chose not to deliver a decision based solely on the M’Naghten rule, which allowed for an insanity defense 
only if it could be established that the accused could not distinguish right from wrong in committing the act. Agranat 
considered the emotions and other social considerations that impacted on the act and offered the accused a defence 
even though the accused knew that what he had done was wrong.  
620 Pnina Lahav, "Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat's Legacy" (1990) 24 Israel 
Law Review at 253-258 
621 Menachem Mautner, The Decline of Formalism and the Rise of Values in Israeli Law (Tel Aviv: Ma'agalay Da'at 
Publishing House, 1993) (Hebrew), Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (New York, US: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 90-95 
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‘fundamental principles’ which constituted norms, and were a precursor to rights, and a central 
component of the rule of law and democratic rule. The rise in values and decline in formalism also 
entailed the Court assigning itself a more active role in shaping the normative content of the law as 
opposed to merely identifying the relevant legal norm and applying it to the case at hand.622 It also 
meant a greater balancing of values based on their relative importance in society, the source of this 
balancing being the 1953 Kol Ha’am decision.623 This period also signified how the court undertook 
purposive interpretation of the law, attempting to identify the legislator’s intent at the time the law 
was legislated as opposed to merely performing a textual reading of the law;624 how it identified 
creative solutions to legal dilemmas for which there was no existent statutory guide;625 and how it 
accepted the possibility that there could be a number of solutions to a legal dilemma as opposed to 
the formalist understanding of each legal problem having a single solution.626 
 
Barak-Erez refers to the passing of human rights legislation in the 1990s, namely Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation as signifying the shift  
from an unwritten constitution627 to a written one, a judicial bill of rights, whereby civil rights 
would be protected against legislation infringing on its associated values. 628 
 
Barak, having played a major role in developing a jurisprudence of civil liberties in Israel since the 
1980s until his retirement in 2006, has hailed the revolutionary work of the Israeli legal system to 
promote human rights and human dignity for all, even when fighting the scourge of terrorism.629  
                                                          
622 See Efrat v. Director of Population Registrar, Ministry of the Interior, HCJ 693/91, 47(1) PD 749, 764 
623 Kol Ha'am Company Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, HCJ 73/53, 7 P.D. 871. See Reem Engineers and Constructors 
Ltd. v. Upper Nazareth Municipality, CA 105/92, 47(5) PD 189, 204. 
624 Nir Kedar, “Interpretive Revolution: The Rise of Purposive Interpretation in Israeli Law” (2002) 26 Tel Aviv 
University Law Review 737 (Hebrew) 
625 See Ressler v. Minister of Defence, HCJ 910/86, 42(2)PD 441, 464.  
626 See Valley Chicken v. Ramat Yishai Local Government, HCJ 547/84, 40(1) PD 113, 141. 
627 Some examples of writings that have commended the development of the ‘unwritten constitution’, or progressive, 
liberal decisions in the courts before the passing of civil rights legislation, include Jeffrey M. Albert, “Constitutional 
Adjudication without a Constitution: The Case of Israel” (1969) 82 Harvard Law Review 1245, Amos Shapira, “The 
Status of Fundamental Individual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution” (1974) 9 Israel Law Review 497, 
Asher Maoz, “Defending Civil Liberties without a Constitution – The Israeli Experience” (1988) 16 Melbourne 
University Law Review 815. 
628 Daphne Barak-Erez, "From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American 
Perspective" (1994-1995) 26 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 309. Barak-Erez cautions, however, that the two 
Basic Laws do not provide explicit guarantees of basic rights such as the right to equality, freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech. Further, under these laws’ provisions, she laments how past legislation detrimental to human 




Similarly, numerous other legal scholars have remarked how the Israeli court has over time 
increasingly challenged executive action630 and in doing so could be considered an activist court.631 
The leading scholars reach a general consensus that although the legal edifice has its constraints 
and challenges, such as when it comes to guaranteeing civil liberties when the cases involve 
Palestinian citizens or terrorism (the latter conflated in most cases to mean Palestinians from the 
OPT),632 it can nevertheless be counted on to deliver basic constitutional guarantees of rights and 
liberties.633 
 
While we find no scarcity in the positive declarations of the Israeli court’s performance, it is hard 
not to notice a residual unease in these scholarly writings. Overwhelmingly, all positive 
commentaries of the Court’s performance vis-à-vis civil liberties carry with them cautionary 
footnotes. In particular, what we can sense in such scholarly analyses is that there seems to loom 
the spectre of unease and tension with the religious establishment and its associated conservative 
ideology impinging on individual freedoms634 and towards the inability or unwillingness of the 
courts to right past wrongs.635  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
629 See for example Aharon Barak, “A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws” (1993) 4 Constitutional 
Forum 83, Aharon Barak, “The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy” (2001-2002) 53 Hastings Law Journal 
1205 at 1208 
630 See for example on the issue of land, Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Land Expropriation in Israel: Law, Culture, and 
Society (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) 
631 See for example Yoav Dotan, "Judicial Accountability in Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenomenon 
of Judicial Hyperactivism" (2002) 8:4 Israel Studies at 87-106, Shimon Shetreet, Justice in Israel: A Study of the 
Israeli Judiciary (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994) 
632 Ilan Saban, "After the Storm? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Arab-Palestinian Minority in the Aftermath of 
October 2000" (2008) 14:4 Israel Affairs 623. Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 283-305. See also 
Suzie Navot, The Constitutional Law of Israel (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007) at 242-259.  
633 See for example the volume, Itzhak Zamir and Allen Zysblat (eds.), Public Law in Israel (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), Pnina Lahav, "Rights and Democracy: The Court's Performance, in Israeli Democracy 
Under Stress," in Sprinzak and Diamond (eds.), Israeli Democracy under Stress (1993) 125-52, Suzie Navot, The 
Constitutional Law of Israel (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007). 
634 See, for example, Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (New York, US: Oxford University Press, 
2011) 99 – 158. 
635 This we see in one of the leading cases on the equal distribution of land, Qa’adan. The judge specifically 
mentions that the decision is forward-looking and will not correct executive action that may have impinged on the 
right to equality in land allocation in the past. It was in the early decades of the state that the majority of Palestinian 
land was expropriated and thereafter disproportionately allocated to Israeli Jews. Qa 'adan v. Israel Lands 
Administration (2000), HCJ 6698/95, P.D. 54 (1) 258. For both praise and unease in commentary on the case, see 
land law scholar Sandy Alexandre Kedar, "A First Step in a Difficult and Sensitive Road: Preliminary Observations 
on Qadan v Katzir" (2000) 16 Israel Studies Bulletin 3.  
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In other words, what we notice in legal commentary commending progressive decisions, is also an 
uneasy scepticism of the rather conservative elements (meaning less challenging to the status quo), 
among them the tendency of the Court to defer to the executive. These trends make an appearance 
in the case at hand as we see how the court did not find that the executive acted unreasonably or in 
bad faith in spite there being considerable evidence to the contrary, in that the court refused to 
address historical inequalities and even lent its support to the ethnic exclusivity argument that 
informed the government’s rationale. Pnina Lahav characterizes this unease as Israeli law being a 
Janus face with which forward looking, (liberal) Israeli law is in daily battle with its authoritarian 
antecedent.636 We can borrow this characterization of the Janus face,637 because I think this 
persistent unease helps us narrow in on a structural deficiency in the legal system that I intend to 
root out as I work through this chapter.  
 
I would like to further flesh out these points, that of the conservative elements in Israeli liberal 
jurisprudence, and in particular the conservatism in the Court’s tendency to defer to the executive.  
 
For this, we will need to go back in time. In 1950 a debate took place in the Knesset regarding the 
institution of a constitution and the guarantee of civil rights via legislative guarantees. In that 
debate, Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister stated, "in a free state like ... Israel there is no need 
for a bill of rights... [W]e need a bill of duties . . . duties to the homeland, to the people, to aliyah, to 
building the land, to the security of others, to the weak".638 A constitution was never drawn up, but 
a resolution, termed the Harari Resolution was agreed upon, whereby the legislature would draw 
up a series of Basic Laws that in their whole would constitute chapters of a constitution.639 Ben-
Gurion’s nay vote in the deliberation around drawing up a constitution is a rather curious indicator 
of what the underpinnings for a liberal jurisprudence would come to be. On its best day, liberalism 
would mean a ‘free state’, or one where the liberties of individuals are respected and protected, and 
would also mean the guarantees of personal security and assistance for the weak. Yet, at the same 
time that these liberties and social protections are proffered, there is also an emphasis on collective 
                                                          
636 Pnina Lahav, “Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat’s Legacy” (1990) 24 Israel 
Law Review at 268-9. 
637 I use this description with caution as it hinges on a binary bifurcation between progressive/regressive, 
liberal/conservative, which refuses to see other possibilities outside the two sided coin of, as Lahav characterizes it, 
‘liberal law based on utopian Zionism’ versus ‘authoritarian law based on disaster/catastrophe Zionism’.  
638 Pnina Lahav, "Rights and Democracy: The Court's Performance, in Israeli Democracy Under Stress," in Sprinzak 
and Diamond (eds.), Israeli Democracy under Stress (1993) 125 at 131. 




duty for a greater national objective, such as building the Jewish state via developing the land and 
institutionalizing aliyah (Jewish immigration). The collective duty that Ben-Gurion talks about 
should be understood as an instruction that imposes obligations towards state-defined objectives. 
Therefore, while the state may have been concerned with the liberty of the individual, the emphasis 
on collective duty meant that the state was also invested in non-liberty, or coercion, whereby 
individual liberties, while existing, do so alongside state-defined national goals. This is the 
argument that Aeyal Gross makes, that while a liberal jurisprudence was developing very early on 
in the state, it was “liberalism Zionist-style – with the context of the Jewish collective”. 640 
 
Barak’s Role in Israel’s Liberal Jurisprudence 
Aharon Barak played a major role in the judicial activism that marked the period since the 
legislation of the two Basic Laws that protected certain fundamental rights in the early nineties. 
Barak is generally considered to be the poster child for Israel’s constitutional revolution and its 
right-sensitive, liberal trend upholding civil liberties, particularly for minorities and the 
disadvantaged.641  
 
In United Mizrahi Bank,642 Barak closed his opinion with the following statement on the potentiality 
of the 1992 Basic Laws, and the almost non-metaphysical, spiritual rationale for the principle of 
equality, “the prospect is of the ascent of the glory of human rights, and enhanced goodwill and 
fellowship among human beings, each born in the image of the Creator”.643 
 
What Barak is purporting here is a rather radical conception of equality. It refuses to confine itself 
to Dworkin’s restatement of Rawls’ fundamental concept of equality, which is that of the abstract 
right to equal concern and respect. This is because this abstract right is on account of human beings 
                                                          
640 Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law” (2008) 3:2 Israel Studies 80 at 86 
641 See Ariel L. Bendor and Zeev Segal, “The Judicial Discretion of Justice Aharon Barak” (2011) 47:2 Tulsa Law 
Review at 476, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Praise for an Israeli Judge Drives Criticism of Kagan“, New York Times (June 
24, 2010), online: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25kagan.html. Barak ranked 39 in a public poll 
conducted by daily Yediot Ahronoth of the ‘200 Greatest Israelis of all time’. Ynet, “Israeli No. 1: Yitzhak Rabin” 
(May 11, 2005), online: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3083171,00.html  
642 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, [1995] CA 6821/93, PD 49(4) 221-588, 1 Israel Law 
Reports 1-436. In the case, the Supreme Court sitting as a court of appeals held that the Basic Laws enabled judges 
to perform judicial review of legislation. Balancing the right to human dignity, codified by a Basic Law of the same 
name, with the right to property, the court overturned the decision of the Tel Aviv District Court that invalidated a 
statute that prevented creditors from claiming their debts in court in their full amount from the struggling 
agricultural sector.  
643 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, [1995] CA 6821/93, 1 Israel Law Reports at 258. 
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having the capacity to make plans and give justice. However, when Barak speaks of human beings 
as each being born in the image of the Creator, he ascribes an almost transcendental quality to 
equality. It is not that one deserves to be treated equal because he is a moral person with the 
capacity to make plans and give justice. Rather, there are no qualifiers to being equal. Neither is it a 
right one is accorded, it just is. The all-encompassing nature of this equality that Barak is 
purporting therefore certainly goes beyond liberal conceptions of equality, certainly those of Rawls 
and Dworkin. We could consider it a reformulation of Agamben’s ‘whatever singularity’ which is 
similarly non-reducible, meaning that equality is on account of no particular and no universal, it 
simply cannot be reduced to a measurement of representation.  
  
As Gross notes, Barak’s are “noble words”.644 But do his actions follow suit?645 
 
There is a sense that Barak was aware that his comments in United Mizrahi Bank could not be more 
than ‘noble words’. In The Hat Maker,646 Ariel Bendor and Ze’ev Sigal compile a series of 
conversations they conducted with Barak. Behind closed doors, Barak seems to be repentant about 
some of his decisions concerning the OPT for failing to uphold the principle of equality,647 
particularly on the issue of home demolitions.648  
                                                          
644 Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law” (2008) 3:2 Israel Studies 80 at 99.  
645 For Gross and Ben-Israel (who Gross cites), they do not. Gross’ argument is that the United Mizrahi Bank 
decision maintained the economic status quo in disfavour of more egalitarian and distributive economics. Ben-Israel 
argues that Barak’s academic writings also betray how equality does not encompass the right to health or education 
and other essential socio-economic rights. See Ruth Ben-Israel, "The Effect of the Basic Laws on Labor Law and the 
Labor Relations System" (1994) 4 Labor Law Yearbook 27-47 (Hebrew), Aeyal M. Gross, “The Politics of Rights in 
Israeli Constitutional Law” (2008) 3:2 Israel Studies 80. 
646 Ariel L. Bendor & Zeev Segal, The Hatmaker – Talks with Justice Aharon Barak (Kinneret Zmora-Bitan Dvir, 
2008) (Hebrew) 
647 Tom Segev, “The law unto Aharon”, Ha’aretz (July 16 2009), online: http://www.haaretz.com/the-law-unto-
aharon-tom-segev-1.280147 
648 Tomer Zarchin, “Former Chief Justice Barak regrets house demolitions”, Ha’aretz (May 27, 2009), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/former-chief-justice-barak-regrets-house-demolitions-1.276763. See also 
Barak expressing regret for the court decision authorizing the expulsion of 415 Palestinians from the OPT to 
Lebanon without those expelled having the benefit of a hearing. Nomi Levitsky, Your Honor: Aharon Barak: A 
Biography (Jerusalem: Keter, 2001) at 188 (Hebrew). Cited in Nimer Sultany, "The Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak 
A Critical Review" (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal Online 83. For more background on the case, see 
also HaMoked, “The Deportation of 415 Palestinians to Lebanon in 1992” (undated), online: 
http://www.hamoked.org/Case.aspx?cID=Cases0076, Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, 
[1993] HCJ 5973/92  
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While Barak may have been a liberal, he was at the same time a conservative.649 Although he states 
in his legal writings that circumstances do in fact require the law to adapt and change, he cautions 
that this must be balanced by stability, for without stability there will be anarchy. The need for the 
law to exhibit conservatism to a changing reality is so as to grant it ‘certainty’ and so that it not 
‘harm security’.650 I am not making a value judgement here on whether this conservatism is a good 
or bad thing, but I only intend to point out that part of the thinking behind one of Israel’s most 
liberal and rights-conscious judges, was the need for the law be cautious, conservative and stable, 
to evolve organically and in continuity with the past.651  
 
On the review of administrative action, Barak writes that decisions should not be invalidated unless 
they were patently unreasonable, and that as long as they fell into the ‘zone of reasonableness’ they 
should be allowed to stand.652 As long as the administrative branch balanced between different 
values, each one granted weight based on its importance in society, then the judge should respect 
the principle of separation of powers and defer to the executive.653   
 
I think the Qa’adan654 case, where Barak sat as president of the Supreme Court and delivered the 
majority opinion, is a telling example of how his liberalism was enunciated in a vocabulary that was 
specifically collectivist, conservative and Zionist. The case was hailed as a watershed moment in 
liberal Israeli jurisprudence where the court affirmed the prohibition on the ILA and other public 
bodies to discriminate against Arabs in the allocation of public land.655 Yet, the court recommended 
that the state reconsider their decision as opposed to delivering a decision that would have set a 
precedent. The status quo remained intact as it would not rectify past discriminatory allocations 
                                                          
649 Yigal Mersel argues that the idea of ‘Barak the activist’ could have just as much been the consequence of 
perception, owing to his writings and wish to be seen as such, as it could have been the result of his decisions. See 
Yigal Mersel, “On Aharon Barak’s Activist Image” (2011) 47:2 Tulsa Law Review 339 
650 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 11. 
651Ibid. at 12-19.   
652 Ibid. at 74. See discussion earlier in the chapter on the principle of reasonableness and the different tests 
associated with it.  
653 Similarly, President of the Supreme Court Dorit Beinisch emphasizes that in evaluating the constitutionality of a 
statute, the chief question to be answered is not whether a proportional impingement on human rights has taken 
place but rather it starts from the assumption that the statute is in fact constitutional, and the chief principle to be 
considered is that of majority rule and the separation of powers. See Academic Center of Law and Business v. 
Minister of Finance, [2009] HCJ 2605/05 at para. 14. 
654 Qa 'adan v. Israel Lands Administration (2000), HCJ 6698/95, P.D. 54 (1) 258. 
655Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, “A First Step in a Difficult and Sensitive Road: Preliminary Observations on Qaadan 
v. Katzir” (2000) Israel Studies Bulletin 3 
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and it did nothing to undermine the exclusionary structure of ‘selection committees’, whose legality 
was strengthened a posteriori.656  
 
So, while the decision exhibited many aspects of a liberal decision, such as labouring to rectify 
status-based inequality in the legal arena around land distribution, affirming the promotion of 
cultural pluralism based on the value of tolerance of the other657 and encouraging regulatory 
amendments to increase the shares of land allocations to the traditionally disadvantaged 
Palestinian minority, it also contained the rather non-liberal elements of maintaining the status 
quo, in particular deferring to the executive to implement what was, in the end, not a binding 
decision, but a fairly conservative recommendation.658 If this decision, attributed to Barak, is an 
indication of Barak’s liberalism, then what we can say is that there is more to Barak. 
 
Barak, the Israeli Hercules?659 
At the start of this chapter, I wrote that I would look at equality as fundamental principle in 
adjudication by comparing Barak’s approach to that of Ronald Dworkin’s, given the latter’s 
influence on Barak’s legal thought. The two diverged on a number of issues, yet Barak frequently 
uses Dworkin as his lodestar, citing him as a point of reference for judicial interpretation, yet 
differing with him on a number of its finer points.660  
                                                          
656 Following the passing of the ‘Admission Committees Law’ which legalized the operation of selection committees 
in nearly 50% of all communities in Israel. 
657 Supra note 654 at para. 24. 
658 The conservative elements in contemporary liberal thought can also be seen among those that self-identify as 
liberals in Israel. See for example the work of anthropology doctoral candidate Callie Maidhof, A House, a Yard and 
a Security Fence: Israel’s Secular Settlers in the West Bank, Doctoral Dissertation (Berkley, CA: University of 
California, 2016) and “Liberal Fascism”, The New Inquiry (December 3, 2013), online: 
http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/liberal-fascism/ .There exist rather convincing external critiques of liberalism on 
the issues of securing minority rights and realizing claims for justice. See Duncan Kennedy, Critique of 
Adjudication (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2007), Povinelli, Cunning of 
Recognition, supra note 14, Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire 
(Princeton University Press: 2008)  
659 The reference here is to Ronald Dworkin’s coining the term ‘Hercules’ to refer to a judge possessing superhuman 
skill, learning, patience and acumen that allows him to decide ‘hard cases’. Charles Fried, former Solicitor General 
under former US President Ronald Regan, thought of Barak as that Hercules. See C-Span Archives, "The Role of 
the Supreme Court in a Democracy", Harvard University Law School (November 11, 2002), online: http://www.c-
spanarchives.org/program/174324-1 
660 Dworkin is heavily cited in Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (trans. Sari Bashi) (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). In United Mizrahi Bank, the landmark decision that opened the door for 
judicial review of legislation, Barak draws on Dworkin to explain that Israel’s social and legal history best describes 
why the Knesset is empowered to adopt a constitution for Israel. Accordingly, the Basic Laws uphold the 
constitutional values of human dignity and equality and also allow for judicial review of legislation to determine 
unconstitutionality. See United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, CA 6821/93 [1995], PD 49(4) 221-




Barak concurs with Dworkin that interpretation rests, at least in part, on the abstract intent of the 
legislator. They both accord ‘fundamental values’ or principles their weight in interpreting the 
law.661 However, while Dworkin believes the law is based on integrity which aims at justice and 
fairness and procedural due process, Barak asserts that these values should not take primacy in 
interpretation and instead argues for the sum of a society’s fundamental democratic values to 
inform the interpretive process.662  
 
While both agree on the importance of abstract intent of the legislative author, for Dworkin this is a 
far more central principle in interpretation; it is what grants the law ‘integrity’, that is to say “which 
mandates giving a text the meaning that casts its political history in the best light”.663 Barak’s 
purposive interpretation gives fundamental values the same weight, or sometimes more, than the 
subjective purpose of the legal text’s author.664  
 
Barak also disagrees with Dworkin that a legal problem could only have a single solution,665 arguing 
instead for judicial discretion that would allow a judge to choose between more than one 
possibility.666 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
principle of equality in CAL Cargo Airlines Ltd. v. The Prime Minister, HCJ 1703/92, P.D. 52(4) 193 and in 
Recanat v. The Labour Tribunal, HCJ 4191/97 [2000], P.D. 54(5) 330. In emphasizing the importance for respect 
and protection of human rights in democratic regimes, Barak cites Dworkin in Horev v. Minister of Transportation, 
HCJ 5016/96 [1997], P.D. 51(4) 1 and in the discussion on restriction of the right to free expression draws on 
Dworkin in Shinui Party v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, HCJ 2194/06 [2006] Tak-Al 2006(2) 
4500. Dworkin is specifically cited in some four dozen Israeli Supreme Court cases and dozens more at other court 
levels. For more on the discord between Barak and Dworkin on interpretation and their different approaches to the 
principle/policy distinction in adjudication, see also Nelson Richard Dordelli-Rosales, Constitutional Jurisprudence 
in the Supreme Court of Venezuela, Doctoral Dissertation (Ottawa: Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 2013) at 
271-278 
661 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (trans. Sari Bashi) (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2005) at 296 
662 Ibid. at 296-7 
663 Ibid. at 297 
664 Ibid. Caleb Nelson argues that the traditional theorizing around statutory interpretation that divides the field into 
two camps – those seeking to interpret in light of the original, subjective intention of the legislator (intentionalist) 
versus those seeking to be more objective (textualist) is misplaced. Nelson argues that it is not clear that the 
intentionalist (less so than the textualist) considers unimportant to ensure fair notice of the law’s legal requirements 
to people outside the enacting legislature. Similarly, it is not unequivocal that the the textualist (less so than the 
intentionalist) considers original intent insignificant. Rather, the issue is of rules and standards. It is safe to conclude, 
according to Cabel, that textualists do tend towards a more rule-based approach to interpretation than intentionalists 
and therein lays the difference. See Cabel Nelson, "What Is Textualism?" (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 347. 
665 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057 
666 Supra note 661 at 207 
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Barak’s drawing on Dworkin is reflective of an approach to adjudication that has been coined 
transnational judicial dialogue,667 whereby he regularly drew on foreign courts, scholars and judges 
in adjudication, leaving a legacy for the same in the Israeli Supreme Court.668 That is not to say, 
however, that the use of foreign decisions was uncommon prior to Barak. Israeli law inherited 
various foreign legal systems such as the Ottoman and British Mandatory and so was not averse to 
the use of foreign decisions,669 an early example of which is the notable 1953 decision of Kol 
Ha’am.670 
 
‘In principle, I agree with you’ 
A central element of Barak’s liberal approach to adjudication was judging on the basis of 
fundamental principles.671 According to Barak, fundamental principles or values included those of 
tolerance, good faith, reasonableness (as proper ways of behaviour), justice (as ethical value) and 
public order and security (as social purposes).672 These principles constituted norms, or binding 
rules of conduct that regulated social relations, which crystallized to constitute the rule of law673 
and democracy.674  
                                                          
667 Anne-Marie Burley, “Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine” (1992) 
92 Columbia Law Review 1907 
668 Markus Wagner, “Transnational Legal Communication: A Partial Legacy of Supreme Court President Aharon 
Barak” (2011) 47 Tulsa Law Review 437 
669 Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) at 1339-1340, Pnina Lahav, "American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free 
Speech," (1981) 9 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 21, Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 202, 
Daphne Barak-Erez, “Judicial Conversations and Comparative Law: The Case of Non-Hegemonic Countries” 
(2011) 47 Tulsa Law Review 405 at 408. 
670 Kol Ha'am Company Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, HCJ 73/53, 7 P.D. 871. 
671 See Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 57-76. Fundamental principles have also been referred to in 
other, earlier scholarly interventions as ‘super-statutory constitutional norms’, see for example, Asher Maoz, 
“Defending Civil Liberties without a Constitution – The Israeli Experience” (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law 
Review at 825-6. 
672 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 58. 
673 By rule of law I take to mean that all people, regardless of status, are held equal before the law and no arbitrary 
action by government is permitted. Barak understands the rule of law not as a rule-book conception, which is to say 
that law must be followed just because it exists. Rather, Barak sees the rule of law as being “social justice based on 
public order”, one that balances the needs of society with that of the individual. See Barak, Judge in a Democracy, 
supra note 349 at 55-6.  
674 By democracy, I refer to the following constituent elements: elections whereby citizens vote to elect their 
representatives in government, participatory aspects to ensure active participation of citizenry, the respect for human 
rights, including those of minorities, and respect and adherence to the rule of law.  Of course, to say that democracy 
and the rule of law are good things is to make a claim about a moral ideal. It is to say that the world is a better place 
because the rule of law and democracy exist. Yet, as Stephen Guest points out, Ronald Dworkin’s work in 
interpretation, and we can certainly extend the argument to Aharon Barak, is that its starting point is that democracy 
and the rule of law are good things, and there is no conceptual description of the nature of law or democracy. 




According to Barak, fundamental principles are the objective purpose of every legal text.675 The 
source of fundamental principles is not the judges’ subjective view but rather they originate from 
the “fundamental positions and beliefs of the society as found in [for example] the declaration of 
independence.”676 Principles are not static, they come and go, and Barak prescribes that they should 
be introduced when 'ripe for recognition' and in a gradual manner, and according to former Chief 
Justice Agranat, upon the will of the people.677  
 
Fundamental principles are used as a tool in interpreting legal texts. Those fundamental principles 
derived from the constitution have constitutional status and a corresponding weight or 
'gravitational force', so that they would trump those principles whose source is secondary, such as 
in regular statute.678 
 
Among those values that Barak sees as fundamental principles is the value of tolerance. He defines 
tolerance as respect for the personal opinions and feelings of every individual.679 It concerns 
respecting ‘difference’, “attempting to understand others, even if they behave in a way that is 
unusual”. Tolerance is the willingness to compromise, between individual and society and between 
individuals. It is a value deployed not to accumulate rights for those asserting it, but a criterion for 
granting rights to others.680 By enabling concessions to be made, tolerance makes proper social life 
a possibility.681 Tolerance is not an absolute value, however, and has its limits.682  
 
A second central fundamental value in democratic society is that of good faith. This principle 
establishes the standard of behaviour for individuals interacting with one another. It establishes 
that this behaviour be honest and fair as required by society’s sense of justice and fundamental 
conceptions about proper behaviour. It balances between the needs of the individual and society.683 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
moral ideals as opposed to working through with the reader why these are desirable concepts in the first place. 
Stephen Guest, “How To Criticize Ronald Dworkin's Theory of Law”, (2009) 69 (2) Analysis 352-364. 
675 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 57. 
676 Ibid. at 59. 
677 Ibid. at 60, Justice Agranat in Shalit v. Minister of Interior, HCJ 58/68, 23(2) P.D. 477 at 602. 
678 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 62-63; on weighting, Barak is citing Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, supra note 566 at 25-27 
679 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 64. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Reem Engineering Contractors Ltd. v. Nazareth Local Authority, CA 105/92, 47(5) P.D. 189 at 211. 
682 Supra note 679 
683 Ibid. at 65, Roker v. Salomon, CA 6339/97, 55(1) P.D. 199 at 279. 
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Good faith takes account of personal interest, “one is not required to be an angel”,684 but that in 
realizing this personal interest, it is done fairly and “with consideration for the justified 
expectations and proper reliance of the other party”.685 Public bodies, as a matter of public law, 
have a higher duty however than just that of acting in good faith.686 
 
According to Barak, justice is law’s goal and thereby the standard by which law can be evaluated. It 
is a central tenet of democracy, and so democracy is weakened by a regime being unjust. It has 
residual value, which means that in a ‘hard case’ if the scales are balanced when pitting one value or 
principle against the other, the ‘more just’ decision tips the scale.687 Barak, however, does not define 
justice so we do not know, to take one instance, if by it he is referring to a principle informed by 
moral, sentimental or rational considerations.  
 
For Barak, public order, which includes public security, is a social goal that is also a fundamental 
principle.688 Its importance stems from the fact that individuals not only have rights but duties to 
society as well. Without public order, the argument goes, “it is impossible to assure the realization 
of other democratic values, including human rights”.689 As Barak himself stated in the Laor case, 
which was a free expression victory for theatre, “Every state has its collective identity, its national 
history, and its social aspirations. Protection of all these is among the fundamental values of the 
state. Democracy is not anarchy. Democracy need not commit suicide to prove its vitality”.690 In the 
balancing of fundamental principles, principles either wrestle in reciprocal compromise (horizontal 
balancing) or simply trump one another (vertical balancing) on account of their relative weight. 
Accordingly, public order or security would play a vertical trump on free expression if it were 
determined that free expression would harm public safety or national security. Similarly, freedom 
of movement outside the country could be restricted if there existed a genuine and serious fear that 
such movement would harm national security.691  
 
                                                          
684 Roker v. Salomon, CA 6339/97, 55(1) P.D. 199 at 279. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 66-67. 
687 Ibid. at 67. 
688 Ibid. at 75-6. 
689 Ibid. at 75. 
690 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board, HCJ 14/86, 41(1) P.D. 421 at 433 
691 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 170-2. 
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In ‘Hard Cases’,692 Ronald Dworkin outlines the distinction between fundamental principles and 
policy in adjudication. While a judicial decision can be made on either principle or policy 
grounds,693 in his article Dworkin makes the argument for adjudication on the basis of the former 
over the latter.694  
 
Dworkin defines a ‘principle’ in terms similar to Barak; that is, originating in the legal system’s 
institutional history and offering the law its best moral justification.695 Principles are the standards 
to be observed because they answer to justice or fairness or some other rule of morality,696 and so 
are quite different from rules. While rules are decided in an all-or-nothing matter, that is either a 
particular rule is accepted as valid or not when applied to the facts of the case, principles do not 
follow the same logic.697 Instead, principles possess weight or importance allowing a judge to 
balance between competing principles.698 Unlike rules whose validity is recognized because of their 
formal source of origin, legal principles are relevant to decision-making from their “sense of 
appropriateness” accorded by the legal profession and public at large,699 or their match with the 
                                                          
692 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057  
693 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057 at 1060 
694 Dworkin’s theory is not foolproof and there have been numerous critiques levelled at it, for example by Stephen 
Guest, supra and one put forth by Allan Hutchinson & John Wakefield. According to Hutchinson & Wakefield, 
Dworkin employs a flawed methodology for identifying a ‘hard case’ so that in effect all cases become hard cases, 
where a judge would decide on principle rather than on the basis of rules. Second, Dworkin subsumes rules to 
principles, yet admits that principles relevant to law are difficult to catalogue. So what solution does Dworkin 
provide? He suggests that one look to principles that are ‘sanctioned by the soundest theory of law’. This soundest 
theory causes one to look at the existing body of rules. In short, Dworkin appears to be saying that “rules derive 
from principles which derive from rules” trapping his Hercules in a “juristic hall of mirrors”. Allan C. Hutchinson & 
John N. Wakefield, “A Hard Look at ‘Hard Cases’: The Nightmare of a Noble Dreamer” (1982) 2(1) Oxford 
Journal Legal Studies 86-110. 
695 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057 at 1098-99. This phrasing is taken from 
HLA Hart, who was in disagreement with Dworkin regarding adjudication on the basis of principles. See H. L. A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law (2d) (Oxford University Press: 1994) at 253, cited in Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “The Irony of 
Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin's Principle-Rule Distinction to Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-
Procedure Dissonance Exemplified by Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases” 
(2004) 87:3 Marquette Law Review 425 at 439. Of course, it was also Hart who was Dworkin’s primary intellectual 
sparring partner in the so called ‘Hart-Dworkin’ debate, sparked by Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s theory of legal 
positivism. See Scott J. Shapiro, “The ‘Hart–Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed” in Arthur Ripstein 
(ed.), Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 22-55, where Shapiro identifies that the central point of 
contention between the two is the relation between legality and morality. See also Brian Leiter, “Beyond the 
Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence” (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
17. 
696 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 22 
697 Ibid. at 24 
698 Ibid. at 26-27 
699 Ibid. at 40. 
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soundest ‘community morality’, which is the political morality of the laws and institutions of the 
community.700 
 
As Dworkin explains, in political theory, arguments of policy justify a political decision where an 
action benefits the community as a whole. The example he proffers is the subsidy for airline 
manufacturers for national defense promotion.701 In our present case, the policy justification by the 
judges, one that trumped the principle of equality, was that the interest of developing the Negev 
was destined to advance a national, public aim, realised by satisfying the subordinate aims of the 
Plan to promote tourism, agriculture and landscape protection.702 
 
Dworkin adds that “arguments of principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision 
respects or secures some individual or group right”,703 for example anti-discrimination statutes for 
minorities. Nevertheless, the distinction between principle and policy is not a fine one. While 
deliberating an antidiscrimination programme, there may be a provision that disallows work 
stoppage should it be seen, from a policy standpoint, as being disruptive or non-beneficial on 
economic grounds. In such a case, we can say that the antidiscrimination programme is one made 
on principal but qualified by policy.704 In summary, arguments of principle are intended to establish 
an individual right, while arguments of policy are to realize a collective goal.705 
 
One reason Dworkin justifies that judges rule on the grounds of principle over policy is that it 
would be more accountable to the will of the people. He recommends that a policy decision be made 
by legislatures rather than judges. Policy decisions seek to “compromise among individual goals 
and purposes in search of the welfare of the community as a whole”.706 This would mean having to 
make interpersonal comparisons of utility or preference which judges cannot be expected to make. 
The legislature may make such comparisons indifferently, but they still make them better than 
judges.707  
                                                          
700 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 126. For more on the principal/policy distinction as a 
challenge to legal positivism, see Raimo Siltala, A Theory of Precedent (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2000). 
701 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057 at 1059  
702 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [June 15 2010] at para. 8. 
703 Supra note 701 
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid. at 1067. 





Another reason why arguments of principle are preferred by Dworkin is that they are more likely to 
uphold the principle of equality. Dworkin offers the example of an antidiscrimination statute 
promoting desegregation. This statute would be hard to defeat were it grounded in the right to 
equality as a matter of principle. The statute could, however, be defeated were it up against a 
principle of comparable importance, such as the right to life in the event that desegregation would 
prompt riots and expose more people to the threat of being killed. However, this consideration, in 
an adequately managed desegregation process, would be a rather rare case. Accordingly, defeating 
the antidiscrimination statute on the grounds of principle would be unlikely. Yet, if adjudicating 
based on policy, where general utility and welfare trumps, then a statute such as this can be 
defeated fairly easily if it can be shown that the majority of people would experience discomfort or 
displeasure by desegregation.708  
 
While Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between principle and policy, Barak does not.709 Therefore, 
while national security is a policy consideration for Dworkin, Barak sees it as fundamental 
principle.710 
 
Before I go further, I’d like to leave suspended, in the spirit of the uneasy spectre, what it would 
mean to extrapolate Dworkin’s assertion that arguments of principle are justified by demonstrating 
that they secure a group right. If Barak sees national security as principle, then does it follow that a 
decision made on national security grounds is justified by it securing a group right to security? And 
if so, then what does a collective right to security entail – what is its scope, parameters and 
normative content? Where does it place in the hierarchy of rights? When is its impingement or 
limitation justified? And who exactly is protected by this right? Who is excluded? I will take these 
questions up as final arguments in this chapter.  
 
The Israeli Multitude as Source of Fundamental Principles 
For both Dworkin and Barak, principles are grounded in society’s fundamental values, that is to say 
in the political morality of the laws and institutions of the community711 and in “fundamental 
                                                          
708 Ibid. at 1073.  
709 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 58. 
710 This non-distinction is admitted by Barak, though curiously as a footnote, where he states that he does not “insist 
on this distinction” [between principle and policy]. Ibid. at 58, footnote 96. 
711 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 126 
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positions and beliefs of the society as found in [for example] the declaration of independence.”712 As 
Israeli legal theorist and scholar Ruth Gavison has written, “Achievements of justice and human 
rights under a law seen as shared by all are more solid and stable than those that are based on 
controversial judicial decisions. If law is a part of life in a community, legal norms need to be 
developed and debated and articulated from within that society and its cultural sources, both legal 
and other”.713   
 
Indeed, this is what democracy means – exercising the will of the people. Such a rationale is found 
in, for example, the Spinozan evaluation of democracy, which states that government is constituted 
by the will of the people, or ‘multitude’ (those who exemplify common social desires through 
common social behaviour), and who by a dynamic form of popular authority as ‘constituent 
government’ give legitimacy to democratic government as institution.714 This chapter assumes, as 
Dworkin does in his theory of adjudication, that democracy and the rule of law are moral ideals 
without an ontological probing of why they are so. So, if democracy is about effecting the will of the 
people, then how better to realize democracy than by translating, via adjudication, society’s 
fundamental values and political morality that underlie the country’s laws and institutions.  
 
Yet, what if the community holds very anti-democratic ideas for how they wish their community to 
run? For example, what if it is shown that the majority of Israelis hold opinions that are 
discriminatory towards Arabs/Palestinians715 or are homophobic716? Would these inform 
corresponding principles to be employed in adjudication since they reflect the majority will? By 
both Dworkin’s and Barak’s accounting of fundamental principles, they would not. This is because 
fundamental principles have a validity, even if not enunciated specifically in the constitution or 
statute, that presupposes said constitution or statute. They have a basis that informs law’s 
                                                          
712 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 59. 
713 Ruth Gavison, “Law, Adjudication, Human Rights and Society” (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 31 at 54 
714 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991) at xv, xvi 
715 A poll conducted by Geocartographica revealed that a majority of Israeli Jews are put off by Arabic speakers. 
Around 50% feel either fear or ‘discomfort’, and 18% feel hate. See Khoury & Ashkenazi 2006. Jack Khoury and 
Eli Ashkenazi, “Poll: 68% of Jews would refuse to live in same building as an Arab”, Ha’aretz (March 22, 2006), 
online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/poll-68-of-jews-would-refuse-to-live-in-same-building-as-an-arab-1.183429, 
In a poll conducted in August 2002 by newspaper Ma’ariv, 72% of Israeli Jews saw Arabs as a security threat. See 
Nimer Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship: Mada’s First Annual Political Monitoring Report: Israel and the 
Palestinian Minority 2000-2002 (Haifa: Mada - The Arab Center for Applied Social Research, 2003) at 129-130. 
716 A poll, global in scale, looking at the acceptability of homosexuality found that in Israeli society, 47% thought 
that homosexuality should not be accepted by society. Pew Research Center, “The Global Divide on 
Homosexuality” (June 4 2013), online: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/ 
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codification, and as far as Israel’s Basic Laws that have constitutional force go, this is not clearly the 
case.717 Principles are also informed by the persuasive force of various sorts of precedent, 
contemporary moral practices and various other standards,718 including those stemming from the 
contemporary human rights framework that provides for the protection of minority rights.  
 
Nevertheless, the dangers associated with a society that holds values that run counter to 
democratic ones has been raised by, for example, Jeremy Waldron. In making a case against judicial 
review on the premise that it is democratically illegitimate when compared alongside deference to 
the legislature, there are four assumptions that must hold true.719  They include a representative 
legislature and judicial institutions that uphold the rule of law and are in good working order.720 
Crucially, among the four are two other caveats of relevance to my argument. First, that there is 
persisting, good faith disagreement about rights by a society committed to the idea of rights and 
that there is a commitment on the part of most members of society and officials to the idea of 
minority rights.721 Failing these assumptions, judicial review would not be a less democratic 
process than resorting to the legislature to uphold rights and democracy. That is to say, in societies 
where the majority does not believe in minority rights or do hold anti-democratic views, there is 
less of a guarantee that the legislature would protect and fulfill its international human rights 
commitments or be democratic. In such a scenario, judicial review would be preferred to do what 
the legislature is unlikely to do.  
 
In United Mizrahi Bank, Barak raises a similar concern to Waldron’s. Barak quotes Dworkin to say 
that majority rule is legitimate only in a community of equals where all are treated with equal 
concern and respect, to make the argument for judicial review of legislation that fails to respect 
minority rights.722 I do not wish to speculate if Barak was making the case for judicial review on the 
conviction that Israeli society was essentially a community of unequals.   
 
                                                          
717 The argument could be made that grounding the basic laws in the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
state, reaffirming the validity of Mandatory Emergency Regulations therein, and positioning Jewish values, culture 
and history as the paradigm with which the laws of the state are interpreted as is found in the Declaration of 
Independence, does make a distinction, or discriminate, between who is Jew and who is not. It is logical to infer then 
that the laws and institutions of the state are informed by a discriminatory political morality or ethic. But this is not 
the argument I wish to make here.  
718 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 40. 
719 Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 The Yale Law Journal 1346 
720 Ibid. at 1360.  
721 Ibid.  
722 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, [1995] CA 6821/93, PD 49(4) 221-588 at para. 80. 
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So, while anti-democratic views among a significant portion of Israeli society exist, and these have 
been translated into statute on the issues of marriage and conducting a family life,723 choosing 
where one wishes to live724 and free expression,725 these commonly held opinions and statutes 
targeting particular aspects of non-Jewish life,726 do not render adjudication on the basis of 
fundamental principles as prescribed by liberal jurisprudes Dworkin and Barak an existential 
problem, permeating all aspects of Palestinian social life. What is problematic is that anti-
democratic views of majoritarian society have crystallized around a very different center, which has 
the almost unrestricted potential to impact all aspects of Palestinian life. I make the argument that 
that center is the fundamental principle of public order, including national security. 
 
A clarification is important. The Wine Path Plan case is not one concerning the balancing between 
the principle of equality and that of national security, at least not at face value. Rather, the court 
sought to answer if the ‘national development’ objective of government violated the right to 
equality of Naqab Bedouin. In Israeli jurisprudence, national development is not a fundamental 
value and so would carry less weight than national security. By this it is logical to infer that if 
national development as objective was not determined to be an unreasonable governmental aim or 
the decision to implement it was not one taken in bad faith, then neither would a national security 
argument, assuming it was a relevant consideration.  
 
Yet, the objective of national security and that of development are not disparate. In fact, they both 
are motivated by a collectivist and materialist objective, towards a telos of ‘securing’ something for 
the state. Indeed, in dismissing the petition, the court stated that the Wine Path Plan “fulfil[s] an 
important national objective…the interest of developing the Negev is destined to advance a 
national, public aim”. A similar argument was put forth by various officials, who more explicitly 
made the link between settlement and security, whereby the plan was justified on the grounds that 
settlement was a priority in order to protect and secure the state’s interests, both present and 
                                                          
723 The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 – 2003. It is also known as the ban on 
family reunification.  
724 Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 5771 – 2011, also known as the ‘Admissions 
Committee Law’ 
725 Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott – 2011, commonly referred to as ‘The Anti-
Boycott Law’ 
726 For a current and informative database on some six dozen discriminatory pieces of legislation, as well as 




future.727 What this tells us is that 'Jewish settlement as an element of national development' is a 
subset of 'national security' objectives, so that even if national security is not the stated 
fundamental principle being evaluated alongside equality, its logic and considerations are.728 What 
this also tells us is that as a concept, 'national security' is broad in scope, an aspect that I will 
explore further.  
 
Section 4.3 On Security 
 
 “There is no security without law. Satisfying the provisions of the law is an aspect of national 
security”729 
 
Before I demonstrate the broad scope of the national security argument, we should ask, what does 
‘security’ mean? I would like to first sketch the major theoretical arguments around the concept. 
Next, I would like to explore how national security was construed within the liberal jurisprudence 
of Aharon Barak while I remain cognizant of the historical circumstances that would likely have 
influenced such a construction. Finally, I’d like to investigate how the elevation of national security 
to the level of fundamental principle could threaten to undermine the very foundations on which 
fundamental principles are based, the rule of law and democracy. 730  
                                                          
727 National development is seen as promoting national security also in the institution of Jewish Hiran (to replace 
Umm al-Hieran), and alongside it another nine villages along the southern West Bank-Green Line border, whereby 
its institution was a matter of ‘national necessity’ meant to assist in Jewish population distribution towards the 
peripheries, preserve state lands and protect borders. See Hana Hamdan, "The Policy of Settlement and ‘Spatial 
Judaization’ in the Naqab," 11 Adalah’s Newsletter (March 2005) at 2-3. As Holzman-Gazit has shown, the public 
purpose behind land expropriations in Israel is justified given the national-strategic emphasis on housing for the 
reasons of demography, security, and immigration. Shamir and Herzog argue that security does not just relate to 
threat or harm but that which jeopardizes the very existence of the state as Jewish. See Hanna Herzog and Ronen 
Shamir, “Negotiated Society? Media Discourse on Israeli Jewish/Arab Relations,” 9(1&2) Israel Social Science 
Research 55 (1994), cited in Samera Esmeir, "Introduction: In the Name of Security" in Adalah, 4 Adalah's Review 
(2004) 2-10 at 3. See also Alina Korn, "Political Control and Crime: The Use of Defense (Emergency) Regulations 
during the Military Government" in Adalah, 4 Adalah's Review (2004) 23-32 at 29. 
728 It is interesting to note that national development is more commonly understood in the world as improving the 
social welfare of the population through better access to education, health care, transportation, work opportunities, 
where the overall goal would be eliminating poverty and reducing inequality. 
729 Quote from Justice Aharon Barak in the Separation Wall case, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of 
Israel, [2004] HCJ 2046/04 at para. 86 
730 That fundamental principles are reflective of the rule of law and democracy is something that Barak and Dworkin 
would assert, but is a view certainly not shared by all, particularly detractors who claim that judicial review that 
appeals to principles so prescribed is antithetical to a rule of law project. See, for example, American Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (University Center for Human 
Values) (ed.Amy Gutmann) (Princeton University Press: 2007) and jurisprude H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(2d) (Oxford University Press: 1994). See also Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” 




While the liberal concept of equality places the individual as its gravitational center around which 
its normative standards are constructed, the dominant historical trend in security studies has the 
state at its center. The state here, however, is not so much a representation of the collective, or a 
multitude in the Spinozan understanding of the term, as it is a generally stable institution with 
individuated interests. By this equation, the threats imagined against its interests (and not the 
threats imagined against the sum of its subjects’ interests) are pitted against that of other states, or 
indeed, as is the formula relevant to us, against its subjects, those with the legal status of citizens of 
the state.731  
 
The state-centric approach to security studies is one which we have no difficulty identifying as 
being the operative understanding in the Israeli state, at the level of government and the judiciary. 
However, it is not the only understanding of security. Since the 1980s, this (neo)realist732 
conception of security studies has come under criticism from what is a more constructivist 
approach,733 whereby the social structure of state action, including the consideration of non-state 
actors and individuals key into understandings of security.  
 
One of the iterations of the constructivist approach is that of securitization theory, which claims 
that security must be understood as a ‘‘speech-act’’.734 This is to say that threats are recognized and 
                                                          
731 See, for example, Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program” (2002) 4:1 
International Studies Review 49-72 at 50-1. According to a ‘defensive realist’ approach, such as that proffered by 
prominent security studies scholar Kenneth Waltz, the international system is essentially anarchic and so states need 
to wield power and guarantee security in order to achieve other goals such as tranquillity and profit. See Kenneth N. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1979). 
732 Although neorealism and realism are often used interchangeably, there are important differences. For one, 
neorealism defines international politics as a distinct structure around which it is possible to build a theory, and this 
structural turn distinguishes it from realism. Second, realism adopts behavioural logic as the determinant of 
outcomes in international relations. Therefore, it takes human nature, or the urge to dominate, to be determinant of 
war; neorealism, however, understands anarchy and not human nature as influencing outcomes. Power as an end 
does not enjoy the privileged status in neorealism as it does in realism. To neorealists, power is a question of means; 
it is useful for states to have, though the primary concern for states is security and not power. See Kenneth Waltz, 
“Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory” (1990) 44:1 Journal of International Affairs 21 
733 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program” (2002) 4:1 International Studies 
Review 49-72 
734 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” (2003) 47 
International Studies Quarterly (2003) 511–531 at 512-513. It is worth noting that in this piece Williams develops 
the argument that although the Copenhagen school, which developed the securitization as ‘speech-acts’ formulation, 
claims to be social constructivist, it also carries the current of that which it critiques, the Realist tradition. 
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represented and in this act of representation so come into being.735 Whether the constructivist 
approach is of the Copenhagen or the Welsh school, 736  they both look beyond the material claims of 
the state and towards society more generally in theorizing about security.  
 
The idea that “the sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity”737 is a claim put forth by 
the Welsh school of security studies. Drawing on critical theory, this stream focuses on 
emancipating humanity from insecurity, which they maintain is caused by war and other forms of 
social stress. As Ken Booth explains, “Emancipation is freeing people (as individuals and groups) 
from the physical and human constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political 
oppression and so on.”738 
 
Such a human-centred view of security has also been put forth by leading human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty in their critique of ‘national security’. 739 As Dunne and Wheeler 
remind us, the focus on the security of human beings is evinced in international human rights 
developments after 1945.740 This critical approach to security hinges on an appreciation of the 
indivisibility between security and human rights. Threats to life by government as well as the denial 
of subsistence rights such as to food, water and housing are violations of fundamental human 
rights, and by this human-centered logic of security, are violations to security. They clarify that 
sources of harm to security can be at the hands of the government or from private individuals, can 
                                                          
735 Ibid. at 513. See Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 46–86 at 55, “In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that 
refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a 
promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘‘security’’ a state representative moves a particular development into a 
specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.’’  
736 For differences between the two schools, their limitations and for prescriptions towards bridging the gap between 
the two, see Rita Floyd, "Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: bringing together the Copenhagen and 
the Welsh Schools of security studies" (2007) 33:2 Review of International Studies 327-350, Rita Floyd, “Human 
Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing 
Move” (2007) 5 Human Security Journal 38 
737 Richard Wyn Jones, “‘Message in a Bottle’? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies” (1995) 16:3 
Contemporary Security Policy 299-319 at 310 
738 Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation” (1991) 17 Review of International Studies 313-326 at 319. 
739 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2003, AI Index: POL1 0/003/2003, online: 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000032003ENGLISH.PDF at 6. Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL), which brings to light the generally unequal and unjust treatment of the Third World by 
the international legal regime, also emphasises how the resulting subjugation, subordination and domination is 
effected over to Third World developing states (the South) as much as it does to Third World peoples. See Obiora 
Chinedu Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time, A TWAIL Perspective” 
(2005) 43: 1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 171-191 at 176 
740 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights 
Theory and Practice" (2004) 18(1) International Relations 9–23 at 10 
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originate from within the state or from a bordering state that threatens another state’s inhabitants 
and can be military in source or otherwise.741  
 
So, we’ve outlined two principal streams of security studies, the realist and the 
constructivist/critical. What this chapter has demonstrated so far is that the constructivist, critical 
approach to security is lacking in Israeli jurisprudence. The implicit recommendation, then, is that 
the courts ought to look more at the sources of human insecurity in performing balances of 
fundamental principles as opposed to having national security, understood solely as a threat to the 
state’s material interests, be a vertical trump as it often is. However, as mentioned earlier, the goal 
of this chapter is not to proffer an alternative epistemology to that which is being criticized, but 
rather to look at the contradictions within the referent epistemology, which in this case is the 
realist understanding of security in Israeli jurisprudence.   
 
Here I arrive at the critique of the critical human-emancipatory approach. The Welsh school has 
been taken up on the issue that security as defined by them is seemingly limitless; critics have 
asked, where does security stop? If all social issues can theoretically be framed in security terms, 
what is the value of such a definition of security, and would it even be possible for competing 
security considerations to be ‘weighted’ against one another?742  
 
This critique, I suggest, is one very relevant for the Israeli case. In Israeli jurisprudence, the 
calibration employed in according national security its weight seems unclear. Like the lack of a 
calibration methodology when it comes to measuring costs and benefits in a balancing test in the 
Beit Sourik decision, and in our present case when it came to deeming administrative action 
reasonable, the Israeli court’s historical performance seems to suggest a court that does not, for 
reasons that could be related to inability, reluctance or indifference, to carry out a proper 
calibration of security considerations.  
 
“Security considerations” are not magic words743 
                                                          
741 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights 
Theory and Practice" (2004) 18(1) International Relations 9–23 at 18.  
742 Rita Floyd, "Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: bringing together the Copenhagen and the Welsh 
Schools of security studies" (2007) 33:2 Review of International Studies 327-350 at 333. 
743 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 301. Barak here is making the point that just because the 
executive claims that its action is informed by ‘security considerations’ that does not make the action lawful. 
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So how would a calibration of security take place in cases where the principle of national security is 
deemed relevant? 
 
Before we perform a calibration, there are prior steps that need to be satisfied. First, we need to 
arrive at a ‘concept744 of security’, which is what David Baldwin sets out to do in his article of the 
same name.745 Once a concept is arrived at, it is possible to identify the necessary conditions for 
realizing this concept of security, to propose recommendations for its realization and to calibrate 
when performing a balancing against other values or principles. I will now walk through Baldwin’s 
development of the concept.  
 
As Baldwin correctly notes, while there is a lot of discussion around the normative and empirical 
concerns and prescriptions around security, such as those stemming from the realist and 
constructivist/critical human emancipatory streams presented in brief above, the fact that a 
concept of security is inadequately worked out leaves empirical recommendations on shaky 
ground. 
 
Baldwin takes his cue from a definition of security proposed by Wolfers,746 which he then reworks 
to mean as the ‘low probability of damage to acquired values’.747 It is important to flag that 
Baldwin’s sketch of this concept of security serves as a tool to conceptualize and calibrate but does 
not make the case for either human emancipation or a realist understanding that is more state-
centric in focusing its concerns. Rather, this determination for one value over another would 
depend on the person/entity wishing to conceptualize security and her/its ethical priorities. For my 
own purposes, it is this working through the concept of security that the Israeli legal system would 
need to undertake so that security as fundamental value is far less opaque than it is at present. This 
would not only clarify for all concerned parties where security places in the hierarchy of values, 
                                                          
744 Concept is different from conception. Concept refers to a general idea, such as a concept of security or justice 
that is common to various streams in security studies or to moral philosophy, while conception refers to a 
particularity distinguished stream, distinguished from other streams in the same field. So, for example, a conception 
of security that defines its reason for being as the necessity to prevent anarchy (realist), as opposed to a conception 
of security that sees itself as necessary to ensure the well-being of individuals and communities 
(constructivist/critical). Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness’ is a particular conception of justice. See John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
745 David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security" (1997) 23 Review of International Studies 5–26 [Baldwin, “Concept 
of Security”] 
746 Arnold Wolfers, “’National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, 67:4 Political Science Quarterly (1952) 481-
502. 
747 Baldwin, “Concept of Security”, supra note 745 at 13 
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thereby allowing them to have certain reasonable expectations concerning the resolution of their 
legal dilemma but crucially, security would cease to become a ‘magic word’, one that on the rather 
perfunctory basis of general welfare is set against fundamental values such as the right to life, to 
equality, free speech and other basic rights. 
 
When defining the concept of security, two principal questions need to be posed. The first, who is 
the referent subject for security – security for whom; and second, what are the values to be 
secured?748 The referent subject could be the individual, a minority group, the state or international 
global trade. As for values, these could be autonomy, economic welfare or territorial integrity, all 
depending on the referent subject and the purpose for which the question is being posed.  
 
To operationalize the concept of security, so that we can identify its necessary conditions and 
perform a calibration alongside competing values, further questions need to be asked. How much 
security is enough? The caveat here is that ‘absolute security’ is unattainable, and that security 
should be a matter of degree. As Baldwin explains, security can be thought of as allocating scare 
resources among competing ends and in this way, will always be a matter of degree.749  
 
From what threats? The Cold War ‘communist threat’ much like the ‘threat of terrorism’750 is a 
rather vague concept, because the sources of those threats are not specified. When we are told of 
the communist threat, we do not know if by the term we are referring to “ideological threats, 
economic threats, military threats or some combination thereof, thus impeding rational debate of 
the nature and magnitude of the threat”.751 
 
Next, what are the means to be used in response to the specific threats? It should be clear that 
military means are not the only valid response.752 
 
Finally, what are the costs incurred in pursuing such a strategy? There exist the costs of sacrificing 
of other goals, the spending of resources and the sacrificing of other values, such as human rights 
                                                          
748 Ibid. at 13-14 
749 Ibid. at 14-15. 
750 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 285. 
751 Baldwin, “Concept of Security”, supra note 745 at 14-15. 
752 Ibid. at 14-15. 
189  
 
values and moral values.753  Of course, the temporal limits of security should also be specified, to 
know if it is a short-term objective or is expected, for example in the case of a protracted conflict, to 
run for the long-term. As Baldwin notes, a fence may be useful to keep neighbours out in the short-
term, though in the long run it may just make more sense to befriend them.754  
 
In summary, one could specify security with respect to the actor whose values are to be secured, 
the values concerned, the extent of security, the types of threats, the response to those threats, the 
costs associated with doing so, and the relevant time period. 
 
Now that we have on hand how to construct a concept of security, we need to ask a follow up 
question, which is how much do we value security alongside other values? How do we calibrate 
security as value alongside, for example, equality as value? Relevant to the balancing that is 
performed between competing fundamental principles, Baldwin identifies three classifications for 
the relative value of security, which is how to graduate its value alongside other values. The first 
classification is the prime value approach, which says that security is a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of other values such as equality and liberty, for example. The difficulty with this 
argument, however, is that the same could be said if we asked, what would life be like without 
water? Water is also a prerequisite to the enjoyment of other values. Since absolute security is 
unattainable and people in real life sacrifice security for other more valued elements, so security as 
prime value is not very convincing.  
 
The core value approach says that security is important but does not say how important relative to 
other core/non-core values. It also runs into the problem of determining what is assigned a core 
value and what is not, and faces the difficulty of justifying the pursuit of realizing any non-core 
value as policy.755  
 
Finally, the marginal value approach, of which Baldwin is in favour, applies the law of diminishing 
marginal utility to security as it would to other values such as food, water or security of tenure. 
Security, as with these other values, does not have an essential value; rather, its value is contingent 
on circumstance. According to this approach, we need a minimum amount of security as opposed to 
                                                          
753 Ibid. at 16-17. 
754 Ibid. at 17. 
755 Ibid. at 18-19.  
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a lot of it, in constant increments, all the time. Value contingent on circumstance factors in how 
much of security someone has, in order to determine how much more of it one needs. Therefore, if 
one has more security/food/water, then one needs less in the present/future, as the factor has less 
value. Similarly, if one has less security, then one would need more, and so security/food/water is 
in such a case more valued.756 
 
In favouring the marginal value approach, Baldwin conveys why he is in favour of security as policy 
rather than principle, and therefore is closer to Dworkin than to Barak in that regard. To take 
Barak’s route of assigning security the value of fundamental principle or ‘core value’ “prejudges the 
value of security as a policy objective, and thus prejudices comparison of security with other policy 
objectives”.757 
 
Baldwin makes interesting observations, and poses pertinent questions, pertaining to the neorealist 
understandings of security, which I contend are very relevant questions to pose before Barak’s 
adjudication method.758  
 
Although national security is regularly cited by state-centric neorealists, there is little explanation 
of security as concept. If the neorealist characterization of security is taken to be ‘survival’,759 then 
the concept becomes so broad it loses its utility. This leads to much confusion about rational policy 
directions to take and is especially dangerous given security’s slippery slope nature. As absolute 
security is unattainable, so states need to accept that they instead ought to seek a certain degree of 
security. This degree of security is reached by determining if the marginal costs associated with a 
particular security measure outweigh their marginal benefits, which if determined to be the case, 
would mean that the state would forego that particular increment of security. Yet, this calculation is 
rarely dealt with in neorealist practice. Also, does one’s own security make neighbours insecure in 




                                                          
756 Ibid. at 19-20. 
757 Ibid. at 14. 
758 See ibid. at 21-22. 
759 Which is how one of the forerunners of neorealist theory Kenneth Waltz puts it, “In anarchy, security is the 
highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power”, Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: 1979) at 126. 
191  
 
The Concept of the Wine Path Plan  
What if we were to attempt to develop a concept of national security for the Wine Path Plan case? 
What would that tell us of the government’s rationales and priorities in sketching out and 
implementing the plan? What would it recommend the government ought to do? Crucially, once 
we’ve reached this preliminary sketch of the concept of security, what does it say about equality in 
liberal Israeli jurisprudence when equality is held in juxtaposition with this concept of security? 
 
My attempt here is not a foolproof illustration for a concept of security, but to mostly work through 
the parameters proposed by Baldwin to develop a concept specific to the conditions of the case.  
 
The government’s stated objective for the plan is national development. However, I’ve attempted to 
show above that ‘national development’, in the Israeli case, is an element of ‘national security’. 
Where the acquired value for which protection is sought under ‘national development’ is economic 
development, for ‘national security’ it would be population dispersion, as identified by both the 
plan’s initiators and detractors. Therefore, we have two scenarios, one flowing from the stated 
objective behind the Plan (development) and the other, the non-stated objective (security). We can 
imagine this sketch as being a bifurcated workflow from this point on, separated by the logical 
operator ‘IF’.760  
 
In both scenarios, the state has identified itself as the primary actor; it is the state’s value of 
‘economic development’ or ‘population dispersion’ that are sought to be protected. To what degree?  
 
The state identified the setting up of the Plan as an objective that would promote economic 
development through tourism and agriculture. The degree of security sought in this sense would be 
indicated by a straightforward return on investment calculation. At its most basic level, this can be 
formulated as, if you want lots of economic development, then you would want to keep your costs 
down, while maximizing profit. Therefore, how much profit I make, relative to the costs invested in 
the project, would indicate the extent or degree of economic development as value I am realizing. It 
would be safe to assume that if economic development as value is highly prized, then I would aim to 
have a high return on investment.  
 
                                                          
760 A logical operator denotes a logical operation in programming language. Therefore, IF objective = development 
THEN RUN Scenario A, IF objective = national security THEN RUN Scenario B.  
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The costs attributable to the project included the setting up of utility and transportation 
infrastructure, laying down roads that connected settlements to one another and also connected the 
settlements with the expressway and other major roads. Another significant cost is the provision of 
services to the different settlements once they are setup. In addition are the human resource and 
logistical costs for the respective government bodies pertaining to the process of setting up the 
settlements – the application process, review, decision-making, implementation, legal procedures, 
follow-up and monitoring. This considerable investment, however, has not turned out a 
corresponding return. Therefore, like the Saragusti family who were forced to scale down, other 
owners lament about the numerous difficulties they encounter in staying profitable.761 Yet, this 
development should not be entirely surprising as a return on investment analysis was not 
conducted in the framework of the plan. As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Tourism was not 
involved, feasibility studies were not performed, estimates of tourist traffic not conducted and 
there was a lack of clarity regarding the spatial arrangement of the settlements. It would seem 
logical that if ‘economic development’ was the value sought, then at the very least an elementary 
economic cost-benefit analysis would have been performed so that it could be the value realized. 
Clearly, this did not happen.   
 
If ‘economic development’ was the value sought, its realization would have to have been preceded 
by basic profit-expense arithmetic. If that wasn’t the case, then it is reasonable to assume that 
another value was the primary motivating factor for the initiative.762 I propose that ‘population 
dispersion’ is the other value motivating the Plan. From here on, I will focus on developing a 
concept of security on population dispersion alone.763  
 
                                                          
761 Interview with Thabet Abu Rass, Director, Naqab Office of Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights 
in Israel, Beersheba (August 23 2012). Interview on file with author. 
762 In fact, officials openly admitted that another aim besides economic efficiency was behind the Mevoot-‘Arad 
settlement plan. Yaron Ben Ezra, Director of the WZO Settlement Division, asserted “Settlement is not an economic 
matter and the decision cannot be examined through an economic lens, but in accordance with the goal of taking 
possession of the land in the plan”. See Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), “Petition for an Order Nisi: 
Summary of Arad Petition” (August 2012), online: http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Summary_of_Arad_Petition_-_English_2.pdf at 4. He also went on to make the point that 
the plan’s goal was to “prevent further Bedouin incursion” on land and prevent “development of a Bedouin and/or 
Arab belt” across the Green Line between “the southern Hebron Hills and Arad” and also within Israel, towards 
Dimona and Yeruham and all the way to Beersheva; which is to say, the Plan seeks to prevent any contiguity of 
Bedouin settlements where they exist. 
763 It would be superfluous to further develop a concept around ‘economic development’, if as I have shown, it is not 




For the value of population dispersion, the degree of its realization was in the state creating twenty-
three single family farms (with an aim to setup thirty in total) to achieve this. These farms span the 
main roads 224, 222, 211 and 40 and are each typically hundreds of dunams in size. However, as 
the value here is dispersion, it is more instructive to look at the extent to which the Plan is spread. In 
realizing the value of population dispersion, the state had to ask itself, to what degree did it seek to 
disperse the Wine Path Plan population? The answer was for this dispersion to more or less 
correspond to the northern, eastern and western boundaries of the Ramat HaNegev Regional 
Council, while its southern limit would circle roughly around the Jewish development town of 
Mitzpe Ramon. The degree of security sought as a measure of the extent of population dispersion, 
then, is considerable. It is equivalent to a contiguous geographical spread of around 1.2 million 
dunams. It is worth noting that the total area of Bedouin land claims, which are not necessarily 
contiguous, amount to just under a million dunams. Therefore, the degree of security aims to 
exceed, in the framework of this plan, all outstanding land claims by Naqab Palestinians against the 
state.  
 
The next element in developing a concept of security is identification of the threats. A threat to 
population dispersion would be the presence of a population who is defined as ‘other’ to the 
referent population, who impinge in some way on the referent population’s dispersion. This 
impingement could take the form of the other population’s residential zones or spaces of settlement 
preventing the referent population from settling in those locales. Such an impingement could also 
impact negatively on contiguity of the referent population, which is an essential element of realizing 
security via population dispersion i.e. a homogenously defined population dispersed in settlement 
pockets are more secure when they are connected to one another than when they are isolated.  
 
The response to the threat was the institution of the Wine Path Plan, to accord farms or individual 
settlements, spread over an area of around 1.2 million dunams, to thirty single Jewish families, 
while in practice to exclude the Naqab Bedouin from participation in the programme. This response 
works in concord with a governmental practice external to this Plan specifically. This is to say that 
this response is supported by the non-recognition of Palestinian villages within the Plan’s borders, 
namely Wadi al-Meshash and ‘Abda and the home demolitions that they are regularly subject to, 




As for the costs, we see that an economic evaluation of the Plan was not conducted. Yet, there were 
other costs identified, of both an ethical and a human rights dimension. The harms cited by the 
petitioners were to the human dignity of Naqab Palestinians and their fundamental right to 
equality.  
 
The temporal dimension to population dispersion under the Plan is bounded by the time it takes to 
set up of thirty individual farms. In that sense, the Plan does take account of the recommendation 
that security measures be restricted in their temporal scope. However, there are plans external to 
this one whereby population dispersion as value is actively being pursued. The first is the Mevoot-
‘Arad (outskirts of ‘Arad) plan being implemented by the WZO’s Settlement Division which aims to 
create a contiguous Jewish settlement zone on both sides of the Green Line in the Negev region. The 
second is the expansion of Israeli Jewish settlement that continues unabated in the West Bank.764 
 
We can assume from this exercise that had the court developed a concept of security in the manner 
sketched above it would have been hard-pressed to conclude, as it did, that the petitioners’ claim of 
discrimination was “groundless”.765  
 
Had the court set out to develop a concept of security, bearing in mind the costs such as harms to 
equality and dignity which are fundamental rights in Israel, the outcome would likely have been 
very different. First off, the court would have determined that the value for which protection was 
sought by the state was not ‘economic development’ but ‘population dispersion’.  The degree of 
dispersion sought would need to be reasonable; a spread of 1.2 million dunams for population 
dispersion compared alongside one million dunams which account for all land claims of Bedouin 
would not concord with a standard understanding of equality. If the threat to Jewish ‘population 
dispersion’ was determined to be Bedouin/Palestinian/Arab presence and settlement, then this 
would be an explicitly discriminatory consideration. It would fail to pass the most elementary tests 
of proportionality with regard to a violation of the right to equality. Accordingly, no reasonable 
‘response to the threat’ that respected the principle of equality could be envisioned. In a scenario 
that was more concordant with respect for fundamental human rights, the court could deem the 
                                                          
764 For settlement expansion in the West Bank, see generally the settlement reports produced by the Foundation for 
Middle East Peace (FMEP). For example, for an indication of the extent of population expansion of Jewish Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank over the past decade and a half, see FMEP, “West Bank 
Settlement Population Growth, 1995-2011” (undated), online: http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/west-bank-
settlement-population-growth-1995-2011 
765 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, [2010], HCJ 2817/06 at  para. 30 
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threat to population dispersion to be restrictions that were not grounded in personhoods, therefore 
not Bedouin persons or communities as restrictions to Jewish population dispersion. Rather, the 
threats could be regulatory and legal restrictions, logistical restrictions related to transport and 
such. When it comes to the costs associated with the plan, these would be hard to justify on a purely 
economic basis, given the considerable setup and administration costs compared alongside 
realizing the value of population dispersion; never mind the ethical and human rights costs 
associated with harms to dignity and equality of Naqab Bedouin.  
 
If the approach to valuing security is the core value approach, as it would be under Barak’s liberal 
jurisprudence where security is elevated to fundamental principle alongside other fundamental 
principles such as justice and equality, the court would nevertheless be hard pressed to not 
intervene in the Plan given the harms to other core values, chiefly to equality. Given the harms to 
equality, it would be becoming of a core value approach to ensure that the core value of equality is 
also affirmed in the trade off. The court would then be obliged to recommend or rule that the 
executive institute more egalitarian measures within the framework of the Plan, for example, to 
assign a minimum percentage of individual settlements to Naqab Palestinian single families that 
would practice an agricultural trade that would be supportive of tourism. So, for example, a quota 
whereby a quarter of settlements are assigned to Palestinian families would be in keeping with 
representative equality, as a quarter of the population in the Naqab is Palestinian.  
 
As this tradeoff between two core values did not occur, would that mean that the court’s approach 
to security is closer to the prime value approach, whereby security takes precedence over all else in 
a quest for the ideal of some sort of ‘permanent security’, more than it is to a core value approach? 
Or is there an ontological ‘something’ intrinsic to security that compels decisions such as the one in 
the Wine Path Plan even when the courts take the core value approach to security? 
 
“The war against terrorism turns our democracy into a ‘defensive democracy’… Defensive democracy, 
yes; uncontrolled democracy, no”766 
 
What can we say national security meant for Aharon Barak? As mentioned previously, for Barak, 
public order, which encompasses public/national security, is a social goal that is a fundamental 
                                                          
766 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 287 
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principle.767 It appears that for Barak its importance does not stem from any intrinsic value it 
possesses. That is, it is not that national security is essentially good in itself, but that ‘life’ and 
‘human rights’ are essential goods and have intrinsic value, and are allowed to exist and flourish on 
account of security existing. This, then, is what makes security desirable or have fundamental value, 
that it is a precursor to other goods. As Barak writes, without public order, and by extension 
public/national security, “it is impossible to assure the realization of other democratic values, 
including human rights”.768 
 
Why can life, democracy and human rights not flourish without national security? In Barak’s view, 
this is because there is a “terrorism that plagues”769 Israel, which has “since its founding… faced a 
security threat” 770 by enemies and terrorists. According to Barak, Israel is a “democratic state 
fighting for its life”,771 a “defensive democracy (in) battle with terrorism”.772 Therefore, given this 
existential threat to the state, a threat it has faced since its inception and continues to face today, 
national security needs to be elevated to fundamental principle in the spirit of protecting the state’s 
democracy.773  
 
Yet, besides the possibility that ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ are good in their own right, does 
Barak consider them important for other reasons? As he explicates in his introduction to A Judge in 
a Democracy, Nazism and Fascism lost out to democracy in World War II.774 The takeaway lesson 
from the Holocaust was that democracy was not simply about majority rule, but about respect for 
human rights. It was because Germany did not appreciate that fact enough that Nazism took hold. 
Human rights, therefore, is “the core of substantive democracy”,775 and the argument that Barak 
                                                          
767 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 75-6.  
768 Ibid. at 75. 
769 Ibid. at 293.  
770 Ibid. at 285. 
771 Ibid. at 288 
772 Ibid. at xx 
773Scholars have offered different reasons for why the Israeli public also elevates security to the level of existential 
need. Ofer Grosbard frames it in psychoanalytic terms as trauma that has given rise to distrust and an unwillingness 
to compromise. Ofer Grosbard, Israel on the Couch: The Psychology of the Peace Process (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2003). Bar-Tal and Antebi proposed (the rather over-generalizing idea) that a history of 
persecution rendered the world a hostile world, reinforcing a ‘siege mentality’. See Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla 
Antebi, "Siege Mentality in Israel" (1992) 1:1 Ongoing Production on Social Representations 49-67, Daniel Bar-
Tal, “The Paradox of Security Views in Israel” in Oren Barak, Gabriel Sheffer (eds.) Existential Threats and Civil 
Security Relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).  
774 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at x 
775 Ibid. at xi 
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seems to be making is that in order to defeat the possibility of another calamitous event transpiring, 
such as Nazism, a rigorous system of human rights protections needs to be in place. 
 
Barak is keen to stress throughout the book and in his decisions776 as well, that a “sensitive”, 
“delicate” and “difficult balance” must be struck by the judge between fighting an existential 
terrorist threat and upholding the rule of law and democracy. However, Barak seems to miss the 
inherent contradictions in this prescription, or if he sees it, chooses not to tease it out.  
 
In order to guarantee that human rights are not abused, Barak’s formula is that you need 
democracy with human rights protections. In order to allow such a substantive democracy to 
survive, you need for it to be a defensive, substantive democracy. That is to say, you need to curb 
rights and freedoms (of suspected terrorists), in order that democracy survive and human rights 
thrive. Therefore, for a system that seeks to guarantee human rights as a central teleological 
principle, it is also open to regularly violating human rights in seeking that end. This is not the same 
as the court seeking to balance between competing human rights claims, but more about the 
balance of human rights against that of national security. Therefore, human rights need to be 
curtailed in order that other human rights survive. This is the first contradiction in Barak’s 
conceptualization of national security as adjudicative principle. 
 
Second, the security consideration is one determined by general welfare. If more are better off 
when an element of security is protected from an external threat, then that security consideration is 
upheld. This is why for Dworkin issues of general welfare, such as national security, should be 
policy decisions, and not principle ones as they are for Barak. As policy decisions, they don’t carry 
as much weight and so are less likely to trump fundamental principles such as equality. General 
welfare is ordinarily taken to mean that the well-being of all persons, whether as moral persons or 
citizens or protected persons under occupation, be considered in government decisions that 
influence their lives. Yet, the contradiction here is that the general welfare is not the general public.  
 
Looking at the Wine Path Plan case, what we learn is that national security is being upheld on 
grounds that do not consider whether all people in the framework of the plan are better off, but 
very specifically only whether Israeli Jews, who are considered full political subjects of the nation-
                                                          
776 See for example Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, [1999] HCJ 5100/94, 53(4) 
PD 817 at 845 
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state,777 are better off; Jewish welfare is conflated to general welfare. If Palestinians were 
considered full political subjects, then it would be their considerations that would inform ‘general 
welfare’, and within the territorial space of Israel/Palestine this would not be to an insignificant 
degree, given that they are a narrow majority over the Jewish population within these spatial limits; 
nevertheless, security considerations virtually always hinge on a general welfare enunciated in 
Jewish terms.  
 
The Pervasiveness of National Security  
What we’ve sketched so far points to very tangible conservative elements to the adjudication of the 
court that claims to be and has been hailed as liberal. However, there are other very problematic 
contradictions that become apparent in adjudication on the grounds of national security.  I opine 
that the reason for the unease that looms in scholarly praise of Israeli law’s liberal progressiveness 
is because the authors tussle with the fact that the project’s logic is not uncommonly contradictory. 
These contradictions expose the legal system to being susceptible to the accusation that on issues 
related to national security, the project of upholding the rule of law and being democratic is still 
very much a work in progress.  
 
We’ve looked at security as adjudicative principle, particularly in relation to Aharon Barak’s 
jurisprudence. Yet, how pervasive is national security in Israeli law and in the considerations of the 
executive, with which the law is in reciprocal exchange? According to Ronen Shamir and Hanna 
Herzog, because security is not evoked in response to the perception of a tangible, particular threat 
but against the wide reaching and vague concept of sovereignty defined in Jewish terms, security is 
indeed very pervasive. Security is an issue concerned with protecting the ability of the state to 
remain sovereign, in a sovereignty enunciated in Jewish terms.778  
 
To return to Baldwin’s concept of security, we can therefore say that the primary value for which a 
‘low probability of damage’ is sought is that which other security-concerned values, such as 
‘population dispersion’ and ‘economic development’ make possible, namely the value of ‘Jewish 
                                                          
777 For more on the full political subject, see Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra note 493 at 130. 
778 It may be understandable why it would wish to remain sovereign, as a means to better consolidate its power, but 
why on specifically Jewish terms? Could this be justified on something along the lines of simply ‘culture’? Raef 
Zreik’s piece, ‘Why the Jewish state now?’ is illuminating in this regard. As he remarks, the Jewishness of the state 
is the raison d’être of Israel. If the state was not Jewish, there would be no legitimacy to its founding and displacing 
native Palestinians; Israel came to be because it was seen as a refuge for the Jews of the world. See Raef Zreik, 
“Why the Jewish State Now?” (2011) 40:3 Journal of Palestine Studies 23 
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sovereignty’. Now, because security is enunciated in ethnic terms, the threats to it take a 
corresponding ethnic form. So, just as the primary security consideration of the state is remaining 
sovereign on Jewish terms, the primary threat is that related to the Arab/Palestinian. This is not to 
say that there are threats other than the Palestinian to Jewish sovereignty, indeed this could take 
the form of foreign threats not specifically Arab, a major natural disaster, or a radical reimaging of 
the definition of the state in non-ethnic terms.779 While the Wine Path Plan case and the other cases 
that this dissertation engages with are concerned specifically with Naqab Bedouin, they are also 
concerned with the place of Palestinians (more broadly conceived as citizens of Israel / OPT) in 
Israeli law. And, as I will show, Palestinians are a significant source of preoccupation when it comes 
to thinking about security in Israel. 
 
Given the terms on which the value of ‘Jewish sovereignty’ is enunciated, it becomes unsurprising 
that Palestinians have, since 1948 and the institution of the Military Administration, been marked 
as enemy.780 As Israeli scholars, Ruth Gavison and Sammy Smooha have conceded, Palestinians 
cannot expect to be treated as equal in the Jewish state.781  
 
As Rouhana and Sultany assert, the marking of Palestinian citizens as an existential security threat 
has become part of a hegemonic782 discourse in Israel.783 This marking is effected through a 
governmentality that legislates,784 implements policies,785 and is discursive,786 meaning it not only 
                                                          
779 Indeed, this is the central argument that Raef Zreik makes when he says that the urgency to secure recognition 
from Palestinians for the Jewishness of the State is prompted by a reframing of the political discourse in Israel in 
recent years to one that should be “a state for all its citizens”, the political platform of the Tajamoa (Balad) party. 
Raef Zreik, “Why the Jewish State Now?” (2011) 40:3 Journal of Palestine Studies 23 
780 Alina Korn, "Political Control and Crime: The Use of Defense (Emergency) Regulations during the Military 
Government" in Adalah, 4 Adalah's Review (2004) 23-32, Alina Korn, Crime, Political Status and Law 
Enforcement: The Israeli Arab Population During the Military Government (1948-1966) (Thesis Submitted for the 
Doctor of Philosophy Degree, Hebrew University, 1997) (Hebrew). 
781 Ruth Gavison, “Can Israel be both Jewish and Democratic?” (2000) 25:6 Moment Magazine at 2, online: 
http://members.ngfp.org/Courses/Gavison/Moment.pdf, Sammy Smooha, "The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel 
as a Jewish and Democratic State" (2002) 8:4 Nations and Nationalism 475-503 and "The State of Israel's Regime: 
A Civil Democracy, a Nondemocracy, or an Ethnic Democracy?" (2000) 2 Israeli Sociology B, 565-630. 
782 Taking from Comaroff and Comaroff and Sibley, I understand hegemony to refer to systemic power, often 
informed by transactions that are legal in character, that become habituated as practices and result in routinized 
subordination that becomes ‘invisible’. See Susan S. Silbey, "After Legal Consciousness" (2005) 1 Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 323-368 at 330-1, Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: 
Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 23-4. 
783 Nadim N. Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony" 
(2003) 33:1 Journal of Palestine Studies 5-22 at 9.  
784 Some examples of the laws passed that have a central security concern about the threat to Jewish sovereignty, and 
implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) refer to Palestinians, include the Order for the Prevention of Terrorism (1948), 
Basic Law: The Knesset, section 7A (Amendment No. 351), The Knesset Members (Immunity, Rights and Duties) 
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represents a certain particularity (Arabs) as reality (security threat), but in its representation also 
constructs it (Arabs as security threat), as a speech-act.787 As we have seen, there is a spatial 
element to security, given that sovereignty is expressed by governing social relations across 
particular geographic locales, and this development has a genealogy both pre-1948788 and during 
the Military Administration.789  
 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian draws our attention to how the Bedouin are sometimes not seen as citizens in 
whose interests the state must act, but rather as a “threat” against whom the state’s interests must 
be protected. At the 2006 Herzliya Conference on National Security,790 Israel’s National Security 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Law (2002) (Amendment No. 29), The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 (2003), 
Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott (2011). For more, see Adalah, ‘Discriminatory 
Laws in Israel’, online: http://adalah.org/eng/Israeli-Discriminatory-Law-Database, Amichai Cohen and Stuart A. 
Cohen, Israel’s National Security Law:  Political dynamics and historical development (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2012) at 120-2.   
785 These policies include the policy to ban family reunification for those with Palestinian spouses from the OPT. By 
referring to all Palestinians as potential security threats, the state’s counsel exposed the racist underpinnings of the 
security rationale. See Rina Rosenberg, “Special Inquiry: Security Practices and Legal Challenges” in Adalah, 4 
Adalah's Review (2004) 82-90 at 86. There are also the policies of racial profiling of Palestinians or those married to 
them, at the airports and in public spaces; see Badi Hasisi and David Weisburd, “Going beyond Ascribed Identities: 
The Importance of Procedural Justice in Airport Security Screening in Israel” (2011) 45 Law & Society Review 867–
892, Arab Association for Human Rights and the Center Against Racism, Suspected Citizens: Racial Profiling 
against Arab Passengers by Israeli Airports and Airlines (Nazareth: HRA, 2006). 
786 Therefore, looking at legal decisions and obiter, that have both the force of a legal decision and that of the 
speech-act, Palestinians have been marked as a persistent, homogenous threat to national security. In 1978, the High 
Court of Justice used a security argument to reject the appeal against the requisition of private Palestinian land to 
establish two Jewish civilian settlements in the Occupied West Bank, “The principal is that from a pure security 
standpoint there is no doubt that the presence in the settlements - even “civil” ones - of citizens of the ruling power 
contributes significantly to the level of security and eases the task of the army and the carrying out of its tasks . . . 
There is no need to be a security expert in order to understand that terrorists act more freely in areas populated by 
apathetic people or supporters of the enemy…” See Ayub v. Minister of Defense, [1979] HCJ 606/78 33(2) P.D. 113 
at 119.  See also Gad Barzilai, “The Argument of ‘National Security’ in Politics and Jurisprudence” in Daniel Bar-
Tal, Dan Jacobson and Aharon Klieman (eds.), Security Concerns: Insights from the Israeli Experience (Greenwich: 
JAI Press, 1998) 243-265 
787 For more on discourse theory, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (2d) (London, New York: Verso, 2001) 
788 As exemplified by the Zionist policy of purchasing land for Jewish settlement, including in the Naqab, as an 
element of securing a stake for Jews in Palestine. See Eric Engel Tuten, Between Capital and Land: The Jewish 
National Fund's Finances and Zionist National Land Purchase Priorities in Mandatory Palestine, PhD Dissertation 
(Utah: Department of History: The University of Utah, 2000) 
789 Alina Korn explains how Palestinian spatio-temporal presence and movement were defined within the security 
sphere: their movements were suspect, and their links to the land were portrayed as a threat to national security. See 
Alina Korn, "Political Control and Crime: The Use of Defense (Emergency) Regulations during the Military 
Government" in Adalah, 4 Adalah's Review (2004) 23-32 at 29. 
790 The annual Herziliyya conference is a gathering of the most prominent politicians in Israel, where national and 
security policy is discussed and recommendations stemming from the conference are often taken up as government 
policy. The Disengagement Plan from Gaza was introduced first to the general public by Ariel Sharon at the 
conference in 2003. See Yonatan Mendel, “Diary – at the Herzliya Conference” 29:4 London Review of Books 34-35 
(22 February 2007), online: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n04/yonatan-mendel/diary , IPS – Institute for Policy and 
201  
 
Council (NSC), the central body for the development and implementation of national security policy, 
presented a position paper outlining the threat posed by the illegal settlement of Bedouin in the 
Negev and recommended intervention to be headed by the police. Subsequently, there was a 
considerable increase in the policing of the community.791  
 
The pervasiveness of national security is so significant that the law has a poor history of being able 
to contain it.792 As Cohen and Cohen describe in their in-depth study of national security law,793 on 
national security issues, justices of the Supreme Court deliberately stop short of striking down 
action by the executive, preferring to defer to the executive or the Knesset to make the necessary 
amendment. 794  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court “has never annulled the declaration of [the] 
emergency situation, and has almost never put actual limits on the broad use of emergency 
powers”.795 
 
There has been similar deference to the executive on the spatial dimension of national security law, 
that is to say with regard to its application in the OPT, which since the second intifada the State no 
longer refers to as ‘occupied’ but as a region of ‘armed conflict short of war’.796 Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Strategy, “The Annual Herzliya Conference Series”, online: 
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=436,  
791 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “The Grammar of Rights in Colonial Contexts: The Case of Palestinian Women in 
Israel” (2012) 4 Middle East Law and Governance 106–151 at 119-120. 
792 See Yoav Dotan’s empirical study on how the Court did have some influence on government policy, though it 
was unable to curb the everyday, pervasive violations of human rights by the military regime in the OPT, through 
the process of facilitating out of court settlements. Yoav Dotan, "Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers and 
Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice during the Intifada" (1999) 33 Law & Society Review 
319–63.  But see Menachem Hofnung and Keren Wienshall-Margel “Judicial Setbacks, Material Gains: Terror 
Litigation and the Israeli High Court of Justice” (2010) 7:4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 664–692. 
which concludes that the “Court did act as a reasonable defender of human rights”. 
793 Amichai Cohen and Stuart A. Cohen, Israel’s National Security Law:  Political dynamics and historical 
development (London, New York: Routledge, 2012). 
794 Ibid. at 162-4. The few exceptions concerned the ban on the IDF’s use of civilians to coax suspects out of their 
homes during an arrest or detention operation and permission to Palestinians to use Route 443 following them being 
barred its use. See also Ressler v. Minister of Defense, [1988] HCJ 910/86 PD 42(2) 441 
795 See Amichai Cohen and Stuart A. Cohen, Israel’s National Security Law:  Political dynamics and historical 
development (London, New York: Routledge, 2012) at 194. For example, it took the court thirteen years to reject the 
petition that called for the end of the emergency regulations in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Knesset, 
[2012] HCJ 3091/99, finding that Israel’s exceptional emergency situation demanded that the emergency regulations 
stay on the books in order to protect the Israeli population. 
796 Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, The Seventh War (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2004) (Hebrew) at 195, cited in Amichai 
Cohen and Stuart A. Cohen, Israel’s National Security Law:  Political dynamics and historical development 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2012) at 194. Similarly, in military operations in the OPT, Palestinians are no 
longer identified as occupied persons or combatants, both categories bestowing their respective protections under 
international law. Rather, they are designated ‘illegal combatants’, thereby making them legitimate targets while 
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Court has adopted the executive’s position towards facilitating the incorporation of the OPT into 
Israel,797 providing the legal backing for the construction of the separation wall,798 allowing for 
electricity provision to Hebron in the Occupied West Bank to be controlled by Israeli interests,799 a 
decision which paved the way for the Court to legitimize the withholding of fuel and electricity to 
the Gaza Strip as a form of collective punishment.800 The Court has also allowed for targeted 
assassinations of suspected terrorists without due process.801 
 
Further, as scant as the Court’s consideration has been towards developing a ‘concept of security’, it 
has similarly produced little clarity on who does what when it comes to national security law.802  
 
“Liberal security”? 
I have looked so far at the contradictions inherent in liberal conceptions of security. Yet, I think it is 
important, as far as this dissertation speaks to critical theory, to outline other takes on security 
external to a specifically liberal vocabulary. 
 
In Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1977-78, he builds on his conceptualization of 
governmentality as disciplinary power and biopower by speaking about governmentality informed 
through the diffusion of security apparatuses.803  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
removing the protections associated with being a prisoner of war. See Adam Roberts, “The Laws of War in the War 
on Terror” (2002) 32 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 193–246. 
797 See Abu Aita v. The Regional commander of Judea and Samaria, [1983] HCJ 69/81, P.D. 37(2) 197, Jami’at 
Ascan Elmualamin v. The Regional commander of Judea and Samaria, [1983] HCJ 393/82 PD 37(4) 785, and Yesh 
Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, [2011] HCJ 2164/09 where the Court justified mine quarrying 
by private Israeli enterprise in the OPT on account of the unique situation of ‘prolonged occupation’ that 
necessitated the amendment of traditional occupation law applicable in the case of the OPT.  
798 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, [2009] HCJ 7957/04  
799 Electricity Company for Jerusalem District v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 256/72, P.D. 27(1) 124. 
800 Bassiouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister, [2008] HCJ 9132/07  
801 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel, [2006] HCJ 769/02 2 Israel Law Review 459 
802 For example, it has not provided clarity on the constitutional principles that apply in national security law or 
taken steps to establish a regulatory body to monitor adherence of the security agencies to international and national 
norms. See Amichai Cohen and Stuart A. Cohen, Israel’s National Security Law:  Political dynamics and historical 
development (London, New York: Routledge, 2012) at 193, 202, 208.  
803 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 (1d) (Arnold I. 
Davidson Francois Ewald, Michel Senellart (eds.), Graham Burchell (trans.)) (Palgrave, Macmillan: 2007). See also 
Samera Esmeir who speaks to the Foucauldian notion of disciplining as security, a performance that aims to 
establish certainty, to fix a certain position, and thereby to compel a particular behaviour. In Israeli jurisprudence, 
security as disciplinary praxis suppresses, excludes, and prevents, both action challenging the status quo and 
knowledges and memories similarly insurgent.803 Samera Esmeir, "Introduction: In the Name of Security" in 
Adalah, 4 Adalah's Review (2004) 2-10 
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Foucault explains that security in contemporary society can be understood as being formulated on 
the edifice of law, discipline, and mechanisms specific to security itself. Therefore, the 
governmentality of social control (disciplinary power) and the governmentality of modifying the 
biological destiny of species (biopower), together ‘biopolitics’, in the modern state is economizing 
power through the apparatuses or mechanisms of ‘security’. 804   
 
How can we understand Foucault’s conception of security? Foucault doesn’t present a definitional 
account of security but speaks more to its relationship with ‘population’.805 Security can be 
understood by the motif of pastoral power, which, Foucault argues, is how the modern, secular 
state governs.806  
 
The rather curious element of security is that it depends in many ways on ideas of liberty, 
otherwise known as privilege, which developed in the eighteenth century. Therefore, just as the 
Hohfeldian notion states that liberty/privilege, as one of the four components of right, allows one 
the freedom to do X because there is no corresponding duty to not do Y, so security operates with a 
similar modality of needing freedom in order to exist. As Foucault explains, “An apparatus of 
security... cannot operate well except on condition that it is given freedom… the possibility of 
movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.”807  
 
Security requires freedom for itself in order to exist and operate well. And yet, freedom is typically 
associated with liberal modes of governance. Does that mean that security needs liberal 
government/law in order to efficiently operate? Foucault makes the claim that it does. Therefore, it 
is not that security and liberalism are incompatible elements of government/law, as Barak and 
                                                          
804 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 (1d) (Arnold I. 
Davidson Francois Ewald, Michel Senellart (eds.), Graham Burchell (trans.)) (Palgrave, Macmillan: 2007) at 10 
805 See Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Defining Security in Late Liberalism: A Comment on Pedersen and Holbraad “ in 
Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen (eds.), Times of Security: Ethnographies of Fear, Protest and the 
Future (New York, London: Routledge, 2013) at 28 
806 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 (1d) (Arnold I. 
Davidson Francois Ewald, Michel Senellart (eds.), Graham Burchell (trans.)) (Palgrave, Macmillan: 2007) at 364. 
Foucault explains that pastoral power has a genealogy, from the Hebraic tradition, with essential characteristics that 
include the pastor not exercising power over a fixed territory but over a multitude of flock moving towards an 
objective, where the pastor’s role is to provide subsistence, to constantly monitor and to ensure the salvation of the 
flock. 
807 Ibid. at 48-49 
204  
 
other scholars808 reiterate, speaking of the need to strike a delicate balance between the needs of 
national security and the liberties of individuals. 
 
Rather, the procedures and interventions required by the double exigency of liberty and security is 
“the paradox of liberalism and [liberty and security] are at the origin of the ‘crises of 
governmentality’ that it has experienced for two centuries”.809 The art of governmentality, then, is 
the ability to be liberal and offer citizen subjects the freedoms and liberties associated with 
liberalism, allowing these liberties to run their course, to flow, and also functioning alongside 
similarly pervasive apparatuses (dispositifs) of security. Therefore, as opposed to conceptualizing 
security and liberty as distinct rationales/operatives/modes of governance, we are advised to look 
at the two as being co-constitutive in a sense.810 
 
Section 4.4 – Israel, (and) the State of Exception 
 
Exceptional Grapes 
As mentioned earlier, on December 7 1999, the National Council for Planning and Building (NCPB) 
took a decision confirming that the institution of single family farms ran contrary to national 
planning objectives. However, the NCPB made an exception for the establishment of farms in the 
Beersheba (Naqab) region.  
 
In its decision, the court emphasized that the Plan’s geographical focus on the Naqab, which was 
unique and distinct in character, fulfilled an “important national objective”.811 It stated, “In practice, 
the plan validated the policy that this distinctive form of settlement will not be breached and 
[would] transform itself from the exception to the rule (emphases added).”812   
 
                                                          
808 See for example, Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the 
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America” (2004) 48:1 American Journal of Political Science 28-46, Susan M. 
Akram and Kevin R. Johnson, “Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting 
of Arabs and Muslims”(2001) 58 NYU Annual Survey of American Law 295, Natsu Taylor Saito, "Whose Liberty - 
Whose Security - The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of 
Political Dissent" (2002) 81:4 Oregon Law Review 1051-1132. 
809 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 (1d) (Arnold I. 
Davidson Francois Ewald, Michel Senellart (eds.), Graham Burchell (trans.)) (Palgrave, Macmillan: 2007) at 384 
810 See Andrew Dilts and Bernard E. Harcourt, "Discipline, Security, and Beyond: a brief introduction" (2008)  4 
Carceral Notebooks 1-6 
811 Adalah v. The National Council for Planning and Building, HCJ 2817/06 [June 15 2010] at para. 23.  
812 Ibid. at para. 25. 
205  
 
The court upholds the executive’s decision to institute the plan as ‘an exception that becomes the 
rule’. However, the court is deciding on a claim of offence to the principle of equality. Yet, to say that 
fundamental human rights can be overridden by the executive or the court sanctioning an 
‘exception’ is rather worrying. This is because it is not that a fundamental human right is being 
trumped by another fundamental human right more deserving of being upheld than the former 
based on the exigencies of the case, or even that a fundamental human right is balanced alongside a 
competing basic human right. Rather, the ‘exception’, which is not grounded in ‘right’ nor derives its 
legitimacy in law itself unless explicitly provided for in statute,813 suffices as the decision of the 
appropriate government body to serve as a trump of a basic freedom of or entitlement that is owed 
to a human being or a community. 
 
Schmitt on the Exception 
Emergency law is grounded in the exception. When a state declares itself to be in an emergency, the 
situation is so extraordinary, that the rule of law needs to be temporarily suspended in order for 
the state to deal with the particular threat it faces – whether it be a man-made natural disaster or 
war. Israel has been in a state of emergency since its founding as a means to combat the existential 
threat that it deems to be facing.  
 
I’d like to bring in Carl Schmitt’s work on the exception in an attempt to understand possible 
implications of the exception’s use for equality in liberal Israeli jurisprudence. 
 
For Schmitt, ‘politics’ is defined in the dyadic terms of friend/enemy in the public, but not private, 
sense.814 The relationship with the ‘friend’, then, evokes the willingness to die for other members of 
one’s group, whereas that of the ‘enemy’ is defined by the willingness to go to war and kill members 
of another hostile group that is external to one’s polity.815  
 
                                                          
813 Although the validity of the declaration of an emergency may be provided for in statute, that does not mean that 
the scope of the emergency response will also have legitimacy in the law. The parallel under the laws of war would 
be the difference between jus ad bellum (determining whether entering a war is permissible) and jus in bello 
(establishing limits to military conduct). 
814 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (trans. George Schwab) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 
[1932]) at 26.  
815 Ibid. at 32-33. 
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The exception is a decision taken outside of constitutional norms and is instituted by the 
sovereign,816 which Schmitt defines as “some person or institution, in a given polity, capable of 
bringing about a total suspension of the law and then to use extra-legal force to normalize the 
situation.”817 Therefore, the sovereign is the one with the power to declare war against an enemy 
that poses an existential threat to the sovereign and its polity. 
 
Why national security as fundamental principle is antithetical to a rule of law project  
While equality is a fundamental ethical value in Israeli jurisprudence, the move to elevate national 
security to fundamental principle is inherently contradictory to the project of adjudication on the 
basis of fundamental principles. This is because the project’s goal, as professed by Barak, is for 
fundamental principles to crystallize into norms that make up the rule of law and democracy.818 
 
Dyzenhaus explores precisely this point, asking if the state of emergency would run contrary to the 
requirements of the rule of law.819 It is because Israel declares itself to be under an ongoing state of 
emergency820 that it does not seem out of place that national security has been accorded the status 
of fundamental principle. Dyzenhaus draws on Dworkin’s conception of the ‘embedded mistake’ to 
illustrate the danger of the emergency to the rule of law. An ‘embedded mistake’ is a prerogative in 
a statute or constitution that exists as a legal fact but to which the judge must not give ‘gravitational 
force’ so that the mistake not have a legal effect beyond that which is absolutely necessary.821 The  
embedding of such a mistake in statute creates a legal black hole, an emptiness or suspension of 
law822 or a space beyond the law,823 because there is no telling the depths to which interpretation 
could lead.  
                                                          
816 Liberal constitutionalists would find backing for the declaration of a state of emergency not in ‘a sovereign’, but 
rather in the law and its norms and rules around the same, and effected through the rule of law and appropriate 
division of powers among the executive, judiciary and legislature. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (trans. George Schwab) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 
[1922]) at 18-26. 
817 Ibid. at 5. 
818 The adjudicative method of Barak has not escaped criticism. For a biting critique on the grounds of methodology, 
see Stanley Fish, “Intention is All There is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law” 
(2008) 29:3 Cardozo Law Review 1109-1146  
819 David Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?” (2006) 27:5 
Cardozo Law Review 2005-2040. 
820 Gad Barzilai, “The Argument of “National Security” in Politics and Jurisprudence” in Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan 
Jacobson and Aharon Klieman (eds.), Security Concerns: Insights from the Israeli Experience (Greenwich: JAI 
Press, 1998) 243- 265 
821 Supra note 819 at 2011, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 121-2. 
822 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (trans. Kevin Attell) (University of Chicago Press: 2005) at 41-42, 47-48 




The state of emergency is essentially about sovereign will and unimpeded by law, therefore by 
definition it cannot be restricted by it. This is why the institution of the emergency cannot be 
concordant with the demands of the rule of law; being beyond the law, it does not follow legal rules 
nor does it hold the government or sovereign accountable to the law.  
 
The existence of such a prerogative in Israeli law should, by Dworkin’s reasoning, be limited by 
judges who uphold the rule of law. While Barak does not deny that such is the special calling of the 
judge, he fails to see how national security is an ‘embedded mistake’, for him it appears more an 
‘embedded necessity’. It is also curious to note that Barak is insistent that where there is judicial 
review there are no black holes, including in times of terror,824 without recognizing the likelihood 
that the embeddedness of national security as principle in adjudication in itself creates a black hole, 
a space beyond the law where law is not operational. As Dyzenhaus cautions, borrowing from Carl 
Schmitt, “one cannot confine the exception. If it is introduced into legal order and treated as such, it 
will spread”.825 
 
The downward spiral 
What is possibly the most disquieting feature of the state of emergency is the extent, uncertain in 
scope, to which the polity’s sense of normalcy is assured through the suppression of those outside 
the polity.826 Accordingly, we can know little about how far fundamental freedoms and liberties 
could be violated in the aim of countering the existential threat and maintaining the polity’s 
identity.  
 
The war on terror in America has fundamentally reformulated traditional understandings and 
applications of the rule of law.827 Looking at the American example, we see that what a national 
security emergency has prompted is the insertion of the exception at the demands of an 
                                                          
824 Barak, Judge in a Democracy, supra note 349 at 298-299. 
825 David Dyzenhaus, “Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law” (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 1-30.  
826 Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen 
Klassenkampf (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1994 [1921]) (German) at 150-67, cited in Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition) (ed. Edward N. Zalta), online: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/schmitt/  
827 See American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), A Call to Courage: Reclaiming our Liberties Ten Years after 9/11 
(New York: ACLU, 2011), Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192 (D.D.C), El-Masri v. Tenet, 37 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. 
Va. 2006) (No.1:05cv1147), ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13cv03994 (S.D.N.Y.) 
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extraordinary situation, as the appropriate response to this exceptional situation, as the US 
administration argued, was simply not possible for international law to realize in its current 
form.828  
 
With the harkening of the exception, however, is also the inability to adequately determine what 
aspects of life could be negatively impacted and how profound those impacts could be. As the 
exception suspends the rule of law, there seems to be little redress for increasing violations to the 
fundamental right of habeas corpus or to jus cogen norms, such as the right to be free from torture 
and the right to life. 
 
In following the state’s assertion that more security means better protection of freedoms and 
liberty, the US courts, not unlike Barak, seems to be following a particular reading of the 
Jeffersonian adage that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of 
patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure”.829  
 
Indeed, recent trends indicate that violations to fundamental freedoms and liberties continue apace 
in Israel, and particularly so since the second intifada at the turn of the century. The downward 
spiral has meant that even the more mundane and everyday practices of living have been 
affected.830  
 
National security arguments have been used to negatively impact on the ability of Palestinians to 
live sustainable lives by growing food for consumption and sale831 and for Palestinian children,832 as 
                                                          
828 Alberto Gonzales, ‘Memorandum for the President: Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on 
Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban’ (25 January 2002) in Karen Greenberg and Joshua 
Dratel (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) 118. 
829 From Thomas Jefferson’s letter to William Stephens Smith, Paris, 13 Nov. 1787. Julian P. Boyd, Charles T. 
Cullen, John Catanzariti, Barbara B. Oberg et al (eds.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1950), Volume 12, 356-7.  
830 As Pain and Smith write, “What is perhaps most extraordinary is the extent to which the everyday – the feelings, 
experiences, practices and actions of people outside the realm of formal politics – has become so invisible in the 
flurry of interest in the globalised geopolitics of fear”. See Rachel Pain and Susan J. Smith, “Fear, critical 
geopolitics and everyday life” in Fear: critical geopolitics and everyday life (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 1-24. 
831 As seen in the Court’s non-intervention concerning the uprooting of olive groves belonging to protected persons 
during army operations in El-Saka v. The State of Israel, HCJ 9252/ 00; and in the destruction of a plantation 
because a Palestinian sniper had used it in Gusin v. The Military Commander, HCJ 4219/02, 56(4) PD 608. 
832 Through the closing of schools and the use of the school building for military operations, see The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel v. The Military Commander, HCJ 8286/ 00 
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well as prisoners, old and young,833 to acquire an education. Tens of thousands of Palestinians are 
being denied their rights to home, to private and family life on account that they or members of 
their immediate family are considered security threats on national grounds alone.834 
  
Recent developments have also brought the Prawer Plan, which threatens to forcibly displace some 
forty thousand Palestinian Bedouin from lands in their historical possession, use or ownership.835 
Part of the rationale is similar to that of the Wine Path Plan’s, where Bedouin are considered threats 
to the goal of population dispersion and the contiguity of Israeli Jewish settlements.836 
 
Possibly the most disconcerting example of the harm to liberty in the downward spiral of security 
or emergency arguments is found at the site of the prison. The restriction to liberty of the prisoner 
grew even more acute, when in April 2014, over one hundred Palestinian prisoners launched a 
hunger strike to protest the illegality of their administrative detention, a procedure whereby they 
are held in prison without charge and for an indefinite time period. In response, the Israeli 
government passed legislation to force feed the hunger striking prisoners,837 a law that was later 
upheld by the Supreme Court.838  
                                                          
833 As of August 2013, 179 children were in prison after being processed through the military court system. They are 
generally denied access to education. See Defence for Children International, ‘Detention Bulletin’ (August 2013), 
online: http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/august_2013_detention_bulletin_draft_04oct2013.pdf . See 
also Addameer, The Right of Child Prisoners to Education (2010), online: 
http://www.addameer.org/files/Reports/addameer-report-the-right-of-child-prisoners-to-education-october-2010-
en.pdf. The Farahat court determined that Palestinian child prisoners did have a right to education similar to that of 
Israeli juvenile offenders, though conditioned on “security considerations”. See Farahat v. Israel Prison Service, 
petition no. 97/400. In December 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that there was no right to education for 
‘security’ prisoners and upheld the District Court’s decision to bar security prisoners from accessing education in 
Said Salah v. Ministry of Public Security, Prisoner Appeal 2459/12. See Adalah, “Briefing Paper on Recent 
Developments on Palestinian Prisoners held in Israeli Prisons” (June 23 2013). 
834 On account of passing the temporary order, The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 
5763 – 2003. This has been unsuccessfully challenged in the courts, see for example, Adalah v. The Minister of the 
Interior, HCJ 7052/03, Adalah v. The Minister of the Interior, HCJ 830/07, For more on the impact and genealogy 
of this blanket ban, see Adalah, ‘Family Unification’ (constantly updated), online: 
www.adalah.org/eng/Articles/1556/Family-Unification  
835 Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, “Adalah's Position Paper on "Prawer II": The 
Israeli Government's New Plan to Forcibly Displace and Dispossess Palestinian Bedouin Citizens of Israel from 
their Land in the Naqab (Negev)” (February 23 2017), online: https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9049. Home 
demolitions in the Bedouin villages continue apace and this is why civil society activist and geographer, Thabet abu 
Ras, has been quoted as saying that, although the Prawer Plan has not become law, various aspects of the Plan are 
already being implemented “on the ground everyday”. Abu Ras, “Two years since Prawer… What’s 
next?”(September 11 2013). 
836 See Neve Gordon, "Uprooting 30,000 Bedouin in Israel", Al-Jazeera (April 3 2012), online: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/2012421020291808.html 
837 BBC, “Israel passes law allowing force-feeding of prisoners” (July 30 2015), online: 




What is so remarkable about this case is that liberty is restricted for the Palestinian prisoner at the 
most rudimentary level of physical autonomy, where the prisoner’s choice of whether to intake 
food or not is also subject to restriction.839 The exception, prompted by the professed security 
threat,840 seems to restrict liberty not just in life, but also with the onset of death.  
 
Dyzenhaus’ caution that the state of emergency can very reasonably lead to a downward spiral is 
probably a major factor in him calling for the emergency to be banished.841 The caution does not 
seem unwarranted. We have seen in the Israeli case how security reasons are cited to deny liberty 
in its most literal form of imprisonment or detention, in the explicit sense in denying one the right 
to free expression or property, to impinge on everyday, mundane liberties such as accessing 
education or growing food, and in this most recent case to say that even the consumption of 
food/not is a security concern, thereby justifying force-feeding, a form of torture according to 
international medical ethics standards. Dyzenhaus’ caution seems warranted and following his line 
of thought, we could ask with justified concern, where security is raised to the level of fundamental 
principle in adjudication, how low can the downward spiral in fact go? 
 
Section 4.5 – Conclusion - Security as right? 
I had earlier posed the question that if Barak sees national security as principle, then does it follow 
that a decision made on national security grounds is justified by it securing some group right? This 
would follow from Dworkin’s formulation that fundamental principles are intended to establish 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ready for final vote after getting fast track" Ha'aretz (June 18, 2014), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.599503    
838 In Israel Medical Association v. Knesset, [2016] HCJ 5304/15, Jesse Lempel, “Force-Feeding Prisoners on a 
Hunger Strike: Israel as a Case Study in International Law” Harvard International Law Journal (December 2 2016), 
online: http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/12/force-feeding-prisoners-on-a-hunger-strike-israel-as-a-case-study-in-
international-law/  
839 This case certainly complicates the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics – whereby bodies are disciplined and lives 
are either encouraged to live or let to die. This is one case where bodies are certainly punished, but those same 
bodies are deliberately kept alive, as ‘living dead’, because even the threat of their deaths render them security 
threats. For more on the ‘living dead’ in what has been described as a governmentality of necropolitics in the OPT 
and Gaza, see Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics" (2003) 15(1) Public Culture 11-40 
840 The state argued that if the prisoners were to die, then this would increase the security threats that Israel would 
face, as the state would be held culpable for their deaths. 
841 Dyzenhaus’ concluding argument is for the emergency to be banished. He argues that the law should be used to 
deal with a crisis situation, and not the emergency/exception, which is an empty space beyond law. David 
Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?” (2006) 27:5 Cardozo 
Law Review 2005-2040 at 2030, 2036, 2038. 
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individual rights842 or indeed are ‘rights’ that exist prior to the law.843 And if so, then how would we 
define such a collective right? Would it be the collective right of the state’s constituents to security, 
or a group right to Jewish sovereignty? 
 
The idea of security as right is brought up by Martti Koskenniemi in his study of the law of 
occupation. Speaking specifically to Israel’s Mara’be844 and the UK’s Jedda,845 he notes how in both 
cases, security becomes a human right,846 with human rights and security suddenly 
indistinguishable so that an “action is always an act of security and human rights and whether we 
describe the former in the latter’s vocabulary no longer really matters”.847 Koskenniemi endeavours 
to show why security should not be conflated to the level of rights as it undermines the protections 
that human rights are meant to guarantee for citizens, occupied persons and vulnerable 
populations.  
 
Whatever the nature of the right that stems from the elevation of national security to the level of 
fundamental principle, irrespective of who the right holder is or how such a right can be defined 
and operationalized, to speak of rights stemming from security’s assignment as a fundamental 
principle is a problematic undertaking.  
 
Therefore, the argument could be made that a security argument enables liberty in the Hohfeldian 
sense of not facing a restriction to do a certain act. Therefore, we saw evidence of how national 
security, broadly conceived as national development or population dispersion, granted Israeli Jews 
the right to settle in ethnically exclusive communities on both sides of the Green Line. We also saw 
how it underpinned the right of Israeli Jews to establish tourist endeavours along a considerable 
stretch of land, as materialized under the Wine Path Plan. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to 
grant such an entitlement the status of right.  
 
For one, it is not a right on par with other rights, there is no hierarchical relationship between it and 
other rights, and as we’ve seen where there appears a threat to Jewish sovereignty, security serves 
as a vertical trump over jus cogens norms and other fundamental freedoms or liberties, an ability 
                                                          
842 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harvard Law Review 1057 at 1067. 
843 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Introduction’ in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) 
844 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, [2009] HCJ 7957/04  
845 AI-Jedda v. Sec'y of State for Defense, [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin), HRLR 1355. 
846 Martti Koskenniemi, “Occupied Zone – ‘A Zone of Reasonableness’?” 41 Israel Law Review (2008) 13 at 28 
847 Ibid. at 29 
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that rights do not have. Second, it is hard to find a moral argument to justify such a right, even 
though Barak has attempted to do so.848 To accord it the status of right also undermines other 
universal rights that the human rights corpus has enshrined in international norms and standards 
to protect all equally and particularly those vulnerable and oppressed persons so that they can live 
in dignity and with their minimum subsistence requirements met. Finally, as security is unbounded, 
there is no limit to when such a right could be called upon, while rights by their very nature are 
identifiable and bounded and tell us who the right holder is, when such a right can be claimed and 
the scope of the right’s action. When security is cited as fundamental principle, there is no way of 
knowing these things.  
 
What we can say, however, is that national security gives rise to privilege, but not in the Hohfeldian 
sense of liberty. Rather, it gives rise to a privilege that is specifically Jewish racial privilege, the one 
in a permanent headlock with democratic, liberal ideals, and one that is seemingly unbounded.849 
This is privilege as used in the critical race studies tradition,850 which speaks primarily of privilege 
to describe certain categories of being that comport advantage to their bearer, so privilege as white 
(race), cis-male (sex/gender identification matching that assigned at birth), heterosexual and in 
socio-economic terms, belonging to the upper-middle class. Privilege often goes unnoticed by its 
bearers because it does not need to be harkened in order to have effect and therefore is reproduced 
in the most mundane of practices. However, for those without said privilege, the advantage of 
others is a regular reminder of their position of disadvantage and of the privilege they were not 
born into or do not possess.851 
 
In this chapter, I set out to investigate the normative content of equality in Israeli liberal 
jurisprudence. I chose to focus on Aharon Barak’s jurisprudence, because the liberalism with which 
he is identified showcases the best that Israeli jurisprudence can be with regards to fulfilling the 
rights and liberties of Palestinians, and in particular the fundamental right to equality. In 
conclusion, and after the chiasmus reading, what I am able to argue is that there is no basic 
                                                          
848 For example, to argue that it is a precursor to the realization of other human rights, much like the Jedda court 
argued. 
849 See Shira Robinson, “The Problem of Privilege” Jadaliyya (March 23 2012), online: 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4797/the-problem-of-privilege   
850 Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, “Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible” in 
Richard Delgado (ed.), Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1995)  573 
851 For the codification of white privilege in the early eighteenth century that turned African bond-labourers into 
slaves, see Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race, Volume 2: The Origin of Racial Oppression in 
Anglo-America (2d) (Verso, 2012). 
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minimum guarantee for those outside the polity, that is for Palestinians, to liberty as license, 
meaning to be granted freedom from legal constraint to do what one wishes. This is because both 
the mundane and the fundamental are constrained if the security situation calls for it.  Neither is 
there a minimum guarantee to liberty as independence, which would mean being treated as 
someone that is independent and equal rather than being treated as someone subservient or in a 
manner insulting to one’s dignity.852 In failing to answer to liberty in these two essential ways, it is 
hard to make a convincing argument that the court is one that can be identified as an institution 
that upholds liberty. As liberty is the core aim of liberalism it would therefore not be fair to assign 
the Israeli court the label of a liberal court. For while some decisions do affirm the liberty of 
persons, such is not the general conclusion one reaches when carefully accounting the court’s 
approach to the liberty of Palestinians, and it would be precisely in these moments, when upholding 
liberty is most difficult in the balance with other considerations, that the court would be most 
deserving of the label.  
 
It would also be more deserving of the label if the court can show that its blameworthiness over 
time has reduced owing to efforts undertaken in the present that display a change towards its 
dealings with Palestinians when compared to its dealings with Palestinians in the past. Therefore, 
for a legal system that was responsible in the founding years of the state for enabling land 
expropriations and forcible expulsions of Naqab Bedouin, we could say its diachronic responsibility, 
or responsibility over time, reduces if there has been a concomitant character change whereby the 
court better respects and fulfills the liberty of Palestinians. However, as evidence for this is lacking, 
we would be hard pressed to show that the court has absolved itself of some of its responsibility in 
limiting the liberty of Palestinians.853  
 
As for the value of equality, the court’s record, and this is rather clear-cut in the Wine Path Plan case 
and the Umm al-Hieran eviction case, shows that similar to liberty, there is no basic guarantee for 
the right to fundamental equality for Palestinians when it is considered alongside the issue of 
Jewish sovereignty. Therefore, neither does the court accept that the Rawlsian notion of the 
abstract right to equal concern and respect should apply to an individual irrespective of social class. 
Nor does the court consider Agamben’s notion of ‘whatever-singularity’ that affirms the value of a 
person irrespective of what it is. Indeed, we can appreciate that when the primary value 
                                                          
852 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 566 at 262 
853 See Andrew C. Khoury, "Synchronic and diachronic responsibility" (2013) 165:3 Philosophical Studies 735-52 
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undergirding security (Jewish sovereignty) is predicated on racial or ethnic privilege, that it will be 
a Sisyphean effort for the court to begin to see equality in the Agambenian sense, which emphasizes 
value with no consideration for status, ethnic or otherwise.  
 
That national security gives rise to privilege means that it grants Israeli Jews, relative to the 
Palestinian, the privileges to travel unrestrictedly854 or to stay at home855, to attend school without 
interruption and then be admitted to university,856 to settle in a home in a location of one’s 
choice,857 to decent pay and an adequate standard of living,858 to access courts859, to the rule of 
law860, to electricity and water,861 to organic produce,862 to agricultural land,863 to leisure864, malls865 
and swimming pools866. In short, it enables greater life chances for the Israeli Jew.  
                                                          
854 Gideon Levy and Alex Levac, "Journalist Majd Kayyal speaks out after Shin Bet interrogation" Ha'aretz, (April 
26, 2014), online: http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/twilight-zone/.premium-1.587161, Zvi Bar'el, "Israel's double 
standard on reporters visiting enemy states" Ha'aretz (April 18, 2014), online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.586189   
855 Reference here to the home demolitions in the Naqab, in both unrecognized villages and development towns for 
unlicensed building. These demolitions will be stepped up with the institution of the Prawer Plan.  
856 Gisha, ‘Student travel between Gaza and the West Bank 101’, Information Sheet (September 2012), online: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/122756105/Student-travel-between-Gaza-and-the-West-Bank-101  
857 Which Palestinians are prevented from doing in roughly 80% of Israel territory, owing to the existence there of 
Admissions Committees.  
858 The incidence of poverty among Palestinian families in Israel in 2012 was 53.4%, see Lidar Gravé-lazi, Greer 
Fay Cashman, “Annual report shows 1.7 million Israelis living below poverty line” (December 17 2013), online: 
http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Annual-report-shows-17-million-Israelis-living-below-poverty-line-335255. 
An annual UN study on the Palestinian economy concludes that Israeli policies play a direct role in exacerbating 
poverty in the OPT, including in East Jerusalem. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 'Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: developments in the economy of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory' (July 8 2013), UN Doc. TD/B/60/3, online: 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdb60d3_en.pdf  
859 There are numerous legal, procedural and practical obstacles for Palestinians seeking access to justice for death, 
injury or property destruction in the Israeli courts. See Ha'aretz, "Palestinians say Israel imposing steep court fees to 
prevent lawsuits" (November 7 2011), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinians-say-
israel-imposing-steep-court-fees-to-prevent-lawsuits-1.394246, Adalah, “Adalah Petitions Israeli Supreme Court 
against Policy Banning Gazans Entry to Israel which Prevents Access to Courts for their Compensation Claims” 
(October 4 2012), online: http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/1840/Adalah-Petitions-Israeli-Supreme-Court-against-to. , 
Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), Penalising the Victim (2013), online: 
http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2013/Penalising%20the%20Victim-report.pdf 
860See Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkley, 
California: University of California Press, 2005), David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of 
Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002) 
861 Amnesty International, Troubled waters - Palestinians denied fair access to water (2009), Index Number: MDE 
15/027/2009, online: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE15/027/2009, Physicians for Human Rights 
(PHR) and The Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV), Sentenced to Darkness: Electricity and 
Chronic Patients in the Unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev (December 2008), online: 
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/articlefile_1235291771187.pdf  
862 Clémentine Cirillo-Allahsa, "Israel-Palestine – Organic farming between the battle and the field" in Philippe 




What are ‘life chances’? Legal scholar Dean Spade furthers the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics to 
show how administrative governance abets enormous discrepancies in the distribution of life 
chances resulting in the premature death of many that are queer, racialized, non-normatively sexed 
and gendered populations.867 
 
What marks these routines and practices as privileged is that they are not readily accessible or 
acquirable to those determined to be without said privilege, Palestinians. These actions that deny 
access to private and public goods, as Dean Spade points out when looking at transgender subjects, 
are mostly the doing of the executive branch868. Nevertheless, when the primary value of security is 
determined by the courts to be Jewish sovereignty, even if implicitly so, it is hard to imagine why 
the executive would feel compelled not to codify Jewish sovereignty in a Jewish privilege of this 
form. It cannot be said to be of great consequence that the court intervenes in certain instances 
whereby the exclusion of Palestinians from a particular privilege offends statute or conscience, 
because when this privilege is so pervasive, the court is simply unable to rectify the countless, 
interlocking, seemingly infinitesimal ways that Palestinians everyday are reminded of their denial 
of such privilege. Nor is the court free from responsibility, for at least as often as it intervenes, it 
also enables. These forms of privilege then carry with them the force of law, circulate in even more 
intimate spheres of one’s life and only become further entrenched. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
863 For Gaza, see Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) "Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive" (May 25 
2010), online: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9A265F2A909E9A1D8525772E004FC34B; for the Jordan 
Valley, see Ma’an Development Center, “The Status of Palestinian Agriculture in the Jordan Valley” (2012), online: 
http://www.maan-ctr.org/pdfs/FSReport/spotlight/Spotlight10.pdf  
864  Ilan Lior, “Segregation at Superland: Separate days for Arab and Jewish students at amusement park” Ha’aretz 
(May 30, 2013), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/segregation-at-superland-separate-days-for-arab-
and-jewish-students-at-amusement-park.premium-1.526705  
865 Oz Rosenberg, "Hundreds of Beitar Jerusalem fans beat up Arab workers in mall; no arrests" Ha'aretz (March 23, 
2012), online: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hundreds-of-beitar-jerusalem-fans-beat-up-arab-workers-
in-mall-no-arrests-1.420270  
866 Ami Kaufman, “Arab barred entry to swimming pool in Beer Sheva country club” 972 mag (July 4 2013), online: 
http://972mag.com/nstt_feeditem/arab-barred-entry-to-swimming-pool-in-beer-sheva-country-club/ 
867 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (Boston: South 
End Press, 2012). 
868 Ibid.  
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What these gestures of exclusion mean to Palestinians are not only that they are not in possession 
of said privilege, but that with every day that passes, the further they are pushed to their premature 
death.869  
 
The reduced life-chances for Palestinians as a result of security being assigned the value of 
fundamental principle in adjudication is an appropriate segway into the principal inquiry of the 
next chapter, the value of life as generally apprehended by Israeli law.  
 
We’ve shown how security is the legally embedded necessity born to protect the ability of the state 
to remain sovereign in Jewish terms and will go beyond the law as its ontological premise is to do 
just that.  While this overrides norms of equality from being realized on land rights for Naqab 
Bedouin or Palestinians more generally, what does it mean for the Palestinian right to life? This is 
something we will take up in the final chapter on the issue of vaccinations.  
 
                                                          
869 Ibid. at 144. 
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Chapter 5 - Vaccinations  
Introduction 
Sailing into Beersheba 
Highway traffic was atypically light. Sailing into the city, the oddness of the day descended like a 
foreboding. Yet, I certainly wasn’t as scared as some of the others around me seemed. A string of 
cars had pulled up by the side of the road as if on cue. Some waited in their cars. Many others, 
however, darted towards the sand dunes artificially propped up by the roadside. I saw one man 
crouched with his daughters, his arms enveloping both in a tight embrace. They were all visibly 
scared; the dad, however, looked petrified.  
 
I was in Beersheba and there were rockets falling from the sky. It was mid-July 2014 and we were 
in the midst of a carnage. Not in Beersheba, though, but only a mere thirty kilometers north west. 
Over there, in the tightly packed enclave of Gaza, around six thousand tonnes of bombs (by 
conservative estimates) were dropped over the span of seven weeks in July and August.870 As the 
dust settled and the dead finally won the honour of being recognized as war tallies, they counted 
2,131 Palestinian deaths in Gaza. On the Israeli side, seventy-one died, sixty-six of who were 
soldiers.871 Among the Israeli civilian casualties was a Palestinian Bedouin from the recognized 
village of Qasr al-Sir, thirty-two year old Auda al-Wadj.872 
 
A day before a rocket claimed the life of Auda al-Wadj and injured members of his family, the state 
justified its lack of provision of protection against such rockets in the (recognized and 
unrecognized) Bedouin villages in court. The Bedouin villages in the Naqab lack bomb shelters, safe 
zones, fortifications and warning sirens, which are standard protective measures in place against 
rocket attacks, and which are found in all Jewish Israeli communities.873 For this reason, residents 
of the villages petitioned the High Court of Justice, demanding that the defense establishment 
                                                          
870 Ali Abunimah, “How many bombs has Israel dropped on Gaza?”, Electronic Intifada (August 19, 2014), online: 
http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/how-many-bombs-has-israel-dropped-gaza  
871 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Occupied Palestinian Territory: 
Gaza Emergency Situation Report” (September 4, 2014), online: 
www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf  
872 Chaim Levinson, Ido Efrati, Jack Khoury and Revital Hovel, “Man killed in rocket strike on Negev Bedouin 
community”, Ha’aretz (July 19, 2014), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-
1.606027  
873 In fact, emergency preparedness of Palestinian communities in Israel is pegged at a mere 14%. Only 9% of Arab 
communities have bomb shelters. Meirav Arlosoroff, “Shelter from the war? For Israel’s Arabs, not so much”, 
Ha’aretz (July 23, 2014), online: www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.606852 citing The Abraham Fund 
Initiatives, “Arab Local Authorities' Preparedness for Emergencies” (December 2013) (Hebrew) 
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provide adequate shelter from rockets for some one hundred thousand residents.874 As part of the 
state’s justification for lack of adequate protection in the villages, it stated that the villages were not 
a priority for the defense establishment and that the best protective measure residents could take 
was to lie on the ground.875  
 
The High Court of Justice subsequently issued a partial rejection of the petition, stating that while 
the state has a paramount obligation to protect the lives and physical integrity of citizens, they did 
not find cause to intervene with the defense establishment’s decision not to erect portable shelters 
in the villages. The authorities had done their homework, making their decision reasonable, and so 
the court found no cause to have their discretion override that of the authorities.876 Besides, as this 
was a ‘security’ matter, “judicial intervention in this area [would be] very limited”.877 
 
I was in Beersheba to meet with Huda Abu al-Obayed, a young Bedouin activist who recently 
assumed the position of Director of ‘Yasmin al-Naqab’, a grassroots NGO mandated to promote 
healthy living among Palestinian Bedouin and to realize their right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health of the community. Huda had arranged for me to meet with four women in Bir al-
Mashash, an unrecognized village, not far from Dimona, and just a few kilometers north of Qasr al-
Sir. Qasr al-Sir didn’t know it yet, but it would mourn the loss of one of its own the following day. In 
retrospect, I suppose my foreboding, unlike that fateful rocket, was not misplaced.  
 
I was in Bir al-Mashash to inquire into a rather peculiar legal case.878 In 2010, an amendment was 
passed in the Israeli parliament to cut child allowance payments to those families that did not 
vaccinate their children according to government directives. The Naqab Palestinian community, in 
addition to having grossly inadequate access to protection from rockets are also in severe want of 
                                                          
874 Abu Afash vs. Home Front Command, [2014] HCJ5019/14. The petition was prompted by a rocket causing severe 
injury to two young girls from an unrecognized village bordering the Bedouin development town of Laqiya, on 14 
July. See Jack Khoury, Shirly Seidler and Gili Cohen, “Bedouin in south unprotected from rocket fire”, Ha’aretz 
(July 16, 2014), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.605416  
875 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), “State: Providing Protection for Bedouin Villages in the 
Negev is Not a Priority” (July 17 2014), online: http://www.acri.org.il/en/2014/07/17/bedouin-protection-priority/  
876 Abu Afash vs. Home Front Command, [2014] HCJ5019/14 at paras. 5-7. The court issued a ‘partial’ rejection of 
the petition, since it denied the request to provide immediate portable shelters for the villages. However, on the issue 
of the structural lack of permanent shelters in the villages, the state gave the authorities thirty days to respond 
regarding instituting a long-term shelter intervention in these communities.  
877 Abu Afash vs. Home Front Command, [2014] HCJ5019/14 at para. 6. The earlier chapter’s discussion on the 
‘fundamental principle of security’ I believe adequately explains the reasons for, and the consequences of, the 
exceptional weight given to the principle of security in Israeli jurisprudence.  
878 Adalah v. Minister of Welfare and Social Affairs, [2013] HCJ 7245/10 
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adequate health care. Although the majority in the community claim to want to vaccinate their 
children, the lack of well-baby clinics in the unrecognized villages makes realizing that want elusive. 
 
Accordingly, members of the community appealed to the court on the grounds that the amendment 
was discriminatory in its effects as it disproportionately targeted the community, who have grossly 
inadequate access to well-baby clinics administering vaccinations. The court dismissed the petition 
and the amendment stayed on the books. The Health Ministry, which was meant to implement the 
amendment, announced, after the court’s decision, that it would not implement it. The Health 
Ministry’s rationale was that the amendment was ‘anti-social’, in part probably because a significant 
percentage of Israeli society would be against it as well.879 
 
Recognizing the assemblage 
I believe that the case as an object of inquiry was what made it ‘peculiar’, more than the case itself.  
This is because the legal decision had no practical impact on the lives of the petitioners as the 
executive branch decided it would not implement the controversial amendment. So why study it? 
For one reason, being about vaccines and the promotion of the health of the child and the social 
body, the case is a rather unique prism through which one can explore how ‘life’ generally is 
conceived, lived, made to conform, regulated and biopolitically governed within the Palestinian 
Bedouin community in Israel. It also comments on how different conceptions of ‘life’ circulate in 
Israel more generally. The second reason is that by appreciating the biopolitics of this space, we 
come to learn how life is made recognizable880 and how different forms of recognition manifest, 
which is a primary point of inquiry of this dissertation and our Polaris star around which we wish 
to draw conclusions.881  
 
                                                          
879 In a recent sample, it was found that 7.4% of Israeli babies are not vaccinated, the biggest reason being refusal on 
‘ideological’ grounds. Dan Even, "More Israeli parents refusing to vaccinate their babies according to state 
regulations", Ha'aretz (June 4, 2013), online: www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.527622  
880 Butler, Frames of War, supra note 93 
881 Therefore, while I look at recognition using the model of the Hegelian dialectic, my vantage point is Gilles 
Deleuze’s critique of Hegel, which is that the dialectic by itself is too identitarian and tends to see difference 
primarily as being dualistic. In Deleuze’s own words, “All these signs may be attributed to a generalized anti-
Hegelianism: difference and repetition have taken the place of the identical and the negative, of identity and 
contradiction. For difference implies the negative, and allows itself to lead to contradiction, only to the extent that its 
subordination to the identical is maintained. The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of 
representation. But modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and of the 
discovery of all the forces that act under the representation of the identical”. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Reptition (trans. Paul Patton) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) at ix.  
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Finally, the case is a rather telling example of ‘assemblage’, which is a coming together of disparate 
elements into a unity. In an assemblage, the relations between these heterogeneous elements are 
always changing, moving and becoming, so that through the affects and energies produced, 
connections and networks are both made and undone. Assemblage is a central element in Deleuze’s 
complexity theory. Complexity theory holds that in order to understand reality, we should not work 
on general abstraction and attempt to fit that to explain complex social situations or individuals. 
Rather, we ought to look at the complexity of relations at the level of the individual and understand 
the relational networks that make individuals to have a fuller understanding of what is the 
subject.882,883 
 
As this chapter will look at agency and recognition of the Naqab Bedouin subject as its principal 
objects of inquiry, so assemblage theory, one that draws in multiple, heterogeneous elements into a 
unified system to study the relations between the disparate elements, is particularly useful. By 
studying the issues of agency and recognition through the lens of the assemblage, we learn to 
appreciate how phenomena manifest in both the coming together of certain elements, affects and 
forces, and in the concurrent possibility of their undoing with affects and forces that 
deterritorialize. This is to say that if medicine can generally be thought of as a ‘good’ thing, as it 
helps us realize good ends, such as longevity and the reducing of human suffering and economic 
burdens, then how do the forces from that particular assemblage influence how actors in our 
assemblage, which is the legal case, react? Are they fully sovereign in making the choice of whether 
or not to vaccinate? Further, if medicine is seen as a good, from which we can assume that the 
community in general have trust in the medical establishment, then how are existing associations 
undermined in this ‘trust cluster’ (which is part of the larger Israeli health system-Palestinian 
Bedouin community network) when the decision is made not to vaccinate?  
 
Similarly, when looking at the state’s immunization practice among the Naqab Bedouin, it is crucial 
to contemplate the manner in which the state’s policies concerning demographic advantage of 
Israeli Jews in Israel/Palestine and nationalizing land square with the national health policy to 
promote health and well-being generally within its jurisdiction. Certainly, the state’s policy does not 
                                                          
882 For a helpful account of assemblage and complexity theory, see Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20   
883 Following a description of my visit to the field in Bir al-Mashash, I will outline the theoretical frameworks that 
will guide this chapter’s inquiries – assemblage theory and feminist theory. These will harness discussion of the 
concepts of affect, Foucauldian biopolitics and performativity as taken up, in particular, by Judith Butler. With these 
theoretical frames and concepts as signposts I will attempt to bring greater understanding to the issues of agency and 
recognition as they pertain to Naqab Bedouin.  
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follow the single trajectory of less Arabs, more Jews but rather is an outcome of affects, forces and 
energies from relational assemblage networks, be they concerned principally with health or 
security or land. In teasing out how Bedouin life is recognized, then, it is crucial to bear these 
influences in mind. Assemblage theory is also always vigilant to the manner in which existing 
associations are broken and undone to form reconfigured networks or completely novel ones. In 
doing so, it offers us hints of when agency, of fluctuating sovereignty, can have transformative 
potential.884  
 
Arriving in Beersheba 
Before expanding on assemblage theory and laying out the theoretical framework for the case 
study, I would like to elaborate on my meetings with a Bedouin woman activist , Huda and with four 
women from Bir al-Mashash, Umm ‘Ayed, Umm Faris, Umm Osama and Umm Mohammed from the 
Abu Skeik family. 
 
Huda and I agreed to meet on David Ben-Gurion street, named after Israel’s founder and first prime 
minister who had made state-centered development of the Naqab something of a personal credo.885 
The street stitched together the academic and medical centers of Beersheba, Ben-Gurion University 
and Soroka Medical Center. In somewhat uncustomary fashion, I arrived ten minutes before our 
appointment. After twenty minutes of thumb-twiddling and rearview-mirror-glancing, I receive a 
text message from Huda apologizing for the delay. She’s held up in a meeting with representatives 
from the Health Ministry with whom she is discussing how the government can support the work of 
the NGO. She asks if I could meet her outside that other Beersheba landmark, the District Court. 
 
Soon we were off to the health NGO she had assumed charge of only recently, Yasmin al-Naqab.886 
Located in the old city of Beersheba, Yasmin al-Naqab was given space within the offices of Itach-
Ma’aki – Women Lawyers for Social Justice. Itach-Ma’aki works under the general rubric of assisting 
socio-economically disadvantaged women, while in the Naqab it focuses mainly on the issues of 
assisting women attaining income support benefits, and dealing with polygamy and domestic 
                                                          
884 I will expound on assemblage theory in the theoretical discussion section that will follow.  
885 Ben-Gurion lived on and off in the Naqab, in Kibbutz Sde Boker, for twenty years until his death in 1973. He saw 
settlement and development of the Naqab as strategic objectives of the Zionist project and in that vein was 
personally invested in the same by setting up his permanent home there. See David Ben-Gurion, The Negev is Still 
Waiting (Tel Aviv: The Labour Party Archive, 1954) (Hebrew). It was his house Nuri and I came across whilst 
swirling and spitting on the wine route. See the previous chapter.  
886 See http://yasminnegev.org/en/  
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violence.887 We walked down the thin, gray-walled corridor to Huda’s office. It was quiet. Besides 
the two of us, there didn’t appear to be anyone working there that day.  
 
Huda and I spoke for about an hour and a half about the case and her impressions of the 
community’s approach to vaccinations and health more generally.888 Huda was in her twenties and 
incredibly astute. I’ve heard her been referred to as a poster child for women’s agency in the Naqab, 
often in reference to ‘women leaders in the Bedouin community’. While Huda may certainly be a 
leader, then again, there isn’t just a poster child of women’s agency or even a few, as everyone 
wields power in their own specific language and form. Yet, they do so in ways not entirely of their 
own making, but rather intimately and inextricably bound to their surroundings. I flag this point 
because of the tendency to identify social change as being located in specific, larger than life 
personalities,889 thereby rendering invisible the contributions of the everyday and everyone as 
being subject-effects of ‘change’.890 This framing also tends to render women in the community as 
overwhelmingly passive and awaiting emancipation through women leaders, who become the 
female equivalents to the sheikhs and mukhtars who were generally seen to be the go-betweens in 
relations between the colonial rulers and the native Palestinian community. I will pick up on this 
issue of agency in the Naqab later in the chapter when I discuss the meeting with the four residents 
of Bir al-Mashash.   
 
Huda met with the Health Ministry officials at their offices, located adjacent to the District Court, to 
explore governmental support for the NGO. She remarked to me how she “was very pleased” with 
the meeting. They discussed the possibility of the Ministry paying the salary of the health 
counselors that Yasmin al-Naqab had stationed in clinics in the community to promote greater 
health awareness among visitors. The Health Ministry also spoke of setting up an additional clinic in 
one of the villages.  
 
                                                          
887 See http://itach.org.il/?cat=11  
888 All references to our conversation refer to our interview on that day. Interview with Huda Abu al-Obayed, 
Director of Yasmin al-Naqab, Beersheba (July 17 2014). Interview on file with author.  
889 See, for example, discussion and public recognition of Amal Al-Sane’, who like Huda is also from the Bedouin 
development town of Laqiya and who is indeed a very prominent activist in the community and has contributed 
greatly to women’s issues among the Bedouin community at large. See The Arab-Jewish Center for Equality, 
Empowerment and Cooperation – Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development (AJEEC-NISPED), 
“Amal Elsana Alh’jooj” (undated), online: http://en.ajeec-nisped.org.il/our-staff-amal-elsana-alhjooj/  
890 I use ‘change’ in single-inverted commas because of the tendency to see these social transformations as distinct, 
temporally bound events as opposed to a process that is always becoming.   
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However, as soon as we had settled in the air-conditioned office, the very first issue she brought up 
with me was that of the vaccine against the human papilloma virus (the HPV vaccine). The HPV 
vaccine is intended to prevent cervical cancer and anogenital warts and was introduced in the 
2013-2014 academic year for some 52,000 eighth grade girls.891 The Health Ministry officials drove 
home to Huda that there were certain Bedouin families opposed to the vaccine. Huda explained to 
me that this was because cervical cancer was caused in part by sexual relations with multiple 
partners. “Because the Bedouin community is a very conservative community” she said, “there are 
families that think if the girl took the vaccine, she would allow herself to have sexual relations with 
many persons as there wouldn’t be any risks involved”. She clarified, “This is how the Health 
Ministry explained it and I think their reasoning is correct”. 892 Huda gave the example of the ninety 
percent turnout rate in the Bedouin community for the polio vaccine as evidence that the 
community was not averse to vaccines; hence, low support in the community for the HPV vaccine 
was attributable to their conservative mores around sex. This conservatism placed sexual propriety 
as having more value than the health of girls in the community. By framing the issue in this manner, 
Health Ministry officials, and Huda, were emphasizing how the Bedouin community’s conservatism 
and desire to control adolescent sexuality, in contrast to the standard-setting majority Israeli 
Jewish society against whom Bedouin were being measured, put their children’s lives in danger. 
What was not addressed was how conservatism around young women’s sexuality was not a 
‘Bedouin’ phenomenon, but also seen in the Orthodox community in Israel893, in Canada894 and the 
                                                          
891 Ministry of Health, “Vaccine against the Papilloma Virus” (October 9 2013), online: 
http://www.health.gov.il/English/News_and_Events/Spokespersons_Messages/Pages/09102013_1.aspx, Dan Even, 
“Health risks push ministry to reconsider HPV vaccine for teen girls”, Ha’aretz (September 3 2013), online: 
www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.545014  
892 I should clarify that sex with many partners does not cause the cancer. Rather, sexual contact allows for the 
human papilloma virus to be sexually transmitted from one person to another. Only a dozen or so strains of the 
virus, of which there are some one hundred in total, can trigger abnormal cell growth which can eventually lead to 
the development of the cancer. Also, it would be incorrect to assume that there wouldn’t be health risks involved if 
somebody took the HPV vaccine since taking the vaccine does not protect against unwanted pregnancies and the 
transmission of other sexually transmitted infections/diseases. See World Health Organization (WHO), “Human 
papillomavirus (HPV) and cervical cancer”, Fact Sheet No. 380 (November 2014), online: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs380/en/, National Health Service (NHS) Choices, “Cervical Cancer – 
causes” (June 17 2013), online: http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Cancer-of-the-cervix/Pages/Causes.aspx  
893 Ronny Linder-Ganz and Ido Efrati, “Cervical cancer vaccine for Israeli schoolgirls meets religious opposition”, 
Ha’aretz (October 30 2013), online: www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.555190  
894 Gina S. Ogilvie, Valencia P. Remple, Fawziah Marra, Shelly A. McNeil, Monika Naus, Karen L. Pielak, Thomas 
G. Ehlen, Simon R. Dobson, Deborah M. Money, David M. Patrick, “Parental intention to have daughters receive 
the human papillomavirus vaccine” (2007) 177 Canadian Medical Association Journal 1506–1512. 
224  
 
UK895. Huda’s take-home message, and that which she wanted me to leave with as well, was that the 
Bedouin community could be accused of being both regressive and irresponsible.   
 
Curiously, when discussing the polio vaccine, Huda mentioned how many (Israeli Jews) in Tel Aviv 
refused to take the polio vaccine because of doubts about its safety. The fact that the vast majority 
of the Bedouin community did take the vaccine was evidence to Huda that the community had not 
reached “the same level of awareness” as those in Tel Aviv. This reasoning seemed to me amiss. 
When the Bedouin community chooses overwhelmingly to take a vaccine, as happened with the 
polio vaccine in the summer of 2013, this is not evidence that they care for the health of their 
children, but rather that they were lacking in knowledge to refuse the vaccine. Once more, in 
relation to the Israeli Jewish population, Bedouin were positioned behind the curve.896  
 
I’m flagging the discussion on the HPV vaccine not to say that there are not reservations in the 
community regarding premarital sex, there may very well be.897 Rather, Huda’s interpretation of 
how the community approaches the issue of vaccination is indicative of an antecedent medical 
discourse around the Naqab Bedouin, and in particular around women in the community, which she 
herself performs.898  I will sketch a genealogy around vaccination and the medical establishment’s 
dealings with the Naqab Bedouin to illustrate this antecedent discourse, after I discuss the legal 
case.  
 
                                                          
895 Alice Forster, Jane Wardle, Judith Stephenson & Jo Waller, “Passport to promiscuity or lifesaver: press coverage 
of HPV vaccination and risky sexual behavior” (2010) 15 Journal of Health Communication: International 
Perspectives 205-17 at 206. 
896 It should be noted that the ninety percent turnout in the Bedouin community owed to the fact that the virus was 
detected in the population on a few occasions, including in the development towns of Rahat and Tel Sheva (Tel al-
Sab’a) and a massive government-initiated public relations campaign. See Asher Zeiger, “Health Ministry to 
immunize children against polio” The Times of Israel (June 18, 2013), online: http://www.timesofisrael.com/health-
ministry-to-immunize-all-children-against-polio/. There is a complex interplay of factors that influence the decision 
to immunize one’s child, see for example, Astrid Austvoll-Dahlgren & Sølvi Helseth, “What informs parents’ 
decision-making about childhood vaccinations?” (2010) 66 (11) Journal of Advanced Nursing 2421–2430. 
897 See for example Lila Abu-Lughod on Bedouin in Egypt, Lila Abu-Lughod, “A Community of Secrets: The 
Separate World of Bedouin Women” (1985) 10(4) Signs 637-657 
898 On Huda’s interpretation, Hanna Herzog has referred to this as the tendency of some Palestinian women to 
implicitly adopt racist Israeli discourse (of Bedouin as regressive and always in need of catching up to Israelis), even 
though the one reproducing the language is the one being racialized. See Hanna Herzog, "’Both an Arab and a 
woman’: Gendered, racialised experiences of female Palestinian citizens of Israel” (2004) 10(1) Social Identities 53-
82 at 61. Of course, I wouldn’t pigeonhole Huda, for although she reiterates certain aspects of the officials’ claims, 
she does so for multifarious reasons and not simply owing to naiveté. She assumes the positions of the officials as 
they negotiate support for the Yasmin al-Naqab NGO and it is in the interest of good business to find common 
ground. Also, as she has can attest to the marginalization of women in the family, it makes sense for her to establish 
common ground on that issue. 
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We then spoke of other health challenges in the community. Huda remarked how anaemia was a 
particular challenge for women. Nearly half of all adult women in the community suffered from 
anaemia.899 This placed it on par with anaemia morbidity rates of pregnant women in South East 
Asia, where anaemia is considered a severe public health problem.900 Huda attributed a poor diet, 
specifically one with inadequate consumption of meat (which provides an iron source that is more 
easily absorbed), to the exceptionally high prevalence of anaemia among women in the 
community.901  
 
As she stated, “It is always the case, always, that the meat goes to the men. Women eat less meat. 
This is usually why there is a lack of iron in women’s bodies… and this affects children when one is 
pregnant. If I have anaemia, the child would likely be born with it. But nobody speaks about the 
issue”. Exasperated, she resolved that she would need to “run a social media campaign” in response. 
Huda had both the statistical and empirical evidence to show that the majority of women in the 
community suffer from anaemia. But more than that, she was also able to scrutinize why that was 
the case, and she does so by interlocking health and gender issues. Therefore, it wasn’t just the 
scarcity of meat in the community that caused iron deficiency, but also the fact that when meat is 
available, unwritten (and unspoken, as she affirms) patriarchal codes presume that it goes to the 
men because “they work outside the home… and because they’re men”.  
 
And yet Huda saw further. She pointed out intersections with race as well, and how racism 
contributes to poor health. One reason why the community does not vaccinate, even though they 
are largely pro-immunization, is the issue of access. She pointed out that the lack of mother-child 
health clinics in the Bedouin communities in the Naqab, and a public transport system that grossly 
underserves the community, has meant that for a community largely living in poverty, hiring a 
private taxi to take them to the clinic is simply unfeasible. Although Huda did not take a position of 
pro/anti-immunization, she did wish that the community were more knowledgeable about the 
drawbacks of vaccinations like Tel Avivians were. However, she understood that one of the reasons 
                                                          
899 Nora Gottlieb, Ilana Belmaker, Natalya Bilenko and Nadav Davidovitch, “Bedouin-Arab women’s access to 
antenatal care at the interface of physical and structural barriers: A pilot study” (2011) 6(6) Global Public Health 
643-656 at 644 [Gottlieb et. al., “Bedouin antenatal access”] 
900 Bruno de Benoist, Erin McLean, Ines Egli, Mary Cogswell (eds.), “Worldwide prevalence of anaemia 1993-
2005” WHO Global Database on Anaemia (Geneva, World Health Organization: 2008), online: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241596657_eng.pdf?ua=1  
901 A poor diet is one cause for the condition, where there is insufficient intake of iron or Vitamin B12 or folic acid. 
Other reasons include malabsorption, inherited or autoimmune disorders and pregnancy.   
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they did not have that knowledge was owing to the lack of a stable electricity supply that would 
allow for unfettered television and internet access, and that this was a result of a government policy 
to deliberately refuse to connect those in the unrecognized villages to the national electricity 
network.  
 
In our brief, but revealing, two-hour tête-à-tête, Huda very eloquently described to me how poor 
health in the community and irregular participation in the national immunization programme were 
not simply due to conservative mores, irresponsibility or just not caring enough.902 Rather, these 
were outcomes precipitated by a plethora of effects, racial, gendered, economic and other. Of 
course, considering solely the immunization programme, without the issue of community 
participation in it, we can appreciate how the programme is similarly influenced by these and other 
factors, including that linked to nation building, and the biopolitical and eugenic ideas embedded in 
the medical profession as I will describe later in this chapter.  
 
On to Bir al-Mashash 
Our parking meter was still running when we jumped into the car. We were eager to get to the field. 
Bir al-Mashash was one of the more southern-lying unrecognized villages, off Road 25 and just east 
of moshav Nevatim.903 Umm Faris, one of the interviewees, would later explain how ‘near Nevatim’ 
was one of the twenty-odd answers she had for the ambulance when they asked for directions to 
her unrecognized village.  
 
We headed south on Road 25, in the direction of Dimona, the city that is home to Israel’s nuclear 
reactor.904 Huda signals for me to get off the highway and onto the snaky sand-path that leads to the 
village. In the shadow of dust clouds, we exit the vehicle and as the air clears, barefoot, wide-eyed 
kids appear to us, scuttling across the brown sand and in our direction. It is slightly cooler than the 
                                                          
902 As has been argued by the Bedouin Development Authority, for example. See Bedouin Development Authority, 
‘Project of Regulating the Settlement of Bedouin in the Negev’, Promotional Video (undated), video on file with 
author. The Israel Lands Authority (ILA) established the Bedouin Development Authority (BDA) to reach 
agreements regarding land ownership claims, though since that time the BDA's authority has extended to the 
provision of services to the Bedouin in the unrecognized villages and in encouraging their relocation from the 
unrecognized villages into the development towns. State of Israel, State Comptroller's Report 52B (2002) at 102-
103, cited in Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), No Man's Land: Health in the Unrecognized Villages of the 
Negev (2003) at 12-13. 
903 Nevatim was setup by the Jewish Agency in 1946 as part of the ’eleven spots’ settlement plan meant to prompt 
the allocation of the Naqab to the future Israeli state. See Ruth Kark, “Jewish Frontier Settlement in The Negev, 
1880-1948: Perception and Realization” (1981) 17:3 Middle Eastern Studies 334-356 at 350-353. 
904 Frank Barnaby, “The Nuclear Arsenal in the Middle East” (1987) 17:1 Journal of Palestine Studies 97-106 
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past few days, but still warm and dry. And characteristic to the vast open spaces of the Naqab, 
sandwashed winds snap us to attention.  
 
Stranger in these parts 
A boy, about eight, is the first to greet us. His face is wind-beaten and his eyes penetrating. What did 
we want? they seemed to ask. I exchange pleasantries in the most unthreatening body gestures I 
know.  
 
We begin talking about what is on most people’s lips these days, the attack on Gaza. He tells us how 
he frequently sees rockets in the sky and how the earth shudders when they drop out of view. He 
smiles. With delight he boasts how he and the other kids climb on top of their tin shack roofs to 
cheer the underdogs who blast their home-made bottle rockets905 into space. In his mind’s eye, the 
fireworks in the sky are part of a rather neatly laid out game of good guys versus bad guys.906  
 
Huda and I then approach the common meeting space of the family we are here to visit. It is 
spacious, tiled and is being made to sparkle by Umm Faris who vigorously splashes and scrubs. It is 
unfurnished except for the odd dark-brown plastic chair. Umm Faris gestures for me to sit on one as 
she goes about her work. She seems pleased to have a guest in Bir al-Mashash but there is unrest in 
her mop’s sweep and swirl. We eventually move to the roofed portion of the meeting room, Huda, 
the four women and me, together with about half a dozen kids. We occupy the lower quarter of the 
room with a plastic table and some more plastic chairs. The kids are quite happy to rest on the floor 
or across their mothers’ laps. In the background, the whistling wind slams the wooden windows 
open and shut to a tune. I’m happy to be here because I feel something serene in our midst. This 
must seem absurd, given that the ground under my feet intermittently shudders from fallen rockets 
and the stories we hear are overwhelmingly those of struggle. Yet, the stories of struggle are also 
stories of victories over struggle told in a communal setting of exchange, deliberation and support, 
so that they are also stories of the modalities of outdoing and overcoming, narrative assurances of 
community agency in the face of war’s leftovers or those of discriminatory health care policy.  
                                                          
905 For more on the characterization of Palestinian rockets as ‘bottle rockets’, see Mark Perry , "Gaza's Bottle 
Rockets", Foreign Affairs (August 3, 2014), online: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141698/mark-
perry/gazas-bottle-rockets 
906 In this sense, I suppose the line he takes is not that different from that of the Israeli government’s. See Gideon 
Levy, “Opinion: Why Israel is its own worst enemy” CNN (August 8, 2014), online: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/israel-own-worst-enemy-levy/ , Chris Hedges, “Why Israel Lies” 





We begin our conversation by addressing those things that most interviews in the Naqab address 
first, the inadequate infrastructure in the villages. Thereafter, the women draw links with the forces 
of patriarchy and their experiences with education, medicine and vaccination. Picking up on where 
the conversation with the children left off, we broached the war, its economics, the possible 
alienation of its fighter pilots and how anxiety tags itself to the skin of those who pore over its 
images on the telly.  
 
“Our life here is like those in the third world… it is hard, they don’t even recognize our presence, we 
don’t have rights, for example to build like regular people, most of us don’t have water or 
electricity” began Umm Mohammed. Umm Osama interrupted, “We ourselves make ourselves; it’s 
not that the government helps us, except very recently on the issue of water provision”.  
 
All the women chipped in to explain that their homes are everyday threatened with demolition. “We 
lay stone on stone, month after month, for two to three months and in a moment they destroy it all”. 
Moreover, they explained that the youth are getting fed up; the demolitions and the threat of them 
imbue their wishes for the future, including their marriage plans, with a permanent uncertainty. 
 
The women reveal that it isn’t easy to sleep in Bir al-Mashash. The fact that there is no garbage 
collection means that oftentimes neighbours burn their trash so that the intoxicating fumes of 
burning plastic make it hard to breathe. However, they tell me that a particular health hazard is that 
when they need medical attention it is hard to come by. There are no paved roads leading to the 
community, the ambulances cannot locate them because they’re not on official maps and none of 
them have access to private cars. So, the route they are often forced to take is the fifteen-minute 
walk to the highway.  
 
As there are few work opportunities for the women, they receive insurance benefits from the 
government’s National Insurance Institute, both for being unemployed and as support for their 
children, which are their only sources of income.907 Despite this governmental support, they sit 
                                                          
907 Welfare payments for mother and child are most often the only sources of income for women in the unrecognized 
villages, see Physicians for Human Rights, “I am Here: Gender and the Right to Health in the Unrecognized 
Villages of the Negev” (April 2008) at 17-18.  
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firmly in poverty. Because of slim work opportunities and patterns of historical labour movement, 
their husbands, along with a hundred or so others from the village, live and work in Kfar Qasim, a 
village in the ‘southern triangle region’ of Israel, east of Tel Aviv, where a significant Palestinian 
population is concentrated.  
 
Discrimination in healthcare? 
Huda then attempted to steer the conversation to health care and vaccinations. So, I asked a 
pinpointed question, did they feel discriminated against when they accessed medical services?908 
The women told me that they did not experience explicit discrimination when accessing health care. 
However, Umm Osama did flag that around fifteen years ago, while receiving medical attention at 
one of the four health service providers in Israel, Maccabi, she felt that a doctor she was seeing was 
explicitly racist against her; she promptly replaced the doctor with another. Umm Osama made 
clear, however, that experiencing racism in health care was a rare phenomenon.  
 
She elaborated on the quality of service she received at the Maccabi clinic located in the city center, 
“When I used to go to Maccabi it was very comfortable, much more comfortable than the ‘Abu 
Rube’ia clinic’. For one thing, we used to start on time”. The Abu Rube’ia clinic is a private clinic run 
by a Bedouin doctor of the same name. She would visit either the Abu Rube’ia clinic or the Maccabi 
clinic located in Beersheba. However, she had recently been redirected from the Beersheba Maccabi 
clinic to the new Maccabi clinic in Neve Ze’ev, a middle class Jewish neighbourhood in southwest 
Beersheba. Reflecting on her experience at the three clinics, she remarked how the Neve Ze’ev 
Maccabi clinic was harder to get to because she had to switch buses to get there and the trip ended 
up costing her more. She also described the discomfort she felt in being marked as an outsider as a 
Palestinian Bedouin woman in a middle class Jewish neighbourhood.909  
 
                                                          
908 Na’amah Razon has shown how racism is routinely experienced by Bedouin families accessing health care, 
though this has been vehemently denied by health services providers. See “Learned Blindness: Transforming 
Bedouins into standardized patients. Examining health and politics in southern Israel” (2015) 45(2) Ethnologie 
Française 269-280. 
909 I would like to footnote the phenomenology of this discomfort Umm Osama feels. Fanon has referred to a 
historico-racial schema to describe the phenomenological process by which the body and the world are in constant 
conversation of making/unmaking one another. In a colonial context, where race is a dominant signifier, the self-
image of the black/brown body becomes deficient owing to myths and anecdotes that circulate in colonial society 
and prompt negrophobia. This deficient self-image also contributes to the coloured body not being fully sovereign in 
shaping the world according to this dialectical schema. See Jeremy Weate, “Fanon, Merleau-Ponty and the 
Difference of Phenomenology” in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), Frantz Fanon, Black 
Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967) 89-119. 
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Unlike Maccabi’s Neve Ze’ev branch, the Abu Rube’ia clinic was located close to the Bedouin 
community market in Beersheba, making it very accessible and familiar. However, Umm Osama 
recalled that the service was rather awful as the appointments never ran on time, forcing her to 
wait hours for hers. This clinic was also always overcrowded. These aspects of the clinic were in 
stark contrast to those at Maccabi. In her mind, it was the clientele to blame, “Abu Rube’ia tries to 
be organized. But Bedouin women are non-committal. They don’t commit to appointments, it’s 
hard, that’s how it is. They say they have work, they just lack commitment… that’s why the situation 
doesn’t change”.910  
 
On vaccinations 
We then move on to the subject of vaccinations. When I asked if they vaccinated their children, the 
women tell me that they regularly vaccinate their children. However, during the discussion, it 
became apparent that on a few occasions vaccinations were either not given or were not given as 
per the vaccination schedule because of access difficulties.  
 
In line with the arguments raised by the petitioners in the case, taking vaccinations was fraught 
with complications. It was not that the women were opposed to taking vaccinations. Rather, 
although they wished to be able to take the stipulated vaccinations, they simply did not have 
adequate access to them.  
 
Umm Osama characterized the process of taking vaccinations as requiring “effort, fatigue and time”. 
Bir al-Mashash, like the majority of unrecognized villages, does not have mother child clinics where 
the vaccines are administered. Therefore, the women travel to a mother-child clinic in the city of 
Beersheba, which costs them 30 shekels (approximately US$ 8) a trip. Umm Osama admits that this 
is no small change for the family and that the same amount would be well spent equipping the 
family home with necessary provisions. To further drive home her point, she then pointed to Umm 
Faris and asked me to imagine her son needing to visit a clinic. If Umm Faris took her son to a clinic, 
                                                          
910 As Shiloh Whitney explains, the affective implications of internalizing racist hatred are that the racialized person 
redeploys it towards other objects of the racialized community which makes her less able of genuine communication 
with them. Shiloh Whitney, “The Affective Forces Of Racialization: Affects And Body Schemas In Fanon And 
Lorde” (2015) 3:1 Knowledge Cultures 45-64. Instances of the same may not be explicit but can be sensed, for 
example, when Umm Osama performs the order/disorder divide when discussing Bedouin in an Israeli context. She 
refers to Bedouin women as unassailably non-committal while the Israeli medical establishment, in this case health 
service provider, Maccabi, is naturally organized. ‘Atwa’s son in the Umm al-Hiran chapter also similarly ascribed 
negative qualities as being a mark of ‘the Arab’. 
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what would she do with her other children? She has thirteen children in total911 and there would 
simply be no place to put the others. There are no day-care centers or kindergartens and Umm Faris 
cannot imagine leaving the care of her kids to chance. She still reels from when, two decades ago, 
her crawling eleven-month-old spilt boiling water on himself as she cooked on the living room 
floor.912  
 
In order to prompt the women’s feedback for the amendment, I mentioned how it threatened to cut 
child allowance payments, without parenthesizing that the Health Ministry had decided not to 
implement it at present (though I clarified this later). I almost immediately regretted phrasing my 
question the way I did. The women were exasperated. Umm Mohammed interjected, “This 
government seeks, by any price, to cut child allowance. It wants to cut allowances for those who do 
not vaccinate? This is completely unfair. This is a big injustice, it is completely illegitimate. They 
seek any way to make our lives harder, what do they want from us? People seek to make a living, to 
have a future, they fall sick when they don’t vaccinate and on top of it all, they want to cut insurance 
payments… this is criminal! What more do they want from us? Aren’t they ashamed to act this way 
when they say that [vaccinations] are important and so should be made accessible?” 
 
Umm Osama added, “All the women here vaccinate, even the extremely poor ones. If they want us 
to vaccinate, then they should come and administer the vaccinations. Do they want to kill a woman 
from hunger because of vaccinations?” “They want us off this land at any price… and they are 




And yet, it seemed that the state was not teaching their children enough. There was a substandard 
kindergarten and primary school and no secondary school. Some of the younger children and most 
high schoolers traveled to the neighbouring recognized development township of ‘Ara ‘Ara to study. 
As ‘Ara ‘Ara was twelve kilometers away, or a two and a half hour walk, the children required 
vehicular access to get there. In the past they were transported by bus for free as the bill was footed 
                                                          
911 Though three of the thirteen were mature and did not require parental supervision. 
912 For Umm Faris, the event was traumatic not only because her baby son was scalded and left with first to third 
degree burns. Owing to the transportation difficulties mentioned earlier, it seemed to her like forever carrying her 
baby to the main road in order to secure a ride to the hospital. Moreover, after the ordeal, she was brought in for an 
investigation by the authorities on suspicion of neglect and child abuse. 
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by a non-governmental organization. However, this wasn’t the case any longer. These days, they 
were being asked to pay 150 shekels per child for private transport, which was no small change. As 
Umm Osama asked rhetorically, “If somebody has three kids, what is she to do?” 
 
Moreover, the buses that transported the children were significantly substandard. The women told 
me that only a month earlier a bus’ rear caught fire while transporting the children. Luckily, 
motorists stopped to save the children. The women told me that it was not the first time this 
happened. 
 
The nearest kindergarten, besides the village’s, was one recently setup in the recognized village of 
Abu Tlul, some six kilometers from the village. However, transport to the kindergarten had not been 
organized and registration costs 34 shekels per child. As Umm Faris told me, “This year we hope 
that somebody brings us a teacher for the children for the local kindergarten. A representative from 
the Education Ministry saw it, liked it, but they haven’t brought us a teacher. Bring us a teacher or 
bring us a few educational materials and let the local women teach the kids”. 
 
In fact, an earlier version of the amendment stipulated that the child allowance would be cut if a 
child did not regularly attend an educational institution, though this condition was later dropped in 
later versions of the bill.913 
 
Vaccination refusal in Tel Aviv 
I then asked what they thought about parents in Tel Aviv who had access to vaccinations but 
refused to give them to their children. They didn’t seem to have heard about the phenomenon 
before. I explained that some parents had concerns about the aluminum content in vaccinations and 
had raised other health related concerns. Umm Osama replied, “The Israelis aren’t aware of what 
they’re doing. I had to deal with chickenpox for one of my kids. It’s highly contagious and it’s bad 
because it can lead to permanent scars. This vaccination is very good, and if the Israelis don’t know 
this [it’s strange] because they know more than us”.  She wasn’t opposed to vaccinations even 
though two of her sons had severely negative reactions to one; one of her sons was rushed to the 
hospital for treatment. She rationalized continuing with the vaccination schedule for her children 
by emphasizing the trust she nevertheless had in the medical establishment, “They run tons of tests 
before they (vaccinations) are approved, so I trust them”. 
                                                          





The falling rocket 
As the earth intermittently recoiled from the impact of falling rockets, the war was never far away 
during our conversation. Every now and then we drifted towards it but somehow steered ourselves 
back on course. Eventually, we could no longer stick to the interview’s schedule, but were drawn in 
to speaking just about the war.  
 
“Tell me what the meaning is that they destroy our homes, us Arabs, but Jews no. Look now, for 
example, in Gaza, look at how they destroy their homes… why is it that when a home or two of an 
Israeli Jew is destroyed, they turn the world upside down? Look at how many homes they’ve 
destroyed [in Gaza]. Honestly, we are going crazy over it. Aren’t our daughters like theirs? The 
Israelis are killing children and women, I’ve become depressed over it… and I don’t [just] imagine 
them, I imagine our kids, our lives”, admitted Umm Faris. She was referring to the palpable fear she 
had for the lives of her loved ones’ lives following the injury of the two girls from the nearby 
unrecognized village of Mkeiman and the death of ‘Auda al-Wadj from Qasr al-Sir.  
 
“They are like us. Gazans and us, we’re the same”, clarified Umm Mohammed. 
 
Umm Faris continued, “If a couple or so rockets hit now, won’t we need to be buried? This is what 
I’ve been feeling the past two, three weeks, by God, I’m depressed, all of the women here are 
depressed”. Umm Osama echoed Umm Faris’ concern that depression in the community was 
pervasive, “If you were to do research on the women, you’d see that most of them are depressed. 
What are they to do? They feel they’re at a dead-end”. Some of the children among us nodded 
vigorously in agreement.  
 
Umm Faris continued, “There’s nothing to do except eat and trust in God…. Don’t they tell us to take 




It also seemed absurd to the women that so many millions of dollars were being spent daily on the 
war, which clearly brought considerable pain and suffering, when the same money could have been 
used to ease the already present suffering of the poor.914  
 
Before I move on to a discussion of the case itself, I’d like to lay out the theoretical frameworks 




Assemblage, as mentioned briefly above, is a coming together of disparate elements into a unity.  
 
One may think of the phenomenon of identity in the space of our study as being either Palestinian 
or Israeli, the attitude towards vaccinations as being either for or against, or in the case of the 
Hegelian dialectic, as there being a duel between the consciousness of the slave versus that of the 
master; that is, one may assume that such phenomena are essentially dualistic.  
 
Yet, assemblage theory stresses anti-dualism as explained by Deleuze himself, as it attempts to “find 
between the terms. . .whether they are two or more, a narrow gorge like a border or a frontier 
which will turn the set into a multiplicity, independently of the number of parts”.915  
 
We can consider identity as being an assemblage when we appreciate how the women in Bir al-
Mashash assume an identity that is at times Bedouin, at times Palestinian, and at times Israeli, the 
latter particularly when thinking about access to certain privileges of citizenship. Yet, concurrently, 
the women understand identity and perform it even as identity is not connected to an ethno-
national characteristic.  
 
On numerous occasions during our conversation, they stressed an identity as women, as working-
class poor, as mothers, as Muslims and so forth.  
                                                          
914 The estimates for the cost of the war were around US$60 million per day. Some officials shared the concerns of 
the women, saying that the inflated defense budget would mean “deep, painful cuts in education, health care, welfare 
and infrastructure” in 2015. Moti Bassok, “The cost of Israel’s Gaza op: $60 million a day” Ha’aretz (August 22 
2014), online: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.611930  
915Gilles Deleuze, Dialogues with Clare Parnet (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) (London: Athlone 
Press, 1987) at 132, cited in Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 




Similarly, on the issue of vaccinations, mothers are generally pro-vaccination, though they often do 
not take vaccinations for themselves or their children because they lack adequate access to them. 
So, while they insist that they’ve all followed the vaccination schedule for their children, they also 
admit that access issues have made it difficult to fully satisfy the requirements of the schedule. 
They’ve had negative reactions among some children to vaccinations, yet they remain adamant 
about continuing to give them. However, most of the women I interviewed did not administer the 
influenza vaccine “because no one insisted on it”, unlike when the Health Ministry was urging 
families to administer the polio vaccine to their children.  
 
As shown, it can hardly be said that somebody in Bir al-Mashash is pro- or anti-vaccination, and 
even if we do, that does not tell us much, such as if they’ve actually followed the schedule for their 
children or if we can predict with absolute certainty future behaviour relating to vaccinations. This 
is the “narrow gorge” between a binary that Deleuze speaks about that opens itself to a multiplicity 
of actions, effects and potentialities. Anti-dualism, then, is one of the starting points to 
understanding assemblage theory and is quite essential as we interpret phenomena, subjects and 
effects both in this vaccination case, and as we take stock of this study’s findings as a whole.  
 
As mentioned earlier, assemblage theory stresses ontology, the metaphysics of being, over 
anthropocentric, subjective experience. That is to say, phenomena under study should not be made 
to fit abstract generalizations of reality as we know them through experience, rather the complexity 
of relational networks should be studied in order to understand phenomena.  
 
Deleuze’s philosophical approach is known as ‘transcendental empiricism’,916 which is to say that 
real conscious awareness is the starting point to philosophy, without assuming pre-existing 
categories or axioms. At the same time, this empiricism is transcendental because it attempts to 
“deduce the conditions of possibility of conscious experience”.917 It acknowledges that the 
                                                          
916 Transcendental empiricism goes beyond both empiricism, as espoused by Hume and transcendentalism, for 
example as argued for by Kant and Emerson. Empiricism holds that ‘experience’ is restricted to one’s sensory 
perception. Transcendentalism holds that our forms of sensibility exist prior to knowledge itself and it is these 
transcendental forms that make experience possible. Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) at 288-9. 




preconditions of experience cannot be known by the senses but need to be deduced 
transcendentally.918  
 
In such an accounting, there isn’t really a Kantian subject as a precondition for all human 
experience; rather, ‘I’, as with any individuated phenomenon, is a product of the contingent effects 
of interactions among events, social forces, chance, memory and affect.  
 
Such a philosophy also moves us away from finding likeness among human beings, to celebrating 
diversity, contingency and difference in each person.919 
 
In Deleuze’s model of reality, there are three realms, the actual, the virtual and the intensive 
process of individuation that are necessary to construct an ontology. The actual is a stable, 
identifiable system, such as power, desire, a state of affair, an individual, a community and is the 
point at which representation becomes possible. The actual is an open-ended system, meaning 
various materials flow through it, though equilibrium points, or ‘attractors’, keep the system in a 
state of equilibrium.920  
 
The virtual refers to events and singularities on a plane of consistency that are immanent to a 
situation, that have the potential to bring about actualization, though are not the actual itself.921 The 
intensive process of individuation consist of ‘far from equilibrium’ processes that embody the 
virtual structure and make the passage from virtual to actual possible.922  
 
Deleuze argues that there is no hierarchy among the realms, that they are all in a concrete mixture 
with one another and that they are all real.923 In the process of individuation, when the actual is 
                                                          
918 Transcendental here means immanent conditions that make a thing possible.   
919 Supra note 917 
920 Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20 at 38-9.  
921 Supra note 917 at 300, Ibid. at 47. 
922 Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20 at 38.  
923 Ibid. For Deleuze, the ‘real’ could be characterized as all of the actual and all of the virtual, thereby to be 
distinguished from a Lacanian definition of the real, which posits the real as distinct from the symbolic and the 
imaginary, and also elusive to representation. For Deleuze, the ‘real’ is the essence of being, including its virtual, 
imagined and emotive expressions. For more on Lacan’s tripartite register theory of the imaginary, the symbolic and 
the real, see, for example, Philippe Julien, Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud: The Real, the Symbolic, and the 
Imaginary (trans. Devra Beck Simiu) (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 
237  
 
realized, continuous multiplicities become discrete.924 Yet, by utilizing the process of individuation, 
we come to appreciate how individuals or individuated identities are not solely their 
representations but a product of processes that produce, sustain and undo them.925  
 
Why is assemblage theory useful for this case study and the dissertation as a whole? This is because 
as we approach a conclusion of sorts, attempting to aggregate our conclusions in Nuri’s land 
ownership case, the crop-spraying case, the Umm al-Hieran evictions, the discriminatory allocation 
of land in the Wine Path Plan case and this vaccinations case, assemblage theory allows us to draw 
in heterogeneous elements into a unity.  
 
How? Take this case study on vaccinations. We study the issue of ‘vaccinations in the Naqab’ as an 
assemblage by drawing in its various identifiable components, health policy in Israel, state-
community relations in the Naqab, scepticism towards vaccinations, poverty, racialization and the 
like. Yet, what is interesting about the assemblage is not just the appreciation of how these discrete 
states of affairs come together to constitute the assemblage of ‘vaccinations in the Naqab’, but how 
these discrete multiplicities themselves come to be more or less stable systems through the 
processes of individuation described above.  
 
Similarly, what sort of actual, stable system can we identify for ‘recognition’ and ‘agency’ as we 
reflect on the dissertation as a whole?  
 
Assemblage theory attunes us to the processes by which ‘things’ come to be labelled as relatively 
stable things, so that in understanding phenomena we do not study the end result, but deduce the 
conditions of possibility that get us there. While an assemblage comes about through 
homogenization and the stability of its boundaries, also known as territorialization, it is the 
immanent possibility of being undone that is particularly interesting.  
 
Deterritorialization is how homogenous states of affairs unravel into more heterogeneous elements 
and the materiality of a particular phenomenon is undone. The process by which it occurs is 
referred to as a line of flight, which is a “fleeing… flowing, leaking, disappearing into the 
                                                          
924 Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) at 
132. 
925 Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20 at 28. 
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distance”.926 It is the creative potential of the assemblage and can result in either the transition to a 
new stable state in the actual or a return to the virtual to create new patterns of organization.927  
 
Assemblage theory allows us to identify the lines of flight that fracture the ‘vaccinations in the 
Naqab’ assemblage by looking at the ways in which the women’s agency, as selectively sovereign as 
it may be, is one particular modality by which the assemblage threatens to be reconstituted or 
absolutely undone.  
 
It is the manner in which the women perceive, enunciate, decide and perform that contains the 
revolutionary potential to rewrite social organization by undermining the existing associations in 
this particular assemblage.  
 
As this chapter looks closely at the women’s agency, it allows us to appreciate not only the tangible, 
material ways in which agency manifests but also the more subtle, immanent potentials for the 
same to come about.  
 
Assemblage theory also allows us to appreciate the expressive elements, including language, that 
make individuals and institutions.  
 
Therefore, part of how territorialization comes about is by the process of ‘coding’, whereby there 
are regimes of existing found in talking, working and relating to one another that are more or less 
fixed. These can be found in bureaucracy, the family and popular culture. Processes of decoding, 
such as “informal conversations between friends”928 is how the language specific to a particular 
institution may be destabilized when they undermine traditional social categorization, precipitating 
the deterritorialization spoken about above.929  
 
                                                          
926 Brian Massumi, ‘Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements’ in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (trans. Brian Massumi) (Minneapolis, London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987) at xvi 
927 Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) at 69-
72. 
928 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (New York: 
Continuum Books, 2006) at 16, cited in Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20 at 65. 
929 Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) at 40-
1, Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, supra note 20 at 64-5. 
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How did the conversations that we held on that warry summer morn undermine the traditional 
social categorizations in the assemblage? How did such decoding open up creative potentials to 
fracture the assemblage and bring about new ways of being?  
 
There are two particular interventions that fall under the rubric of assemblage theory that are 
relevant to mention as they bear on our case; the first is Jasbir Puar’s exploration of 
homonationalism in Israel/Palestine as assemblage930 and the second is Elizabeth Povinelli on 
‘social projects’ and the liminality931 intrinsic to them.932 
 
Puar identifies homonationalism as a form of modern nation-state building as it attempts to 
evaluate the legitimacy of a state’s sovereignty based on how it treats its gay and lesbian subjects.933 
There are at least three particular elements of her analysis of homonationalism that are of import to 
our own study.  
 
First, homonationalism as assemblage acknowledges the phenomenon as one that is of process, of 
becoming as opposed to a phenomenon that is fixed and unchanging. In Puar’s words, 
homonationalism, which names a historical shift in the making of nation-states that increasingly 
insist on homonormativity from earlier heteronormative stances is “an assemblage of de- and re-
territorialising forces, affects, energies, and movements… a field of power rather than an activity or 
property of any one nation-state, organisation, or individual”.934 It is the coming together of, among 
a plethora of factors, political economy, the history of settler-colonial violence and the LGBT 
tourism and human rights industries.935 In this way, it is an assemblage in much the same way that 
vaccinations in the Naqab are linked to the medicalization of society, the state’s township-transfer 
                                                          
930 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University Press, 2007), Jasbir 
K. Puar, “Homonationalism as Assemblage” (2013) 4:2 Jindal Global Law Review 23-43 
931 Liminality here refers to the condition located at the threshold between two actual states that is the disruptive 
potential intrinsic to social transformation. It is “the noise that a social formation produces” that escapes 
identification. Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, Silvia Posocco & Elizabeth Povinelli, “Obligation, Social Projects 
and Queer Politics” (2013) 15:4 International Feminist Journal of Politics at 556. Povinelli draws on earlier work 
on the liminal by Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1969). 
932 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, Silvia Posocco & Elizabeth Povinelli, 
“Obligation, Social Projects and Queer Politics” (2013) 15:4 International Feminist Journal of Politics, 554-564.  
933 The concept is taken up at length in Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times 
(Duke University Press, 2007). 
934 Jasbir K. Puar, “Homonationalism as Assemblage” (2013) 4:2 Jindal Global Law Review at 25. 
935 Ibid. at 34. 
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policy, settler-colonial genealogy, the anti-vaccination movement and a host of other factors that we 
can come to know by transcendental empiricism. Neither phenomenon is authored solely by the 
Israeli state.  
 
Second, homonationalism makes the nation-state by defining those subjects who are permitted 
envelopment in its fold and those left outside. Puar discusses this aspect in relation to 
Israel/Palestine whereby liberal gay rights936 activists and their supporters are afforded the 
privilege of being included in the Israeli nation state.937 These activists, and by their enfolding,938 
also the state, are juxtaposed to the naturally homophobic Palestinian population (except for those 
Palestinian individuals who subscribe to the liberal gay rights formula) and the gay-rights-violating 
Palestinian state. This particular construct allows for Israel to present itself as a bastion of 
democracy and tolerance in the midst of virulently homophobic neighbours.939 Moreover, it 
‘pinkwashes’, which is to say that it justifies the Israeli occupation of Palestine according to the logic 
that progressive, democratic configurations vis-à-vis gay rights have the right to rule over 
regressive, less democratic ones. Homonationalism not only makes the modern Israeli nation state, 
it also defines ‘subjects’ and ‘outsiders’ and justifies state practices, irrespective of whether those 
practices have been critiqued for being undemocratic.940  
 
In a similar vein, on the issue of vaccinations among the Bedouin in the Naqab, the court and 
government representatives consistently muster the issue of non-administration of vaccinations 
among the Bedouin community to designate those who belong to the nation-state and those who 
don’t with regards to their sense of duty to the nation’s subjects. In doing so, the Bedouin find 
                                                          
936 Jasbir Puar identifies the liberal gay rights movement as one that “produce narratives of progress and modernity 
that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the 
partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations.” It is one that tends “to privilege identity politics, 
‘coming out’…and a flat invocation of ‘homophobia’ as an automatic, unifying, experiential frame”. Ibid. at 25, 37. 
937 Subscribing to the liberal gay rights formula would be just one condition, among others, to be satisfied in order to 
belong to the Israeli nation-state; a principal condition, and one that we are most familiar with, is being Jewish. 
938 I use ‘enfolding’ here in the sense of Deleuze and Foucault, which is to say that subjectivity comes about when 
outside forces are enveloped within a particular interior, which we then identify as ‘subject’. For more on the fold in 
Deleuze, see Adrian Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2010) at 107-8. 
939 Among the institutions that make this explicit claim is the US-based pro-Israel outfit, Stand With Us; see for 
example the following booklet, “LGBT Rights: In Israel and the Middle East”, 
https://www.standwithus.com/booklets/LGBT/files/lgbt%20booklet-final.pdf. An Israeli LGBT organization that 
operates on this premise is HaAguda, in particular its “Palestinian Rescue Project”, see Jason Ritchie, “How Do You 
Say ‘Come Out of the Closet’ in Arabic? Queer Activism and the Politics of Visibility in Israel-Palestine”(2010) 
16:4 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 557-575. 
940 Jasbir K. Puar, “Homonationalism as Assemblage” (2013) 4:2 Jindal Global Law Review at 33-4. 
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themselves on the wrong side of modernity and are rendered irresponsible actors towards both 
their families (when they don’t vaccinate their children) and the wider community (when they risk 
infecting others as a result of their children not being immunized).  
 
Where in Israel/Palestine Puar shows how homonationalism serves to justify occupation, I will 
focus in on how Israeli state discourse around Bedouin vaccinations supports the state’s 
dismembered941 forms of recognition of the community and justifies its policy of the community’s 
forced relocation into development townships.  
 
The third element of import, and one that is fundamental to assemblage theory, is the possibility of 
deterritorialization or undoing. Puar argues for sexuality to be understood as the multiplicity of 
‘affirmative becomings’, which is the multiplication and proliferation of difference which 
overwhelms binaries such as man/woman, gay/straight and the status quo.942  It is the creative 
potential of the assemblage in our case as well that clues us in to how the signifiers such as 
‘Bedouin mother’ or ‘Bedouin woman’ come to be, how they circulate within an assemblage, and 
how they contain the possibilities of their own undoing. 
 
In Economies of Abandonment,943 Elizabeth Povinelli looks at alternative ways of being in the age of 
what she terms ‘late liberalism’, which refers to the shape liberal governmentality takes as it 
responds to crises of legitimacy prompted by anticolonial, new social and new Islamic 
movements.944 In constructing a sociology of potentiality945, Povinelli looks at ‘projects’, “the thick 
subjective background effects of a life as it has been lived… (and which refer to) any given social 
                                                          
941 One way to characterize the state’s recognition of the community is dismembered, for two reasons. For one, it is 
partial, and being partial, it is incomplete to the point that it handicaps the person from reaching her true potential. 
Therefore, the state grants partial recognition for the community when it constructs a gravel exit from the highway 
to your village, yet your village remains unrecognized and lacks other paved roads within it. Being dismembered is 
also to disavow the subject’s historicity, it’s genealogy, autology, diversity, creative potential and all those other 
wonderful (and not so wonderful) things that make us who we are. See Elizabeth Povinelli, The Empire of Love: 
Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy and Carnality (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006). 
942 Supra note 940 at 41-3. 
943 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011) [Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment] 
944 Ibid. at 25 
945 As opposed to an ‘ontology of potentiality’, which could be how some would characterize Deleuze’s work. 
Povinelli, however, thinks that Deleuze too would subscribe to the idea that potentiality cannot be constructed in a 
general way, but embedded in particular arrangements.  In her own words, then, “Rather than the question of the 
variation of being and not being or affects and ideas in general, I want to understand this variation in specific 
historical contexts. But I am making a general claim; namely, that potentiality and its perpetual variations never 
occur in a general way, but always, as Deleuze himself noted, in specific agencements- arrangements of connecting 
concepts, materials, and forces that make a common compositional unity”. Ibid. at 16 
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world, (where) multiple moral and political calculations proliferate because no one ever lives the 
exact same project”.946 When projects start being in relation to one another is when they become 
‘social projects’. ‘Alternative social projects’, on the other hand, are digressions and deviations from 
the “explicitly given categories of life and world”.947  
 
Povinelli conceives of social projects as assemblage. This is because social projects break up the 
multiple forms of sociality and meaning present in social worlds and aggregate them into individual 
social projects that can be treated as a unity. Social projects are not static, but are always 
aggregating practices and activities.948 Yet, there are many activities and practices that are not 
aggregated into a social project so that they escape apprehension and enunciation. Some such 
practices, which may be considered quasi-events before their enunciation, may catch and may 
aggregate into alternative social projects.  
 
Povinelli looks at how such quasi-events come to be apprehended and named and how they 
aggregate to an identifiable, more-or-less whole ‘alternative social project’, for example, the 
mundane, ordinary forms of suffering as opposed to the catastrophic ones that prompt civic and 
political ethical engagement in liberal markets and states.949  
 
‘Liminality’ describes this space of the quasi-event.950 It is the ‘potentiality’ intrinsic to the 
assemblage that is bursting with possibility to move the assemblage to a new stable state or to undo 
the assemblage altogether.  
 
Just as the ‘why’ of how liminal spaces come to be grasped and enunciated in alternative social 
projects intrigues Povinelli, so too this dissertation is similarly motivated to identify these 
temporally and spatially specific liminal spaces in all five case studies that are bursting with 
potential in our Naqab-Bedouin assemblage and how it is they come to be and when it is they fizzle 
and fail. 
                                                          
946 Ibid. at 6. 
947 Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, Silvia Posocco & Elizabeth Povinelli, “Obligation, Social Projects and Queer 
Politics” (2013) 15:4 International Feminist Journal of Politics at 556. Such alternative social projects and their 
emergence in a normative world interested Foucault as well, see Michel Foucault, “Des espaces autres” (1984) 5 
Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 46–49. 
948 Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment, supra note 943 at 8. 
949 Ibid. at 13-14. 
950 Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, Silvia Posocco & Elizabeth Povinelli, “Obligation, Social Projects and Queer 




“...I write this as a woman, towards women. When I say 'woman,' I'm 
speaking of woman in her inevitable struggle against conventional man; and 
of a universal woman subject who must bring women to their senses and to 
their meaning in history. But first it must be said that in spite of the enormity 
of the repression that has kept them in the "dark" --that dark which people 
have been trying to make them accept as their attribute-- there is, at this 
time, no general woman, no one typical woman” – Hélène Cixous951 
 
 
Feminist theory inquires into the role of gender in shaping social relations and draws out paths in 
the pursuit of a more just world.952 In discussing the theory’s relevance to this case study, I would 
like to address four main points. First, I would like to make a clarification on the theory’s genealogy, 
which will be followed by outlining the theory’s principal tenets. Next, I will address the contested 
concepts of ‘woman’ and ‘gender’ within feminist theory itself. Finally, how might we take from 
feminist theory to imagine a more just world for the women of Bir al-Mashash as well as for all 
others caught up in this particular assemblage? How might feminist theory clue us into constructing 
alternative social projects for the Naqab Bedouin as a community?  
 
It is commonly assumed in feminist theory that feminism can be studied at specific temporal 
moments, those that have progressively unraveled in three waves. The first wave is identified as the 
women’s liberal rights movement at the turn of the 20th century in Europe and the US and the 
second wave is determined as occurring in the postwar period of the 1960s and 1970s. This 
genealogy identifies the current wave as emerging since the mid-1990s and as underscoring 
diversity and ambiguity as a postcolonial response to neoliberal politics.953  
 
However, the proposed genealogy is a truncated one, because it ignores the plethora of ways that 
women of colour, those enslaved and native women have been doing feminist work in locales 
                                                          
951 Hélène Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1976) (trans. Keith Cohen, Paula Cohen) 1:4 Signs 875-893 at 875-
876. 
952 Mari J. Matsuda, “Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1986) 16 New Mexico Law Review 613 at footnote 1 
953 See, for example, this claim made by Charlotte Kroløkke and Anne Scott Sørensen, From Silence to 
Performance: Gender Communication Theories and Analyses (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006). 
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outside of Europe and the US (and within them as well) and for a time much longer than the last 
century and a half.  
 
In ‘Decolonizing Feminisms’, the authors argue that modern feminist theory is a “Eurocentric, 
Global North-hegemonic notion”954 of feminism that discounts the feminist groundwork that was 
laid down for it by Native feminists over the past 500 years of settler colonialism. In a similar vein, 
Nikeeta Slade and Akunna Eneh argue that black women and other women of colour began 
organizing in the US as early as white women, during which they formed a multitude of 
organizations to address their particular predicaments of economic exploitation, racism and sexism 
and other forms of oppression.955 As has been documented, black women mobilized with black men 
and white progressives to lead the sharecroppers strike of the 1930s and were active in workers 
struggles in the automobile, packing and steel industries.956  
 
Why have I attempted to clarify feminism’s genealogy in the study of this assemblage? There are 
two principal reasons, both stemming from the form that the debate around vaccinations in the 
Naqab assumes.  
 
What we notice is that the omissions of mainstream feminism mirror the omissions when 
discussing the issue of vaccinations in the community. When the principal actors in this assemblage 
are identified, it is common practice to identify Bedouin women as being victims at the hands of 
patriarchy in the home and in their larger environs and not as agents who, while being 
marginalized in very tangible and visible ways, everyday confront and challenge their 
marginalization.957  
 
                                                          
954 Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck, and Angie Morrill, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler 
Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy” (2013) 25(1) Feminist Formations 8-34 at 14. 
955 Nikeeta Slade and Akunna Eneh, "A History of Black Feminism" (June 26, 2014), Paper presented at the annual 
conference of the International Socialist Organization,  ‘Socialism 2014’ (Chicago, Illinois), online: 
http://wearemany.org/a/2014/06/women-race-and-class  
956 Claudia Jones, “An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman!” in Beverly Guy-Sheftall (ed.), 
Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought (New York: The New Press, 1995) 107-123 at 
114-115 
957 For example, although commendable for its scope and empirical case studies, Physicians for Human Rights, “I 
am Here: Gender and the Right to Health in the Unrecognized Villages of the Negev” (April 2008) nevertheless fails 
to tell how Bedouin women actively oppose their marginalization and subordination. By failing to tell the whole 
story, we take home a very incomplete picture of this assemblage, one in which Bedouin women are little more than 
the impetus for human rights actors to intervene. 
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The second reason is that because Bedouin women are not characterized as agents, so a betterment 
of their situation comes about through the efforts of ‘saviours’, others who proffer aid through 
advocacy or financial support and are typically progressive Israeli Jews, human rights organizations 
or Bedouin men, who in fact similarly diagnose Bedouin women as being in essence without 
agency.958  
 
By this logic, Bedouin women do not initiate challenges to their oppression but follow the lead of 
other women/men, who are not Bedouin and women, with the exception of a handful of Bedouin 
‘women leaders’.959 It is important to identify the omissions of mainstream feminism in order to be 
able to identify similar patterns of omission when looking at the feminist work of Bedouin women, 
and the manner in which the modalities of settler colonialism can quite casually minimize the 
feminist labour that Bedouin women do, every day. 
 
Some central tenets 
Feminist theory works to undermine how the structures and affects of heteropatriarchy and 
heteropaternalism circulate, by undermining the strict male/female binary upon which they are 
based.  
 
Arvin, Tuck and Morrill argue that heteropatriarchy is a social system that assumes the naturalness 
of heterosexuality and patriarchy, thereby rendering alternative ways of being aberrant. Second, it 
enables the positioning of the father, or father-like figure at the centre of social groupings and 
organizations of family, church and state, and this is what is meant by heteropaternalism.  
 
Feminist theory works to undermine these forces and structures of heteropatriarchy and 
heteropaternalism that are essentially founded on the idea that the male gender is both strong and 
capable while the female gender is its opposite, frail and confused.960 The feminist legal scholar, 
Mari Matsuda argues that the binaries constructed by heteropatriarchy also place men on the side 
of science and rationality and women on that of intuition and emotion, the latter seen as inferior to 
                                                          
958 For more on ‘liar saviours’in the Bedouin women context, those who claim to be helping the community but 
whose ulterior motives are not lost on the women in the community, see Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “The 
Grammar of Rights in Colonial Contexts: The Case of Palestinian Women in Israel” (2012) Middle East Law and 
Governance 4: 106–151 
959 See the short commentary on Bedouin ’women leaders’ in the Introduction section of this chapter. 
960 Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck, and Angie Morrill, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler 
Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy” (2013) 25(1) Feminist Formations 8-34 at 13. 
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the former. The privileging of rationality over real-life experience, she maintains, is a form of 
androcentric scholarship and therefore something that feminist theory seeks to overcome by 
making the personal political and telling stories of the daily, mundane ways in which power and 
agency operate.961,962  
 
Woman as a contested concept963 
 
Matsuda’s critique of Rawls’ abstraction in developing his social contract theory of justice is 
spurred by it being a theory of ‘anti-experience’. She accuses Rawls’ abstraction of being devolved 
of feeling and specificity when it asks individuals to apply a veil of ignorance, to ignore their 
particular conditions, context and the historical materiality of their being as they are called to 
choose from various conceptions of justice.964  
 
Abstraction is of use because it allows us to form concepts or ideas by finding common features to 
particular entities while ignoring other elements possessed by those entities. For Rawls, abstraction 
was useful when it came to the issue of moral judgements. Rawls saw the utility of identifying the 
rational, self-interested individual as a common starting point for human beings who were being 
asked to make a moral judgement about how they would like to see society organized.  
 
Yet, what if we attempted to be abstract about women? Could we identify a particular common 
feature to women that would allow us to generalize about them? Would that common feature be the 
common experience of oppression and heteropatriarchy?  
 
                                                          
961 Mari J. Matsuda, “Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1986) 16 New Mexico Law Review 613 at 617-618. 
962 This dissertation is acutely aware of the pitfalls of androcentric scholarship and for this reason each chapter is 
grounded in on-the-ground vignettes and narrations of real-life experiences before it engages with a legal analysis of 
the case.  
963 For Butler, both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are equally socially constructed, so that ‘sex is gender’. For Stone, sex is not 
gender, and claims about sex (for example, men are physically stronger than women) imply claims about gender 
norms, that is make claims about how a ‘man’ or ‘woman’ ought to behave (men, more than women, ought to take 
up physically demanding jobs). See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter (London: Routledge, 1993), Alison Stone, An 
Introduction to Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
964 Mari J. Matsuda, “Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1986) 16 New Mexico Law Review 613, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972)   
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This is precisely where the essentialist/anti-essentialist divide stands, in wilful disagreement about 
whether there are essential properties common to women, and that all women share965 as their 
‘essence’.966  
 
The debate hinges very much on the political expediency of either conception of ‘what is woman’, 
anti-essentialism being criticized for undercutting both feminist political activism and feminist 
social criticism by arguing that women are fully diverse.967  
 
Scholars have proposed different explanations for navigating the contested terrain.968 So, for 
example, strategic essentialism acknowledges that any descriptive essentialism is false. However, 
because states and institutions determine women in descriptively essentialist ways, so we should 
act as if essentialism were true for political/collective action and expediency.969  
 
Iris Marion Young has proposed that we think of women as a series. Women are not a homogenous 
group, but are “multifaceted, layered, complex and overlapping”, though are nevertheless united 
passively by the same or similar constraints in society.970  
                                                          
965 Alison Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy” (2004) 1:2 Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 135-153 at 138 [Stone, “Essentialism, Anti-Essentialism”] 
966 Yet, would not the attribution of certain qualities to all women performed in a turn of abstraction be at the same 
time essentializing of women by arguing that they possessed an ‘essence’ even if on the most minute of attributes? It 
seems, then, that abstraction by this Rawlsian formula is not ‘anti-essentialist’ by being abstract, but in fact 
essentializing. This is what Matsuda argues in her article, “Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human 
Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1986) 16 New Mexico Law Review 613, John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
967 Stone, “Essentialism, Anti-Essentialism”, supra note 965 at 141 
968 One of the main concerns of the essentialist/anti-essentialist debate is the concern for the implications of 
activism. Would an anti-essentialist stance undermine political and social advocacy for those who identify as 
‘women’? The debate, then, is not necessarily structured on what is a more honest accounting of what is woman, if 
indeed we can even attempt at a definition, but how do anti-essentialist assumptions undermine the emancipation of 
‘women’ sidelined in society? Considering this, we can appreciate how the ‘race’ debate, fictional as ‘race’ is, being 
a construct, similarly functions in critical race theory for the reasons of political expediency and social justice. The 
debate on race and women, then, seem to be at their core, the search for social justice for those on the wrong side of 
each identifier, while at the same time trying very consciously not to perpetuate the essentializing myths associated 
with them.  
969 Stone has critiqued strategic essentialists for placing all women in an equally situated disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
state. Doing so, they indirectly affirm descriptive essentialism, even as they critique it and describe it as a ‘fiction’ 
of the state. Therefore, the contradiction is that strategic essentialists claim that women’s experience is diverse, yet 
nevertheless structured by descriptive essentialist assumptions that thereby prompt uniform models of behaviour, 
undermine their own claim that women’s experience is fully diverse. Stone, “Essentialism, Anti-Essentialism”, 
supra note 965 at 142-44.  
970 Iris Marion Young, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective” (1994) 19:3 Signs 713 




Critical of both strategic essentialism and “women as a series”, Alison Stone proposes the concept of 
‘women as genealogy’, drawing from Judith Butler’s performative theory of gender.971  
 
According to Stone, “women always acquire femininity by appropriating and reworking existing 
cultural interpretations of femininity”, 972  and thereby become situated in a historical chain of 
‘women’, all of whom have practically reinterpreted the meaning of femininity specific to their 
context and the power constellations in which they reside. As all women are embedded in this 
complex history, they can be said to belong to a determinate social group, even if they don’t hold a 
common understanding or experience of what it means to be ‘woman’.973  
 
Catharine Malabou attempts at a concept of woman that is neither exclusively essentialist nor anti-
essentialist, but located in the interstices between the two.  
 
Malabou argues against the anti-essentialist claim that women’s identity is completely without 
essence because she claims that such a position risks robbing women of agency and is also 
apolitical. 974 Malabou borrows from Sartre to argue for a ‘minimum concept of woman’ or ’a 
minimal essence’ based on essence not existing as something substantial but essence as “being in a 
situation”.975 Malabou argues by analogy that the essence of woman is being in a situation of 
‘woman’.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constraining women have certain unifying characteristics, which Stone claims is descriptively essentialist. Ibid. at 
144-146.  
971 Judith Butler’s performative theory of gender maintains that gender is an act continuously actualized and 
reproduced by its interlocutor subjects based on a script already composed. Gender being ‘performativity’ and not 
‘performance’ means that the subject isn’t an independent doer and “there is no gender identity behind the 
expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its 
results”. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990; 
Anniversary edition 1999) at 25. That said, with each appropriation of ‘woman’, the term is modified a little, so that 
gender norms are continuously organized anew. Judith Butler, “Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig and 
Foucault”, in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.), Feminism as Critique (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987) at 131. 
972 Stone, “Essentialism, Anti-Essentialism”, supra note 965 at 135 
973 Ibid. at 149-150 
974 Catharine Malabou, “On Sexual Difference”, Lecture at The London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE) (June 2 2014), online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2014/06/20140602t1830vNT.aspx . See also 
Catherine Malabou, Changing Difference (trans. Carolyn Shread) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) for Malabou’s 
more in-depth exploration of sexual difference within the essentialism/anti-essentialism debate. 
975 Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate (trans. George J. Becker) (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1995 [1944]) at 43 
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If Malabou were to insist on the specificity of women, then she would argue it in the context of 
violence, all instances of which are also specific. It is the particularity of violence directed against 
women – domestic abuse, sexual abuse, forced prostitution, exploitation and fascism – that makes 
the woman.976  
 
Judith Butler’s critique of linguistic essentialism hinges on how language as a signifying practice 
erases difference. As categories (including gender identities of masculine and feminine) are 
features of language, so all categories eradicate cross-cutting differences and undermine other ways 
of describing those within a particular category.977 Accordingly, Butler calls for a recognition of the 
contingency of categories and the need to parody and destabilize terms like "women" even as we 
call upon them.978 
 
Considering all of the above, how would feminist theory inform our discussion of agency and 
recognition not just for the women in Bir al-Mashash but for the Naqab Bedouin community more 
generally? How is the call to parody and to destabilize linguistic categorization, as suggested by 
Butler, already fracturing this particular assemblage? We will address these questions in the 
concluding discussion.  
 
The Case: Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10  
 
I will now move on to the discussion of the vaccinations case. The petition called for the revocation 
of Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the 
Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009. The petitioners were ‘Yasmin al-Naqab’, the 
                                                          
976 Feminist scholar, Alison Stone, differs with Malabou on this. Stone counters, “How do women concretely derive 
resistant powers from their very violation? Moreover, we might wonder whether the definition of women’s being in 
terms of their being violated is unduly negative. Has patriarchy really violated women’s being so totally that nothing 
more positive than violation is left to define them? After all, if violation enables resistance, then surely women 
having always been violated must have always resisted their violation and created more positive modes of being for 
themselves. In that case their essence would be less wholly negative than Malabou suggests”. Alison Stone, “Book 
Review: Changing Difference by Catherine Malabou” LSE Review of Books (May 15 2015), online: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2012/05/15/book-review-changing-difference-catherine-malabou/  
977 Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodemism’," in Seyla Benhabib, 
Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), cited in Cressida J. Heyes, ’Back to the Rough Ground!’ Wittgenstein, Essentialism, and Feminist 
Methods, Doctoral Dissertation (Montreal: McGill University, 1997) at 40-1 
978 Cressida J. Heyes, ’Back to the Rough Ground!’ Wittgenstein, Essentialism, and Feminist Methods, Doctoral 
Dissertation (Montreal: McGill University, 1997) at 43-4, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) at 34 
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organization that Huda now represents as Director, together with other civil society organizations 
and individuals from the Naqab. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 
represented the petitioners. In issuing its decision, the court combined petition HCJ 7245/10 of the 
Naqab Bedouin community with two other petitions also calling for the revocation of Section 
61(2)(d), though for other reasons than those raised by the petitioners in HCJ 7245/10.979   
 
Section 61(2)(d) allowed for the reduction of state-funded child allowance payments if the child 
had failed to receive vaccinations identified as mandatory on the Health Ministry’s vaccination 
schedule. The petitioners had called for the revocation of Section 61(2)(d) as it would 
disproportionately affect Bedouin children of the Naqab who suffer from inadequate access to 
health services.  
 
As a result of the amendment, Bedouin children (and their families) from the unrecognized villages 
would see a reduction in their child allowance payments because they lacked adequate access to 
well-baby (also known as ‘mother-child’) clinics where said vaccinations were administered. 
Therefore, even if the families wanted their children to receive the vaccinations, that is, even if they 
were not opposed to vaccinations because they had no reservations about their safety nor did they 
have any ideological opposition to them, they would nevertheless not be able to access vaccinations 
without significant difficulty. This meant that they, as Bedouin from the unrecognized villages, 
would be more likely to see a reduction to their child allowance payments than the general 
population. 
 
The vaccines determined by The Ministry of Health to be mandatory are listed in the ‘Vaccination 
Program’. At the time of the decision, and at the time of writing, they include four vaccines, measles, 
                                                          
979 The Israel National Council for the Child v. Government of Israel, [2013] HCJ 8357/10, The Association for 
Information on Vaccines v. The National Insurance Institute, [2013] HCJ 908/11. The argument put forth by the 
Israel National Council for the Child was that the amendment violates the right to equality of those who do not 
vaccinate their children. This is because the amendment creates a distinction (between those who vaccinate and 
those who do not) that is not relevant to the purpose of the child allowance. The purpose of the child allowance is to 
allow for redistribution of income among the population, between citizens without children to those with children 
and with more mouths to feed. Therefore, whether or not one’s child is vaccinated should not bear on whether that 
parent receives the allowance payment for that child. The Association for Information on Vaccines argued that both 
the effectiveness and safety of vaccines are contested issues in the medical community and among the general 
population. Accordingly, by cutting child allowance payments to those who do not vaccinate, the amendment 
violates the right to equality, the individual’s right to autonomy and the right to autonomy of parents in the 
upbringing of their children. 
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mumps, rubella and varicella. The four are administered as a quadrivalent vaccine, in a single jab, 
when the child is one year old.980 
 
The amount reduced from the child allowance payment would be 100 shekels per month for the 
second, third and fourth child in a family unit that had not received the mandatory vaccines, which 
would amount to a reduction of just over 60%.981 The reduction would apply for the entire length of 
time that it was suitable to receive the vaccine, following which the allowance would return to its 
original amount.982  
 
The judge who wrote the majority opinion was Justice Arbel, who also sat on the bench in the crop-
spraying case discussed earlier in this dissertation, Abu Mdeghem.983 Although there were no 
dissenting opinions, in the concurring opinions of Justice Barak-Erez and Justice Hayut, both judges 
laid out different reasons for reaching their decision. In the court’s judgement, even though the 
constitutional right to equality enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) was 
violated, the violation satisfied the cumulative conditions of the limitation clause in the Basic Law. 
Accordingly, the court ruled to deny the petition.  
 
The issues considered by the court were whether the Amendment to the National Insurance Law984 
violated the rights enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992), in particular the 
right to a dignified life or the right to social security, the right to autonomy, and the right to 
equality.985 
 
Justice Arbel found that there was comprehensive groundwork done by the authorities ahead of the 
formulation of the amendment, denying the petitioners’ claim to the contrary.986 Accordingly, 
Justice Arbel found that there was no room for judicial intervention in the legislative proceedings 
                                                          
980 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 30-31. MMRV is also given in the first grade but this 
second dosage is not included in the ‘Vaccination Program’ and therefore is not subject to the Amendment.  
981 Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 
5769-2009 at Section 68(d)  
982 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 50  
983 Abu Mdeghem v. Israel Lands Administration, [2007] HCJ 2887/04, IsrLR 62.  
984 National Insurance Law, 1995, S.H. 5755, No. 1522 
985 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 38 
986 Ibid. at para. 18-19 
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because they were not an instance of a process that “causes deep harm to material values of the 
constitutional regime[.]”987  
 
Arbel determined that the purpose of the child allowance was to help families with children bear 
the costs associated with raising them. Following this premise, Arbel emphasized how the 
allowance helped families with children maintain a certain standard of living and reduced their risk 
of falling below the poverty line.988  
 
While not deciding conclusively on whether the allowance belonged to the child or the parent, Arbel 
held that when determining child allowances, the legislator had in mind the welfare and best 
interests of the children.989    
 
On the issue of vaccines, Arbel determined, drawing on the findings of the Ministry of Health, that 
their purpose was twofold. First, vaccines ensured the protection of children from the risk that “any 
immigrant or tourist will bring with him diseases that are not currently found in Israel”.990 Second, 
that the high coverage rate of vaccines helps ensure ‘herd immunity’, which helps protect those 
who are very young, very old, and those with weakened immune systems for whom the 
administration of a vaccine is not effective or possible, to nevertheless be protected from the 
disease.991 
 
Arbel laid out the dangers of the four diseases that the MMRV vaccine is meant to protect against – 
measles, mumps, rubella and varicella (chicken pox) and concluded that “the prevalent and 
recognized position worldwide is that the benefit derived from the vaccines immeasurably exceeds 
the risk inherent therein”.992  
 
After Arbel determined the facts of the case, she moved on to undertake a constitutional review of 
the Amendment, looking specifically at whether there was a violation to the Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Freedom (1992).   
                                                          
987 Ibid. at para. 20-21, citing Shlitner v. The Pensions Commissioner, [2011] HCJ 6784/06 at para. 36 of the opinion 
of Justice Procaccia. 
988 Ibid. at para. 24 
989 Ibid. at para. 25 
990 Ibid. at para. 27 
991 Ibid. 




Arbel first considered if there was a violation to the right to a dignified life. She determined that a 
reduction in the child allowance payment did not automatically result in a violation of the right. 
Rather, the petitioners bore the burden of proving the violation by showing that after examination 
of the range of services provided to the family by the state in terms of income support payments 
and the like, that the reduction of the child allowance would cause a decline to the material living 
conditions of the families, thereby harming their dignity. At a minimum, Arbel opined that the 
petitioners ought to have presented individual cases that illustrated the alleged harm to facilitate a 
shifting of the burden of proof to the State. As they failed to provide this minimum proof, Arbel 
found no harm to the right to a dignified life.993  
 
Arbel then considered if there was a violation to the right to autonomy. Arbel explained that the 
right to autonomy derived from the right to human dignity and was “a central component of the life 
of every individual in society”.994 The right enables an individual to shape her life and is essential 
for the individual’s self-determination.  
 
Arbel clarified that at the case at hand it was the right to parental autonomy that was being 
considered. The right to parental autonomy encompasses both the obligation and the right to care 
for the needs of the child, including the child’s health. This right is vested in the parents since there 
is a natural connection between these two parties and because it is assumed that parents will make 
the best decisions for their children because they know them and the family unit in which they are 
raised most intimately.  
 
Moreover, there is no unequivocal social consensus on the issues that parents are called to decide 
upon. Finally, parents will have to live with the consequences of their decisions, and so it is 
assumed that their decisions vis-à-vis their children will have generally favourable consequences in 
the long-term. All the same, Arbel conditions the above on the fact that the right to parental 
autonomy is not absolute and that it is limited by the principles of the child’s best interests and her 
rights.995  
 
                                                          
993 Ibid. at para. 41-42 
994 Arbel here is citing the Daaka case, Ali Daka v. Haifa ‘Carmel’ Hospital, [1999] CA 2781/93 IsrSC 53(4) 526 at 
570 
995 Supra note 993 at para 45 
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In order for the right to autonomy to be a constitutional violation in the case at bar, two parameters 
would need to be examined. The first parameter would be the ‘essence of the choice denied’, which 
is to say that the more harm caused to the personal expression and self-realization of the person, 
the more likely it would be deemed a constitutional violation. The second parameter is the extent of 
coercion and denial of will.996 
 
Arbel determined that the denial of the child allowance for non-compliance with the government-
mandated vaccination schedule was not a violation of the first parameter in the way that a citizen 
denied the right “to marry the love of his life”997 would be. Second, she held that the extent of 
coercion was limited to the denial of a financial benefit, which is not the same as the imposition of a 
criminal sanction. Finding that neither of these two parameters were fulfilled, Arbel determined 
that there was no violation to the constitutional right to autonomy.998 
 
Finally, Arbel considered if there had been a violation to the right to equality. Arbel concluded that 
the conditioning of the child allowance payment on receipt of the vaccination was a condition that 
was foreign to the purpose of the allowance. The purpose of the allowance, she held, was to assist in 
financing the expenses of raising children and to prevent the family from falling into poverty. 
Accordingly, denial of an allowance for non-receipt of the vaccination was a violation of the right to 
equality for all those parents insured by the National Insurance Law. 
 
However, for the violation to be a constitutional violation and justify judicial intervention, the four-
pronged limitation clause test would need to be applied, only failing which, would the amendment 
be deemed a constitutional violation.  
 
Arbel found that the first two conditions of the clause were satisfied, as the amendment was made 
by law and befit the values of the State of Israel. As for if whether the amendment had a proper 
purpose, she found that its objective to increase vaccination rates was proper, since it “promotes an 
important social objective of caring for public health in general and children’s health in 
particular”.999 The amendment is also intended to maintain ‘herd immunity’1000. Accordingly, the 
                                                          
996 Ibid. at para 46 
997 Ibid. 
998 Ibid. at para 47 
999 Ibid. at para. 57 
1000 For more on ‘herd immunity’, see above and ibid. at para. 27 
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amendment has a close connection to the right to health and the right to life, and so even if 
considered a violation to the right to equality, it has a sufficiently strong purpose to justify the 
violation.  
 
Finally, Arbel considered if the violation was proportional. This was the fourth and final prong of 
the limitations clause test (also known as the ‘proportionality test’) that examined if there was a 
rational connection between the means chosen and the end result and whether there was a less 
harmful means that could have been chosen in the amendment’s stead. The last of the three 
subtests looked at whether there was a proper balance struck between the benefit derived from the 
achievement of the amendment’s purpose and the scope of the violation of the constitutional right.  
 
Arbel found that there was a rational connection between the means and the ends, since there was 
a “reasonable probability” the means chosen would at least result in “partial achievement”1001 of the 
end sought.  
 
As for the less harmful means subtest, Arbel cited those instances, in foreign jurisdictions, where 
non-compliance with state vaccination schedules resulted in criminal sanctions for the offending 
adult party and the denial of enrollment into an educational institution for non-compliant children. 
The reduction in child allowances provided for by the amendment, relative to these other means, is 
less harmful.  
 
Further, Arbel stressed, as she did on numerous occasions in her decision, that the reduction in 
child allowance payments happened concurrently with the increase in child allowance payments, so 
that it “should be deemed as not granting a benefit [and] not as a deduction from a person’s 
income”.1002 Because the amendment resulted in the withholding of a benefit, this was less harmful 
than if it was an economic sanction or penalty.1003  
 
Finally, Arbel found that the state had done the necessary work – including establishing well-baby 
clinics in the Bedouin recognized towns and unrecognized villages, setting up a mobile health clinic, 
equipping these centers to be culturally appropriate and incentivizing staff who worked in these 
                                                          
1001 Supra note 999 at para. 60 
1002 Ibid. at para. 42 
1003 Ibid. at para. 61 
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clinics - to make receiving vaccinations accessible for the Naqab Bedouin population.1004 These 
considerations led Arbel to conclude that the amendment passed the second subtest of the 
proportionality test.  
 
In evaluating if the amendment passed the third subtest, Arbel grounded her argument in one that 
this dissertation has explored being made by former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, namely that of the 
law striking a balance between the needs of society and the rights of the individual.1005  
 
Arbel states, “The effect of each and every individual on the public justifies a balance which harms 
the individual to a limited and restricted extent for the benefit of the public. It is impossible to 
ignore that the individual lives within society and sometimes his acts or omissions impact the 
society around him”.1006 The benefit in this case was public health. When vaccination rates crossed 
a particular threshold it would create ‘herd immunity’ for vulnerable members of society.  
 
This reasoning allowed Arbel to conclude that the third subtest was also satisfied, thereby 
satisfying all elements of the limitation clause test, and finding the violation to equality to be 
proportional.   
 
Justice Barak-Erez concurred in her decision. Like Arbel, Barak-Erez denied the petition, though 
qualified by a different rationale. Barak-Erez concluded that the right to equality was offended but 
that the violation to the right was proportionate.  
 
Barak-Erez offered a different rationale for why the amendments were issued, that is, it was not 
primarily about the financing of families raising children and staving off poverty as Arbel had 
argued. Rather, the purposes of the child allowances were multifold, they varied over time, and they 
included the goals of assisting in the absorption of immigrants and encouraging births.1007 
Accordingly, the purpose of the child allowance, besides promoting the child’s welfare, was also “to 
promote the social policy of the government at a given time”.1008   
                                                          
1004 Ibid. at para. 62 
1005 In the ‘Wine Path Plan’ case, I discussed in detail the use of fundamental principles in adjudication, and 
specifically how Barak’s argument about balancing between an individual’s rights and the individual’s duties to 
society in order to be responsive to society’s needs, factors in such adjudication.  
1006 Supra note 1004 at para. 63 
1007 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para 18-19 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring)  




Barak-Erez also emphasized that the amendment should not apply to those families who wish to 
vaccinate their children but are unable to do so because of access issues, as was argued by the 
Naqab Bedouin petitioners. Nevertheless, based on the evidence before her, she did not find that 
the amendment wrongfully discriminated against Bedouin children compared to Jewish 
children.1009  
 
Justice Hayut, unlike Justices Arbel and Barak-Erez, did not find that the amendment violated the 
constitutional right to equality and voted with the majority to deny the petition.  
 
Analysis of the Case 
 
Genealogy of the Israeli Medical Establishment’s dealings with the Naqab community 
 
Prior to analyzing the legal decision, I would like to sketch a brief genealogy of the Israeli medical 
establishment’s dealings with the Naqab Bedouin. Therefore, the purpose of this sketch is not to 
draw out a historical record that is linear, progressive or official. Rather, true to the method of 
genealogy, we appreciate how this relationship between the Israeli medical establishment and the 
Naqab Bedouin is informed by meanings that fluctuate based on constellations of power that mold, 
erase, and obscure its elements.  
 
Based on this premise, when we attempt a historical accounting of this relationship, we attempt to 
identify the silences in the official record and the ruptures in the assemblage within which this 
relationship is found.1010  
 
So, for example, while the official record may state that the vaccination rate among the Naqab 
Bedouin from the unrecognized villages for the MMRV vaccine is over 90%1011 and that they enjoy 
                                                          
1009 Ibid. at para. 59 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring) 
1010 For more on the Foucaldian insistence on genealogy over historiography in medicine, see Colin Jones and Roy 
Porter (eds.), “Introduction” in Reassessing Foucault: Power, medicine and the body (Routledge: London and New 
York, 1994) 
1011 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para 62 
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access to eight well-baby clinics within these villages,1012 when we attend to the silences, we learn 
much more.  
 
For one, how were Bedouin from the three dozen unrecognized villages able to achieve a 90% 
vaccination rate for MMRV given that public transport does not service these villages? What 
measures were they forced to take and what hurdles overcome to outperform Jewish families? 
What were the affective investments of Bedouin mothers, the primary caregivers of their children 
in most cases, in meeting this vaccination rate? By identifying these omissions and ruptures, we are 
able to undertake a more accurate accounting of the claims put forward by the official record.  
 
As Israeli scholars1013 have shown, Israel had a medical selection policy, instituted in 1951, 
specifically directed towards new immigrants, and not unlike that which was implemented in the 
United States and Canada.1014 Shvarts et. al. claim that the policy was informed by considerations 
both Zionist and eugenic.1015  
 
This is to say that immigrants to the newly formed state were screened both for how they 
contributed to the national identity and for how much disease they carried. Often, and without due 
cause, there was a an indiscriminate association of disease-producing germs with immigrants.1016 
 
Medical anthropologist Na’amah Razon, who undertook extensive fieldwork on the Bedouin and 
their historical and current interactions with the Israeli public health system, has shown that as 
                                                          
1012 Ibid.  
1013 Shifra Shvarts, Nadav Davidovitch, Rhona Seidelman And Avishay Goldberg, “Medical Selection and the 
Debate over Mass Immigration in the New State of Israel (1948-1951)” (2005) 22:1 Canadian Bulletin of Medical 
History 5-34 
1014 Ibid. at 7-8 
1015 Here the authors are referring to the relations between Zionism and eugenics before the establishment of the 
state, and cite Raphael Falk, “Zionism and the Biology of the Jews” in Science in Context (1998) 11:587-607, 
Mitchell B. Hart, Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2000) and John Efron, Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siècle 
Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Of course, the authors’ use of ‘eugenics’ is not to be equated 
with that which was practiced by the Nazis, though Nazi practices under this label are often construed as 
representing the science as a whole. 
1016 Supra note 1013 at 8 
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with immigrants, the state was preoccupied with hygiene and sanitation of Bedouin in the early 
years following the state’s foundation, when Bedouin lived under military rule.1017  
 
Razon’s archival research shows that the provision of health care to Bedouin in the early years of 
the state was sporadic and by 1955 there were only two clinics that served a population of 12,000 
Naqab Bedouin. As Bedouin lived under military rule until the mid-sixties, the provision of medical 
care was limited to within the confines of the closed military zone, making treatment of Bedouin 
and Israeli Jews within the same geographic space essentially separate. Further, the military 
government’s rationale regarding health care also mirrored the rationale of Bedouin as a security 
threat, so that, according to officials, health care provision to the Bedouin became necessary to stop 
the spread of disease that would threaten the majority Jewish Israeli population.1018  
 
In Razon’s interactions with medical personnel, she was made aware of how the health system 
identified Bedouin culture as a source of pathology.1019 While medical personnel often identified 
Bedouin as those that received ‘equal’ treatment, medical staff concurrently identified them as 
those who were inherently prone to disease because of their nomadic culture.  
 
Therefore, by this reasoning, it was inherent to Bedouin culture for families to bear many children. 
This contributed to a high disease burden on the medical system. As the culture was essentially 
nomadic prior to the state’s founding, it was forced to undergo a rapid transition from ancient to 
modern living, which resulted in poor eating habits and an unhealthy lifestyle, which contributed to 
poor health.1020  
 
As Razon critiques, curiously missing from the analysis of health officials are the structural forces of 
the 1948 war, military rule, forced settlement of the community, underfunding and institutional 
                                                          
1017 Na'amah Razon, ‘Chapter 2: Military and Medicine, Archives and Notes, Writing and History’ in Producing 
Equality: Citizenship, Science, and Medicine in the Negev/Naqab, PhD Dissertation (Department of History, 
Anthropology, and Social Medicine, University of California San Francisco, 2013) at 62. 
1018 For example, the Military Governor of the southern division, commenting on the poor health condition of the 
Bedouin population, wrote to the Ministry of Defence, “I am yet to receive help from the State’s Ministry of Health. 
I refuse to accept the situation - is this not a state that cares for its citizens? Especially if the subject endangers the 
well being of the entire population” (emphasis added). See ibid. at 67 
1019 Na’amah Razon, “Seeing and Unseeing Like a State: House Demolitions, Healthcare, and the Politics of 
Invisibility in Southern Israel” (2017) 90:1 Anthropological Quarterly 55-82 at 71-74 
1020 Ibid. at 72 
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discrimination as contributing factors to poor health. Rather, as Razon concludes, “it is ‘culture’—as 
nomadic and ‘Bedouin’— and the loss of culture that becomes the culprit of disease”.1021   
 
Razon asserts that it should not strike one as surprising that the political and historical forces that 
shape a Bedouin’s health are absent from consideration. Rather, to ignore non-medical, structural 
forces is key to biomedical interventions such as diagnoses, protocols, and clinical trials. In a 
medical protocol for leukemia that Razon became acquainted with through the course of her 
research, for example, there is very little personal information or background about a patient; 
rather they are categorized by risk level upon their arrival, risk itself determined by discrete 
criteria such as age, blood count and genetics. Accordingly, patients are rendered equivalent units, 
diagnosed with the same disease, receive the same treatment and become the same units within 
protocol data.1022  
 
The rendering of patients as equivalent units extends also to how health personnel refer to patients’ 
treatment. Therefore, health officials repeatedly claimed to Razon that Bedouin were treated the 
same as Israeli Jews or other minority groups. Nevertheless, when Bedouin missed certain aspects 
of the leukemia protocol because they lacked adequate transport to the treatment center, health 
professionals refused to see how these transportation and socioeconomic barriers did in fact make 
treatment unequal.1023  
 
Until 2000, there was not a single mother-child health clinic servicing the unrecognized Bedouin 
villages.1024 Currently, there are eight clinics operating in the villages, and the first of these were 
only established following a petition filed by Adalah, the petitioner in this case.1025 This lack of well-
                                                          
1021 Ibid.  
1022 Na’amah Razon, “Learned Blindness: Transforming Bedouins into standardized patients. Examining health and 
politics in southern Israel” (2015) 45(2) Ethnologie Française 269-280 at 272. For more on the how patients are 
objectified in the bureaucratic space of medical diagnosis see Charles E. Rosenberg, “The Tyranny of Diagnosis: 
Specific Entities and Individual Experience” (2002) 80:2 The Milbank Quarterly 237–260 
1023 Na’amah Razon, “Learned Blindness: Transforming Bedouins into standardized patients. Examining health and 
politics in southern Israel” (2015) 45(2) Ethnologie Française 269-280 at 273 
1024 Gottlieb et. al., “Bedouin antenatal access”, supra note 899 at 644 
1025 In 1997, Adalah filed a petition on behalf of 121 Arab Bedouin citizens of Israel and 3 NGOs against the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) demanding the establishment of 12 mother-child health clinics to serve the unrecognized 
villages in the Negev. In March 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that the MOH construct six such clinics by May 
2000, and provide public transportation to neighboring recognized towns with clinic services. Adalah v. Ministry of 
Health, [1999] HCJ 7115/97, see Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Interim Report on 




baby clinics servicing the Bedouin population in the unrecognized villages is although their need is 
most pronounced there than probably anywhere else in the country.1026  
 
Although these mother-child clinics service the community, the services they offer have been 
substandard. So, for example, it has been documented how the clinics are understaffed, have short 
operation hours, are overcrowded and have extended waiting periods.1027 A common complaint of 
patients is the lack of service in Arabic.1028 In fact, the service is regarded by some women as so 
poor, that they use the well-baby clinics in the unrecognized villages as ‘a last resort’, when it is too 
hard to reach the well-baby clinic in the Jewish town of Dimona.1029   
 
Bedouin women also have high morbidity rates for urinary tract infection and anemia.1030 They live 
on average five years less than Israeli Jewish women.1031  
 
Bedouin vaccination rates are higher than the average population, however…  
Given the poor health of Naqab Bedouin women and the historical and contemporary disadvantage 
at which they’re placed vis-à-vis the general population in terms of health care provision and 
accessibility, it may strike as surprising that the rate of vaccination of Bedouin children in the 
unrecognized villages is roughly the same as that of Israeli Jewish children.1032 Probably more 
                                                          
1026 The importance of well-baby clinics in the Naqab owes in part to the high infant mortality among the Bedouin 
there compared to other populations in Israel, 11.5 compared to 4.5 in 2006. See Gottlieb et. al., “Bedouin antenatal 
access”, supra note 899 at 644. This, together with premature births and low birthweights, owe to the 
underutilization of antenatal care. See Irit Twizer, Eyal Sheiner, Mordechai Hallak, Moshe Mazor, Miriam Katz, and 
Ilana Shoham-Vardi, “Lack of prenatal care in a traditional society. Is it an obstetric hazard?” (2001) 46:7 Journal of 
Reproductive Medicine 662-668. 
1027 Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), The Bare Minimum - Health Services in the Unrecognized Villages in the 
Negev (2009) at 24-27, Gottlieb et. al., “Bedouin antenatal access”, supra note 899 at 652. The substandard health 
services in the unrecognized villages are not limited to just the well-baby clinics, but also to the regular health 
clinics located there. See Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), The Bare Minimum - Health Services in the 
Unrecognized Villages in the Negev (2009) at 8-23. 
1028 Lack of service in Arabic makes treatment ineffective and renders the consultations as sources of frustration and 
shame for the women, and indirectly sometimes results in the violation of their right to confidentiality, see 
Physicians for Human Rights, I am Here: Gender and the Right to Health in the Unrecognized Villages of the Negev 
(April 2008) at 26-32 for more.  
1029 Gottlieb et. al., “Bedouin antenatal access”, supra note 899 at 652. 
1030 Based on a sample size of 202 Naqab Bedouin women, from both the unrecognized villages and the 
development towns, it was found that more than 50% suffered from urinary tract infection and close to 50% suffered 
from anaemia. Julie Cwikel, Rachel Lev-Wiesel, and Alean Al-Krenawi, “The physical and psychosocial health of 
Bedouin Arab women of the Negev area of Israel: The impact of high fertility and pervasive domestic violence” 
(2003) 9:2 Violence against Women, 240-257 at 248. 
1031 Ramsees Gharrah (ed.), Arab Society in Israel (5): Population, Society, Economy (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 
2012) at 23, 29, Summary Table 2 
1032 Adalah v. Minister of Welfare and Social Affairs, [2013] HCJ 7245/10 at para. 59 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring) 
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striking is the fact that the rate of vaccination for the MMRV vaccine is in fact higher among Bedouin 
than among Israeli Jews.1033  
 
One would expect that if a particular service was inadequately provided, or that if there was some 
other reason that made it more difficult to access a particular service, that there would be lower 
rates of service procurement. This was indeed the argument being made by the petitioners.  
 
The only reasonable explanation for a higher rate of procurement would be if those acquiring the 
service would have had to work with significantly more effort than the average person (without the 
same provision and access challenges) so that their acquisition rates were similar or higher than 
the average person.  
 
In a revelatory 2009 essay, DeNeen L. Brown walks her readers through the rather obvious, yet 
often overlooked, fact how it is the poor pay more, “more in money, time, hassle, exhaustion, 
menace”.1034 This fact is no different from the experience of the women, who are from the poorest 
households in Israel.1035  
 
So, for example, in Bir al-Mashash, because the women I interviewed did not own a private car or 
have ready access to one, and since public transport does not service their village, they were forced 
to hire a private taxi for the return journey to the nearest well-baby clinic. This cost them more 
time and money than it would if a well-baby clinic was located within their community or if they 
had a private car at their disposal. Umm Osama characterized the process of taking vaccinations 
similarly to Brown’s characterization of doing routine tasks when poor, saying taking vaccinations 
required considerable “effort, fatigue and time”.  
 
There was also the issue of lack of childcare. As mentioned earlier, when Umm Faris, a mother of 
thirteen children, wants to take her son to a clinic, she has to make a number of calculations and 
arrangements. For one, where would she put her other children if there were no childcare options 
in the community? Could she leave some of them behind to take care of themselves? She still recalls 
                                                          
1033 Adalah v. Minister of Welfare and Social Affairs, [2013] HCJ 7245/10 at para. 62 
1034 DeNeen L. Brown, "The High Cost of Poverty: Why the Poor Pay More" Washington Post (May 18, 2009), 
online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/17/AR2009051702053.html 
1035 The incidence of poverty among Naqab households is nearly 70% Ramsees Gharrah (ed.), Arab Society in Israel 
(5): Population, Society, Economy (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2012) at 91, Table C1 
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with horror that occasion when her eleven-month old was scalded by boiling water because she 
was not able to give him her full attention while she was preparing food for the family.  
 
What the courts omit and the official record does not register are those affective investments of 
Bedouin mothers in meeting and surpassing vaccination rates for their children, the feelings of 
uncertainty, inadequacy and in Umm Faris’ case, those of fear, guilt and remorse that invariably 
accompany the routine procedure of vaccination. 
 
Was the law able to accommodate hearing and registering those investments, the court would less 
readily consider the high vaccination rates of Bedouin children in spite of inadequate access issues, 
as a phenomenon not deserving a remedy of sorts, in line with the request of the petitioners. That 
is, just because Bedouin received the combination MMRV vaccine at rates slightly higher than 
Israeli Jews, they did so in spite of access issues, meaning they were forced to undertake efforts over 
and above the majority population to realize this particular aspect of the right to health for their 
children.  
 
The right to health has been determined to have constitutional standing in Israeli case law.1036 
Further, access is a core element of the right to health in international human rights law as 
explicated by the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in their General Comment 
No. 14.1037  
 
Not only do high vaccination rates mean that Bedouin have to work harder to receive the full child 
allowance payments that are ordinarily paid to families with children. Because they are poor, 
Naqab Bedouin also have less freedom to choose whether they would like to take vaccinations in the 
first place.  
 
                                                          
1036 See Louzon v. Government of Israel, [2008] HCJ 3071/05 at para. 10, where Chief Justice Beinisch concludes, 
“Thus, it emerges from the case-law of this Court that the constitutional rights enumerated in Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty are likely to include various aspects from the areas of welfare and social security, including 
health care”. In Gamzo v. Isaiah, [2001] LCA 4905/08 IsrSC 58(3) 360 at para. 20, Chief Justice Barak states, “a 
person without access to elementary medical treatment is a person whose human dignity has been violated” and in 
Physicians for Human Rights v. Minister of Finance, [2004] HCJ 494/03 IsrSC 59(3) 322 at paras. 16, 18, Barak 
determined that, “the social right to the provision of basic health services can be anchored in the right to bodily 
integrity under s. 4 of the Basic Law”.  
1037 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health”, General Comment No. 14, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4  
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That is, they are unlike Israeli Jews who, in numbers greater than Arab citizens, opt out of 
administering vaccines for their children1038 because they would generally like more autonomy in 
making health choices for their children.1039  The Bedouin do not enjoy the same freedom to make 
similar considerations, because the price they would pay (forfeiting the child allowance payment) 
would be beyond what they could afford. Although I discussed earlier how the mothers themselves 
did not see the closing down of such ethical considerations as a major concern,1040 the amendment 
nevertheless does close down the possibilities for Bedouin to choose differently. In doing so, the 
punitive element of the amendment, as we saw in the Wine Path Plan case, also offends liberty as 
license (to do as one pleases) and indirectly offends liberty as independence (to make decisions for 
one’s self and one’s family), for example to live on their historical lands without being forced to 
forfeit adequate standards of health care.  
 
Finally, the decision did not give adequate weight to the fact that the amendment is damaging 
because Bedouin children would be doubly harmed, for not receiving the vaccination and having to 
forego their allowance, even though Justice Arbel acknowledged that the children would be harmed 
on both those accounts.1041 
 
Premises for the Decision 
The judges relied on a number of premises in reaching their decision, which included: 
1. Vaccinations were in the best interest of the child since vaccines are essentially good 
2. The amendment resulted in a ‘denial of a benefit’ and was ‘not to be considered a deduction’ 
3. Bedouin access to mother-child well-baby clinics was ‘good enough’ 
 
The court’s central premise in reaching its decision was that vaccines were essentially good.1042 It 
was because vaccines were essentially good that Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law was 
enacted.  
 
                                                          
1038 Dan Even, "More Israeli parents refusing to vaccinate their babies according to state regulations", Ha'aretz (June 
4, 2013), online: www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.527622  
1039 Stemming from the health critique of vaccinations, such as concerns about the aluminum content in vaccines, or 
the detrimental health effects of a combination vaccine, where as many as four or five vaccines are combined in a 
single shot. I will briefly address the critiques of vaccinations below and the implications of their inadequate 
consideration by the judges in the case.  
1040 See section, ‘Blindspots: the Knesset’s and mine’ 
1041 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 49. 
1042 Ibid. at para. 28. 
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First, to ensure that those of vaccine-appropriate age did receive those vaccines designated by the 
state to be especially important for their health. Second, because vaccines made a significant 
contribution to maintaining public health by preventing the outbreak of disease.1043  
 
Indeed, the petitioners Adalah, Yasmin al-Naqab and The Israel National Council for the Child did 
not contest this point, though The Association for Information on Vaccines did. The latter argued 
that both the effectiveness and safety of vaccines are contested issues in the medical community 
and among the general population.  
 
Vaccines have been proven to result in brain encephalopathy, or brain damage, and victims have 
been compensated in US courts.1044 In fact, Israel itself has legislated a Vaccine Victims’ Insurance 
Law1045 5750-1989 allowing those determined to be harmed as a result of receiving a vaccine to 
claim damages.  
 
The administration of two concomitant vaccines, DTaP-Hib-IPV and MMR have also been shown to 
have more side effects on babies in Israel than when those vaccines were administered 
separately.1046 There have also been questions raised in the medical community about the 
effectiveness of vaccines, particularly pertussis vaccine, as a result of pathogen resistance.1047  
 
Although the court is right to state that there is general agreement in the medical community that 
vaccines are a general ‘good’, that statement is not unqualified. That is, there are several points of 
contestation around vaccines, both in the medical profession1048 and among members of the public. 
                                                          
1043 Ibid. at para. 28, 63. 
1044 Sharyl Attkisson, "Vaccines, Autism and Brain Damage: What's in a Name?" CBS News (September 14, 2010), 
online: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/vaccines-autism-and-brain-damage-whats-in-a-name/  
1045 Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law, 5750-1989 
1046 The full form of those vaccines are MMR: measles-mumps-rubella, and DTap-Hib-IPV: diphtheria tetanus 
acellular pertussis-Haemophilus influenzae type b-poliomyelitis. Elena Shneyer, Avshalom Strulov and Yaakov 
Rosenfeld, "Reduced Rate of Side Effects Associated with Separate Administration of MMR and DTaP-Hib-IPV 
Vaccinations" (2009) 11 IMAJ 735-738 
1047 F. E. Mooi, N. A. T. Van Der Maas and H. E. De Melker, "Pertussis resurgence: waning immunity and pathogen 
adaptation – two sides of the same coin" (2014) 142:4 Epidemiology and Infection 685-694 
1048 Eve Dubé, Caroline Laberge, Maryse Guay, Paul Bramadat, Réal Roy and Julie Bettinger, "Vaccine hesitancy: 
An overview" (2013) 9:8 Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics 1763–1773 at 1767. See also J Leask, HE Quinn, 
K Macartney, M Trent, P Massey, C Carr et al. “Immunisation attitudes, knowledge and practices of health 
professionals in regional NSW” (2008) 32 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 224-9, 
PMID:18578819; online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-6405.2008.00220.x., T. Jelleyman, A. Ure, “Attitudes to 




What The Association for Information on Vaccines argued in their petition is that because the 
taking of vaccines is a contested issue, there should be freedom of choice whether one takes it or 
not. Indeed, this has so far been the case, where taking vaccines has been a choice. However, that   
freedom to choose is impaired with a law like the one in contention. Owing to the fact that the 
efficacy and safety of vaccines are actively deliberated in the public agenda, the court would do well 
to reconsider whether penalizations attached to the non-administration of a contested practice 
(irrespective of whether the benefits outweigh the risks) is fair to all parties involved.  
 
Second, the court stressed that the amendment called for an increase of NIS 100 in the child 
allowance for the second, third and fourth child at the same time as it called for a decrease of NIS 
100 from those who did not receive the vaccine.1049 Therefore, the court determined that the 
amendment was not a ‘deduction’ but ‘a denial of a benefit’,1050 which meant that it was less likely to 
be considered a violation of the constitutional right to human dignity.  
 
However, there are two problems with the court’s statement.  
 
First, child allowance increases are prompted, since 2006, as a matter of course by the rising 
consumer price index (CPI),1051 which is a measure of the average change over time in the prices 
paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services.1052  The CPI 
measures inflation, and the child allowance increases are a response to rising inflation and a higher 
cost of living.  
 
The fact that child insurance allowances are being paid to enable families to keep up with the rising 
cost of living so that they stay out of poverty makes it difficult to regard such payments as a ‘benefit’ 
as opposed to an essential cash injection.  
 
Second, and most significantly, the child allowance increases were implemented until July 2013. 
Thereafter, and in the framework of the same Arrangements Law that enabled their increase, the 
child allowances were drastically cut.  
                                                          
1049 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 42 
1050 Ibid.  
1051 National Insurance Institute of Israel, Annual Survey 2010, “Chapter 3: Benefits: Activities and Trends – 
Children Insurance” at 4, 7 





Today, the level of child allowances are the lowest they’ve been in the past twenty years.1053 
Nevertheless, the reduction of child allowances owing to non-receipt of the mandatory vaccinations 
is still on the books.  
 
The court’s third premise in reaching their decision was that the access Bedouin enjoyed to the 
well-baby clinics was ‘good enough’. Justice Arbel fully adopted the government’s submission 
regarding clinic accessibility, while it did not adequately consider the accessibility concerns raised 
by the petitioners.1054 Further, the court almost completely ignored reports from leading human 
rights organizations who conducted in-depth studies on services provided by these clinics, and 
which found them to be grossly substandard.1055  
 
So, for example, Israeli Jews from Omer receive 5.18 physician hours per 100 patients compared to 
1.86 in the neighboring unrecognized Bedouin village of Algrain.1056 There are 4 pediatricians who 
receive patients in Omer for 81.5 hours per week, while there were no pediatric services in Algrain 
in spite of the fact that there are more children in Algrain than there are in Omer.1057 Both these 
glaring disparities did not strike the court as problematic or indicative of accessibility issues 
                                                          
1053 National Insurance Institute of Israel, Annual Survey 2013, “Chapter 3: Children Insurance” at 6-9. So, for 
example, as of May 2015, the second, third and fourth child (born in June 2003 and after) in an eligible family is 
paid NIS 188 per month, whereas after the said increase by April 2012 they were paid NIS 259 per month. See 
National Insurance Institute (NII), “Child allowance rates” (undated), online: 
https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/AnnualSurvey/2013/Documents/Chapter%203_Children.
pdf, National Insurance Institute of Israel, Annual Survey 2010, “Chapter 3: Benefits: Activities and Trends – 
Children Insurance” at 1 
1054 See Adalah, Summary Petition for an Order Nisi, Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 (December 
6, 2010) at paras. 66-69. 
1055 See, for example, the reports of Physicians for Human Rights, Discrimination in Access to Health, Position 
Paper (November 23 2011), Israel’s Step Children: About the lack of pediatrics in the Unrecognized Villages in the 
Negev and its Ramifications Step Kids, Position Paper (November 2008), I am Here: Gender and the Right to Health 
in the Unrecognized Villages of the Negev (April 2008), The Bare Minimum - Health Services in the Unrecognized 
Villages in the Negev (2009) 
1056 Physicians for Human Rights, Israel’s Step Children: About the lack of pediatrics in the Unrecognized Villages 
in the Negev and its Ramifications Step Kids, Position Paper (November 2008) at 2, 21 
1057 Ibid. at 21 
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requiring remedy.1058 Somehow, in the court’s view, these substandard services were ‘good enough 
for Bedouin’.1059  
 
Performing Biopolitics 
The Foucauldian notion of biopolitics is a particularly helpful lens through which to understand the 
motivations and implications of the court’s decision.  
 
The court’s decision is directed towards modifying the biological destiny of the population via 
vaccinations, and exerts disciplinary power (the amendment’s provision to penalize non-
administration, the court’s decision that gave the amendment the additional force of law, the more 
nuanced coaxing by health professionals) towards that end.1060  
 
As Foucault argues about medicalization, of which the administration and discipline around 
vaccinations are only a small part, disease was seen as an economic problem for social collectives to 
be resolved as a matter of policy.1061 The rationale, Marxist in essence, was that the less healthy an 
individual was, the less able he would be to partake as labour in capitalist production.  
 
In particular, Foucault saw vaccinations of children as intrinsic to the project of creating the 
economic and physical conditions to ensure the child’s survival and development to adulthood 
towards the telos of ‘being useful’ within that production schema.1062  
 
What made the issue of vaccinations successful as a social policy, however, was that it was policed, 
which is to say that an ensemble of apparatuses, regulations, institutions, and indeed vaccination’s 
                                                          
1058 So, for example, Justice Barak-Erez states that should vaccination services to the Bedouin not be reasonably 
adequate, then the court would be ready to hear the case challenging the implantation of the law on these grounds, 
see Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para 59 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring). See Justice Hayut 
concurring, Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para 8 (Hayut, E., concurring). 
1059 The fact that health services for the Bedouin are so sparse, yet that this is nevertheless acceptable to the court, 
echoes with the Abu Musa’ed decision, when it ruled that the Bedouin have a right to 'minimum access to water' on 
the basis of having a 'human right to minimal existence in dignity'. Abu Musa'ed v. Water Commissioner, CA 
9535/06. 
1060 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 (1d) (Arnold I. 
Davidson Francois Ewald, Michel Senellart (eds.), Graham Burchell (trans.)) (Palgrave, Macmillan: 2007) at 10. For 
more on biopolitics, see the chapters on Atir and Umm al-Hiran and the Wine Path Plan.  
1061 Michel Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper) 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 166 
1062 Ibid. at 172 
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subjects themselves, contributed to order, enrichment and health, making the social milieu one of 
physical well-being.1063  The force of the moral responsibility to vaccinate, inculcated in parents, 
helped the family from the eighteenth century to “become the most constant agent of 
medicalization”.1064  
 
Seen in this way, the court’s decision is one that aligns neatly with medicalization’s own goal, which 
is to build the nation as a healthy social body, and to have the nation’s subjects perform within the 
bounds of the law that accommodate for that goal. That the nation’s subjects do perform to that 
standard is evident in how the women from Bir al-Mashash were convinced of vaccination’s 
intrinsic good, and how the petitioner Adalah argued for the same.1065  
 
A second motivation for the decision, and one that Judge Arbel admits, is that the case is one 
concerning nation-building at its core,1066 and cites the state’s intervention towards women 
delivering babies in the hospital and not at home as another instance of the same.1067  
 
Barak-Erez opines that the goal of the amendment is to build a healthy social body. This goal is 
indicative of the state promoting human dignity1068 and looking out for the children in Israel.1069 
Yet, the fact that Bedouin children suffer from poor health1070 and are deliberately denied basic 
living amenities by the state, does not strike Justice Barak-Erez as contradictory to her claim that 
the case is “evidence of the state’s commitment to the welfare of the children in Israel”.1071  
 
The policy goal of moving the Bedouin out from their historical lands in the unrecognized villages 
and into the development townships, while concurrently having them secede land claims, is a 
biopolitical goal central to the building of the Israeli nation-state. This policy goal is a recurring 
theme in all the land-centered cases we’ve studied so far, and as we see, resurfaces in a case not 
explicitly about land, but about vaccinations and health care.  
                                                          
1063 Ibid. at 170 
1064 Ibid. at 173 
1065 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 28 
1066 Ibid. at para. 26-27 
1067 Ibid. at para. 60 
1068 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 36 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring). 
1069 Ibid. at para. 69 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring). 
1070 Physicians for Human Rights, Israel’s Step Children: About the lack of pediatrics in the Unrecognized Villages 
in the Negev and its Ramifications Step Kids, Position Paper (November 2008) 




The reason that grossly substandard health services in the unrecognized villages is not a source of 
concern for the court is because these spaces of residence, as we saw clearly in the Umm al-Hieran 
evictions case, are not seen as legitimate spaces. Rather, they are spaces of colonial governmentality 
where systems of modernization and correction can be acted upon Bedouin bodies. And if those 
Bedouin bodies are non-conformant, either in their insistence not to move to development 
townships, or receive vaccinations, they are either forcibly evicted (as is immanent to Umm al-
Hieran) or immediately designated as irresponsible and acting contrary to the best interests of their 
family or larger society.1072  
 
It therefore becomes acceptable to condition the quality of health service delivery, and 
consequently the payment of child allowance, on whether the Bedouin are conformant to the state’s 
goal of determining where is acceptable for them to live, in forms that do not pose a threat to the 
state’s exercise of absolute sovereignty over the land within its borders.  
 
I would like us to take notice of how vaccinations’ subjects’ performativity is what makes the 
biopolitical project such a successful one. Performativity, according to Judith Butler, should be 
understood more as a ‘doing’, rather than a ‘being’, one where “gender is the repeated stylization of 
the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to 
produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being”.1073  
 
The women’s convictions around vaccination appears to me to be a gendered expression of a health 
choice. The belief in vaccinations is not a characteristic essential to the nature of the women of Bir 
al-Mashash, but rather an outcome of the particular assemblage that they are embedded within, the 
regulatory frameworks of medicalization, state policy towards Naqab Bedouin, and what it means 
‘to be a good mother’.  
 
These forces (in relational networks of constant realignment and fluctuation) dictate ways of doing 
gender through already-scripted acts, from the explicit acts of walking several kilometres and 
                                                          
1072 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para 63. This latter phenomenon whereby certain bodies are 
marked outside the respectable, healthy community is another marker of nation-building, allowing a consolidation of 
meaning around who makes the nation and who threatens it.  
1073 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990; 
Anniversary edition 1999) at 33 
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utilizing multiple means of transport in order to vaccinate their child, to the more affect-based 
performativity of guilt, when they fail to live up to the ideal of what a mother should be.  
 
Here I think also of Umm Faris and her recalling of the guilt and remorse she felt as a result of her 
child being burned while she was cooking for the family, something that was no doubt reinforced 
when social workers soon thereafter appeared at her doorstep to question whether she satisfied 
the responsibility standard that mothers ought to live up to (irrespective of life circumstances).  
 
At the risk of sounding overly deterministic, one could say that one reason mothers want to 
vaccinate is because that’s the responsible thing to do; mothers in Bir al-Mashash are pro-
vaccination because that’s what makes them ‘good mothers’.  
 
The case is performativity exemplified, and as discussed above, the women are exercising a 
‘choiceless choice’. That is, although they appear to be making a choice to vaccinate, the law, 
poverty and pervasive gender norms are the forces that constrain their choices. They are forced to 
choose vaccinations without being able to determine freely if that is indeed what they would like to 
do. 
 
However, Butler identified the possibilities implicit to the situation. That is, because gender is a 
construct, implicit to that construction is the possibility of its undoing. As Butler writes, 
“Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency.”1074 I will discuss more 
on the subversive possibilities in the Naqab below, in the concluding chapter on agency and 
recognition.1075  
                                                          
1074 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990; 
Anniversary edition 1999) at 147 
1075 It is worth noting that Elizabeth Povinelli, who I referenced above in relation to ‘alternative social projects’ as 
being the deviations from constructed, performative norms of being, proposes a refreshing take on how we can 
understand performativity through the lens of ‘obligation’. Obligation is, in one sense, a liminal space, not always 
enunciated or known. Obligation is that space that could be considered “a no man’s land between choice and 
determination”. Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment, supra note 943 at 33. To say that one is obliged by 
something does not imply that one is also determined by it. Rather, it “is a much richer form of relationality, a 
continual nurturing, or caring for, bindings that are often initially very delicate spaces of connectivity”. So, while 
one may be able to enunciate why one is drawn to a particular space to attend to a particular obligation or to sever it, 
there is very little that can be described as ‘choice’ in this orientation. Kim Turcot DiFruscia, “Shapes of Freedom: 
An Interview with Elizabeth A. Povinelli” (2010) 7:1 Altérités 88-98 at 93-94. This would be a worthwhile inquiry, 





Social Goals for Land and Life 
As Justice Barak-Erez herself writes, the goal of child allowance payments has always been social.  
 
In the early years of the state, when the state was keen to increase the birth rate in Israel, Ben-
Gurion introduced a monetary prize for those families with ten children or more.1076 Later, child 
allowances were legislated in part as a response to poverty (and social unrest) among recent 
Mizrahim (Jews of Middle Eastern origin) immigrants. There were also special child allowances 
made to those families where a member had served in the Israeli army, to ultra-orthodox families 
and new Jewish Israeli immigrants.1077  
 
Therefore, the social goals whose realization was sought through child allowance payments were 
concerned with two factors primarily, demography and immigrant absorption. Yet, demography 
and immigrant absorption are precisely the goals that inform the state’s land and housing policy.1078  
 
You will recall how in the Wine Path Plan chapter we identified the objective of Jewish settlement 
as an element of ‘national development', an objective enforced by raising the principle of 'national 
security' to the level of fundamental principle. Further, as discussed in the crop-spraying case, the 
motivation behind the spraying of herbicide on several thousand dunams of Bedouin agricultural 
land was to facilitate the state-building goals to secure land and assist in the settlement of new 
Israeli Jewish immigrants in the Naqab.  
 
The social goals, in this case and in the Wine Path Plan and Abu Mdeghem cases, therefore are 
specifically Zionist social goals. They are goals that are drawn up with the purpose of benefiting the 
majority Jewish Israeli population alone, they are informed by the phenomenon of nation-building, 
and they secure the ability of the state to remain sovereign in Jewish terms. 
 
The rather troubling implication of this case, however, is the slippery slope it sets us on. If access to 
health care for Bedouin is not set at a minimum standard concordant with international human 
                                                          
1076 Adalah v. Ministry of Social Affairs, HCJ 7245/10 at para. 7 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring). 
1077 Ibid. at para. 7-10 (Barak-Erez, D., concurring). 
1078 Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Land Expropriation in Israel: Law, Culture, and Society (Hampshire, 
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) at 82-83. I’ve discussed this at length in The Efficacy of the Israeli 
Legal System in Protecting and Fulfilling Naqab Bedouin Land Rights, LLM Thesis (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, 2009). 
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rights law standards, then what are the implications for conditioning other rights on social goals? 
What other aspects of social health would seem threatening to the state that it would warrant an 
intervention harmful to the dignity or autonomy of vulnerable population groups, such as the 
Naqab Bedouin? Indeed, in the initial formulation of the amendment, later excised, Bedouin 
children would not have been allowed to enroll in school if they did not receive the mandatory 
vaccinations.  
 
As discussed in the Wine Path Plan case, with national security raised to the level of fundamental 
principle in adjudication, there is no basic minimum guarantee for Palestinians to liberty as license 
(freedom from legal constraint to do what one wishes) nor to liberty as independence (being 
treated as someone that is independent and equal rather than being treated as someone 
subservient or in a manner insulting to one’s dignity). Consequently, the threat of the downward 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Recognition  
 
After the inter-stellar journey over the past five chapters, we’ve arrived at our North Star, Polaris. I 
would like to conclude this dissertation with a reflection on recognition, specifically iterations of 
the Hegelian dialectic, to imagine ways forward and trajectories out of the impasse for Naqab 
Bedouin in their interaction with the Israeli legal system, but more generally as political person 
‘others’ in a settler colonial state.  
 
I suppose you could say that this dissertation was born during my volunteer work for Palestinian 
human rights NGOs in Israel, well over a decade ago.  It was born in my personal recognition for 
what was suffering at possibly its most acute among Palestinians in Israel. Recognition was for 
contours of human suffering that I apprehended as running deeper and along edges more jagged, 
specifically for a particular identity of people, non-Jewish, Arab, Palestinian citizens of Israel from 
the Naqab region in southern Israel.   
 
In truth, I gravitated towards ‘Naqab Bedouin’ as a subject of study as I saw reflections of myself in 
the community and in the desert-environment they lived, analgous to the environment of my birth 
and childhood. Over time, I came to appreciate how recognition happens on a few registers. 
Palestinians from the Naqab sought recognition for their particular identity and lifeways. They 
sought legal recognition for their living spaces. And they sought these things from the Israeli state, 
the sovereign.  
 
Why did they seek recognition at this address? This is because they were seeking rights primarily 
as ‘citizen subjects’. In order to be bestowed such rights, those with the power to accord it (the 
sovereign over these citizen subjects), ought to recognize them in particular ways – as citizen-
subject/minority persons/moral persons and so forth. But the struggle for recognition from the 
sovereign is fraught, particularly in settler colonial situations like this one. Phenomenology tells us 
that we come into being by how we are recognized (at the same time that we make the world in 
dialectic relation). Fanon has shown us how in colonial situations, phenomenology operates 
through a historico-racial schema so that in the encounter with whiteness, the black body 
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constructs a self-image that is deficient. As a result, she is unable to make the world as a full 
sovereign.1079 
 
Recognition for the wretched of the earth, those seeking social justice, those seen as and seeing 
themselves as minority, black, subaltern, Arab, LGBTI, Muslim or any other formula of non-
normative pivots around a particular identity for which autonomy or freedom is sought.  
 
I called upon Hegel and his treatment of the dialectic of recognition because it spoke of all these 
things. Hegel’s dialectic speaks to identity, to conflict between competing identities and the 
resolution thereof, to self-recognition, to the possibilities of mutual recognition, and crucially, that 
which is often overlooked, the realization of Absolute Spirit. I find Hegel useful because it is the 
general abstraction that assists in interpreting the complex social relations that undergird this 
project.  
 
That said, there is no one way to read Hegel.1080 As Butler has shown in Subjects of Desire,1081 
readings of Hegel are contingent, as is the process of reading itself.1082 As Theodor Adorno has 
admitted, “[i]n the realm of great philosophy Hegel is no doubt the only one with whom at times 
one literally does not know, and cannot conclusively determine, what is being talked about.”1083 
 
Andrew Cole puts forth a particular reading of Hegel’s dialectic, underscoring the temporal 
sensitivity required to better determine the original intent of the author. Cole’s main thesis is that 
Hegel’s writings were composed in the medieval ages, and it was the feudalistic relations of that 
time that informed his writings.1084 Cole contends that what is missing from other scholars who’ve 
been influential in elaborating on the dialectic, such as Kojeve, is that they ignored the issue of 
                                                          
1079 Nasser Rego, “Reading Fanon in Palestine/Israel” Jadaliyya (April 9 2012), online: 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4972/reading-fanon-in-palestine-israel, Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963) 
1080Paul Redding, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/hegel/. 
1081 Where Butler looks at how Hegel was appropriated by Hyppolite, Kojeve, Foucault, Sartre, Lacan and Deleuze. 
Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987) 
1082 Sara Salih (ed.), Judith Butler (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) at 33 
1083 Theodor W. Adorno, “Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel” in Hegel:Three Studies (trans. Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993) at 89, cited in Andrew Cole, “What Hegel’s Master/Slave 
Dialectic Really Means” (2004) 34:3 Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 577-610 at 577 [Cole, “What 
Hegel’s Dialectic Means”] 
1084 Cole, “What Hegel’s Dialectic Means”, ibid. at 577 
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possession, and probably focused too much on the fight to the death instead. Accordingly, they 
mistranslated ‘lord’ and ‘bondsman’ as ‘master’ and ‘slave’, thereby eliding this focus on 
possession.1085 The struggle for recognition under this formula therefore becomes a struggle 
between ‘ownership’ of land by the lord and its ‘effective possession’ by the serf or bondsman. The 
bondsman’s self-consciousness therefore comes about through labour and in the late Middle Ages 
allowed him to break his servile bonds and himself become a landholder.1086 Alienation comes 
about because the product of the bondsman’s labour is not directed towards life-affirming ends, 
rather it is absorbed by the protocapitalist forces.1087 The dialectic’s resolution or its aufheben 
moment happens when we see how ‘possession’, which gave rise to feudal society was also that 
which led to its undoing as it gave rise to a revolutionary self-consciousness in the serf.1088 
 
It is hard to ignore the parallel between this reading of the dialectic and the Naqab Bedouin 
community’s own dialectic with the Israeli state over the issue of land. The state claims to be owner 
of the land that Bedouin ‘effectively possess’ and have lived on for centuries and it is this battle that 
is staged between the state and the Bedouin. It is the battle for recognition of the propertied self. 
This specifically Marxist reading, that stresses that Hegel was talking more about ‘land’ than he was 
talking about ‘life’ as usually understood,1089 finds echoes in the work of legal scholar, Brenna 
Bhandar.  
 
According to Bhandar, the subject of recognition is “thoroughly imbricated with relations of 
appropriation and ownership”.1090 Drawing on Fanon, she stresses that in the colonial context, there 
was no possibility for mutual recognition as the native was dispossessed and alienated.1091 In order 
to be recognized as a proper political subject in a settler colonial situation, one had to be in 
possession of property. Accordingly, recognition was about recognition of the propertied self, a 
                                                          
1085 Ibid. at 580-581 
1086 Ibid. at 584 
1087 Ibid. at 585 
1088 Ibid. at 590-591 
1089 Ibid. at 593 
1090 Brenna Bhandar, “Plasticity and Post-Colonial Recognition: ‘Owning, Knowing and Being’” (2011) 22 Law 
Critique 227–249 at 228. See also Brenna Bhandar, “Re-covering the limits of recognition: The politics of 
difference and decolonisation in John Borrows’ Recovering Canada: The resurgence of Indigenous Law” (2007) 
27:1 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 125-151 
1091 Brenna Bhandar, ibid. at 227-228 
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privilege restricted to those who were white and male since those were the qualities, when 
possessed in the requisite degrees, that determined whether one could own property or not.1092  
 
Bhandar incorporates the concept of plasticity, as espoused by philosopher Catherine Malabou, to 
show the deconstructive potential immanent to a situation, such as the potentiality of the body to 
destabilize typical forms of recognition in a settler-colonial situation.1093 Bhandar illustrates how 
Palestinians from the refugee camp of Dheisheh are undermining recognition of the propertied self 
through the construction of a bridge, illegal under the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, 
between their camp and the newer, built up area of ‘Doha City’ in the West Bank. By engaging in 
such building practices, Dheishens are imaging and creating something extraterritorial, escaping 
the control of the old logic of state sovereignty.1094 
 
While I subscribe to both Cole’s and Bhandar’s reading of recognition as recognition of the 
propertied self, I subsume such a reading within a ‘revised metaphysical’ reading of Hegel. It is 
‘revised metaphysical’ because it is not exclusively material and it incorporates an idealist 
sensitivity. At the same time, my reading is not idealist in that it subscribes to classical teleogical 
spirit monism central to Taylor’s interpretation1095 (which would say that ‘immaterial minds’, 
whether God’s or human’s were the real entities to which material things could be reduced to)1096 
or that of English idealist, FH Bradley.1097  
 
By ‘revised metaphysical’ it is opposed to traditional metaphysical in that it attempts at an 
understanding of reality and subjects through the mind/reasoning, at the same time that it 
acknowledges the limits of the mind. It is idealist in the Aristotilean, neo-Platonic sense, in that 
thoughts of a divine mind are immanent to matter, where matter and mind are attributes of the one 
substance.1098  
                                                          
1092 Ibid. at 228-229 
1093 Ibid. at 231, 233, drawing on Catherine Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, 
Deconstruction, (trans. Carolyn Shread) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) 
1094 Brenna Bhandar, ibid. at 247-248 
1095Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 
1096 Paul Redding, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/hegel/ 
1097 Who defines the Absolute as follows, “the Absolute is one system, and ... its contents are nothing but sentient 
experience. It will hence be a single and all-inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord. 
For it cannot be less than appearance, and hence no feeling or thought, of any kind, can fall outside its limits”. See 
Francis Herbert Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1893).  




The forms and modalities of recognition in this study 
In the five case studies we explored, we looked at how Israel, as a collection of individuated 
interests given expression in the form a state, is in a dialectic of recognition with the Naqab 
Bedouin community.  
 
In all the legal cases, Bedouin places of residence in the unrecognized villages were concluded to be 
‘illegal’, thereby rendering the residents of such villages as lawbreakers. Bedouin remain 
lawbreakers according to place of residence unless explicitly exculpated from such illegality, as 
happened in the Umm al-Hieran case when the judges chastised the executive for referring to them 
as ‘illegal’ when they were in fact ‘permitted residents’. However, even though they were 
recognized as being ‘permitted residents’ by the courts, this did not preclude the courts’ eviction of 
the community from their place of residence to make way for an Israeli Jewish community.  
 
We also saw how Bedouin were apprehended by the courts and the executive as threatening to 
Jewish sovereignty, particularly on the issue of their claims to land and their current places of 
residence, most notably in the Wine Path Plan, but also in Abu Mdeghem.  
 
Because of the particular modality by which the Israeli state apprehends Bedouin, which we can say 
is ‘dismembered’ as it disavows the Bedouin subject’s historicity, genealogy, affect, diversity, and 
the fact that such a being is always a becoming, Bedouin are not recognized as full moral persons or 
political subjects. It could be said that they therefore come to be recognized in the interstices 
between bare life and politically significant life.1099 Bedouin life, then, “may be apprehended as 
‘living’ but not as ‘life’”.1100  
 
Bedouin recognition, as partial as it may be, is also conditional. Therefore, the courts relay to 
Bedouin how they ought to behave in order to be bestowed ‘official recognition’. However, ‘official 
recognition’ does not necessarily mean that the courts will then begin to see their lives as politically 
significant life. Rather, Bedouin lives somehow become more intelligible and the basic elements 
that sustain life become more available, be they water, shelter or electricity. Therefore, the courts 
condition a higher grade of ‘recognition’ upon Bedouin moving to development towns, to their 
                                                          
1099 Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra note 493 
1100 Butler, Frames of War, supra note 93 at 7-8 
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‘integration’ into Israeli society, to their forfeiting of historical land claims, and possibly towards a 
greater identity affiliation as ‘Israeli’ rather than ‘Palestinian’.  
 
In the struggle for recognition, it is not uncommon to see Bedouin appeal to these conditions. We 
see evidence for this in court proceedings where Bedouin petitioners and their legal 
representatives appeal to the Goldberg Commission’s recommendations for the resettlement of the 
community or in the way individual Bedouin such as Nuri are significantly invested in relationships 
with Israeli individuals, institutions and even solidarity struggles that are specifically ‘Israeli’.1101 In 
this way, Bedouin hold on to the hope that if they speak a particular language that it may be caught 
by the right ears and resonate loudly enough that it will result in some truncated form of 
recognition.1102  
 
In seeking such a form of recognition, the community risks not seeing the full extent of what Israel 
is asking. The state is not only saying do such and such so we can recognize you in a particular way, 
but recently has been calling for Palestinians generally to recognize Israel in a particular way. The 
insistence of Israel seeking recognition from Palestinian citizens as ‘a Jewish state’ is a very strange 
ask.1103 In essence, it is telling Palestinian citizens, ‘do not see yourself in the state that is meant to 
represent your interests and accord you rights’. The state, then, is asking for the Palestinian’s self-
negation through this form of recognition.  
 
And yet, what was inspiring about my encounter with the women of Bir al-Mashash was how they 
exhibited the bondsman’s consciousness in Hegel’s dialectic. On numerous occasions, they spoke of 
a shared humanity with Israelis, reflecting a self-consciousness becoming aware of another self-
consciousness and through the process becoming certain of its pure being-for-self. 
 
 
                                                          
1101 As evidenced in Nuri’s considerable investment in the Israeli social justice protests of 2011, also dubbed as the 
“cottage cheese protests”. Nuri’s investment involved camping overnight with Israelis on Ben-Gurion street in 
Beersheba to handing out protest flyers at supermarkets, among many other solidarity acts. For more on the 2011 
social justice protests, and why these were particularly ‘Israeli’ and also steered by state-loyalist discourses, see Uri 
Gordon, “Israel's ‘Tent Protests’: The Chilling Effect of Nationalism” (2012) 11:3-4 Social Movement Studies 349-
355 
1102 As Butler cautions, while the subject may talk back to the socially constructed authorities, she cannot escape her 
situation of fundamental subjection. Judith Butler, Excitable speech: A politics of the performative (New York: 
Routledge, 1997) at 15 
1103 See the discussion on ‘the pervasiveness of national security’ in the Wine Path Plan chapter for further 
elaboration on this point. Raef Zreik, “Why the Jewish State Now?” (2011) 40:3 Journal of Palestine Studies 23 
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Recognition is the Struggle 
In the struggle for recognition, numerous authors warn of the shortcomings of state-minority 
recognition. So, for example, Dean Spade has shown that following state recognition of racialized 
and queer identities, how administrative governance nevertheless results in the reduced life-
chances of those recognized as non-normative.1104 In Frames of War, Butler cautions how in war 
situations, certain lives come to be seen as grievable when lost, while others not as much. This is 
because states render certain lives recognizable as ‘life’ and others as ‘living’. Thus recognized, 
when ‘living’ subjects (as opposed to subjects of life) are wronged, their precarity cannot be sensed, 
allowing these lives to wither without them being grieved.  
 
In The Cunning of Recognition,1105 Elizabeth Povinelli critiques liberal forms of recognition in 
multicultural societies as a category of rule. She stresses how the law provides for fixed and formal 
standards in recognizing cultures and ‘indigineity’. Therefore, not only is indigenous culture 
compelled to show continuity in its expression to the court and public, and to constantly prove the 
same, there are also certain indigenous practices prohibited by law and by the public’s sense of 
moral decency, being culturally repugnant.1106 Povinelli cautions about such forms of recognition as 
they force subjects to both be and not be themselves in the contradictory discursive and moral 
mandates that they inhabit. 
 
Glen Sean Coulthard tells a personal tale to drive home the lie of recognition (and reconciliation) in 
the Canadian context. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Dene Nation negotiated away rights to their 
indigenous lands in exchange for limited self-government and land claims deals proffered under the 
rubric of ‘recognition’. The land claims process became a form of primitive accumulation, 
something the Dene Nation vociferously opposed only a decade earlier. As a result, although the 
indigenous community were not physically evicted from their lands, they run the very real risk of 
                                                          
1104 See a short discussion of the same in the Wine Path Plan chapter. Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative 
Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (Boston: South End Press, 2012). 
1105 Povinelli, Cunning of Recognition, supra note 14 
1106 Ibid. at 3. This fact underscored the hypocritical nature of such liberal governance. While liberal governance 
claims to adjudicate difference i.e. answer to the needs of minorities on account of public reason, when they come to 
find certain ‘different’ practices by said minorities as repugnant, exceptionalism kicks in, and the different no longer 
has dignity deserving of being adjudicated by reason. See Kim Turcot DiFruscia, “Shapes of Freedom: An Interview 
with Elizabeth A. Povinelli” (2010) 7:1 Altérités 88-98 at 91-92 
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being dispossessed, as those same lands “remain open for exploitation and capitalist 
development”.1107  
 
Alternative Engagements with the Dialectic  
 
I’d now like to look at more philosophical engagements with the Hegelian dialectic. And thereafter 
to address what the recommended shapes that recognition, and its promise of freedom or 
autonomy for the individual, ought to take. 
 
I particularly appreciate the direction in which Indian philosopher, Sri Aurobindo has taken up the 
Hegelian dialectic1108 in the reconstruction of Vedantic thought.1109 So, while Sri Aurobindo applies 
the Hegelian concept of the Absolute as Being and Consciousness (the latter regarded as an intuitive 
and supramental awareness), he develops the concept further by adding a third axis, which is that 
of ānanda, or ‘Supreme Bliss’. Ultimate reality by this formulation is saccidānanda or the Absolute 
as Existence-Knowledge-Bliss.1110  
 
While Sri Aurobindo subscribes to the Hegelian view that the Absolute is a self-positing universal 
consciousness, he pushes against the association of the Absolute with reason or mind; it is, rather, 
‘supramental’ awareness.1111  As opposed to idealists, Sri Aurobindo’s concept of the Absolute is not 
static oneness, but a triple movement of involution-evolution, or separation and return. The self-
unfolding of Spirit is not linear or mechanistic but one animated by evolutionary principles from 
the supramental plane. Also, as opposed to Hegel, involution-evolution is value-centric, grounded in 
ānanda or ‘Supreme Bliss’, and this is “the aesthetic-value principle underlying the cosmos”.1112 
 
                                                          
1107 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014) at 77 
1108 Steve Odin, “Sri Aurobindo and Hegel on the involution-evolution of Absolute Spirit” (1981) 31:2 Philosophy 
East and West 179-191, Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Press, 1973). 
1109 Vedanta is one of the six systems of Indian philosophy. 
1110 Steve Odin, “Sri Aurobindo and Hegel on the involution-evolution of Absolute Spirit” (1981) 31:2 Philosophy 
East and West 179-191 at 180 
1111 Ibid. 
1112 Ibid. at 188 
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Sri Aurobindo shows how the body, vital, mind and supermind are all vehicles for the manifestation 
of Absolute Spirit, in a cosmological process that is free and expressive “as opposed to one 
emanating from privation and necessity”.1113 
 
At the same time, I acknowledge the difficulty one would have squaring  ānanda as the underlying 
principle of the cosmos when we think of the increasing precarity of bodies under constellations of 
multiple modes of power – sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical in the age of the Anthropocene.  
  
Renowned Hegelian philosopher, Houlgate is particularly helpful for readers grappling with Hegel’s 
texts, in particular with the concept of Absolute Spirit. When Hegel refers to ‘God’ or ‘Absolute 
Spirit’ he is certainly not talking about the metaphors or other representations of ‘God the Father’ 
or the ‘Holy Spirit’. Rather, he refers to “existence, actuality or being as such”.1114  
 
Philosophy is the driver that moves us from seeing ‘God’ as image/representation to seeing ‘God’ as 
absolute being and human self-consciousness as one single actuality. When actuality becomes self-
conscious in human beings within a community of reciprocal recognition, this is Absolute Spirit.1115  
 
According to Houlgate’s reading of Hegel, then, how do humans become free and autonomous? 
Since the spectre of war and death persistently hover, and freedom is often construed as a ‘right’ to 
be affirmed by the sovereign, so there will always be limits to freedom’s bestowal and exercise. 
Accordingly, humans become free not through economic or political work, “but through an 
understanding of the absolute character or truth of existence in art, religion and philosophy”.1116 
 
For Judith Butler, seeking to know oneself, as well as to overcome external objects, is the fuel 
behind the Spirit’s journey. What motivates the ‘desire for recognition’ is the desire for self-
consciousness.1117 All the same, the subject can only know itself through recognizing and knowing 
another. In Hegel’s Phenomenology, there are two modes of desiring: desire for Other leading to loss 
                                                          
1113 Ibid. at 189-190 
1114 Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (2d ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005) at 100 
1115 Ibid. 
1116 Ibid. at 210 
1117 Sara Salih (ed.), Judith Butler (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) at 25-26 
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of Self and the desire for self-consciousness (which entails autonomy) which leads to the loss of the 
world.1118 
 
Yet, like other critics of the dialectic that I’ve mentioned above, Butler appreciates how social norms 
define the dialectic of recognition. Therefore, who is recognized and how she is recognized is 
determined by the social conventions, language and norms that frame the encounter with the 
other.1119  
 
All the same, Butler does not understand the subject as ‘subjected’, but as one acting with agency. 
Although a person is shaped by social norms, the subject “participate(s) in the discursive processes 
that define its existence”.1120  
 
Recognition comes about through seeing vulnerability as a condition of our ethical relation to 
another, that is we are all at risk of being infringed and hurt. Further, acknowledging we cannot 
know ourselves completely, allows us to suspend judgement of the other, and this is what enables 
us to experience the other in the first place.1121 For Butler, recognition is not the pursuit of 
consciousness’ self-affirmation, rather it is one of intersubjective agency, something to be 
performed, and something that happens in a community of reciprocal recognition.1122  
 
 
Agency and Fracture 
Yet, what happens when one does not live in a community of reciprocal recognition? For Palestinian 
Bedouin in the Naqab, where the forms of recognition are those symptomatic of a settler colonial 
situation as described above, how does the subject effect agency towards her freedom and 
autonomy?  
 
There were numerous instances in the five case studies where Palestinian Bedouin exhibited 
agency. They do it in the act of sumoud – insisting on a persistent, stubborn presence on their 
historical lands in spite of considerable pushback by the state. This particular modality of agency 
                                                          
1118 Ibid. at 26 
1119 Kathy Dow Magnus, “The Unaccountable Subject: Judith Butler and the Social Conditions of Intersubjective 
Agency” (2006) 21:2 Hypatia 81-103, 99-100 
1120 Ibid. at 101 
1121 Ibid. at 95 
1122 Ibid. at 99-100 
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has echoes in that signalled by Brenna Bhandar with how Palestinians in the Dheisheh camp are 
engaging in extraterritorial practices to undermine the logic of state sovereignty, in spite of the 
logic of state sovereignty (and its attendant practices of disciplinary and biopolitical power).  
 
In the lived space of Umm al-Hieran, we identified a couple of instances of agency. Naqab Bedouin 
of Umm al-Hieran resist via outreach to the public sphere by engaging journalists and researchers 
so that they can tell their stories and through performing ‘checkpoint cheek’, or confronting racism 
at the checkpoint when they encounter it.  
 
With the women of Bir al-Mashash, I noted how subversive speech acts fractured the 
assemblage.1123 Therefore, in the informal gathering, they shared statements such as “The state isn’t 
looking out for us”, “Why is it that when a home or two of an Israeli Jew is destroyed, they turn the 
world upside down?”, “Don’t they tell us to take cover in shelters when the bombs fall, where do we 
take cover? There are no shelters”, “Why are so many millions of dollars being spent daily on the 
war… when the same could have been used to ease the suffering of the poor”?  
 
These statements dispel myths of a state looking out for its citizens and highlight the double 
standard applied when the state deals with Israeli Jews and Palestinians. The codification of the 
promise of citizenship is therefore undone in informal conversation. 
 
In all these acts, we note the subversion of recognition as is particularly taken up in the materialist 
sense in settler-colonial situations. Naqab Bedouin are effectively saying, “This is not a community 
of reciprocity, so I do not expect recognition for our lifeways and for our lands to come from you, 
the sovereign”.  
 
This stands in stark contrast to the community’s formal, institutionalized approach to recognition, 
where the community seeks to be recognized by the state and to be absorbed into some sort of 
liberal form of recognition as a minority community in the Jewish state. We saw this, for example, in 
the setting up of the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV), the most prominent of 
Bedouin NGOs, whose raison d'être was government recognition for four dozen Bedouin villages. 
And we see it in community participation in the state-sanctioned Goldberg Commission ‘seeking to 
                                                          
1123 Judith Butler, Excitable speech: A politics of the performative (New York: Routledge, 1997) 
285  
 
regulate Bedouin settlement’ and in the everyday practices by leading NGOs campaigning for 
recognition.1124  
 
The use of the court very much falls in line with the more acceptable forms of agency. Conditioning 
the citizen-state encounter in the court, as in other state-sanctioned participatory forums, is a first-
step conditional in order to be recognized as a political person in the settler colony.  
 
What is particularly interesting, however, particularly in the agency exhibited by the women of Bir 
al-Mashash, is the affective turn. Affective praxis has the potentiality imminent to its production to 
fracture the assemblage.  
 
On Affect1125  
 
Affect exists in the interstices of the intimate, it is obtuse and fleeting. As Roland Barthes has put it, 
while the material and symbolic are both signifiers, ‘the third meaning’, which we can take to mean 
‘affect’, is significance. It is of consideration, but it does not conclusively signify any one thing.1126 
They pick up texture as they move through bodies, dreams and lifeways.1127  
 
Although affect is commonly taken to be ‘emotion’, the two pertain to different orders. Affect is 
different from emotion since emotion is subjective, recognizable, knowable, defined, unlike 
affect.1128 The spark of affect can spring up in the encounter with another being, an object, in a 
                                                          
1124 See, for example, the “I Am Invisible – Because You Refuse to See Me” campaign by Adalah: The Legal Center 
for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, online: https://www.facebook.com/invisiblebecauseyourefuse/ and the “Please 
Recognize” newsletter column by Dukium – The Negev Coexistence Forum, see for example, the May 2011 issue. 
1125 I quote Kathleen Stewart at length here for her description of how the everyday is replete with affect, “Ordinary 
affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual 
motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences.  They're things that happen. They happen in impulses, 
sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of 
persuasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, and agency, and in publics and social 
worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something that feels like something… they pick up density and texture as 
they move through bodies, dreams, dramas, and social worldings of all kinds… At once abstract and concrete, 
ordinary affects are more directly compelling than ideologies, as well as more fractious, multiplicitous, and 
unpredictable than symbolic meanings”. Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2007) at 1-3. 
1126 Roland Barthes, "The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills," in The Responsibility of 
Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art, and Representation (trans. Richard Howard) (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985) at 318, cited in Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2007) at 3 
1127 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007) at 3 
1128 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect” (1995) 31 Cultural Critique 83-109 at 88 
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particular situation, with one self and in the everyday. And crucially, it also contains the recipe of its 
own unmaking.  
 
It wouldn’t be accurate to say that affect exists within a person. It isn’t just about the fact that I feel 
a certain something about a certain something. Rather, affect is potential, because as Sara Ahmed 
reminds us, it is circulatory and mobile. In that erratic and unstable movement between the 
material, symbolic, and the embodied, it has the potential to disrupt and break. In that movement, 
affects construct persons and bind bodies, reminding us that we are not fully autological authors – 
we do not alone make ourselves, nor can we easily speak of an essence that we possess, rather we 
are effects of effects and affect and its movement remind us of that.1129 
 
The subversive speech acts of the women of Bir al-Mashash were a product of something that 
emanated in the space between the content (so, when the state promises to cater to citizens and 
when the state drops bombs in a tit for tat with Gazan ‘bottle rockets’) and the effect (the home 
demolitions that the community experiences and the reverberations of the earth and there being no 
shelter to run to). The something that emanates in that interstitial space between content and effect 
is the fleeting, and circulating, sense of being hoodwinked and of not being seen as fully human, 
even though clearly, they are.  
 
By attuning ourselves to such affective currents, we can trace the potentiality for the undoing of the 
assemblage. So, if recognition is fleeting for Naqab Bedouin in the state-citizen dialectic, why does 
the desire for it persist?   
 
As Lauren Berlant has shown, affect also clues us into why we desire recognition. In Cruel Optimism, 
Berlant outlines why the desire (for recognition, for love) is a cluster of promises we want someone 
to make possible for us. Our attachment, however, to this object of desire is incoherent because it 
doesn’t guarantee us that which we seek, and often fails to do so.1130  
 
Nevertheless, there is something intrinsic to its promise that keeps us seeking it out. In this sense, 
Naqab Bedouin’s desire for recognition from the state is also a form of ‘cruel optimism’. It is 
attachment to that which is not yet lost. It gives the Naqab Bedouin subject a sort of continuity of 
                                                          
1129 Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies” (2004) 22:2 Social Text 117-139 
1130 Lauren Berlant, “Cruel Optimism” (2006) 17:3 differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies at 20 
287  
 
what it means to ‘keep living on and to look forward to being in the world’. All the same, the ‘cruel’ 
rears its head when we realise that the object of desire contributes to one’s attrition where thriving 
is meant to occur.1131 In this way, by tuning into affect, we can also see what makes the assemblage, 
and ‘the struggle for recognition’, so stable.  
 
By way of conclusion to this dissertation, can we imagine a way forward for Naqab Bedouin in their 
dialectic with recognition? Is there something that would better help them realize thriving over 
merely surviving? 
 
Assuming we give Houlgate’s caution weight, that full freedom and autonomy of the Self through 
recognition can never be achieved in a situation like the one that Naqab Bedouins find themselves 
in – one of war, pervasive security and no minimum guarantees of liberty as license or liberty as 
independence – can they ever be fully free? And how would that look like within (or without) the 
dialectic of recognition? 
 
“There are no Bedouin but at most people who engage in Bedu-ing among other activities”1132 
 
One of the things that struck me the most in over a decade of fieldwork and interaction was how 
contingent identity was when working with the community. At times, community members 
identified as Muslim, at times Palestinian, on a few occasions as Israeli, even others as Arab, and 
certainly there were those that self-identified as ‘Bedouin’.  
 
It was striking because although I acknowledged that identity was a construct, very much like race, 
I nevertheless continued to recognize the community under that label. Even though I was told 
repeatedly by community members, even if implicitly so, that I ought not to take this for granted.  
 
A famous lawyer from the community once guffawed when I asked him if his family was from the 
Tiyaha or Tarabin Bedouin tribes of the Naqab. He clarified to me after, “Yes, Tiyaha if you must 
know. But we stopped being ‘Bedouin’ a long time ago”. By this he meant that the primary qualifier 
for that identity was being ‘a desert dweller’ engaged in nomadic or semi-nomadic temporal 
                                                          
1131 Ibid. at 21  
1132 An iteration of “there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities”, from 




movements. Certainly, as a well-travelled lawyer who had received his Masters degree in Law from 
an American University, he wanted to make sure I knew that he was no such ‘Bedouin’.  
 
I also picked up on this among the women in Bir al-Mashash. In the interviews, there was a great 
deal of not knowing and no firm conviction that ‘this’ is who I am. Indeed, being from the Abu Skeik 
family, they don’t consider themselves ‘Bedouin’ because the Abu Skeik family are among the ‘falah’ 
(peasant, agricultural labour) class that settled in the Naqab and were therefore distinguished from 
the majority nomadic tribes that lived in the Naqab.  
 
When I met Sa’eed al-‘Oqbi, a prominent shari’ah court judge, and Nuri’s younger brother, the thing 
that haunted me most about him, months after I left his dwelling in the unrecognized village of  
Khirbet al-Hura, was the melancholy that stubbornly tagged itself to his skin. Still, Sa’eed didn’t 
seem particularly eager to throw it off. Nuri, on his own volition, later told me Sa’eed’s story. Sa’eed 
had lost his daughter when she was still very young because of a car accident. She was one among 
fifteen extended family members that had died because their village was ‘unrecognized’ and so 
lacked proper roads, walkways, and paved turn-offs from the highway.  
 
It didn’t strike me as obvious that Sa’eed would want to be recognized (by anybody) as a Bedouin or 
a judge, more than he would as a father who was still mourning his daughter. I am trying to lay the 
groundwork for an ethical relation to the dialectic that is also authentic to the very particular 
narratives of intimate realms; and one that doesn’t assume that in a study such as this one we ought 
to capitulate to the grand narrative of Israel versus Palestine.1133  
 
For Judith Butler, it is because the moral subject is embedded in so many social structures that she 
cannot definitively say ‘this is who I am’. The moral subject is one that acknowledges that she 
cannot fully know herself. Such a moral subject that is able to acknowledge her own shortcomings 
and fallibility is also one to accept the shortcomings of others.1134  
 
                                                          
1133 Even though, in many ways, it is about that grand narrative. However, I am seeking some sort of opening out of 
the impasse and towards freedom and autonomy of a self imbricated in multiple entanglements of recognition. 
Accordingly, a strictly materialist reading of recognition as my point of focus will not suffice.  
1134 Kathy Dow Magnus, “The Unaccountable Subject: Judith Butler and the Social Conditions of Intersubjective 
Agency” (2006) 21:2 Hypatia 81-103 at 93 
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In Parting Ways, Butler attempts to critique Zionism as colonial subjugation from within the Jewish 
tradition, drawing on Levinas, Arendt, Benjamin and others and then effecting a break from such an 
identitarian discourse in order to account for living in a world of social plurality.1135 Butler explains 
that ethical relationality, which we can appreciate as what ought to occur in the dialectic of 
recognition, is about displacing the self and opening to some demand that emanates from another. 
Alterity as the condition for such relationality is key to this displacement.1136  
 
Accordingly, ethical relationality, or ethics for short, is about contesting sovereign notions of the 
subject and self-identity. Ethics therefore becomes about clearing a space for that which is ‘not-me’. 
In her own words, ethics is “a way of being comported beyond oneself, a way of being dispossessed 
from sovereignty and nation in response to the claims made by those one does not fully know and 
did not fully choose”.1137  
 
Butler draws our attention to how Levinas himself insisted that we are bound by those who we do 
not know or choose, in a precontractual obligation. At the same time, it was also Levinas who said 
that the ‘Palestinian had no face’, and Levinas’ ethical obligation could only extend to those like him 
who were bound to Judeo-Christian and classical Greek origins. Butler responds by saying that we 
are obligated to extend that principle to Palestinians precisely because Levinas could not.1138  
 
While Butler is proposing an ethical relation for the Jew towards the non-Jew in Israel/Palestine, 
the anti-identitarian current is instructive for Naqab Bedouin also seeking freedom and autonomy 
through the dialectic of recognition.  
 
Although I stated at the start of this section that what the wretched of the earth seek is freedom and 
autonomy for a particular identity, full freedom and identity does not come about without the 
requisite displacement of identity that Butler and Levinas speak about. In the movement towards 
Absolute Spirit, it is only when the bondsman confronts his own nothingness, does his 
consciousness understand that his essence lies in being nothing in particular. This being nothing 
“affords him a profound sense of freedom by allowing him to uncouple his identity from the 
                                                          
1135 Butler, Parting Ways, supra note 17 at 9 
1136 Ibid. at 5-7 
1137 Ibid. at 9 
1138 Ibid. at 23 
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particular labor he undertakes.”1139 True being in and for itself, towards the realization of Absolute 
Spirit, is therefore necessarily anti-identitarian.    
 
So, does a Naqab Bedouin person finally become free when they cease identifying as ‘Bedouin’?   
To be clear, I am not suggesting that people in the community no longer identify as ‘Bedouin’ or any 
such identifier. Indeed, it would be very difficult to be ‘of this world’ and engage in the social 
projects that one is embedded in, without an identity per se. What I am suggesting, however, is that 
a space is created within this self-identity that is ‘nomadic’; not in the sense of desert dweller 
moving hither and thither, but rather in the sense deployed by Deleuze and Guattari – one that is 
not repose in identity, but one that rides difference.1140     
 
                                                          
1139 Stephen Houlgate, “G. W. F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit” in Robert Solomon and David Sherman 
(eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) at 24 
1140 As Brian Massumi explains ‘nomad thought’, “it does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it 
moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on identity; it rides difference”. Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (trans. Brian Massumi) (Minneapolis, London: 
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